Addison Cameron-Huff, Cryptocurrency Lawyer

John (Joannes) Stobaeus was the author of a collection of quotes from hundreds of ancient philosophers and writers. His book is now the only extant source for the quotes. Unfortunately, the book itself is not available in English. The best I could find was a Latin/Greek book from the early 1800s digitized by Google. Googling around for this book, all I could find was people complaining there's no version of this in English. Which is a shame, because it contains some nice quotes. How do I know that? It's quoted in Montaigne's Essays. When I come across a good quote I like to go see where it came from and that led me to the unfortunate dead end. Fortunately, thanks to the wonders of LLMs, this book is now available in English again.

Below is a text version of Anthology, as his book is now known, translated using Google Gemini Flash 2.5 in July of 2025.

It's still somewhat difficult to do this translation technically, because the book is hundreds of pages long. Hopefully this page gets indexed by search engines and other people looking for this book can read what Stobaeus collected 1500 years ago without having to go through the trouble of splitting the PDF and translating it themselves. And it'll spare somebody a few bucks of LLM API calls. If you find this page helpful, I'd like to hear from you because I'm curious who might come across this: addison@cameronhuff.com.

JOHN STOBAEUS'S

ANTHOLOGY

JOHN STOBAEUS'S

FLORILEGIUM

REVISED AND SUPPLIED ACCORDING TO THE FAITH OF MANUSCRIPTS

BY

THOMAS GAISFORD, M.A.

ROYAL PROFESSOR OF THE GREEK LANGUAGE

AUGMENTED EDITION

VOL. I.

AT LEIPZIG

IN KUEHN'S BOOKSHOP

1823

PREFACE.

A historical account of Stobaeus's Florilegium, which is contained almost solely in the testimonies of Photius and Suidas, as well as many remarks on the usefulness and excellence of the work in their dedications and prefaces, have been provided by Gesner and Grotius, to be reprinted after mine. To these should be added the observations of J. A. Fabricius excerpted from Bibl. Gr. Book V. ch. 25., to be presented to my readers not without benefit, before I begin to explain what innovations have been made in this edition.

Among the most useful ancient monuments, and those which one might rejoice have fortunately escaped the ravages of time, deservedly ought to be reckoned the Anthologion, or Florilegium of Selections, Apophthegms, and Precepts, which IOANNES STOBAEUS, with incredible diligence, compiled from every kind of writer, about five hundred poets and prose authors, into four books for the use of his son, Epimius or Septimius, arranged by common topics of all philosophy, especially moral and natural, whom learned men prefer to call in Latin STOBENSIS, from Stobi, the second city of Macedonia, which they believe to have been his homeland. He himself never revealed who he was or when he lived, nor did he have anyone else to note and teach us this. However, the overall structure and texture of his work, and the fact that he never uses sacred or Christian writers, even in those arguments which are most beautifully expounded by them, demonstrates that he was alien to the name of Christ. I would also not go so far as to say that he was very far removed from the times of Themistius, the philosopher; for he is known to have been the last in age of all those praised by Stobaeus. Nor is it necessary for anyone to suggest that in the Florilegium popularized by Gesner, not only the much younger Simplicius but also Christian writers, Gregory the Theologian, Paul the Silentiary, Agathias, and Agapetus the deacon, who wrote for Emperor Justinian, are cited. For it has been ascertained from Photius, who compiled the names of the authors from whom Stobaeus made his selections, that none of these were cited as witnesses by Stobaeus, but rather those passages were added by another hand, such as those of Agapetus by the editor Gesner.

The same author has the following concerning the editions of John Stobaeus:

Greek Edition of the Florilegium, or Book III. and IV. according to Photius.

The Florilegium of Stobaeus first saw the light in Greek, edited by Victor Trincavellus, from a less complete and poorly emended manuscript, Venice 1586, quarto, printed by Bartholomaeus Zanetti.

[Footnotes:]

a Suidas's manuscripts have "Epimion" for "Ioannes". But Photius's manuscript 167 has "Sestimion", whence Hoeschelius and A. Schottus prefer "Septimion": Koenigius "Heptimion". FABRICIUS.

b Erasmus in his Adages called him Nicolaus Stobaeus, which is refuted by the consistent testimonies of Stobaeus's, Photius's, and Suidas's manuscripts. FABRICIUS. Gesner had already briefly noted Erasmus's error, though concealing his name, in his Dedicatory Epistle. See p. ix. It is clear that Nicholas Stobon, Bishop, was present at the Council of Chalcedon from Concil. ed. Harduin. Vol. II. p. 371 B. whose name perhaps

c H. Valesius calls him Stobensis in his notes on Malchus's Excerpta Legationum. Lucas Holstenius in his notes on Stephanus Byz. on "Strobos", Menagius in his History of Female Philosophers, Hemsterhuisius in his notes on Pollux, etc., FABRICIUS. Here it should be noted that the best manuscripts of Suidas exhibit "Stobês" not "Stobaios".

d Tyrwhitt in his preface to Pseudo-Orpheus's "Aithika", p. v., states very correctly: "Having investigated the matter more accurately, I have no doubt that all the passages of our author which are read in editions of Stobaeus after the first were interpolated by Conrad Gesner. Fabricius observed something similar concerning the passages of Simplicius, Gregory the Theologian, Paul the Silentiary, Agathias, and Agapetus. Indeed, I believe all those passages, not only of Agapetus, were inserted by Gesner; and also two hymns of Proclus on pp. 389, 590, and five called Orphic on p. 100, and also more verses from that barbaric writer who falsely assumed the name Phocylides. From the true Phocylides, in my opinion, Stobaeus preserved only two fragments on pp. 434, 496."

PREFACE.

Greek-Latin Editions.

From Trincavellus's edition, Conrad Gesner of Zurich first translated and published in both languages in 1543, folio, using no manuscript except a fragment of some discourses which he had received from Oporinus. Nevertheless, he restored countless passages, by comparing them with authors cited by Stobaeus, and arranged the verses better.

The second Greek-Latin edition, Basel, by Io. Oporinus, 1549, folio, is superior to the former in many ways, because in it, from a manuscript by Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, he not only emended many more passages but also supplied numerous maxims and entire chapters, such as I. On Virtue and VI. On Intemperance, which were missing in the previous edition, and he noted the names of the authors from whom Stobaeus drew his collections much more diligently. I doubt, however, whether everyone will approve of the study of this most excellent and deserving man of good letters, as he also appended some foreign material. (See Gesner's preface below, p. xxii, previous).

The third Greek-Latin edition, Zurich 1559, folio, has nothing peculiar, except an index of authors cited by Stobaeus.

The fourth Wechelian edition, Frankfurt 1581, folio, easily surpasses the others in typographic elegance: but it presents the complete collections of S. Maximus and Antonius Melissa mixed with the excerpts of Stobaeus in a troublesome confusion, resulting in a different chapter numbering and order. It is good, however, that it kept Stobaeus's chapters distinct and did not, like Maximus and Antonius, confuse them among themselves.

The fifth edition, Lyon 1608, folio, more correctly presents Stobaeus separately, to which the Genevans in 1609, folio, similarly appended Maximus and Antonius Melissa separately.

Certain parts from Stobaeus's Florilegium published separately.

Gesner, having noted that Volaterranus had transferred not a few passages from Stobaeus, then still unpublished, into his Urban Commentaries, adds from Varinus Phavorinus, Camers, certain shorter maxims, excerpted sparsely from Stobaeus's collections, and reduced to a distinct booklet of four or five folios, in Latin, but with a rather infelicitous translation. It was published dedicated to Leo X. in Rome 1517, quarto; 1519, octavo; Krakow 1622, octavo.

PREFACE.

Greek-Latin Gnomology, i.e., more significant and older maxims excerpted from the great anthology of Io. Stobaeus by Michael Neander, Basel 1557, octavo.

Conrad Lycosthenes' compendium of maxims and apophthegms from Stobaeus and others, Basel 1557, octavo; Lyon 1571, octavo; and then often elsewhere.

G. Ratallerus translated certain fragments of poets praised by Stobaeus into Latin in the same genre of verse and published them with three tragedies of Euripides, Antwerp 1581, duodecimo.

Epitome of Stobaeus's commonplaces, Cologne 1608, duodecimo.

Fragments of certain Pythagoreans taken from Stobaeus, Greek and Latin. William Canterus, Basel 1566, quarto; and H. Stephanus appended them to his Laertius, published with more than one edition. Thomas Gale also added them to his Mythological, Ethical, and Physical Works. Similarly, there exist, with G. Canterus's translation, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, published in both languages with D. Lambinus's translation, etc., Basel 1582, folio. But in the Thesaurus of Moral Philosophy, Lyon, by Tornaesius 1589, duodecimo, and Geneva 1613, duodecimo, together with Epictetus, Cebes, and Theophrastus's Characters. Finally, fragments of Pythagoreans on political subjects collected from Stobaeus are appended, with John Spondanus's translation, to Aristotle's Politics illustrated by Zwingli and Victorinus, Basel 1589, folio.

The Sayings of Poets, which Stobaeus adduces both in his Eclogues and in his Florilegium, were revised against manuscript codices by the eminent H. Grotius, and rendered into most elegant Latin verses, published in Paris 1623, quarto.

So much for Fabricius. Now I must briefly discuss the resources I have used, as well as the plan and method of my work in emending these collections. Therefore, I have myself examined, or with the help of others, three Parisian manuscripts (A. B. N.), one Leiden manuscript (Voss.), one Florentine manuscript (Damasc.), one Moscow manuscript (Arsen.), and two Oxford manuscripts (Can. Nov. Coll.), whose character and nature I shall proceed to describe in detail.

PREFACE.

A. Manuscript codex of the Royal Parisian Library, now numbered 1984, formerly designated 84, then 1420, and later 2656. Made of parchment, 13th century according to the cataloger, but in my opinion written no earlier than the 14th century. This codex (which, along with the rest of Cardinal Nicolaus Rodulphus's library, came into the possession of Catherine de' Medici, and was therefore sometimes called "Reginensis," as Sigismund Gelenius states in Gataker's A. M. P. XIV. p. 555. F., and was finally added to the Royal treasures under Thuanus's auspices at the end of the 16th century) is the best and most complete of all that I have had the opportunity to use, and is even comparable in the excellence of its readings to the Vienna manuscripts, whose merits Schowius celebrates so highly. It is in poor condition at the beginning and end, so that it often cannot be read without extreme difficulty: some leaves are missing, at least one at the beginning, another at the end, and more elsewhere noted in their proper place: some passages were also misplaced by the negligence of the binder; I have judged it appropriate to describe this in a special schedule, showing how the series of excerpts often deviates from published editions, and to explain it more fully at the end of the fourth volume, with the aim that anyone who may undertake this work again in the future may do so with less trouble than I encountered in making the collation. Someone unknown wrote at the beginning: "Pinax. Stobaei Ethica, i.e., a collection of maxims in 29 chapters of 110, of which the last is unknown, and nothing more." Here, the number of chapters neither corresponds to the common editions, nor to Photius's: perhaps it will be useful for someone who will have the opportunity to examine the codex again, for I have neglected, unless by chance once, to note which chapters coalesced. I forgo a more curious inquiry into how many passages I have supplied from this manuscript, how many I have established and emended more correctly. Even Teletus's single dissertation, "On Self-Sufficiency," restored almost to its entirety on V. 67, will sufficiently demonstrate how much this codex surpasses all others known thus far. However, it should not be disguised that several excellent maxims are missing from this source, which we would perhaps entirely lack if that class of manuscripts, which Trincavelli's edition expresses, had perished by any chance.

B. Codex no. 1985 of the same Library. A paper manuscript, very recent, written around the middle of the 16th century, as I conjecture. Whoever transcribed this book,

[Footnotes:]

e In the Library of St. Mark in Venice is preserved a paper codex no. 452, containing Macarius Chrysocephalus's "Rhodonia", or Florilegium from various writers, first described by Villoison in Anecd. T. II. p. 4, and afterwards by Morellius in Biblioth. MS. Gr. Lat. p. 318. It contains Stobaeana from p. 114 to 142, according to Villoison p. 68. Morellius p. 319 adds: "As far as Stobaeus is concerned, a selection of maxims is included, described as 'Ekloge ek tes sylloges Ioannou tou Stobaiou ton heka-' (Selection from the collection of Ioannes Stobaeus of the hundred...) containing twenty chapters: however, from the discourses or chapters, two and twenty above a hundred sentences were truly taken. The order of the discourses is as it appears in the complete editions: the sentences also mostly correspond to them, except especially for the first one, 'On Virtue', which contains passages excerpted from other sources as well. It also contains something not found in Stobaeus, such as this saying of Teletes 'On Self-Sufficiency' which is extraneous to the proposed argument: 'One should not try to change things, but to prepare oneself to deal with them as they are; just as sailors do, for they do not try to change the winds and the sea, but prepare themselves to be able to turn towards them.' Variant readings, which should be taken into account, are also not lacking. In the first discourse itself, a saying attributed to Bias in the edition reads 'Bradiôs encheirei' (Slowly undertake), etc., in this manner. 'Bradeôs men encheirei' (Slowly indeed undertake) etc. In the second discourse 'On Vice', Axinicus's saying in the edition reads 'auton ton tokon' (their interest) etc.; in the manuscript it reads 'anti ton tochon' (instead of the chances) etc. In the same discourse, what some editions, and the most recent ones by Schowius, attribute to Lycurgus: 'Pheû, hôs ponêron' (Alas, how evil!) etc., the codex, like Philemon's 'Agyrtou', objects: 'O pôs ponêron' (Oh, how evil!) etc., which Grotius had published from a Parisian codex. In the same discourse, in Philemon's verse, near the edition, it reads 'hapaxapasin opsetai tropon th' hena' (he will see once and for all one way): in the manuscript it reads 'hapax apason opsetai tropon th' hena' (he will see once for all of them one way). Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the text is not a little contaminated by corrupt readings, and sayings are sometimes attributed to authors who are not their own." So far Morellius. See Teletes's Dissert. V. 67. p. 158. Bias's saying III. 30. Axinicus II. 2. Philemon. II. 26. 27. This codex will undoubtedly greatly assist a future editor of Stobaeus.

PREFACE.

seems to have had before his eyes not only one of the older editions, or a manuscript similar to the one from which Trincavelli's edition flowed, but also the Parisian codex 1984, or another one largely agreeing with it. I would not say that he followed any other scribe than A., had I not found a few notes from codex B. that were not present in that manuscript, such as 12, 2. 20, 82, whence suspicion arose that either Mendoza's codex, used by Gesner, or the Vienna codex, was before him. Indeed, it is most certain that not a few of those readings, which are otherwise unknown, are owed to the transcriber's ingenuity, often professing himself a critic: nor is it less certain that in the excerpts from Xenophon's Hiero 49, 30-46, many additions came not from Stobaeus's text but from Xenophon's original. Moreover, Theodoros Sypsomos, a Greek by nationality, who performed this task quite diligently, entrusted this codex (formerly handled by Brunck, to whom our A. seems to have been unknown) to my use, along with Trincavelli's edition.

N. Codex of the Royal Library, no. 2092. A paper manuscript, very recent, only cursorily inspected by me. It agrees in most points with Trincavelli's edition. In those places where Grotius collated it with the Geneva edition, which are missing in A., I refer to this codex, following Grotius's collation, as I lacked time to make a new one while in Paris.

Voss. Manuscript codex, formerly Is. Vossius's, now in the Library of the Leiden Academy, quite accurately described by Valckenaerius in his Diatrib. Euripid. p. 198. Collated by me in 1816.

DAMASC. Manuscript codex. From John of Damascus's Sacred Parallels, preserved in Florence in the Laurentian Library tiana VIII. 22., whose existence was revealed by Bandini in Catal. T. I. p. 369. In this codex, an appendix extracted from a more complete exemplar of Stobaeus's collections than the one we currently use is found. Ruhnkenius had commissioned a copy of it to be made for himself, now preserved in Leiden: I have never seen it myself: I only have excerpts from Wyttenbach, who very amiably offered them to me for handling, affirming at the same time that he had faithfully transcribed everything from Ruhnkenius's book that is not found in Stobaeus today, and had diligently noted the variant readings in other places. However, to better and more correctly judge the nature of the codex (since Wyttenbach, having only pursued unpublished material, had omitted to indicate the series of fragments as they appear in the codex), Janus Bakius, a man flourishing with the praise of exquisite doctrine and most dear to me in many respects, at my request, reviewed Ruhnkenius's exemplar and excerpted from it individual lemmas together with the beginnings of the maxims. I also obtained from Elmsley, residing in Florence, permission to inspect the Damascene codex in certain passages, whose work has often benefited me, especially in the fragment of Archytas on p. 46. I have taken care to print the supplements, which largely pertain to physical and ethical eclogues, separately at the end of the fourth volume, along with the beginnings of the maxims arranged in the order in which they are read in the written book. For I considered it useless to repeat the very maxims found in Stobaeus, especially since I have interwoven the variant readings with the testimonies of the other codices. To Musonius's disputations, I appended Wyttenbach's commentary published in Philomath. Lib. I. II. Furthermore, the reader will immediately understand that the scribe used a flawed exemplar, or introduced errors of his own, which I could not correct in many instances with sufficient certainty by conjecture. Most things, therefore, I have left as I found them.

PREFACE.

ARSEN. Archbishop Arsenius of Monemvasia: Violatum, which Christ. Frid. Matthaei had communicated to Ruhnkenius from the Library of the Holy Synod of Moscow. Ruhnkenius allowed Wyttenbach to collate it, who then lent me his excerpts to copy... I truly do not know if this is the same work or a different one that Bandini mentions in Catal. Bibl. Laurent. T. I. p. 549. Bandini denies that the Medicean codex has the same content as Arsenius's edition praised by Fabricius in Bibl. Gr. T. I. p. 744. ed. Harles.

CAN. NOV. COLL. Both codices are very recent, of the same class as N. The former, a paper manuscript, recently introduced into the Bodleian Library from the library of Matthaeus Aloysius, Canon; the latter, a parchment manuscript, written by Zacharias Calliergus in Rome in 1523, preserved among the manuscripts of New College. I consulted these codices, which agree in most points with Trincavelli's edition, only in suspicious passages. From Nov. Coll., various readings appear to be derived from the margin of the Wassian exemplar preserved in the library of Corpus Christi College, an apograph of which Schowius obtained, and I did not neglect it either.

The Leiden Library supplied the Geneva exemplar of Stobaeus (1609), collated by Hugo Grotius with two Parisian manuscripts (A. N., as Grotius has them). I myself transcribed Grotius's collation to Codex A, by which means I was able not only to supply many omissions by that great man but also to correct some errors. I also used the convenient copy of Grotius's edition from the same treasury, which the editor himself had revised throughout, from which also emerge prolegomena, a Latin translation, and more extensive and corrected notes. And perhaps I would have given more of this kind, if I had been able to resolve the knots of Grotius's script, which is very often most intricate, more easily.

I derived less benefit from the Gatakerian example of Grotius's edition preserved there, whose margin is filled with parallel passages from writers of both languages, cited from all sources, now largely occupied, but which offers almost no emendations for corrupt passages or interpretations for difficult ones.

L. C. Luzacius most kindly communicated to me everything pertaining to Stobaeus from Valckenaer's Adversaria. These are not numerous, nor are they greatly different from what that eminent man had put forth in his observations on Euripidean plays and elsewhere: but there are a few new ones, and not unworthy of Valckenaer. Valckenaer, moreover, had left an exemplar of Stobaeus marked throughout in his own hand, which, along with his other books, was dispersed at the Luzac auction in 1811, and I am utterly ignorant of where it went.

I examined the examples of Salmasius and Tyrwhitt preserved in the British Museum in London through the eyes of my friends' deputies. From Tyrwhitt's notes, I provided those precepts which I had not seen elsewhere: Salmasius's notes, which were neither numerous nor of great importance, became known to me only after the typographer had completed all the titles.

I myself possess Wakefield's copy of the Zurich edition of 1559, whose margin is filled throughout the work with conjectures, sometimes good, but more often not even specious. Wakefield had hastily perused Stobaeus in his usual manner, and had committed to writing everything that came to his mind while reading, both his own thoughts and those of others, without any distinguishing mark to separate his own from foreign material. Hence it happens that I have sometimes attributed foreign material to Wakefield, as for example at 1, 65.

PREFACE.

Furthermore, I had all editions that Fabricius mentioned, except one, printed in Dillingen in 1556, according to Schowius; I lacked it, not without suspicion of a fictitious title, as I found no trace or sign of this edition among bibliographers. Of these editions, only two provide critical utility, namely the Trincavellian, and the other Gesnerian edition published in Basel. Whether Trincavellus accurately followed the Venetian codex and separated all corrections, we shall know if that codex is ever handled by some learned man: in the meantime, I will warn that the Oxford codices, wonderfully agreeing with Trincavellus in mutilations and errors, sometimes diverge and supply better readings or traces of better readings: for example, 1, 64, both have "optilôn" with A. instead of "ommatôn".

Gesner, who in his Zurich edition of 1543, had presented many passages, especially from Plato, Xenophon, and Plutarch, according to the common books of those writers, by the authority of Trincavellus after him, later obtained a much more augmented codex from Mendoza's library, and in Basel, 1549, decided to produce a new recension. And indeed, if he had known how to use the good things offered to him correctly, he would certainly have left us nothing but perhaps a very small gleaning of omitted readings. For I do not doubt that Mendoza's codex (which, according to Iriarte in Catal. Bibl. Matrit. p. 277, later became part of the Spanish king's library) was exactly similar to the one I call A, so much so that one must have been transcribed from the other. But however this may be, it cannot be denied that Gesner did not only fail to remove the errors of the previous edition, but even augmented them with new ones, as he interpolated many passages without any authority, while neglecting many excellent readings from his own codex, and often excising entire sentences that he had found there.

Schowius's edition, whose first volume appeared in Leipzig in 1797, will always remain imperfect, as the editor's resources were consumed by a disastrous fire. His own warnings, which I have taken care to repeat from the addenda published in Rome in 1788 to the Papyrus Chart of the Borgian Museum, and from a letter to Heyne given in Rome in 1790, will show how many manuscript codices he had at hand.

And so much for that. It remains for me to briefly explain my plan and the methods I have decided to follow. First of all, I wanted to produce a book such as Stobaeus himself had left. Therefore, Gesner's interpolations had to be removed, and the text of the excerpts was not to be conformed to the modern editions of the authors themselves, but restored everywhere to the fidelity of Stobaeus's exemplars. If, however, a few things from Gesner's recension remain, they are certainly for the most part enclosed in brackets: if the true reading, i.e., the reading of the codices, has not been received into the text, the reader will find it faithfully placed in the annotation below. I would indeed wish not to have left even the slightest thing of this kind to be corrected by a future editor: but several things restrained me from wanting to direct everything to the same standard, things not easily explained to anyone lacking experience in such matters.

Secondly, I considered it my duty to open the way to the sources from which Stobaeus drew his material by indicating the numbers of pages, verses, or chapters according to the divisions noted in the best editions: these I have noted not only in the annotations appended to the text, but also included them in the index of lemmas. The numbers placed before each fragment will be very useful to readers: and no less useful are the numbers marked at the top and right side of each page, indicating the pages and verses of Gesner's 1609 edition, which are frequently cited by critics. There is no need for me to commend the usefulness of the indexes I have compiled at length.

As for what remains, if I am ever given the opportunity to edit the other volume of Stobaeus, commonly called Physical and Ethical Eclogues, I will append additions by which I shall endeavor to correct errors in these books and supply omissions.

[Footnote:]

f To Stobaeus's editions should be added the Frobenian collection of maxims, which appeared together with Callimachus in Basel 1532, octavo, under this title: "Gnomai ek diaphoron poiêtôn philosophôn te kai rhêtorôn syllengeisai kata stoicheion syntetagmenai" (Maxims collected from various poets, philosophers, and rhetoricians, arranged alphabetically). As far as I can judge from my collations, this collection is in many ways very similar to Vossius's Stobaeus and Arsenius's Moscow manuscript. I have referred the series of titles and fragments to a special index at the end of the volume. See Gesner's preface below, p. xiv.

TO THE MOST LEARNED PIETRO BEMBO,

VICTOR TRINCAVELLUS SENDS GREETINGS.

When these days, Bembo, glory and splendor of learning, I was about to publish John Stobaeus's Selections of Apophthegms, which have long lain hidden, for the convenience and benefit of scholars (a work which, in my opinion, is most approved and noble, and thus most fitting and useful for educating and forming human life, inasmuch as in it that illustrious man arranged the more famous sayings of Greek authors, as if they were precious gems and pearls, drawn from the abundant and ancient treasures of Greece, in a wonderful order into more than one hundred and twenty books, as if into as many most noble necklaces), I certainly hoped that they, even if tasted but once, would be pleasing and delightful to learned men. Indeed, I was well aware that they would be far more pleasing and delightful if they appeared under your auspices and forthwith inscribed with your name on the title page. For, to pass over in silence now your singular virtues and exceptional humanity, for which all good men love (may flattery be absent), cultivate, and revere you, there is no one present, however learned, who does not acknowledge and proclaim you as an alumnus of good letters, and indeed a most excellent parent and an exceptional patron of all scholars. For with you as author and patron, those three languages which now flourish pre-eminently, Greek, and both Latin, that ancient one and our own vernacular, have already recovered their pristine beauty, grace, and elegance, against the injury of time and the ignorance of the unlearned. Therefore, I send Stobaeus to you, both so that coming forth first from your house, he may reach the hands of learned men with greater favor; and also so that they, as in almost innumerable other arguments, may recognize how kindly you (who strive to enhance literature in this way) embrace and foster them. For I (to confess frankly) undertook this task of bringing to light the monuments of celebrated authors verging on ruin, primarily for this reason, that I hoped you would never fail my honest desire, so that whenever occasion demanded, from the distinguished library, which, as the chief assertor of the best literature, was entrusted by the Venetian Senate to your care and protection, you would, by your kindness, accept everything that would contribute to illustrating and enhancing literature; I have always believed this. In the meantime, I would like you to undertake the patronage of Stobaeus, and to number me among your most devoted servants, who will then consider himself to have been treated most excellently when these labors of mine have been approved by you. If this indeed happens, I shall, moreover, most gladly bring forth many other works, if not greater, at least not lesser, which I have long been laboring to produce, with the help first of God, most good and greatest, and then of you and other most excellent men. Farewell.

Venice, January 31.

TO THE ILLUSTRIOUS AND NOBLE MEN

D. JOHANN JAKOB VON WATTENWYL AND

D. JOHANN FRANZ NAEGELIN,

MOST WORTHY CONSULS OF THE MAGNIFICENT SWISS REPUBLIC OF BERN,

AND TO THE ENTIRE MOST DISTINGUISHED ORDER OF THE SENATE,

THEIR MOST HONORED LORDS,

CONRAD GESNER OF ZURICH,

SENDS GREETINGS AND PEACE IN OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST.

Indeed, most illustrious men, I cannot approve of those who criticize the ancient custom, whereby anyone wishing his works of genius and scholarship to be published dedicates them to others whom he loves or reveres, as being illiberal. For while dedicating a work of learning to other men is a signal act of humanity and friendship, it is especially fitting to offer such books to those who hold magistracy, partly because we thereby testify that we owe them a great deal, and partly because we thus entice them to philosophy. Moreover, Plato declared that the republic would then thrive best when either princes engaged in philosophy or philosophers held the reins of power. Furthermore, there are indeed many reasons that prompted me to dedicate this work of John Stobaeus, now for the first time translated into Latin by my efforts, to your Excellencies, but especially two: first, because, generously supported by your stipend in Lausanne, I taught Greek literature there for three years to the best of my ability, where I perhaps would still be teaching, had not certain reasons recalled me to my homeland; second, because your most distinguished order has very many men who govern the republic, either in your most illustrious city or in your most beautiful territory, and who are either exceptionally or at least moderately learned: and also those who, for particular reasons and occupations, have not studied literature—which is not surprising in such a large democratic senate—but who diligently, in the meantime, patronize better studies and good and learned men, and act as most faithful patrons, at the same time promoting good letters and the sincerity of religion among their cultivators: not unlike elephants, who, though unable to swim, delight in strolling along the banks of rivers. I would adduce testimonies to this matter and compile a catalog of learned men in your region, who either teach the Gospel purely, or profess languages and good sciences, to whom you liberally bestow stipends and for whom you furnish libraries, were they not too numerous to enumerate at present, and the matter itself too clear for me to need to expound upon it. Therefore, so that I might not be ungrateful for your past favors towards me, and that I might declare you most worthy of the literary office, I wished to dedicate these commonplaces of Stobaeus to your Excellencies. I believe that this attempt of mine, in which I have striven with utmost diligence to prove my gratitude towards you, cannot be displeasing to you.

Moreover, the subject matter of this book is entirely political, and most suitable for magistrates. For it contains very many moral, economic, and political discourses, numbering over one hundred and twenty: indeed, very few do not pertain to these three general categories. It admirably teaches moral principles regarding the pursuit of virtues and the avoidance of vices. A magistrate, above all else, ought to devote himself to the discipline of morals and the moderation of passions. For their examples, placed in high office, are looked up to by all and held forth for imitation. Hence it happens that the people readily become almost such as the magistrate is. Therefore, since those who govern the republic can benefit very many by their virtues and examples, but on the other hand, can offend very many, it is much more necessary for them than for private individuals to cultivate the discipline of morals. For although each of us is born not only for himself but for his country and the republic, nevertheless, magistrates, above all, ought to look out for the common welfare of all, and imitate divine purity of life and benignity towards all other men, so that the name of God may not be invoked in sacred literature in vain. To this must be added that each individual should first know how to govern himself before he wishes to govern others: this principle is contained in the moral passages, which are found in Stobaeus before all others.

Others are economic, which pertain to family discipline, whose nearest concern, after oneself, must be held by each individual. This discipline, in all matters, even private, requires diligence and accuracy, but is especially required with utmost diligence in magistracy. For in this lies the greatest, most beautiful, and entirely peculiar power of goodness and virtue, that it never ceases, as far as possible, to make as many as possible like itself. Therefore, a good man will at the outset take care to be himself a student of virtue, and to be always and everywhere consistent and like himself; soon, in every way, he will strive to make his family such, nor will he ever cease from his good instruction. For goodness cannot cease; in the presence of material, it is never idle, but acts perpetually. Therefore, a good man, when he has created a good family, then endeavors to assimilate all things to himself even outside of it, proceeding from nearer things to more remote ones (for the nature of goodness is infinite), and to imbue them with the study of true virtue. For goodness or virtue is a certain heavenly fire, claiming as much as it can for itself and converting it into itself. I call it fire because it does not cease as long as material is supplied, before it has completely converted it into itself. But since our earthly fire indeed does this, but in the process corrupts and consumes the things it acts upon, it is proper to call virtue a heavenly fire, which does not harm, does not consume, but warms and refreshes with its benign heat. Since virtue thus appropriates everything to itself and converts it into its own nature, so that the things converted suffer no interim harm, but become better than themselves and perfectly perfected. Therefore, whoever has not well instructed, taught, and corrected his family, and that perpetually, with utmost faith and diligence, will not be worthy of the name of a good man. But no one will instruct better than he who has joined to his natural, or rather divine, goodness that economic discipline which is clearly perceived from these passages of Stobaeus. Now, as I have said, no one will govern a republic well who has not first learned to govern himself.

It must be understood the same concerning the administration of a family. For he who has not governed his own household well, how will he govern the republic? Indeed, a family is like a small state: and just as it is fitting for a father to be affectionate towards his family, so it is for a prince towards those who are committed to his trust and care. Therefore, the Romans, with a name full of humanity, called their senators "Fathers". So much has been said concerning the discipline of morals and life, to be observed both in individual men and in families, which is like a foundation for the subsequent administration of the state, and without which the state cannot exist, just as a whole does not exist without its parts.

Furthermore, very many political topics are wisely and copiously presented by Stobaeus, containing most abundant and salutary precepts and counsels, concerning the republic, laws by force and custom, powerful men in the state, magistracy, and what kind of person he who holds magistracy ought to be, concerning monarchy, kingdom, tyranny. Not only domestic and peaceful counsels, but also military and warlike counsels have been collected by him.

Thus far I have almost completed a summary division of this book. But because there is a triple good, as is agreed among most wise men, namely, of the mind, of the body, and of fortune; of these, first, that which is true and perpetual, moral topics and very many of them are assigned to it, as being most excellent: to the others fewer. Namely, some topics concerning physicians, health, disease, and beauty are inserted, which refer to the good or bad of the body. Concerning fortune and misfortune, riches, poverty, and other topics of the same kind, he placed some at the end, until finally, reaching old age, death, mourning, burial, and consolation, he closes the book. But if it pleases to distribute the concept of good differently, namely from the very nature of things, into the honorable, the pleasant, and the useful: thus it will also appear that the entire compass and breadth of good is encompassed in these most copious passages of our Stobaeus, or rather, your Stobaeus. Indeed, honorable things are the same as the goods of the mind: truly sweet and pleasant things are those which bodily senses enjoy and are delighted by: finally, useful things fortune provides.

You have, most illustrious sirs, what matters are presented by this author, in what order, and by what rule of order; it remains for me to briefly explain how he treated them. Therefore, the author himself did not write this volume relying on his own erudition, nor leaning on one or two philosophers, nor adhering only to one sect: but from all the wisest and most notable writers of all Greece, he did not select better things from bad and promiscuous ones, as it is usually said, "gems from dung", but he chose the very best from the best, and brought only the more precious gems from a heap of gems into his treasury. Indeed, he drew the most weighty and illustrious maxims of the Greeks, sometimes more elegant histories, and memorable examples, whatever he could observe by reading throughout all ages, from the most ample and ancient treasuries of books, connecting them into one hundred and twenty discourses, as if into so many most precious necklaces: from many most fragrant roses and various flowers, he composed as many garlands or crowns in a wondrous order: and like a bee, drawing whatever sweetest nectar was in various kinds of flowers, he gathered from everywhere, traversing the most abundant and flourishing meadows of authors, into one truly mellifluous work, and like a most elegant honeycomb, divided into many cells: he filled his workshop as an apothecary with various kinds of noble aromatics, like a rich pharmacist, separating each into its own capsules. And just as a good economist diligently stores the most excellent fruits of trees, and those that can endure time, in his pantry: so Stobaeus wrote into this book the more elegant maxims, which seemed worthy to survive among men for a very long time: whatever was beautiful, useful, admirable everywhere, he collected, as if some very rich merchant bought and brought home from various and most distant nations all things everywhere excellent, rare, precious, profitable. Just as Indian Griffins dig up gold from rocks broken by their beaks, which are sprinkled with tiny golden drops, and preserve it with great care: so our Gnomograph, by persistent labor, gathered truly golden, and, so to speak, gem-like sentences, scattered throughout many and extensive works of authors, into a great heap.

But apophthegms, precepts, counsels, chriae, maxims of this kind, or whatever they may be called, are as superior to gold and gems as external things yield to bodily ones, and these again are inferior to the goods of the soul. Bodies adorned with gems and gold become no better in themselves, neither among men nor among other animated or inanimate bodies (for even a horse, however adorned with trappings and bridles, does not become better in itself), but perhaps they even become worse in this way, especially men, inflated with the tumor of pride. But the soul imbued with the precepts of wisdom is raised above all brute and mortal kind to the heavens. Likewise, since one gem can only adorn one body, and, as long as it is someone's property, it benefits no one else: the doctrine of a wise man can instruct all willing people, make them better, and benefit everyone equally: indeed, the more it is communicated, and the longer it is used, the more effective it always seems to become. For it is not limited by any time or number of users. But the exact opposite happens to the goods of the body and fortune: for they are diminished, grow old and are consumed, whether used for a long time or by many. Finally, this difference (for I will state it, even if it may not seem great) between the treasures (κειμήλια) of fortune and good precepts entrusted to letters and books is that the former are not suitable for more than one to be made from them, while the latter can be transcribed into infinite copies, thanks to the art of typography. Aristotle had written many things for Alexander the Great alone, which all men today can freely enjoy by redeeming them everywhere for a modest sum of money, due to the abundant supply of copies. And I have dedicated the volume of Stobaeus, translated by me into Latin, to your Excellency alone, but through you, as many students as wish will enjoy it. Yet the gift should not be considered less valuable because it is communicated to more people. For generosity is the desire to make as many as possible sharers of one's goods, which desire you indeed daily approve to possess. But perhaps I have discussed these matters too extensively among those who know: yet it is a pleasure to repeat what is beautiful and honorable, as the proverb says, "three and four times". Furthermore, the authors whose words Stobaeus often recites are over two hundred and forty, as appears in the catalog prefixed to the entire work; but if one counts more accurately, one will find about three hundred, of whom indeed I find only forty extant today, partly printed, partly in certain libraries: all the rest have perished for us. But among the same number of two hundred and forty, or rather three hundred writers, I also include those who, though fewer, have no extant works, but whose sayings have been collected by others into commentaries, like those of Socrates by Plato and Xenophon. So many authors has the most diligent Stobaeus rescued from oblivion for us, authors who perhaps would not even be known to have lived, much less would all their writings or sayings have perished by the injury of time, consumed by decay, worms, fires, and similar misfortunes. It is therefore excellent that they have been preserved for us, and, I believe, not without divine providence, snatched from that general destruction that was already threatening good books, and from the impending danger, as if from the burning of a rich house, not entirely, but what was best in them. For I believe that soon after his time, destruction befell most good books, with barbarians laying waste to everything, and literature also declining along with the Roman Empire. Let us therefore congratulate ourselves that at least these authors survive through the work of Stobaeus, and, as if in a council of princes and wise men who have gathered from different parts of the world, offer most prudent counsels, each pronouncing his own opinion as if in the Areopagus most weightily. Therefore, add to yourselves, most illustrious men, such counselors, princes, legislators, emperors, philosophers, poets, orators, who, for a thousand years and more, have been approved by the common consent of all as the wisest among all heathens, namely from the time of the Seven Sages of Greece, which preceded the birth of Christ by about seven hundred and forty years, up to the era of Emperor Probus, who reigned for two hundred and seventy-nine years after the birth of Christ. For Porphyry lived up to his age, whose words are cited a few times by Stobaeus: although Jamblichus was later than Porphyry. But all the rest, if I am not mistaken, were older.

But those who flourished before the age of the seven sages, such as Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus, since they are very few, I have not added to the number of a thousand years by which they surpass the age of others; otherwise, I would declare that wise men of a much longer time and many centuries have gathered in this book. Concerning John Stobaeus himself, I find nothing certain about the time he lived, except that it is evident from what has already been said that he flourished after the time of Emperor Probus, and I gather from his very name that he was a Christian, for you will not find any heathen named John, although some read Nicolaus instead of John. Since, therefore, this book has been compiled only from the best writings and sayings of the greatest and most illustrious men, it will not only contribute to the instruction of life and the discipline of morals, but will also be useful for abundant discourse, whether one wishes to cite testimonies and authorities by name, or only to gather arguments for written or spoken discourse from it.

However, human wisdom is not to be despised, for although it is useless without the gift of faith for the blessedness of eternal life, and cannot attain heaven by its own ingenuity or works (as some philosophers believed), yet it is most useful, indeed necessary, for contemplating and administering human affairs and civil matters. But if it is also joined with divine piety, then it will become the best and most beautiful blend. For they do not conflict with each other, as some ignorant people assume, civil, economic, moral, natural, logical, and divine wisdom. But human wisdom is also a gift of God, as is clear in Solomon: to whom God granted wisdom, by which he would govern his people, that is, political wisdom: by which he would discuss the natures of animals and plants, that is, natural wisdom: by which he would resolve the controversies of disputants, which cannot be done without dialectic, that is, the discernment of truth and falsehood. And although the seeds of such wisdom are innate in all minds, yet in this lies their virtue and praise, if they are cultivated in such a way that they excel greatly above others, which happened in Solomon, not indeed by cultivation or exercise, as in other wise men, but by divine gift. Wherefore also the Queen of Sheba came to him, following the fame of his wisdom, human rather than divine, as she was a pagan woman. For although all wisdom of this kind is communicated by God, yet we call one human, the other divine, namely, from the things about which they are concerned, the former about divine and eternal things, the latter about human and perishable things. Or certainly, because of dignity and excellence, what was a common name, if you consider the author who imparts both, is attributed to one as if it were his own. It has therefore been demonstrated that earthly philosophy does not oppose heavenly philosophy: and if this place and time allowed, I would also attempt to show that it contributes not a little to it. What, I ask, can be said so Christian (I speak of life and actions, not of faith), than that which is often repeated in Platonic dialogues: "It is better to suffer injustice than to inflict it," "Wretched is he who has not paid the penalty for his sins," "Do not do to another what you would not wish done to yourself"? And other such things, which are as it were the foundation of Christian morals and works, and for establishing life most excellently in the republic. Socrates, Pythagoras, and others similar to them, pure philosophers, if they were alive today, even among those who profess themselves Christians, who would not call them saints for their discipline of life? Indeed, they directed all their study towards tranquility of mind, frugality of body, innocence of life, and finally, meditation and praises of the one God. Certainly, all philosophy is either situated in the contemplation of nature, considers the motions of celestial and terrestrial bodies simultaneously, and other things that are annexed either to the bodies themselves or to their motions, and finally rests in the first mover, that is, the one, omnipotent God: how then could it be contrary to the sacred scriptures, which command us to estimate the eternal creator from created things, the invisible majesty of God from things falling under sight, gradually transported by degrees from opaque senses to a pure and clear mind, from the elements of bodies to the simple divine essence, from earth to heaven and up to the throne of divinity, and almost to behold God? The other part of philosophy teaches the method of speaking, of discerning truth from falsehood, and necessity from probability: the science of which is common not only for convenience but also for necessity in every proposed question. But questions are often proposed in sacred scripture, and are called into doubt.

How then will this science not agree with sacred things, since the Apostle commands us to possess the faculty of speaking and of refuting adversaries? The third part prescribes the discipline of morals, family, and the republic, admonishes to avoid vices, and to embrace virtues in all ways. But I will not dwell longer here: for I do not doubt that you yourselves, according to your prudence, sufficiently understand that the wisdom of the ancients, even though pagan, in human affairs, not only does not oppose the Christian profession, but rather aids it: not indeed for the end of blessedness, but for the illustration and clearer tradition thereof, and for defense against impious cavilers in disputation. All parts, therefore, by which philosophy is perfected, are most salutary and excellent, especially if Christian doctrine puts the finishing touch on them, and converts all these things – the contemplation of nature, I say, eloquence and judgment of speech, and finally the entire institution of morals – to the honor and glory of God, and to the benefit of one's neighbor: although not a few pagans also teach this, they do so obscurely, and not as clearly, consistently, or frequently as sacred scriptures. Furthermore, if some have abused ancient philosophy (for there were very many sects), should we therefore immediately reject philosophy itself and condemn it entirely? By no means. For by the same reasoning, we would condemn many other very great goods, and also the sacred scriptures themselves, which a large part of mankind (if indeed they can be called men) abuses and interprets poorly. All other things, therefore, which pertain to earthly and human happiness, for which the magistrate ought to have no small care, are abundantly drawn from sincere pagan philosophy: but the cause of eternal blessedness, that is, faith, which constantly believes that Jesus Christ, the Son of the living God, having become man without any blemish, died to remove the sins of the faithful, rose again, and ascended into heaven to the right hand of the Father, so that we too may migrate first in soul, and finally also in body, and live immortally with him: this faith, I say, can be acquired only from sacred scriptures, and divinely through the grace and mercy of God. Yet this spiritual wisdom alone would satisfy us, if we would need many external things, and would be occupied among creatures, and finally would have commerce with men partly ignorant and foolish, partly naturally evil. But lest I go further afield, as they say, I will put an end to this letter here.

This place indeed required that both your most celebrated praises and those of the city of Bern be proclaimed, the sincerity of religion renewed, the most prudent moderation of the republic, benevolence, love, and liberality towards good letters and their students, the bravery of the people, the situation, extent, and fertility of the region, and finally many such things to be celebrated with worthy praises: but since I cannot embrace all your and the republic's gifts and virtues in my speech as they deserve, and if I wished to enumerate even a part, a book would have to be written by me, not merely a letter, and to say little of your magnificence would be unworthy, I have decided for now to be silent, and to leave this task to other more learned and eloquent minds. What remains, I beg and implore your kindness, most ample and benevolent sirs, that you consider this monument, whatever it may be, as a pledge and testimony of my gratitude and reverence towards you, with fair and honorable judgment, and that you accept it with the same spirit with which it is offered by me to you, namely, with gratitude and sincerity, and finally that you always hold me recommended among your clients to your Excellency. Fare well, and live happily through our Lord Jesus Christ, who may always increase in you the affection for the Christian religion, and preserve your republic safe for a very long time with all good and learned men. Zurich, 13th day of June, 1543.

**TO THE CANDID READER BY CONRAD GESNER CONCERNING STOBAEUS' COLLECTANEA, AND ITS TRANSLATION. A PREFACE.**

I know not by what fate, dearest Reader, I devoted myself to this translation of Stobaeus' Commonplaces, with a single copy, the most corrupted of all books that have ever existed anywhere, whether this happened due to the fault of the printers, or of the archetype, or, as I believe, of both. For there are some booksellers who are unwilling to publish corrected copies, they present them to learned men to be examined, and they do not have learned correctors whom they might appoint for their books; nor do they bother to compare different copies (although these could be acquired for a modest sum of money), but being persuaded that there is a scent of gain from everywhere, they strive for this one thing, that they may get rich, and live only for themselves, not for students or candidates of literature: whom, because of such harmful ignorance (if it were up to me), I would prevent any book from being published by them hereafter, by the edict of a severe penalty. But many of them will pay the penalty for their sluggishness and avarice much later, while the books are not sold as they hoped; which I hope will happen more and more, so that books are not so easily and carelessly bought by students. For indeed, good authors, if they have not been printed with due fidelity and care, lack their genuine grace and usefulness. Therefore, the greatest praise is due to those who, from corrupt copies, communicate good and complete ones to students.

They strive to communicate; but those who not only neglect this, but also make good ones worse with their own presses, are to be blamed by everyone in the highest degree. It seemed good to admonish through this digression, so that students of literature might spare expenses on corrupted copies, and observe which printers were accustomed to produce books accurately and in good faith: such as, among a few others, our Christopher Froschover, a faithful and diligent man in the art of printing, which the books themselves, as many as issue from his workshop, speak of, even if I remain silent. We have recently caused their catalog to be published; and we are preparing a double enumeration of all books, or at least the better ones, which we know to exist, or have seen ourselves, arranged both by alphabetical order of authors' names, and according to arts, sciences, and various common topics, with each of their works disposed: moreover, in the former catalog, we have generally added where the book is located, in what format, in what year from the birth of Christ, and by which printers it was printed, which latter aims for students to be able to acquire those copies for themselves, or order them from elsewhere, especially from markets, which were produced by more esteemed printers. I would also bring forth many other things concerning our catalog, to be submitted to the press within a few months, God willing, for various and great uses, were not my present undertaking calling me elsewhere. Therefore, I return to this edition of John Stobaeus' Commonplaces, which if compared with the previous one published in Venice some years ago, it will immediately and easily appear how much brass differs from lupins; so that if anyone saw the earlier one, he would surely exclaim, "Oh, how much it has changed from that!" For whatever I could achieve either by strength of intellect or by persistent labor, all of it has been applied to the emendation of this writer, so that this work, like the Augean stable, might be cleansed. But so that the candid Reader may more easily trust me, I will enumerate a few parts of my labor. First, therefore, I diligently sought out, compared, and corrected against the archetypes themselves all passages cited by Stobaeus from all authors whom I could find printed thus far, which I have done in other cases, whose enumeration here it is not necessary to mention names, especially in the discourses of Plato and Xenophon: for many testimonies from these, often perhaps too lengthy, as some might think, are produced. Mostly, however, I noted in the margins of the Latin translation the place or book in which the words I could find were written by individual authors, if it had not been indicated in the Greek copy, so that I might prove to the reader that I had diligently searched for the passage. Then I compared all those maxims recently published in Greek at Basel, along with certain hymns of Callimachus, with our own copy. For there is nothing in those maxims that was not taken from Stobaeus by some scholar, mostly from more extensive passages, with omissions of what others did not much like. To this I also added a fragment of Stobaeus, which contained some of the earlier discourses, which I obtained from the most learned Mr. John Oporinus, a most diligent Basel printer, and one who has deserved exceptionally well of good letters. And I devised many other opportunities to make the book better, which I now pass over, lest I seem to speak too much about myself. In the book printed in Venice, not even once is any variant reading noted, due to human negligence: but here you will find various readings everywhere, in those places we have compared, an argument of our diligence. If anything seemed corrupt to us, we changed nothing, unless the error was so obvious that it could be detected even by a boy with just a few days' experience in Greek grammatical rules, especially in orthography and the distinction of meanings: but if anything seemed likely to cause any doubt as to which way it should be read more correctly, in those cases we strictly retained the old reading of the manuscript, and wrote our conjecture in the margin, whether in Greek, Latin, or both. Furthermore, as far as the translation and the style of writing itself are concerned, I want to admonish the Reader that I have translated partly literally, as much as could be done without harming the Latin language, and partly more freely, so that I seem to have preserved a certain moderation. Nor do I much ask to be forgiven for not having polished this translation with more elegance and greater eloquence. For although I admire and praise eloquence and grace in words, I would rather praise those who, in cultivating speech, moderately, but most diligently and for a very long time dwell on investigating the matters themselves. Thus, I would greatly prefer a fowler who has caught a hare or another animal, to another who carries a gilded badger. Meanwhile, I utterly abhor those who speak barbarously. We owe our care to both studies, but a shorter one to speech, a longer one to matters. For as much as a shadow is viler than a body, as much as signs and pictures yield to the things themselves; so much does the knowledge of things, of sciences, and the study of true philosophy excel the cultivation of speech. The wretched suitors of Penelope, since they could not possess their mistress' embraces, mingled with the maidservants: so most people, neglecting mistress philosophy, linger around her instruments and rudiments. But these things incidentally. Furthermore, I wished the Latin translation to correspond directly to the Greek, both so that those who wished could immediately compare them, and so that in this way I might declare my sincerity to scholars. I might have been permitted to publish the Latin separately, in this way for the sake of dissimulation, if I were to deviate from the Greek text: as it is said of a certain painter who, having depicted a rooster on a panel, ordered a boy to keep live roosters far away, lest by comparison of the live and painted roosters, his own lack of skill might be detected. I did not think this ought to be done by me. Therefore, I wished to combine Greek with Latin, and I frankly noted passages that were obscure either by fault of the manuscript or only to me: judging it sufficient in other cases if the meaning was understood, and once simply and clearly known, it would then be free for anyone to either use the Greek words or change ours at their discretion, and express them more accurately. Certainly, since every language has its native grace and peculiar force, which is not easily transferred into another: then especially Greek contains I know not what subtle and recondite quality, which cannot be conveniently rendered and vividly expressed in Latin speech. Therefore, I affected nothing, but followed Greek traces with an open and simple style, yet not, I hope, an impure one. The less learned will therefore compare them with less difficulty by their juxtaposed position: but the more learned, if they wish, omitting my interpretation, will read only the Greek, or at least consult it in more obscure passages. "Often even a gardener spoke very opportunely/aptly."

For sometimes I supplemented in Latin what seemed mutilated in Greek, which I often noted in the margin, or marked the text with certain signs, sometimes with parentheses: however, this was not done everywhere, either because of the narrowness of the page, or for some other reason. Certainly, I judge translations of this kind, which neither cause distaste by their not-so-Latin diction, nor deviate too far from the author's words, to be especially observed in more difficult passages: for thus, besides other advantages, this convenience will also be added, that the reader may understand therefrom what reading the translator followed; which will be most useful, since in most authors today there are very many variant readings. Moreover, the translator will likely seem to have chosen a better reading. I recently observed this benefit in Theodore Gaza's interpretations of some of Aristotle's books; in which, if you compare them with the Greek, very many diversities will be found, so that you can correct the Greek from the Latin. Yet even Theodore himself, although Greek by nation, and most skilled both in his own language and in the knowledge of things, erred in not a few places, which I shall endeavor to show shortly, at least in those books that discuss the History of Animals. For it is so arranged by nature that it is much easier to correct the works of others than one's own; and to see more keenly abroad, but to be blind at home. These things are said by me for this reason, so that learned men may also be more lenient towards me, if I should sometimes seem to suffer from a common and in a way natural infirmity: as he says, "sometimes even good Homer nods."

Furthermore, it should not be passed over in silence that many passages, especially the more extensive ones, cited by Stobaeus, I have transcribed almost word for word from those works of authors which learned men had already previously rendered into Latin, and this especially in the books of Plato and Xenophon, not so much to shorten my labor, as because I hoped they had translated them faithfully, and perhaps better than I would have done, since they had considered the entire author, both the phrasing and the subsequent and preceding parts simultaneously: and I did not doubt that some commentaries had also been used, which I could not easily have obtained, as from Marsilio Ficino in Plato's dialogues. However, I did not transcribe entirely at random, but first compared everything with the Greek text, and if anything seemed to need changing, I did so candidly.

It is truly a very difficult task, which cannot be believed by anyone who has not experienced it, both to translate other Greek works into Latin, and especially those of authors for whom no commentaries have been left by the ancients. For aided by the help of scholia and commentaries, we confidently approach even the most intricate books: on the other hand, without them, many books, even those considered easy and clear, present no small difficulty. Other difficulties arise in translating this work: first, almost as many styles of speaking as authors are cited; then, the variety of dialects, Common, Attic, Ionic, Doric. For all these you will frequently find here. Add to this that the discourse is sometimes prose, sometimes poetic. For among the Latins, poetic diction does not differ much from the style familiar to other authors: but among the Greeks, one who has passed from a historian or orator to a poet, as from Thucydides to Homer, from Demosthenes to Pindar, will seem to have migrated to another part of the earth, and to a completely different language. Furthermore, very many verses in the previous edition were corrupted, and were read either completely unintelligible or improperly distinguished, which caused me particular labor in correcting them. Furthermore, I did not render the Greek poems into Latin, partly to gain some benefit from the labor, and partly because it seemed useless, moved by the same reasons by which I was led to translate the entire book into plain and simple language. For the remaining Greek maxims sound somewhat more weighty and elegant in their own language, and verses lose their grace in a foreign language much more than prose. For although I concede that some things can be said in Latin with the same, or even greater elegance, than they are said in Greek, yet I would deny that the same can be done in more subtle maxims or poems: or if it happens somewhere, it does not happen everywhere, but much more infrequently. Yet since all things act much more freely and successfully in their native place, where they are conceived, born, nourished, and refined, as is widely evident in the genera of animals and plants: it should not seem wonderful to anyone if even what is contained in speech, they possess no little more energy in their primitive and genuine language than in a foreign one.

This being conceded, there is no need for me to try to obtain forgiveness for not having striven for more polished Latin eloquence even in prose, or for not having rendered verses in the same meters. For if they are not to be used in Latin, but in Greek, it will be enough for the sense to be simply understood. Add to this that a simpler discourse is clearer and more lucid, which is required in a paraphrase. Furthermore, if you translate a Greek poem into Latin meters, it is scarcely possible for the sense to return everywhere the same, but some dissimulation is necessary, even where there is nothing obscure in the sense, because of the law of verse: and I could have thus subtly evaded more difficult passages, as if doing the same thing I had often done in clearer passages, had I not preferred to consider the reader's benefit and act with complete candor. To this it is added that Greek verses quoted abruptly, a few out of many, sometimes without beginning and end of a sentence, if rendered in Latin while preserving the law of verse, mostly become inept, unharmonious, and too artificial, unless one takes much liberty and deviates far from the author, as can be seen in the works of Erasmus of Rotterdam, a man otherwise learned to a miraculous degree, and in the lucubrations of others. Furthermore, it does not escape me that if a poem is turned into prose, much grace is lost, and sometimes all charm is stripped away: which readers must consider, and be more lenient towards me, if Latin passages read separately sometimes show nothing outstanding, nor should Greek be measured by Latin, since the former, both because of their language and the harmony of their verses, are much better and more pleasant to read: but the latter, both because of a foreign language, and a simple one at that, and because of the dissolution of numbers and rhythm, are read with an utterly humble and supine meaning, since nothing remains that strikes the ears with a sweet harmony, delights, or produces admiration, as Aristotle testifies somewhere in his Rhetoric that this happens. Moreover, although I sometimes wished to translate more freely, it was not permitted, since no more space was granted to the Latin than to the Greek, and precisely as much had to be contained on the Latin page as the Greek contained. Thus, for me translating, a certain space of paper, as it were, a measure of time was prescribed to the orator speaking by the water-clock: which indeed caused me no small trouble, and sometimes booksellers were compelled to use different characters on the same Latin page, partly larger, partly smaller, so as to fill the paper equally. And so much has been said thus far about the translation, perhaps too prolixly.

Furthermore, concerning the author of the work, John Stobaeus, how celebrated and distinguished a gnomographer, indeed the foremost among all writers of this genre, he rightly ought to be considered, I think it is clear to no one who has read the monuments of the learned men of our age: for most are accustomed to cite the maxims collected by him, some by name, others dissimulating whence they received them, since they possessed this gnomology hidden away as a treasure. Phavorinus Camers, whose Greek Lexicon we possess, translated some shorter maxims excerpted here and there from these collections, and compiled them into a special booklet, which consists of four or five sheets of paper, but not entirely successfully. For we compared, and from there also emended some passages of our codex. Volaterranus translated many things from here into his books. But among the ancients, I find no one who mentioned Stobaeus, except that in Suidas' Lexicon these words are read: "Joannes, surnamed Stobaeus, compiled a Florilegium, containing the opinions of many, preserved by all, in four books. It is very virtuous and full of all education. He wrote these things to his son Epimius." That is: John, surnamed Stobaeus, compiled a Florilegium, in which are contained the opinions of many, which have been committed to writing by all writers, in four books. And he writes that these are addressed to his son Epimius, being exceedingly excellent and full of all learning. So he says. Nor should anyone be moved by the fact that this copy is not inscribed to Epimius: for the beginnings of ancient books are easily corrupted and obliterated, as they are exposed to many damages due to their location. However, it is clearly apparent that the work was divided by the author himself into four books, so that the first book was related to the discipline of morals, the second to the institution of the republic, the third to the administration of family affairs, the fourth mainly to fortune and certain other mixed discourses.

Furthermore, that fragment, of which I spoke above, had the inscription "Book I" at the beginning. Moreover, there is no need for me to speak at length about the usefulness of the work itself, since everyone who has even approached good literature understands how widely the use of commonplaces extends. For from the very name the matter immediately becomes clear: for they are called commonplaces because they are suitable for many and various topics. Who among scholars, I ask, does not himself collect, or wish to collect, whatever common examples, sayings, and counsels of virtues, vices, and other such things he has observed by daily reading of authors? For it is for this reason that we read and examine books, so that we may extract this fruit as a kernel. Therefore, Stobaeus, who has already completed the greater part of this work for us, is deservedly to be acquired, read, and held in the highest esteem. For if any of us possessed such a treasure, gathered by his own vigilance and assiduous reading, how highly do you think he would value it, or for how much money would he not wish to be without it? Therefore, we ought to hold Stobaeus in high regard, especially since such a good book can be acquired for such a small sum of money: although most people are so foolish that they value otherwise excellent things less, the lower the price at which they are sold. And a certain blind self-love makes us favor our own works more than those of others. Therefore, if this kind of collection is to be approved, let us embrace Stobaeus, who alone in this genre, as far as I know, exists for us, in whom he has dealt with all other things most copiously and in the best order. Indeed, a "Florilegium" of Greek epigrams compiled by Maximus Planudes circulates, in which some commonplaces seem to be treated, but there are entirely few common maxims, since almost all seem to be written about specific persons and circumstances. There are also monostichic senarii, which convey a complete meaning in each verse, collected primarily from the plays of Menander, which are indeed elegant and quite well arranged, but very few. To these are added the Philosophical Maxims of Illustrious Men, once printed by John Froben, but those also are not many, and not arranged according to the meaning, but each ascribed to its authors in alphabetical order. Apostolius of Byzantium recently promised something of this kind, calling it Ionia, a work to be compiled by him, but whether it exists I do not know. I also hear that other Greek authors are found in certain libraries, especially among the Italians, whose lucubrations either contain maxims explicitly, or are otherwise related to this subject, whose names, lest I conceal anything, I will write here for the candid reader.

Of the Great Logothete Theodore Metochites, "Gnomikai Semeioseis", that is, sententious observations.

Notable maxims on vices and virtues from sacred and pagan authors, by an unnamed author.

Maxims from various poets.

Maxims of Democritus.

Maxims of Menander. Perhaps these are the same as the monostichs mentioned above.

Discourses of Amphilochius, Bishop of Iconium, on vices and virtues.

Of Gemistus on virtues.

Collection of proverbs by an uncertain author.

Commentaries on Greek epigrams.

Interpretation by Hierocles the philosopher on the golden verses of Pythagoras.

Exposition by Maximus Planudes on Theophrastus' characters.

Furthermore, I want to admonish the Reader that Stobaeus seems to me not to have completed his work everywhere. For sometimes maxims are not cited in their proper place: for instance, in the discourse on Prudence, many things are written that pertain more to Temperance, or to Virtue itself in general. But this was the greatest error from the beginning: in other places, almost all individual maxims sufficiently agree with the subject matter promised by the title of the discourse. Otherwise, if more were so confused, I would have changed the order: which I did not wish to do, as I observed the error in this part to be rarer. Many things are there which could be adapted to different places, mentioned by Stobaeus only once: but the Index, which has been added sufficiently copiously, will supply all these things. I had already begun to add a 'corollarium' (supplement) to each passage of Stobaeus from Greek writers, to compose and moreover add new ones: but because I feared that the book might become too bulky, and necessarily being engaged in other occupations, I deferred this labor for the present, although I had advanced it somewhat, intending to publish it separately at another time, if I live, with Christ's favor, provided that scholars indicate that the present work has not been unwelcome to them. For from Latin authors, passages should, in my judgment, be collected separately into a commentary, lest one volume become too long and inconvenient by compiling writings from both languages. Farewell, excellent Reader, and approve of our labors.

**Concerning the Second and Third Edition.**

A few years ago, having set out for Venice for pleasure, I there became friends with Arnold Arlenius Peraxylus, a most learned man: who, concerning good letters in both languages, has deserved exceedingly well, more than anyone else, and still strives, while he frequently publishes some excellent and recondite books from Florence, printed under the most illustrious Duke Cosimo de' Medici, together with the excellent Laurentius Torrentinus. Besides other no small favors to me, he also brought it about that I received from the library of the noble Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, then imperial orator at Venice, a very ancient and manuscript volume of Stobaeus. I, having soon returned to my homeland, diligently compared this with our first edition: and although very many things were contained in our Stobaeus printed earlier in Venice, and then among us with my translation, which were not in the manuscript; nevertheless, I again found very many things in that one too (among other things, ancient writings whose books are no longer extant) which were nowhere in ours. I transcribed all these, so that this Edition now comes forth augmented not only with scattered maxims, but also with entire discourses: and more enriched with named authors from whom individual maxims are drawn, without needing comparison. Furthermore, by the benefit of the same codex, I either completed mutilated passages or corrected corrupt ones. Passages on Virtue and Vice, and on Intemperance, are entirely new here. Aristotle's treatise on Virtues and Vices, we have now placed it not as before, whole in one place, but divided into various places according to its subject matter: whoever wishes to see it whole, will find it with the rest of Aristotle's works. Furthermore, I have also added here and there certain Corollaries collected from Greek books, both in verse and in prose: yet not many, not lengthy, and not without selection. The book of Theophrastus on Characters, divided into a few brief and very elegant chapters, but translated into Latin rather unsuccessfully by some anonymous interpreter long ago, I have emended with all the diligence I could, and inserted it throughout according to the subject matter. The names of authors were omitted in the Greek texts, and only added to the translation, so that Greek and Latin might be more conveniently joined in two columns on one page. Lastly, the Reader seems to need to be reminded that the Theological Discourses by Antony and Maximus the monks, collected from sacred and profane Greek authors, and edited by us in Greek and Latin, ought to be joined with this volume, if only they can be combined into one volume due to their size: if not, then for reasons of subject matter and usefulness, they will be joined by scholars as two volumes by one author. Whoever is about to speak about any matter that commonly comes into discourse, so that he may soon find it treated in our own or others' places, should consult our Universal Index, or the Tonus Bibliothecae, where, among others, we also frequently cite passages from Stobaeus and Antony Maximus. But if this inquiry seems too laborious, it will be sufficient to have inspected the indices printed with the books of Stobaeus and the Monks. Farewell again.

Moreover, this third edition is indeed the same as the second, but much more emended.

To the Most Illustrious Man, Nicolaas Brulart, Lord of Sillery, Chancellor of France, Hugo Grotius, Greetings.

I hesitated, Most Illustrious Sir, and on account of whose merits supreme dignity has been added to the supreme position you hold, whether I dared to dedicate to this literary work your name, most celebrated among all nations. For if I considered myself, I was not unaware how much I owed to you, in whom my innocence had found protection and my misfortune solace. But if I turned to you, I could not but know how much this work of mine would fall short of that lofty summit, where God and Kings and your wisdom have placed you. Yet I preferred to declare my inadequacy than to shirk a profession of debt. For even among the peoples of the East, where it was forbidden to approach kings without gifts, it was permitted to discharge a minimal offering, and those who lacked a supply of great victims were believed to make an offering of salted meal.

I was also moved by this, that these letters are not to be banished from your sight, as you have so happily absorbed them, that you could be esteemed with this praise, were it not that the magnitude of other works overshadowed this one. I did this the more readily because I am indebted to you not only for private but also for public reasons, and I wished to signify this not only privately but also publicly. For since in France I have obtained both security and tranquil leisure through royal favor, by your recommendation, it is fitting that I should not feel indifferent to the good things that have come to France through you. For that severe tempest of civil war, which raged so fiercely that it would easily have drawn foreign arms here, that not only peace but also the assurance of lasting peace was obtained for the kingdom everywhere by the restoration of the King's authority, is especially to be attributed to your and your son's prudence and industry, as all good men acknowledge, and the wicked dare not deny.

Dedication of H. Grotius.

they dare not. There is another reason, for which I owe you no less, namely that you show that the welfare of my country is dear to your heart, by adhering to the counsels of HENRY THE GREAT: and that the ungrateful and malicious spirit of a few utterly wicked men towards a King so benevolent, who is neither alienated nor indigent nor desirous of anything, cannot prevail with you to consider the republic, in which so many silently lament changed affairs, overthrown laws, and the basely treated friendship of France, whose ultimate liberty is being stripped away, as deserving to be abandoned. May God grant that one day, by the King's authority and your counsels, France may be seen not only firm and stable internally, supported by faithful friendships externally, and formidable to enemies, but also that my own country may be restored to that state in which it flourished to the wonder of Europe from the year 1589 to the year 1618. If this is added, that the wars or seeds of wars that have now flared up almost throughout the Christian world can be removed by equitable laws, with France judging, then this will indeed be the greatest addition to your praises, and will perpetually stand as a most useful gift to the human race, to be recompensed not only by human thanks and praises, but especially by His goodness, who liberally promised rewards for both lives to the authors of peace: to whose protection I commend the best King, and the kingdom, and you and yours, Most Illustrious Sir, as much as I possibly can.

The day after the Kalends of May, 1621. Paris.

PROLEGOMENA OF HUGO GROTIUS.

The Greeks used to mark the margin of the books they were reading, either by painting a star or by adding the letter 'z' to signify 'chreston', that is, that what was said in that place was useful. Then, most of those who had observed things in this way made a collection for themselves, which they called 'chrestomatheia', and arranged it into books and titles, as if into storehouses from which to draw when needed. The work of John Stobaeus was excellent in this genre, and its arrival in our hands is to be considered all the more significant because, in making his collections, he used many writers whom our age has begrudged us: so that he himself now fills their place among us. The time when this John Stobaeus lived is uncertain, but certainly after the Emperors had professed Christianity: for he uses the authority of Iamblichus among others, who lived up to the time of Julian. (Indeed, whatever appears in some books from a later age is not from Stobaeus himself, but added by other collections, as this kind of work tends to grow with many additions.)

In arranging the titles of their collections, each person chooses an order according to their own genius and capacity: but it is worthwhile to know which order Stobaeus followed. In the year 1543, Gesner edited and translated into Latin a book by Stobaeus, inscribed in this manner: *Horn of Amaltheia. Ioannes Stobaeus' Selections of Apophthegms and Precepts.* This book, without any other division, extends to 127 titles. For the fact that only 125 appear in the editions is a fault of the transcriber, who twice placed the numbers XXXVII and XXXVIII. Afterwards, in the year 1575, Guilielmus Canterus edited [a work] from the library of Joannes Sambucus,

and endowed with Latinity another part of Stobaeus under this title: *Two Books of Joannes Stobaeus' Eclogues*, of which the former comprises Physics, the latter Ethics. But from Photius's library, we truly learn that in Stobaeus's work, the first place was held by the two books that Canterus edited: followed by those that Gesner had edited, not as one book now, but as two, of which the latter, the fourth of the entire work, began with the title *On the Republic*. Knowing these things, it is not difficult to ascertain the method Stobaeus followed in arranging his titles.

For the study of Wisdom, which we call philosophy, he divided, along with Epicurus and others, into a natural and a moral part: not without reason. For the rational art, and indeed oratory, is more an instrument for the whole of life than any part of that study. The name of natural science, however, he took in a somewhat broader sense than is commonly understood, comprehending under the term 'nature' not only corporeal things but also incorporeal, even the eternal nature and maker of all nature, whom we call God. Therefore, the treatment of God and providence, and of numbers and figures, and all sidereal science, are included within this scope.

The first book of Morals contained general doctrine concerning virtue, and those things that lead to virtue: beginning with that part which Laertius calls *peri tes prōtes axias* (concerning the first value), (Marcus Aurelius: *look within. let no deed be without its own quality, nor its value be without its measure.* Cicero: *Estimation*), Seneca assigning to each his own inspection, and judging how much each is worthy.

Therefore, the first title was concerning the knowledge of God and divine matters, which, of course, has its use in morals. The second title followed this, concerning rational art and oratory, and concerning speech and letters, and then also concerning poetry, and the form of speaking which is called character. The third was concerning the moral part of wisdom itself. The fourth concerning its true foundation, that is, the freedom of human will. In Canter's edition, the second title merged with the first. The third, however, is distributed into five titles. And those which followed that title concerning the freedom of human will—up to number XLVI—have perished, and only their lemmata remain in Photius, from which we learn what kind of treatise was there.

what a philosopher ought to be, then, concerning religion, as that which is most necessary for rightly forming morals, then many things which especially pertain to human interaction, and which are thought to have some importance in life, such as fame and glory, then some general things about virtue: the last part of the book was indeed about friendship, and about benefits and gratitude: which part, since others place it last among moral topics, Stobaeus, I think, placed in an earlier position, because he considered the use of friendship to be most important for learning and cultivating virtue (in which sense the Stoics now place it among the *poietika*, that is, things conducive to honorable actions).

Having completed this general treatise, the third book followed, which is the prior part of Gesner's edition, a specific enumeration of virtues and vices. The very last book, which is the posterior part of the same edition, first contains civil science, to which military science is also referred. From there, what is now title LVI., the art of domestic management, follows, up to title XCVIII. The very last part, up to the end of the book, contains precepts which correspond to various cases of human life, and could not be conveniently referred to the preceding titles.

I have always revered other fragments that exist in Stobaeus, and especially, owing to my inclination towards the poetic art, I have singularly cherished the remnants of poets which we have preserved through his kindness. For I very often saw in them what Horace said about Homer:

Who tells us what is beautiful, what is ugly, what is useful, what is not, more fully and better than Chrysippus and Crantor.

I particularly recalled what Cicero said about Euripides, that each of his verses was a testimony. And Quintilian also says that he was almost equal to the wise in what they handed down (Athenaeus indeed calls him a dramatic philosopher). But as for Menander, who, in Quintilian's judgment, expressed the entire image of life, how could I not revere him, since a certain saying of his was eminently consecrated by the Apostles in their divine writings? Following his example, Clement of Alexandria and other ancient writers of Christian doctrine freely take emblems from the books of Greek poets, with which they adorn their own works.

I persisted in the same pursuit as that for which I was called to public service. It occurred to me what Suetonius had written about Caesar Augustus, that in perusing authors of both languages, he pursued nothing so much as precepts and examples salutary for public or private life: so that these, taken verbatim, he would often send to his household, or to the commanders of armies and governors of provinces, or to the city magistrates, according as each needed advice. For these reasons, I was often moved to follow Cicero's example, who rendered the best passages from Greek tragedies and comedies into Latin verse, so that he might have them readily available, to be useful for speeches or philosophical writings.

I seemed to myself to be doing this with greater fruit in the verses preserved by Stobaeus, because Gesner had rendered no verses in verse, contenting himself with expressing the sense in prose, to the great detriment of their charm: and Canter, though most learned in Greek and Latin, had translated them in such a way that it was apparent he was less practiced in making verses. The mass of my affairs and the turmoil long prevented me from carrying out this thought, until, by the will of fate for the republic, I was cast into prison at The Hague, and as long as I was allowed writing instruments, I prepared for myself the best solace from this exercise, alongside God and a good conscience, for the ever-beloved state of the present republic and the concord I championed. I had reached title XLIX. when my supply of writing materials was also taken away, leaving me with only the memory of what I had read and written, as a solace in that vast solitude. Having been transferred to Loevestein, I afterwards resumed the interrupted work and brought it to completion. I translated the Greek poems in a similar kind of verse, except that for the Greek lyric poems, which were free in their meter, I substituted Latin meters, which are more common, binding them into verse. In interpreting the verses of comedies, I used the liberty of comic meters, though not as much as Plautus and Terence employ, but nearly that which is found in Phaedrus's fables. I translated not too literally, but more closely than Cicero did Aratus,

Germanicus, Avienus, Priscian on Dionysius, and the same Avienus, so that I generally matched the number of verses as well. The pleasure of this work led me to another similar one, namely to translate from Sophocles and Euripides whatever Stobaeus had left untouched concerning morals: and likewise, the remaining maxims we have from other tragedies and from more recent comedies: this collection equals or surpasses Stobaeus's work.

In the same prison, I wrote the institutes of Hollandic law in my native language, in Loevestein. In the same language, but in verses, I wrote six books for the use of common people, especially foreigners, so that those who cannot avoid the customs of the impious, pagans, Jews, and Mohammedans might have something by which to protect themselves or even to convince others. In that work, which recently became public, just as I confess myself helped by the labors of others before me, so I trust that the order, and other things that are properly mine, will not displease fair judges. While I was occupied with these, a man destined for the gratitude of posterity, Thomas Erpenius, a restorer of Oriental languages, wrote to me, stating that he was preparing an edition of the books of the New Testament in Greek, Syriac, Arabic, and Ethiopic, with various Latin interpretations: and that he implored the help of friends, among whom he placed me, more out of his affection than my merit, to adorn it with notes. Although I knew how little gleanings remained after the harvests of the most learned Erasmus, Beza, Maldonatus, and Jansenius, yet to oblige such a great man, I committed to paper what seemed to me to pertain to the investigation of the true reading, the interpretation of words and phrases, the collation of parallel passages, and the illustration of customs and rites.

And I had already reached the end of Luke when, by the wonderful grace of God, I was released from my bonds. Whence, having come to France, I was received by the Most Christian King with that benevolence with which good and just kings are accustomed to receive supplicants, who are wretched not by their own fault but by public calamity. And here, having found leisure, I believed it to be my first duty to make known to mankind the truth of what had been done by and against us: which I did briefly and with the utmost fidelity in my *Apologeticus*, intending to do so more fully in my *Annals*, which

I have mostly completed, and which, if any false opinion has lingered with anyone, will abundantly wipe it away. After this concern, I undertook the second task of editing the works of Stobaeus that exist in Greek and Latin verses. I have presented the Greek text, corrected in innumerable places, both regarding the sense and the laws of poetry, partly by my own conjecture and that of friends who will be named in the Notes, and partly from books which I obtained through the courtesy of the very famous and learned man Nicolaus Rigaltius from the Royal Library. For I incorporated the emendations into the text itself, so that it might be read with less offense: however, I mentioned the previously apparent reading in the Notes. Moreover, this edition has been augmented with many verses by means of manuscripts, which were lacking in the common codices.

I need not commend the usefulness of this work at length to many. For it is clear that, while all maxims and skillfully expressed sayings are of the greatest use, those contained in verses flow more pleasantly into the mind and adhere more firmly to memory. Hence it is that in the most ancient times, precepts of wisdom were given only in poems: to which Homer's account also pertains, that Clytemnestra did not yield to vice until she had lost her singer.

Youths must only be warned not to give assent to all sayings, but to exercise judgment. For because the art of poets shines most brightly in moving emotions, it happens that their sayings do not always align with the rules of wisdom, which is the moderator of emotions: a point Plato proves with examples from Homer in his books *On the Republic*. Furthermore, poets, like painters, imitate both the crooked and the straight, and assign words to each character according to their disposition and manners: which should be taken as outlines of the mind of the speaker introduced, not as the approving judgment of the poet. Plutarch most wisely addresses these dangers in a small book he wrote for youths, *On Reading Poets*, which for that reason I have had prefixed to this work. For he teaches excellently that the sayings of poets must be examined against what more austere teachers, namely philosophers, dictate. But not even thus is the danger avoided: for even in these very things, which can be known to some extent by the guidance of reason,

we see philosophers err, whence such great discrepancy among their tenets; and there are certain things of such a kind that their truth cannot be investigated by human reason alone. In these matters, while other philosophers often deviate from what is true, Plutarch himself also, in the book I mentioned, when he treats of providence and of things to be expected after this life. Therefore, the ancient Hebrews owed much to God Most Good and Great; we Christians owe even more to the same God, to whom all things that have any bearing on rightly ordering life have been revealed with such certainty that no room for doubt is left in upright minds. For it is certain that what the Prophets and Apostles have handed down to us came from God, which can be established, as far as possible, only by manifested wonders, and by their own testimony, to which the innocence of their lives adds credibility, no gain from falsehood, and many evils, sometimes even death, endured for that testimony. And what is said to be true by God is among the enunciations of primordial light, which do not borrow light from elsewhere. For in the very name of God, just as all good, so also the meaning of truthfulness is included.

Therefore, just as from poets to philosophers, so also from poets and philosophers to a third tribunal, that is, to the Prophets and Apostles, we must appeal: and only those sayings are to be held valid which can stand in this court. On this matter, since Basil, as is his custom, has piously and eloquently discoursed, not undeservedly having obtained the name "the Great," we have deemed it fitting to place his discourse pertinent to this argument at the beginning of this work; so that just as a remedy against the enchantment of poets is prepared for youth from Plutarch, so a remedy against the contagions of Plutarch and others who philosophize outside the oracles of God may be prepared from Basil.

And what Basil advises, I myself most strongly advise young people, as much as I can, to compare as diligently as possible those maxims that exist in the sacred text with the maxims of the Greeks. For from this they will derive no small utility, nor

b And the tabernacle of Moses and the temple of Solomon and Zerubbabel had much from the Egyptians, Syrians, Arabs, Persians.

e Tertullian, *On the Soul*.

I promise, but also pleasure. Long ago, the peoples of the East excelled greatly in the sententious style of speaking: which, among other things, the Arabic gnomological books demonstrate, which, like many other things, Erpenius, whom I just named, was the first to give to Europe: whence we learn that that Pythagorean saying, that fire must not be stirred with a sword, as well as many other things of his school, came from the East. The antiquity of this study is attested by that passage in the first book of Samuel, which in Latin is the first book of Kings, chapter XXIV, verse 14: כאשר יאמר משל הקומני מרשעים יצא רשע, that is: as that ancient saying goes, "Wickedness proceeds from the wicked"; which saying corresponds to the Greek proverb, κακοῦ κόρακος κακὸν ἀὸν, "a bad crow laid a bad egg." The word which in that place denotes a saying properly signifies a comparison, whence Hellenists, who prefer to approach the Hebrew idiom as closely as possible rather than follow the elegance of Greek speech, translated both there and elsewhere παραβολὴν.

The reason for this name is that the most ancient authors used to deliver precepts about morals and the republic through comparisons, either full ones, which rhetoricians properly call παραβολὰς, or abridged ones, and these either taken from plainly fabulous things, such as that about the trees, olive, vine, thistle, in Judges VIII. 8. and about the thorn and cedar in 2 Chronicles XXV. 18., about the hawk and nightingale in Hesiod, Demosthenes about wolves, dogs, and sheep, Menenius about the members of the human body: or from plausible things, such as that of Nathan to David, and most of Christ's parables. The ancients called these abridged comparisons αἴνους, "fables", and later they began to be called apologi, "allegories". And because a brief fable becomes a παροιμία, "proverb", therefore by abuse, what other Gospel writers call παραβολάς, "parables", John called παροιμίαις, in Luke VI. 6., XVI. 25., XVI. 29. On the other hand, in Matthew XV. 16., what is truly a παροιμία is called παραβολὴ. From this frequent use of comparisons and fables, every speech deviating from the common began to be called משל among the Hebrews, as can be seen in Ezekiel XX. 49. And not only figurative speech, but also simple speech, which merely contained some useful precept. Hence among the Hebrews, משלי, and among the Greeks, παραβολαὶ (and παροιμίαι), is the title of that book which first contains the sayings of Solomon, as if poured forth by him without any order,

contains them; then collections from other books of the same author and others, likewise without order, aphoristically, as Theognis and the old and true Phocylides wrote among the Greeks. For the book that now exists under his name is by a Christian, just as Christians published books under the names of the Sibyls and Hermes Trismegistus, and just as Pythagoreans imposed the names of Orpheus and Linus on their books. (In a similar manner, we also have two books written by Isocrates, one on private life to Demonicus, the other on royal matters to Nicocles.) Following the example of Solomon and those who imitated him, Jesus Sirach the father began to compile sayings, partly his own, partly collected from elsewhere, into a single body, but likewise without order; and Jesus the other son of the same Sirach completed that book; which book, and another similar one titled *Ecclesiasticus*, which is believed to have an older Philo as author, not the one from the time of Caius, we owe to the Alexandrian synagogue. Therefore, if anyone diligently compares the sayings from these books with those of the Greeks, which are extant in Stobaeus and elsewhere, I think he will perform a great service.

But also in the sayings of Christ, many things are taken from common popular speech or from the precepts of the wise, but which He Himself generally transferred from human matters to divine. It will not be unpleasant to compare these sayings also with those of the Greeks and Romans. For example, what is in Matthew chapter V.: "God makes His sun rise on the good and on the evil:" Seneca expressed it thus: "and for the wicked the sun rises." What is in the same Matthew VII.: "Seek and you will find," is the same as that of Sophocles: "Everything sought is found. To seek is to hope." (Nothing is so difficult that it cannot be investigated by seeking. Terence, *Heautontimoroumenos*.)

But indeed, that passage in the same place: "Why do you see the speck in your brother's eye, but do not perceive the plank in your own eye?" has the same meaning as that of Menander:

d Seneca's saying: You observe others' pimples, but are yourselves covered with many ulcers. STOBAEUS' FLORILEGIUM VOL. I.

We are all wise in advising, but we ourselves do not know when we err. Indeed, we all give good counsel to others: but we do not heed our own errors. And that also by the same author: No one perceives his own evils, Pamphilus, clearly; but he will see them if another commits an unseemly act. Whoever commits anything shameful, Pamphilus, does not see it himself: but if another does it, he sees it. To the same point belongs that old Latin saying: "But we do not see what is in the pouch behind us." And that of Cicero: "It is characteristic of foolishness to see the vices of others, and to forget one's own." The following from an unknown author also approaches it more closely: "You, most envious man, are sharp-sighted to another's vice, but you overlook your own." "Another's fault, which is your malice, you see acutely, but you overlook your own." Whence Horace took his own saying: "When you, with your bleared and anointed eyes, overlook your own ills, why do you see so sharply the faults of your friends, more keenly than an eagle or an Epidaurian serpent?"

And what is in chapter X.: "For there is nothing hidden that will not be revealed, and nothing secret that will not be known;" it agrees with that of Sophocles: "All things that are hidden by long and countless time, time brings to light." "Long days reveal all hidden human things." And with that of Menander: "Time brings truth to light." What is in chapter XII.: "Every kingdom divided against itself will be desolated; and every city or house divided against itself will not stand:" it agrees with that of Sophocles: "For there is no greater evil than anarchy: this destroys cities, and makes houses desolate." "No greater pest is misrule: This overturns both homes and cities long renowned."

To which is similar that passage of Cicero: "What house is so stable, what city so firm, that it cannot be utterly overthrown by hatreds and discords?" In the same chapter of Matthew there is another saying: "Out of the abundance of the heart, the mouth speaks;" the same, strong, with that of Menander: "A man's character is known by his speech." Speech reveals human character. And that of Aristides: "As the disposition, so the speech." As the character, so the speech. Thus that which occurs in two places: "Many are called, but few are chosen:" Theodoret explains this by that Greek proverb, although it comes from a false religion: "Many are thyrsi-bearers, but few are inspired by Evios." Many carry the thyrsus, few are inspired by Bacchus. And that which is also read in more than one place: "To him who has, it will be given," is taken from popular speech: to which Martial's saying responds: "Wealth is now given to none but the rich."

Innumerable such instances will be found by those who wish to read sacred and profane writers with care. Above all, however, young people should diligently observe in reading Greek and Latin whatever occurs that pertains not to the rules of common life, but to true piety: of which, just as full light appears only in sacred texts, so sparks are to be seen scattered among others, so many and varied, that I almost dare to say, just as no one has seen everything, so there is nothing that no one has seen: so that one may partly pity nations seeking the way by groping in dense darkness, and partly admire the goodness of God, who did not allow truth, held back by injustice, to be completely overwhelmed. To illustrate this with a few examples, and to show youths the way by which they can advance simultaneously in letters and in piety, we will begin with what the sacred oracles admonish: "Be wise with sobriety in divine matters," "God's secrets are to be left to God," "He who searches majesty will be overwhelmed by glory," and other things of that kind. For to these perfectly corresponds that of Philemon: "Believe in God and worship him, but seek no further, for you have nothing more to seek than that."

It is proper to believe in God and worship him, not to question him: For beyond Him, by seeking, you will gain nothing. And this also from Anaxandrides: "We are all foolish concerning divine things, and we know nothing at all." We human beings are dull towards divine matters, nor do we know a whit. Nor is that of Aristarchus far off: "And again, to speak well is equal to not speaking well; to inquire is equal to not knowing. For the wise know nothing more about these things than the unwise; but if one speaks better than another, he excels only in speaking." Concerning these matters, to speak or not to speak is equal; the right belongs equally to the ignorant and to the seeker. Nor do those who are thought to be wise see more than the inert populace: but if anyone seems to speak more correctly, he has only more to say.

To these may be added that of Xenophon: "For it is manifest to all that divine things are beyond us; and it is enough to revere the power of that which is superior to us. And who the Gods are, it is neither easy to discover nor lawful to seek. For it is not proper for servants to know the nature or actions of their masters, to whom nothing more than service is due." It is manifest that divine things are above us. Moreover, veneration is due to a more excellent and powerful nature: but what kind of Gods they are (we will say what the nature of God is) is as difficult to discover as it is unlawful to scrutinize. For it is not proper for servants to know the nature or actions of masters, to whom the glory of obedience is left. To this passage Nazianzen seems to have referred when, speaking of Christ, he said, that it is not for servants to dispute about the birth of the master. However, the general properties of God, from which in the sacred books he is invisible, immense, eternal, most good,

e Plato, *Timaeus*: "Therefore, to find the maker and father of this universe is a task, and having found him, to speak of him to all is impossible." Cited by Theodoretus in *Therapeutica of Greek Affections*, Book II.

f The same meaning in Hilary, Book I *On the Trinity*, Ambrose, Book V, Chrysostom, Book I *On the Trinity*. Add: "much rather, those who curiously inquire into the Master's birth will suffer the worst ignominy." [In this note, I have omitted certain things because I could not read them.]

it is said, not all Greeks were ignorant, as appears from these verses cited from an ancient tragedy: "Separate God from mortals, and do not think He is like yourself, made of flesh; you do not know Him. Sometimes He appears as unformed fire in its impulse; sometimes as water, sometimes as mist. And He Himself becomes like beasts, to wind, cloud, lightning, thunder, rain; the sea serves Him, and the dreadful rocks, and every spring, and systems of water; mountains tremble, and the earth, and the vast deep of the sea, and the great height of the mountains, when the Lord looks with a stern eye."

"Separate God from all mortal impurity, nor think Him clothed in flesh, nor like yourself: He is unknown: now He appears as implacable fire, now He is seen equal to darkness, now to water. Sometimes He imitates a beast, thunder, winds, lightning, fires, clouds. The sea and dreadful rocks serve Him, and dreadful rocks, and liquid springs of rivers and their winding courses. The earth itself shudders at Him, and the mountain ridges, and the widely spread depths of the dark blue sea, if perchance the Lord casts a stern glance."

To this may be added that of Antiphanes the Socratic: "God is like nothing; therefore, no one can know Him from an image." God is like nothing: whence no one can know Him from an effigy. And that of Xenophon: "He, therefore, who shakes and terrifies all things, is clearly great and powerful: but invisible, so that His form cannot be known." He, therefore, who shakes and terrifies all things, is certainly, as is clear, great and powerful: but invisible, so that His form cannot be known. And that of Thales: who, when asked what God was, replied, "That which has neither beginning nor end;" that is, what lacks a beginning and an end. And again, when asked by another whether a man doing anything could escape God's notice; "No," he said, "not even thinking." (Antipater of Tarsus: [in Plutarch, II, p. 1051, E.] "Therefore, we conceive God as a blessed and immortal living being, and beneficial to men." We believe God to be a living, blessed, imperishable, beneficial being to humans.) To this may be added that of Philemon: "What God, tell me, is to be conceived? He who sees all things, but is himself unseen."

If you know God, then know this also, that the divine can do all things. If God is known to you, then also know this, that God can do all things. And this by Anaxandrides: "We are all foolish concerning divine matters, and we know nothing at all." We human beings are dull towards divine things, nor do we know a whit. Nor is that of Aristarchus far off: "And again, to speak well is equal to not speaking well; to inquire is equal to not knowing. For the wise know nothing more about these things than the unwise; but if one speaks better than another, he excels only in speaking." Concerning these matters, to speak or not to speak is equal; the right belongs equally to the ignorant and to the seeker. Nor do those who are thought to be wise see more than the inert populace: but if anyone seems to speak more correctly, he has only more to say.

To these may be added that of Xenophon: "For it is manifest to all that divine things are beyond us; and it is enough to revere the power of that which is superior to us. And who the Gods are, it is neither easy to discover nor lawful to seek. For it is not proper for servants to know the nature or actions of their masters, to whom nothing more than service is due." It is manifest that divine things are above us. Moreover, veneration is due to a more excellent and powerful nature: but what kind of Gods they are (we will say what the nature of God is) is as difficult to discover as it is unlawful to scrutinize. For it is not proper for servants to know the nature or actions of masters, to whom the glory of obedience is left. To this passage Nazianzen seems to have referred when, speaking of Christ, he said, that it is not for servants to dispute about the birth of the master. However, the general properties of God, from which in the sacred books he is invisible, immense, eternal, most good,

Sweet hopes nourish and soothe the soul, and guide the wandering mind's course to old age. In the golden verse it is: "When you leave the body and go forth to the ethereal, you will be an immortal God, imperishable, no longer mortal." You will go to the ethereal abodes, where, free in body, you will be an immortal God, and no longer human.

From Epicharmus: "If your mind is pious by nature, you will suffer no evil after death. Your spirit will remain blessed forever in heaven." If your mind is holy, you will suffer no ill dying: your spirit will forever remain blessed in heaven.

Tertullian refers to the resurrection of the dead with an old proverb: "He has gone, and he must return." Nor are there wanting philosophers who have taught this. And concerning the future conflagration of the world, we read that the Sibyl and Hystaspes wrote things consistent with sacred oracles: whence those things cited from a tragedy seem to be derived: "For there will be, there will certainly be that time of ages, when a golden ether shall burst forth with a treasury full of fire, and the flame, nourished, shall rage and consume all things on earth and above them; then, when all this has perished, the entire depth of the waves will be gone, and the earth will be desolate of its foundations, and the air will no longer bear winged creatures, burning; and then it will save all things which it had previously destroyed."

"For that day will come, will surely come, when golden ether, rich with overflowing stores of fire, will burst forth: then, raging, the fiery heat will consume the earth, and whatever is loftier than it. Then, when all this has ceased, no waters will carry waves,

k From which that of Antipho does not greatly deviate: "The impious man who transgresses against the gods, and even deprives himself of hope (which is the greatest good of human life), deprives himself of it." Whoever is impious and sins against divine things, even deprives himself of hope (which is the greatest good of human life).

l Chalcidius: "Having laid aside the body, when you freely proceed to the ether, you escape human pride, a nourishing god of ether."

m Antisthenes used to say that those who wish to be immortal must live piously and justly.

nor will the scorched air nourish the winged race: Soon the same will restore all things, who gave them to destruction. From this, Ovid also seems to have taken his own saying: "It is remembered that it is also in the Fates, that a time will come. When the sea, and the earth, and the seized royal palace of heaven will burn, and the laborious mass of the world will labor." (After whom Lucan: "A common pyre remains for the world, about to mingle stars with bones.")

Sacred authority teaches that humans are prone to sin. To this agrees the saying of Sopater: "It is innate for humans to err." (And what we read in Thucydides: "All are born to sin both privately and publicly:" so all are born to commit many sins both privately and publicly. And Sophocles: "For it is common to all mortals to err:" "To err is innate in all mortals.")

And this of Seneca: "We have all sinned: some gravely, some lightly, some intentionally, some by chance impulse, or carried away by others' wickedness: some of us stood too weakly by good counsel, and lost our innocence unwillingly and reluctantly. Nor do we only transgress, but we will transgress until the very end of our lives." It is also his: "Among other inconveniences of mortality, this is the darkness of minds, that there is not only a necessity of erring, but a love of errors." And this: "We must always declare the same about ourselves, that we are bad, we have been bad." (It is also his, "No one is found who can absolve himself.") The philosopher Themistius expressed the same meaning thus: "To err not at all lies outside human nature:" "To sin not at all is placed outside the condition of human nature." Aristides *On Concord* to the Rhodians: "To be without sin from the beginning is characteristic of gods; and it has not reached any one of us who dwell on earth." To be perpetually free from sin is for gods, and it has not reached any of us who inhabit the earth. Plotinus also saw what the beginning of this evil is: "A small initial turning, progressing, always makes the sin more and greater, and the body was constituted, and desire came from necessity."

A slight inclination at the beginning, progressing, makes the sins graver and more numerous. Moreover, since the body exists within us, desire also necessarily exists. To this can be added that of Aristotle: "For the beginning has such power, to prepare many things as it is itself. For this is the work of the beginning, to make, as it is itself, many other things." For a principle has the power to produce many things of its own kind. For it is the property of a principle to make other things similar to itself.

It follows from this that humans cannot strive for true piety or persevere in it without divine aid: which, just as the sacred scriptures openly declare, Plato also saw, in whom we read these words: "How then, Socrates, do you think good men come to be, if they are not by nature, nor by learning? In what other way then would they come to be good? I think it would not be easy to explain. But I conjecture that this is preeminently a divine gift, and that good men come to be, just as divine seers and soothsayers come to be. For these are not such by nature, nor by art, but they become such by divine inspiration from the gods." If therefore good men are not made by nature nor by discipline, Socrates, how shall we say they are made? I think it is not easy to explain this. But I conjecture that this is primarily a divine matter, and that good men are made, just as prophets and seers are made. For these too are not such by nature or by discipline, but they become such, inspired by divine power. (To this passage refers Dion of Prusa, *Borysthenic Oration*: "A short voice came, and some divine inspiration of nature and truth, like a ray of fire shining from the unseen." A brief voice reaches men, and a certain inspiration of divine nature and truth, like the splendor of light shining from the hidden.) Simonides: "No one attains virtue without the gods." No one obtains virtue without God.

There are other similar passages in Plato, and a notable diatribe on this subject by Maximus Tyrius, number XXII. (Ecphantus: "Man is a creature residing on earth, greatly inferior to a purer nature, and heavily burdened by the earth, as if barely lifted from its mother, unless some divine inspiration mercifully joins him to the superior part, revealing the sacred wisdom of the creator.")

HUGONIS GROTII

This is a foreign thing, and very remote from purer nature; and it can barely tear itself away from the earth, as if from its mother, unless some divine inspiration touches the miserable creature, and gives it to a better nature, and shows it the benevolent face of the father.

Polybius, wishing a better mind for the Cyneatheans, adds: "If ever God should bestow it upon them." (Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, II: No great man was ever without some divine inspiration.) Seneca: No good man exists without God. Can anyone rise above fortune unless aided by Him? God dwells in every good man. And again: Such a great thing cannot stand without the help of a deity. Elsewhere: God comes to men, indeed, what is closer, He comes into men. No good mind exists without God. Sacred authority teaches that faith is needed to comprehend things that do not fall under the senses. (This is for Plutarch: "a certain fixed seat and foundation for piety, a foundation for devotion.")

Plato said: "For look around, lest any of the uninitiated hear; and these are those who think nothing exists except what they can grasp firmly with their hands." Look around and see lest any profane person hears. And profane are those who think nothing exists unless they can clearly comprehend it with their hands.

Heraclitus's subtle saying is this: "If you do not hope for the unhoped, you will not find the unsearchable and impassable." Unless you hope for what is beyond hope, you will not find that which cannot be found.

And Euripides:

The unseen

is apprehended credibly by signs.

What is unobservable

can be sought by credible signs.

And Xenophanes of Colophon:

Yet with his mind, he steadfastly beholds things far away as if present.

And he beholds things that are absent with a mind as if present and firm.

And in Xenophon's Cyropaedia it says: "The gods do not love those who disbelieve." (The gods do not love the incredulous.)

(Theophilus quotes from Plato that it is impossible to learn accurately unless God teaches through the law.)

PROLEGOMENA

We are taught that those who cultivate God are heard by Him, both elsewhere and in John 9. The poet, name unknown, said:

God is not deaf to the righteous prayer.

God easily hears the prayers of the pious.

Christ said that we should not pray with many words, because God the Father knows what we need. Plato elaborates on this in the later Alcibiades, and Juvenal in Satire X. The following ancient verses also pertain to this:

O King Zeus, grant us what is good, both to those who pray and to those who do not; but avert from us what is terrible, even if we pray for it.

O Father supreme, whether we are silent or pray,

Grant us good things: but ward off evils, even from those who pray.

And that other saying:

May it not happen to me what I desire, but what is expedient.

What the Lacedaemonians praised was the formula: "May God give what is beautiful with what is good." So that God may give honorable things with useful ones.

Prophets and Christ, in many disputes against the Pharisees, everywhere cry out that inner sanctity is more pleasing to God than outward rites. To this pertains the saying of Epicharmus:

If you have a pure mind, your whole body is pure.

If your mind is pure, your whole body is pure to you.

How little does this differ from what we read in Matthew 23:26 and Luke 11:11? To which also the response of the Pythagorean woman can be referred, who, when asked on what day a woman was pure after coitus with a man, replied: "Immediately after her own, never after another's."

And what Diogenes said upon hearing the verses of Sophocles, who affirmed that all initiates after this life were blessed, while others were subject to many evils, he wondered if Pataecion, a notorious thief, would fare better after this life than the excellent Epaminondas, because the former was initiated, but the latter was not. To this also pertains what Menander or Philemon said:

If someone, O Pamphilus, offers a sacrifice,

Be it a multitude of bulls, or goats, or by Zeus

other such animals, or brings gifts

like a golden or purple robe,

or ivory or emerald figurines,

and hopes thereby to gain the favor of God,

he is deceived, and his mind is foolish.

For a man must be useful by nature,

not defiling virgins or committing adultery,

not stealing or killing for money.

And do not desire even a needle, Pamphilus,

for God sees you present nearby.

(Julian to Heraclius thus: "It is ridiculous," he said (Diogenes), "O young man, if you think that the tax collectors, for the sake of this initiation, will share with the gods the good things in Hades, but Agesilaus and Epaminondas will lie in the mud.")

And not dissimilar to that which is often confused with the former:

And not even a needle,

my dearest, ever desire what belongs to another.

For God delights in righteous deeds.

And he allows one to elevate their own life through labor,

plowing the earth night and day;

And sacrifice to God always, being righteous through and through;

Be not splendid in your robes, but in your heart.

When you hear thunder, do not flee far away,

having nothing to reproach yourself for, master.

(Josephus, On Samuel, book 6 (7), Antiquities: The prophet said that the divine does not delight in sacrifices, but in good and righteous deeds; and these are those who follow His will and commands, and believe that nothing good will be done by themselves unless they do what God has commanded.)

PROLEGOMENA

Nor if it thunders from heaven, flee immediately,

my dear, for you are conscious of no fault within yourself.

(In the preamble of Charondas' laws it was stated, "to have a soul pure of all wickedness; for the gods are not pleased by the sacrifices and expenditures of wicked men, but by the just and pure conduct of good men": let everyone have a mind pure of all malice; for the gods are not pleased by the sacrifices and expenditures of wicked men, but by the just and pure conduct of good men. Dion of Prusa, in his third oration, says that God is honored by righteous deeds and just actions: thus he believed that whatever is done wrong is also impious, and what is done rightly is pious. Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, II: The best and most chaste and most holy and most pious worship of the gods is to always venerate them with a pure, uncorrupted mind and voice. The same, On Laws, II: The law commands to approach the gods chastely; that is, with the mind, in which all things reside.)

And there is also that saying of Menander:

Every pure person is one who is conscious of no evil in himself.

That man is truly pure who is conscious of no evil in himself.

And of the same author:

Every place is sacred by good words;

for the mind is what speaks to God.

Every place is a temple in good words: for the mind is what speaks to God.

And that of Thucydides should not be scorned: "A festival is nothing other than doing what is necessary." A festival is nothing other than doing what is proper. (And of Diogenes: "Does not a good man consider every day a festival?")

The supreme precept of charity, which Christ inculcates everywhere, Emperor Severus emphasized in almost the same words: "What you do not want for yourself, do not do to another." Aristotle and Cicero seem to approve of private revenge. Christ's teaching, to which Plato's saying beautifully conforms, commands the opposite: "Therefore, in no way should one do injustice." "By no means." "Then, should one not retaliate when wronged, as many suppose, since one should in no way do injustice?" "It does not seem so." "What then, to do evil?"

HUGONIS GROTII.

"should one, O Crito, or not?" "By no means, O Socrates." "What then? To retaliate when suffering evil, as many say, is it just or not, is it just?" "By no means." "For to do evil to men is no different from doing injustice." "You speak truly." Plato teaches the same in many other places, and Maximus Tyrius in his second dissertation. And the Lacedaemonians in their prayers asked God "to be able to suffer injustice," to endure injustice.

This is from Menander:

This man, O Gorgia, is the best of men,

who knows best how to bear injustice among mortals.

O Gorgia, that man is the best of men

who knows best how to bear injuries from others.

Seneca excellently: "Inhuman is the word, and yet accepted as just, revenge, and it differs from insult only in order. He who returns pain sins only more excusably." (Ariston the Spartan, when someone said it was kingly to do good to friends and evil to enemies, said: "No, rather do good to friends and make enemies friends." Dion, in that admirable speech about the liberator of Sicily, says in Plutarch that the true demonstration of a philosopher's study is not that one is kind to friends, but "if one who is wronged is easily appeased and mild towards those who err.")

Juvenal's passage concerning the same matter is well-known. But Musonius the philosopher not only forbade retaliating injustice with one's own hand, but also did not think that actions for injuries, that is, for revenge, should be instituted. (And in Lysias we read: "it is ignoble and very litigious to go to court for slanders.") Comedy teaches wrongly that it is not shameful for a young man to whore, and Cato's authority is deceptive: "It is right for young men to..."

(Cicero: "It is a sin to be in lust, even without the act.")

PROLEGOMENA

descend. But what Epictetus says perfectly agrees with Christ's teaching, which bars fornicators from the heavenly kingdom: "Concerning sexual matters, one must be pure before marriage." One must abstain from sexual intercourse before marriage.

And also this from Musonius: "As many sexual acts as are outside of marriage, and deprived of legal validity, all these are disgraceful. For they are done out of incontinence." For any sexual intercourse outside of adultery, if it is not in accordance with law, is base. For it has only lust as its aim.

(Charondas wrote in his laws, "Let each man love his lawful wife, and from her let him beget children; and let him not cast his seed for children elsewhere; nor let him recklessly and insolently squander that which is by nature and by law honorable. For nature made procreation for the sake of begetting, not for incontinence." There is a remarkable passage in Dion of Prusa's seventh oration, where he severely inveighs against those lusts which were formerly considered permissible in their time, and shows that not only are more serious crimes not prevented by such permission, but rather that a step is taken towards them.)

Many peoples' laws formerly condoned divorce: but not right reason, which aligns with divine law, hence Anaxandridas' saying:

For the double course brings shame.

This reciprocal journey is never free from infamy.

And this from Martial:

She who marries so many times is by law an adulteress:

I am offended less by a common prostitute.

(Seneca: Does any woman now blush at divorce, after some illustrious and noble women count their years not by consuls but by husbands, and leave marriage to marry again after divorce? This was feared for as long as it was rare. But because no acts are done without divorce, what they often heard, they learned to do.)

(Pythagoras' act of freeing the Crotonians from familiarity with unmarried women: he called for them to abstain from all intercourse with unmarried women.)

HUGONIS GROTII.

Thus also, it was customary among many peoples to have more than one wife. But Euripides rightly saw what is best:

For it is not good for one man to hold the reins of two women,

but rather, looking to one conjugal Cypris,

they love her, whoever wishes to manage his house well.

For it is not right

for one man to rule over two women.

Let whoever desires to manage his house properly

be content with one wife.

(And elsewhere: "I will never praise double beds for mortals." Never will I praise double beds. Likewise: "You spoke of an evil thing, a double bed for one man." You speak of a bad thing, a double bed for a man. Among those who have many wives, as C. Sallustius said of the Numidians: "That slight necessity is drawn, because the mind, being divided among a multitude, obtains no value as a partner, and all are equally worthless.")

It is Christ's saying that it is difficult for the rich to attain salvation: hence Plato's saying is not far off: "It is extremely impossible for one who is exceptionally good to be also exceptionally rich." It is not possible for one who is exceedingly good to be also exceedingly rich.

Those who err, Christ commanded that they should first be admonished privately, then before many. Likewise Seneca: "You are still in the first part of errors, and you err not gravely, but frequently: secret admonition first, then public, will correct you."

Similarly, sacred writers tell us in many places that we must be like God: and Plato said, "The end of good things is to become like God." The end of good things is to become like God. Christ teaches that good deeds are corrupted if they are done primarily for the sake of glory. To this agrees the praise of the good man in Aeschylus:

For he wishes to be best, not to seem so.

For he wishes to be the best man, not to be believed to be so.

And that from Cleanthes:

Illiberal is anyone who looks to glory.

He is ignoble who strives for glory!

That many of the Hebrews did not believe that even one who merely willed to do evil was guilty of sin, as appears from Josephus and their more recent teachers, there are those who saw it:

(Cicero: "It is a sin to be in lust, even without the act." Aelian: "Not only is he who has done evil a bad man, but also he who has thought of doing evil, in my judgment.")

PROLEGOMENA

Seneca: "All crimes are perfect before the act is done, as far as the fault is concerned." Elsewhere: "He is a robber even before he soils his hands, who is already armed to kill, and has the will to plunder and slay. Wickedness is exercised and revealed by action, but does not begin with it." (Elsewhere: Not without reason is she numbered among sinners who preferred chastity to fear, and not to herself. The father in his declamations: She is incestuous even without intercourse who desires intercourse.) To this can also be referred Ovid's saying:

She does it, who does not do it because she was not allowed to.

Though your body you have guarded well, your mind is adulterous:

With all excluded, an adulterer will be within.

(Aristophanes himself says, "For to think is equivalent to doing." For to be able to do and to wish are equally valid. Dion of Prusa in Oration LXVIII says: "And he who refrains from stealing out of fear, but not because he hates and condemns the act, is a thief of stolen goods." He is no less a thief who abstains from theft out of fear, not because he hates or condemns the thing, than he who takes what belongs to another.)

In this sense, Tryphoninus the jurist also says that an adulterer can be called such by intention alone, even if he has never corrupted another man's wife: if only his mind is such that he would commit it given the opportunity.

And Aristides defined justice as "not to desire what belongs to others," not to covet what is alien. No one among us is ignorant of how much praise and promises repentance has in sacred writings. And Plutarch says "repentance, a saving daemon." Repentance is a saving Goddess. And elsewhere: "Reason removes other sorrows, but repentance she herself creates." Reason removes other pains. It creates repentance itself.

(In Arrian we read, "The only cure for sin is to confess one's transgression, and to show that one repents of it." Pindar said: "The minds of good men are curable:" good minds are curable.)

Now, if I proceed to relate which parts of ancient or new covenant history the Greek and Latin writers approved by their testimony, what...

(Aelius: "Not only is he who has done evil a bad man, but also he who has thought of doing evil, in my judgment.")

HUGONIS GROTII.

the customs of these writers were similar to new or recent sacraments, the preface would stray too far from the original institution and become too long, though we have already extended it a little, to encourage young people, who use this book of Stobaeus and similar ones, to be careful in despising evils, if any exist, and to be diligent in observing what is right. If our translation is not everywhere as vigorous, keen, and fluent as accurate judgment would desire, the reader will forgive, if he has any humanity, given the very serious calamities in which this work was born. And if, after the greatest part has been exhausted, some part still remains, we will bear the falsehoods and slanders against us and the threats of the powerful with good grace, and often repeat that Homeric saying to ourselves:

Endure, dear heart, for you have endured worse things before.

Endure, dear soul; for you have borne even heavier burdens.

POSTSCRIPTUM.

We also wish to admonish the reader that, from the many readings available in common codices, we have adopted what seemed better; we have also used the emendations written in the margin of printed books whenever we deemed them correct. We have ascribed the names of authors and places based on the authority of MS. A, which often differs greatly from the common codices; unless it was certainly established from elsewhere that the sentiment was taken from there, for example, because the book existed, or the sentiment was praised elsewhere with the author's name explicitly stated. We also followed this in related names, as the verse structure required. Thus, when the names of Philiscus, Philemon, and Phileas were often interchanged, we assigned the tragic verses to Philiscus, the comic ones to Philemon, and the elegiac ones to Phileas. But you should not wonder at this either, if a sentiment sometimes has the name "Tragedy" ascribed to it, and you search for that sentiment in vain in a tragedy of that name now. For often the same poet wrote several tragedies on the same subject at different times, or left out part and changed part, so that a double edition of them reached posterity: which could be proven with many examples.

(Philiscus of Aegina wrote Tragedies according to Diogenes.)

EX ADDENDIS NICOLAI SCHOWII

AD CHARTAM PAPYRACEAM

MUSEI BORGIANI VELITRIS ROMAE 1788.

EDITIONS of Stobaeus' Sermons, as is known to the learned, can be divided into two classes: the first presenting shorter versions of Stobaeus' sermons, the second more complete ones. The first class includes the Venice edition by Jo. Fr. Trincavellus, 1535, and the first Basel edition, 1543. The second class includes the second Basel edition, 1549, Gesner's Dilinga edition, 1556, Wechel's Frankfurt edition, 1581, and the repeated Aurelia Allobrogum edition, 1609.

This diversity of editions also indicates a similar difference in the manuscripts: it is regrettable, however, that the number of codices from which the first editions originated is greater than that of those from which the more recent editions have been augmented and enriched. Thus, all codices of Stobaeus' Sermons that are in Rome, all of which I have consulted, are transcribed from the very same archetype, to which the text of the first editions, namely Trincavellus' and the first Basel edition, owe their origin. In the Vatican library, I found only two codices containing Stobaeus' sermons (under numbers 954 and 955), one in quarto, the other in folio, paper, from the 15th century. The former is carelessly written, the latter more emended: they follow the text of the first editions exactly, except that at the end of Theoctistus' sayings, after the words "which, in turn, proceeded contrary to it" - some things are added which are missing in the editions, and which begin thus:

"There was a certain Hippomachus, an athlete of old renown, and once he happened to be sitting with other private individuals of the craft etc."

They end with the sayings of Marcus. At the end of the Vatican codex no. 954 is inscribed: "Michael Apostoles of Byzantium, living in poverty after the fall of his own country, transcribed this divine book..."

SPECIMEN N. SCHOWII.

"...book for hire in Crete." Thus, it was written in Crete after Constantinople was captured by the Turks. This completely agrees with the codex preserved in the Angelica library, derived from the same source and of almost the same age, also quite carelessly written: meanwhile, I have also consulted these codices with benefit in more difficult passages. To the other class of MSS. codices belongs that excellent codex in Caes. Vindobonensis, which I used in Vienna, and with the help of which I partly corrected and partly supplemented many passages of the printed text; it was written, it seems, around the end of the tenth century: codices of this type are very rare, and I have not yet found a similar one; although the royal Parisian manuscript, which I know only from Brunck's Gnomici Poetae, seems hardly inferior to the Caes. Vindobonensis in quality and excellence. Of all these, the most learned Chandler, whom I had the good fortune to know here in Rome, gave me hope that he could serve to amend the text of Stobaeus' Sermons from English libraries; hence, I hope there will be no shortage of critical resources. After consulting the codices, the work will be ready for printing; for I have already transcribed and emended the entire text in my archives.

This will be the procedure: I will omit the prose parts, if the learned deem it appropriate, fragments of Plato, Xenophon, Isocrates, Theophrastus, and other printed authors, for these are burdens on a new edition and have no true critical utility; but these will be preserved where there is some great discrepancy between Stobaeus' text and that which is published elsewhere, among which I primarily refer to the fragments of Epictetus. I will not add any Latin translation; for this makes the edition less accessible, and provides no true utility, nor do truly learned men, who inquire into the history of ancient Greek poetry or philosophy, and for whom alone Stobaeus' Chrestomathia can be useful, seem to need it, although I may perhaps find a more convenient way to remedy this deficiency. Therefore, I will present only the Greek text, the basis of which is the 1609 edition, with the emended text, corrected according to critical considerations, placed under each page. Brief notes on the more difficult fragments will follow the Greek text. Finally, indices of authors and subjects will be added at the end of the work:

(I later inquired about these MSS. in Venice, after returning to Rome, but they brought me little utility or insight. There was also a MS. codex of moral maxims there, which is a Christian chrestomathia, and of the same nature as the Barberini, and many others, in which sayings from sacred books and the Fathers are collected under certain moral headings.)

EX PHOTII BIBLIOTHECA

COD. CLXVII.

READ: "The four books of selections, apophthegms, and precepts of John Stobaeus, in two volumes; and he dedicates these, on account of whom he says he undertook the diligent collection, to his own son Septimius. And the collection was made by him from poets, orators, and those who lived splendidly in states; from whom, as he himself says, he collected selections and apophthegms and certain precepts, in order to regulate and improve the nature of his son, which was somewhat dull, and to lead him to the column of readings.

And for him, the first book is "On Physics"; and of the second, some part at the beginning is "On Logic," and the rest, and the greater part, "On Ethics"; and the third and fourth books, except for very few parts, are "On Ethics and Politics." For the first book has 67 chapters, to which also apply the uses and needs of the "palamae"; and these are after "On God," to discourse that He is the creator of beings, and governs the whole by the word of providence. (2.)

(To Septimius) Septimius. Suidas calls it 'Epimion': I think it should be read 'Eptimion' in both places: he also numbers four books of Stobaeus, of which scarcely three are now extant in their entirety. Schott.

(The first six chapters are lost. Schott.)

(political) (most of it)

(All these have been published in Greek and Latin by Gul. Canter long ago, but are differently arranged in some places, and sometimes dispersed without titles, besides being corrupted or mutilated in many places. Schott.)

(The chapter on numbers that intervenes here in Canter's edition, proves that Photius above, and our fragments, show that it was wrongly transferred here from the prolegomena. The same is confirmed by the MS. codex in the Augustan Library. Schott.)

EX PHOTI BIBLIOTHECA

Second, On those who believe there is no providence, and consequently, on the divine powers regarding the administration of the universe.

Next, On justice ordained by God, overseeing human actions, and punishing sins. (4.)

And, On divine necessity, by which what happens by God's will is unchangeable. (5.)

On fate, and the good order of events. (6.)

On fortune or spontaneity. (7.)

And, That the course of fortune is irrational. (8.)

On the essence and parts of time, and what it causes. (9.)

And, On heavenly Aphrodite and divine love. (10.)

Tenth, On principles, and elements, and the universe. (11.)

Next, On matter. (12.)

On ideas. (13.)

On causes. (14.)

On bodies and their division, and on the smallest. (15.)

On shapes. (16.)

On colors. (17.)

On mixture and blending. (18.)

On void and place and space. (19.)

On motion. (20.)

And twentieth, On generation and corruption. (21.)

On the cosmos, and whether it is animate and governed by providence, and where its ruling part is, and whence it is nourished. (22.)

On the order of the cosmos; whether the whole is one. (23.)

On the essence and division of the heavens. (24.)

On the essence and shapes of stars, and their motion and significance. (25.)

On the essence and size of the sun, and its shapes and changes, and eclipses and signs, and motion. (26.)

On the essence and size of the moon, and its shape, and illuminations, and on eclipses, and on distances and signs. (27.)

On the Milky Way. (28.)

(Canter's book adds a face: concerning which Plutarch writes a treatise in his works. Schott.)

COD. CLXVII.

LXXXI

Concerning Comets and Meteors and such phenomena. (xxix)

Concerning Thunder, Lightning, Thunderbolts, Typhoons, Tornadoes. (xxx)

Thirtieth, Concerning Rainbows, Halos, Mock Suns, Rods,

and also Clouds, Mist, Rains, Dew, Snow,

Hoar Frost, Hail. (xxxi. xxxii.)

Concerning Winds. (xxxiii)

Concerning Earth, whether it is single and finite, and concerning its size,

and concerning its position, and concerning its shape,

and whether the Earth stands still or moves;

and concerning Earthquakes, and concerning the Sea, how tides

and ebbs occur. (* xxxiv-xli.)

Concerning Waters. (xlii)

Concerning the Universe. (xliv)

Concerning Nature and its attendant causes. (xliii)

Concerning the Generation of Animals and what follows. (xlv)

How many kinds of animals, and whether all are rational and sensible. (xlvi)

Concerning Sleep and Death. (xlvii *¹)

Concerning Plants. (xlviii)

Concerning the Nourishment and Appetite of Animals. (xlix*)

Concerning the Nature of Men. (1)

Concerning Mind. (li)

Concerning Soul. (lii)

Concerning Sensation and Sensible Objects, and whether Sensations are true. (liii)

How many are the Senses, and of what substance and function each is. (liv).

Concerning Sight and Specular Reflections. (lv)

Concerning Hearing. (lvi)

Concerning Smell. (lvi)

Concerning Taste. (lvi)

Concerning Touch. (lvi)

Concerning Voice, and whether Voice is incorporeal, and what is its

governing part. (lvii)

Concerning Imagination, and Judgment. (lviii)

FROM PHOTIUS' BIBLIOTHECA

and 59. Concerning Opinion. (lix)

and 60. Concerning Respiration and Affections. (lx)

And so many are the chapters of the first book; and concerning these;

and indeed natural ones, except for some at the beginning, which one

would rather assign to the metaphysical topics; to these, as we said,

he appends the opinions of the ancients, whether they agree or

disagree. In this book, however, before

embarking on the aforementioned chapters, he discusses two chapters;

one of which is an encomium of philosophy, and this compiled

from various sources, and the other concerns the established philosophical

sects, in which he also lists ancient opinions concerning geometry, music,

and arithmetic.

The second book is completed with 67 chapters

and 40. It first discusses

Concerning those who interpret divine matters, and how the truth

of intelligible things in their essence is incomprehensible to men. (i)

then Concerning Dialectic. (ii)

and Concerning Rhetoric. (iii)

and Concerning Speech and "Letters. (iv*)

Concerning Poetics. (v)

Concerning Character. (vi)

Concerning the Ethical branch of philosophy. (vii)

Concerning what is up to us. (viii)

"That no one is willingly wicked. (ix)

'What sort of person the philosopher should be. (x*)

That one should revere the divine. (xi*)

That the Superior Being assists the pious and the just. (xii*)

Concerning Divination. (xiii*)

That one should highly value association with the wise,

and avoid the vile and uneducated. (xiv*)

Concerning seeming and being; and that one should not judge a man by speech,

but by character. (xv*)

That those who plot against others unwittingly harm themselves. (xvi*)

Concerning good repute. (xvii*)

Concerning fame. (xviii*)

That moderation is best. (xix*)

That virtue is difficult to achieve, but vice is easy to handle. (xx*)

That one should not make a matter of speech the testing of the ignorant. (xxi*)

That hypocrisy, being harmful to those who use it and

to those against whom it is directed, should be cast out from the soul. (xxii*)

That one should not be meddlesome, for such a disposition

causes envy and slander. (xxiii*)

That it is best to repent when one errs. (xxiv*)

Concerning slander, that it is not good. (xxv*)

That when slandered one should consider whether we have not fallen into the same faults. (xxvi)

Concerning the necessity of life. (xxvii*)

That one should act opportunely. (xxviii*)

Concerning willingness, that one should not procrastinate carelessly. (xxix*).

That misfortune often turns out to be beneficial, and especially to the foolish. (xxx*)

Concerning upbringing and education. (xxxi*)

That the friendship of the good is best. (xxxii*)

That similarity of characters produces friendship. (xxxiii*)

That in adversities and dangers one should not abandon friends. (xxxiv*)

That one should not join friends in wrongdoing. (xxxv*)

Concerning true and fickle friends. (xxxvi*)

That one should quickly reconcile with friends,

bearing their faults more easily with forgiveness. (xxxvii*)

That in misfortunes we recognize true friends. (xxxviii*)

FROM PHOTIUS' BIBLIOTHECA

Friendly exhortations. (xxxix*)

Concerning hatred, and what sort of person one should be towards enemies. (xl*)

Concerning how one can benefit from enemies. (xli*)

Concerning doing good. (xlii*)

That gratitude given in due time is greater. (xliii*)

Concerning returning good deeds. (xliv*).

That one should not do good to the wicked, nor receive good from them. (xlv*)

And lastly, Concerning Gratitude. (xlvi*)

in which are also the contents of the second chapter.

In the third [book] are forty-two chapters.

First, Concerning Virtue. 1.

Then,

Concerning Vice. 2.

Concerning Contempt. 22.

Concerning Self-love. 23.

Concerning Prudence. 3.

Concerning Conscience. 24.

Concerning Folly. 4.

Concerning Memory. 25.

Concerning Self-Control. 5.

Concerning Forgetfulness. 26.

Concerning Intemperance. 6.

Concerning an Oath. 27.

Concerning Courage. 7.

Concerning Perjury. 28.

Concerning Cowardice. 8.

Concerning Love of Labor. 29.

Concerning Justice. 9.

Concerning Idleness. 30.

Concerning Avarice and Injustice. 10.

Concerning Modesty. 31.

Concerning Truth. 11.

Concerning Impudence. 32.

Concerning Falsehood. 12.

Concerning Silence. 33.

Concerning Free Speech. 13.

Concerning Speaking Timely. 34.

Concerning Flattery. 14.

Concerning Brevity of Speech. 35.

Concerning Prodigality. 15.

Concerning Talkativeness. 36.

Concerning Frugality. 16.

Concerning Kindness. 37.

Concerning Self-Restraint. 17.

Concerning Envy. 38.

Concerning Incontinence. 18.

Concerning Homeland. 39.

Concerning Freedom from Malice. 19.

Concerning Strangers. 40.

Concerning Anger. 20.

Concerning "Know Thyself". 21.

And 42. Concerning Slander.

And these are the contents of the fourth book:

First, Concerning Polity. 43.

COD. CLXVII.

b Concerning Laws and Customs. 44.

* Concerning the People.

Concerning Rulers in Cities. 45---

Concerning Rule, and what sort of person the ruler should be. 46.

That monarchy is best. 47.

Exhortations concerning Kingship. 48.

Censure of Tyranny. 49.

Concerning War. 50.

Concerning Boldness. 51.

Concerning Youth. 52.

Concerning Generals and matters necessary in War. 54.

Exhortations.

Concerning Peace. 55-

Concerning Agriculture. 56, 57.

Concerning Tranquility. 68.

Concerning Navigation. 59.

Concerning Arts. 60, 61.

Concerning Masters and Slaves. 62.

Concerning Pandemian Aphrodite. Concerning erotic pleasures of the body. 63, 64.

Concerning Beauty. 65, 66.

Concerning Marriage, etc. 67 - 73.

Marital exhortations. 74.

Concerning Children, etc. 75-78.

That parents should be deemed worthy of due honor by their children. 79.

What kind of fathers should be towards their children. 83.

That brotherly love and affection towards relatives are best. 84.

Economical. 85.

Concerning Nobility, etc. 86-89.

Concerning Baseness. 90.

Concerning Wealth, etc. 91-94.

Concerning Poverty. 95.

Comparison of Poverty and Wealth. 96, 97.

That life is short and full of cares. 98.

Concerning Grief, that it is very painful. 99.

FROM PHOTIUS' BIBLIOTHECA

Concerning Disease and Cures. 100.

Concerning Health and its preservation. 101.

Concerning Physicians. 102.

Concerning Happiness. 103.

Concerning Misfortune. 104.

That human prosperity is uncertain. 105.

Concerning those who are fortunate undeservedly. 106.

Concerning those who are unfortunate undeservedly. 107.

That one should bravely bear what happens. 108.

That one should display good fortune, and conceal misfortunes. 109.

Concerning Hope. 110.

Concerning unexpected events. 111.

That one should not rejoice in the misfortunes of others. 112.

That those who are unfortunate need compassion. 113.

Concerning Old Age, etc. 115-117.

Concerning Death. 118.

Concerning Life. 119.

Comparison of Life and Death. 121.

Concerning Mourning. 122.

Concerning Burial. 123.

Consolations. 124.

That one should not be insolent towards the deceased. 125.

That the memory of most people quickly fades after death. 126.

The chapters of the fourth book. Of the four books, which,

as we said, John gathered from selections and maxims

and precepts, both opinions and necessities. He gathered these from

PHILOSOPHERS such as Anacharsis

and Aristonus and Aristoxenus and Archytas

and Apollonius and Antisthenes and Aristotle

and Aristippus and Anaxagoras and Anaxarchus and Anaximander.

COD. CLXVII.

Anaximenes

Damippus

Heraclitus

Archelaus

Diogenes

Heraclitus

Anaxagoras

Diodorus

Herophilus

Arcainetus

Diotimus

Themistius

Arcesilaus

Diocles

Theobulus

Areianus

Damarmenus

Theagenes

Antipater of Histiaea

Didymus

Theages

Dio

Theophrastus

Archedemus of Hecataea

Euclid

Theodorus

Euphrates

Thales

Apollophanes

Epicharmus

Theocritus

Aegimaius

Epandridus

Thrasyllus

Apollodorus

Erasistratus

Hieronymus

Aristarchus

Ecpulus

Hippius

Asclepiades

Epicurus, Garthian

Iamblichus

Aristaeus

Gettius

Hierocles

Atticus

Epictetus

Hippalus

Amelius

Hermes

Ion

Albinus

Empedocles

Hippon

Aristander

Epicurus of Athens

Hierax

Arcopration

Naius

Hippodamus

Apellus

Eusebius

Hippasus

Aristagoras

Erysus

Ioungus

Aristobrotus

Eratosthenes

Criton

Archimedes

Eurystratus

Cleobulus

Boethus

Ekphantus

Cebes

Bias

Epidicus

Coriscus

Berossus

Eudoxus

Cleitomachos

Beronice

Epigenes

Critolaus

Brotinus

Eninius

Cleinius

Bion

Euryphamus

Carneades

Glaucon

Zaleucus

Cleanthes

Demonax

Zeno

Callimachus

Demetrius

Zoroaster

Critius

FROM PHOTIUS' BIBLIOTHECA

Neophron

Naumachius

Neoptolemus

Xenophanes

Senarchus

Homer

Orpheus

Olympias

Pindar

Parmenides

Poseidippus

Pausanias

Polyidus

Patrocles

Peisander

Panyasis

Peirinthus

Pompeius

Rianus

Sophocles

Sotades

Simonides

Sosiphanes

Simylus

Sosithius

Sclerios

Sappho

Sarapion

Sosicrates

Stasinus

Sopater

Sthenidas

Sousarion

Stesichorus

Timostratus

Timocles

Tyrtaues

Telesilla

Hypobolimaeus

Hypsaeus

Philetas

Philoxenus

Philippides

Phrynichus

Philonides

Philemon

Phocylides

Philippus

Phoenicides

Philiscus

Pherecrates

Phanocles

Phintys

Philaius

Chairemon

Choerilus

Chares

Chilon

and Cynics

Antisthenes

Diogenes

Crates

Hegesianax

Onesicritus

Menander

Monimus

Polyzelus

Xanthippus

Theomnestus

But also poets, whose sayings he placed in the chapters, these are they:

ORATORS and HISTORIANS, KINGS and

GENERALS, for he also gathered testimonies from these, namely:

Aristides

Demosthenes

Theodorus

Aristocles

Demades

Thrasyllus

Aelian

Demaratus

Theopompus

Aeschines

Ephorus

Isocrates

Agathon

Zopyrus

Isaeus

Antiphon

Hegesias

Cornelianus

Archelaus

Hegesius

Callisthenes

Gaius

Thucydides

Cleitophon

Gorgias

Theseus

Ctesias

COD. CLXVII.

Lysias

Lamachus

Diocles the physician

Nicostratus

Mallias

Euxitheus

Xenophon

Pericles

Hermarchus

Ombrimus

Pyrrhus

Hermippus

Polyaenus

Ptolemy

Eryximachus

Protagoras

Semiramis

Euphranor

Sostratos

Scepio

Erasistratus the physician

Timagoras

Timotheus

Euryphron the physician

Trophimus

Philippus

Eratosthenes

Hyperides

Phocion

Eubulus

Philostratus

Phalaris

Theopompus

Chrysippus

Charillus

Theocritus

Alexander

Charias

Thomaridas

Agesilaus

Chares

Thynon

Agathocles

Aristophanes

Hippocrates the physician

Antigonus

Aesop

Cato

Agis

Agrippinus

Antigenidas

Cephisodorus

Anaxilaus

Aristotle

Cleostratus

Archidamus

Aristides the righteous

Cleitomachus

Dionysius

Alcmaeon the physician

Licymnius

Darius

Myson

Epameinondas

Antyllus the physician

Metrodorus

Eudamidas

Arimnestus

Metrokles

Themistocles

Apelles

Nicostratus

Iphicrates

Bryson

Pravsion

Hipparchus

Glaucon

Simonides

Cotys

Galen the physician

Seriphius

Cleitarchus

Dikaiarchus

Sotion

Lycourgos

Dion

Sostratos

Deonides

Dionysius

Speusippus

But the chapters, for which John Stobaeus compiled the sayings of the ancients,

and from which men, philosophers, poets, orators, kings, and generals,

he gathered these things, so many and from so many.

FROM PHOTIUS' BIBLIOTHECA COD. CLXVII.

The book is useful for those who read the writings and compositions of these men

for remembrance; and for those who have not experienced them, because through continuous

study of them, in a short time they will reap a memory full of many good and varied concepts;

and common to both is the effortless and quick discovery of what is sought,

whenever one wishes to refer from the chapters to the broader

texts; and the book is not useless for others who are eager to speak and write.

JOHN STOBAEUS:

ANTHOLOGIUM.

CONCERNING VIRTUE. A.

1. *Sophocles, Eriphyle.

Only possessions that are sure are those of virtue.

2. Euripides, Andromache.

Time does not take away the remains of good men; but virtue

shines even on the dead.

3. Euripides, Oedipus.

Indeed, not only white silver and gold are currency; but virtue, too,

is currency for all mortals, which must be used.

4. Euripides, Temenidae.

And virtue, even if one dies, does not perish;

but lives on when the body is no more; while for the wicked

all things vanish with them beneath the earth.

JOHN STOBAEUS

(2)5 Euripides, Suppliants.

A noble man is ashamed to be called

wicked; valor is teachable, if a child is taught

to speak, and to hear things of which he has no knowledge.

Whatever one learns, that tends to be preserved

until old age. So educate your children well.

6.

There is no possession more valuable than virtue;

for it is not naturally a slave, nor of riches,

nor of security, nor of the flattery of the crowd.

But virtue, the more you wish to use it,

the more it grows when polished.

7. *Euripides.

Virtue is the greatest good among men.

8. Euripides, Antiope.

There are three virtues, which you should practice, my child:

(3) to honor the gods, your parents who raised you,

and the common laws of Greece; and doing these,

you will always have the most beautiful crown of renown.

CONCERNING VIRTUE. A.

9. *Bacchylides.

One boundary, one path to happiness for mortals is,

if one can pass life without sorrow in spirit.

10. [Iambic verses.

Rest from troubles is inaction.

Do not hear, or see, or do what is unfitting.

It is better for the body to be ill than the soul.

One must be orderly when dining at others' expense.

For it is the part of a free man to speak the truth.

Maintain your character as a free man.

Guard yourself in your manners to be free.

Only self-control is the treasury of virtue.

Take care of your soul, as far as you are able.

Noble characters produce good fruit.

Good fruit is an orderly life.

Take forethought for the appropriate life.

Blessed is he who serves the blessed.

Virtue is a great weapon for mortals.

11. *Iambic verses. To good men.

A good man never hates a good man.

For good deeds are produced by good judgment.

And to a good man, God gives good things.

JOHN STOBAEUS,

of noble man and the temperate man.

Time is the test of character for men.]

12. *Aristotle's Hymn to Virtue.

Virtue, much-suffering to the race of mortals,

most beautiful prize in life.

For your sake, maiden, in form,

and for your sake, a coveted fate in Greece to die,

and to endure harsh and unceasing labors.

Such a thought you cast into the mind;

fruit unto immortality,

(5) better than gold, and than parents,

and than soft-shining sleep.

And for your sake, Heracles, son of Zeus,

and the sons of Leda endured many things,

proclaiming your power through their deeds.

And for your desires, Achilles,

and Ajax came to the dwellings of Hades.

And for your beloved form,

CONCERNING VIRTUE. A.

Artaeus, nurtured.

He deprived him of the rays of the sun.

For those, glorious in deeds,

the Muses, daughters of Memory,

will exalt him to immortality,

exalting the glory of hospitable Zeus.

13. *Philippides, Ananeosis.

When you err, rejoice in being defeated;

for thus your advantage is best preserved.

14. *Epicharmus.

A wise man should not repent, but rather foresee.

15. *Pythagoras.

Accustom yourself to master these:

first, your belly, and sleep, and lust,

and anger; never do shameful deeds with others,

nor by yourself; but most of all, be ashamed of yourself.

Then practice justice, in deed and in word.

Do not thoughtlessly concern yourself with anything;

but know that all are fated to die;

and possessions sometimes are acquired, sometimes are lost.

16. *Theognis.

JOHN STOBAEUS

Many wicked men are rich, and good men are poor.

But we will not exchange

the wealth of virtue; for it is always firm,

while wealth for men changes hands.

17. *Hesiod.

For virtue, the Gods placed sweat before it,

(7) immortals; and long and steep is the path to it,

and rough at first; but when one reaches the summit,

it becomes easy, though it was hard.

18. *Aristotle, Concerning Virtue.

Praised are good things, and blamed are base things; and

virtues are considered good, and vices are considered base.

Praised also are the causes of virtues, and what accompanies virtues,

and what comes from them, and their deeds; blamed are their opposites.

As the soul is threefold according to Plato, the virtue of the rational part

is prudence; of the spirited part, both gentleness and courage;

of the appetitive part, both temperance and self-control; of the whole

soul, both justice, and generosity, and magnanimity.

Vice of the rational part is folly; of the

spirited part, both irascibility and cowardice; of the appetitive part,

CONCERNING VIRTUE. A.

of the appetitive part, both intemperance and incontinence; and of the whole soul,

injustice, and illiberality, and small-mindedness.

Prudence is a virtue of the rational part, preparing

what tends towards happiness.

Gentleness is a virtue of the spirited part, by which those who are prone to anger

become difficult to move.

Courage is a virtue of the spirited part, by which they are

unfazed by fears concerning death.

Temperance is a virtue of the appetitive part, by which they become

unreceptive to base pleasures.

Self-control is a virtue of the appetitive part, by which they master

their desires, even when these tend towards base pleasures, by means of reason.

Justice is a virtue of the soul, distributing things according to

worth.

Generosity is a virtue of the soul, ready to spend on noble things.

Magnanimity is a virtue of the soul, by which it is able to bear

good fortune, or misfortune, and honor and dishonor.

Folly is a vice of the rational part, the cause of living

badly.

Irascibility is a vice of the spirited part, by which they become easily moved

to anger.

Cowardice is a vice of the spirited part, by which they are terrified by

fears concerning death.

JOHN STOBAEUS

Intemperance is a vice of the appetitive part, by which those who are prone to pleasure

become desirous of base pleasures.

Incontinence is a vice of the appetitive part, by which they choose

base pleasures, even when reason does not prevent them.

Injustice is a vice of the soul, by which they become greedy

beyond their due.

Illiberality is a vice of the soul, by which they become fond of

shameful gain.

Small-mindedness is a vice of the soul, by which they are unable

to bear good fortune, and misfortune, and honor and dishonor.

The functions of prudence are to deliberate well, to judge

good and bad things and all things in life that are to be chosen and

avoided, to make good use of all existing good things,

to associate correctly, to discern opportunities, to be keen-witted,

to use both word and deed well, to have experience in all useful things.

Memory, and experience, and keenness, and

(10) dexterity, and good counsel, that is, each of these is either from prudence,

or accompanies prudence. And some of them, such as

experience and memory, are instrumental to prudence;

others, such as good counsel and keenness, are parts of it.

Gentleness is to bear reproaches moderately, and

OF VIRTUE. A.

[It is characteristic] of moderation in neglect, and not to rush quickly to punishments, and to be slow to anger, having a gentle disposition and being non-contentious, with a calm soul, and stable.

Of courage it is to be fearless in the face of death, and to be bold, and to be daring in dangers, and to prefer dying nobly to being disgracefully saved, and to be the cause of victory. It is characteristic of courage also to toil, and to persevere, and to prefer performing noble deeds. And courage is accompanied by daring, and bravery, and boldness, and moreover magnanimity, and endurance.

Of temperance it is not to marvel at the enjoyment of bodily pleasures, to be without desire for any disgraceful pleasure, and to fear disorder, and to be orderly in life, likewise in small and great matters. And temperance is accompanied by orderliness, decorum, reverence, and caution.

Of self-control it is to be able to restrain by reason the desire rushing towards base pleasures, and to endure, and to be patient in natural want and pain.

[...of] prudence, love of life, and freedom from pain; and there is also a certain caution, and a non-contentious disposition.

Of intemperance it is to prefer the enjoyment of pleasures that are harmful and disgraceful, and to consider those living in such pleasures most fortunate, and to be fond of laughter, and fond of jesting, and fond of witty conversation, and to be mischievous in words and in deeds. And intemperance is accompanied by disorder, impudence, indecorum, luxury, idleness, negligence, carelessness, dissolution.

Of incontinence it is, when reason forbids the enjoyment of pleasures, to consider it better not to partake of them, but nonetheless to partake of them, and to believe one ought to do what is good and advantageous, but to turn away from them due to pleasures. And incontinence is accompanied by softness, repentance, and most of the same things that accompany intemperance.

Of injustice there are three kinds: impiety, covetousness, insolence. Impiety is wrongdoing concerning gods, and concerning daemons, and concerning the deceased, and concerning parents, and homeland. Covetousness is choosing profit beyond what is fair in contracts. Insolence is when they provide pleasures for themselves, bringing disgrace upon others. Hence Evenus says of it: "Which, gaining nothing, nevertheless commits injustice."

It is also characteristic of injustice to transgress ancestral customs and and laws, to disobey laws and rulers, to lie, to commit perjury, to violate agreements, and pledges. And injustice is accompanied by slander, boastfulness, inhumanity, pretense, malice, cunning.

Of illiberality there are three kinds: avarice, stinginess, and niggardliness. Avarice is when people seek gain from all sources, and value gain more than shame. Stinginess is when they are unwilling to spend money for proper purposes. Niggardliness is when they spend, but sparingly and badly, and suffer greater loss by not making a difference at the right time. It is characteristic of illiberality to value money above all else, to consider nothing a disgrace if it brings profit, and to have a mercenary, servile, and squalid life, alien to ambition and freedom. Illiberality is accompanied by pettiness, heavy-heartedness, faint-heartedness, humility, immoderation, ignobility, misanthropy.

Of pusillanimity it is not to be able to bear either honor or dishonor, either good fortune or bad fortune, but when honored, to become puffed up, and having a little good fortune, to become arrogant, and not to be able to bear even the slightest dishonor, and to consider any misfortune a great failure, and to lament at everything, and to be discontented. Furthermore, the pusillanimous person is such that he calls all minor offenses "insolence" and "dishonor," and things done through ignorance, or forgetfulness, or folly. And it is accompanied by pusillanimity, pettiness, fault-finding, despair, humility.

In general, of virtue it is to make the disposition of the soul noble, employing straight and orderly movements, and agreeing in all its parts; hence it also seems to be a model of good governance, a noble disposition of soul. And it is characteristic of virtue to do good to the worthy, and to love the good, and to hate the wicked, and to be neither punitive nor vengeful, but rather gentle, benevolent, and grateful. And virtue is accompanied by kindness, equity, gratitude, good hope, and furthermore such things as: being fond of one's household, and fond of friends, and fond of companions, and fond of strangers, and fond of humanity, and fond of beauty, all of which are praised; and of vice are the opposite things, and the opposite things accompany it. And all things of vice, and the things accompanying it, are among those mentioned.

19. Of Pythagoras.

Be vigilant in mind; for sleep concerning this is akin to true death.

20. What one should not do, one should not even think of doing.

21. One should seek a husband and children and friends who remain faithful until the end of life.

22. Of Pythagoras.

Choose strength for the soul rather than for the body.

23. Be persuaded that what you do not possess within your mind is not your property.

24. Achieve great things, without promising great things.

25. Learn to beget children, not those who will nourish the body in old age, but those who will nourish the soul with eternal sustenance.

26. Consider laborious things more conducive to virtue than pleasant ones.

27. It is difficult to walk many paths of life at once.

28. Every passion of the soul is most hostile to its salvation.

29. Of Pythagoras.

Pythagoras said that one should choose the best life, for habit will make it pleasant. Wealth is a weak anchor, glory still weaker; the body likewise, offices, honors—all these are weak and powerless. What, then, are powerful anchors? Prudence, magnanimity, courage; these no storm can shake. This is the law of God: that virtue alone is strong and firm; all other things are nonsense.

30. Of Antisthenes.

Neither a symposium without conversation, nor wealth without virtue, has pleasure.

31. Of Phocion.

Neither from a sacred altar nor from human nature should mercy be removed.

32. Of Diogenes.

Someone asking, "How can one become one's own teacher?" He replied, "If one criticizes oneself most of all for what one criticizes others."

33. Of Socrates.

All parts of life, like a statue, must be beautiful.

34. A statue stands on a base, but a worthy man, standing on a noble purpose, ought to be immovable.

35. Incense should be offered to the Gods, and praise should be given to the good.

36. For one ought to defend those who are unjustly accused of injustice; but to praise those who excel in something good.

37. Of Socrates.

Neither would a horse be judged noble by having splendid equipment, but by being naturally excellent; nor a man by possessing valuable possessions, but by being noble in soul.

38. When the mouth of the wise is opened, as if sacred, the things of the soul are beheld, like statues.

39. Of Democritus.

It is fitting for humans to value the soul more than the body. For the soul, being most perfect, corrects the wretchedness of the body; but the strength of the body without reason makes the soul no better.

40. Of Democritus.

For cheerfulness comes to humans through moderation of enjoyment and symmetry of life; but deficiencies and excesses lead to changes.

[...] it loves, and great movements. It produces them in the soul. And souls moved by great intervals are neither stable nor cheerful. Therefore, one must fix one's mind on what is possible, and be content with what one has; having little thought of those who are envied and admired, and not dwelling on them in one's mind; but observing the lives of those who suffer hardships, reflecting deeply on what they endure, so that what you have and possess may appear great and enviable, and so that your soul may no longer suffer from desiring more. For he who admires those who have much and are deemed happy by other people, and constantly dwells on them in his memory, is always forced to seek new things, and to commit himself, out of desire, to doing something ruinous which the laws forbid. Therefore, it is necessary not to seek some things, but concerning others, it is necessary to be cheerful by comparing one's own life to that of those who fare worse, and to consider oneself fortunate, reflecting on what they suffer, so that one may fare and live better than them. For by adhering to this mindset, you will live more cheerfully, and you will banish not a few plagues from your life, such as envy, and jealousy, and ill-will.

41. Of Isocrates, Nicocles or Cyprians.

Do not believe that vice is more beneficial than virtue, or that it has a more unfortunate name; but rather consider their powers to be such as the names each of them has received.

42. Of Isocrates, To Demonicus.

Of virtue there is no possession more venerable, nor more secure.

43. In the same place.

The possession of virtue, if it grows truly with one's understanding, alone grows old with one; it is superior to wealth, and more useful than noble birth; it makes possible what is impossible for others; what is fearful to the multitude, it endures bravely; and it considers hesitation a reproach, and toil a praise.

44. Of Isocrates, Panathenaic Oration.

Who then are well-educated? Since I reject arts and sciences and powers. First, those who deal well with the matters that arise each day, and have a reputation successful for the circumstances, and are largely able to aim at what is advantageous; next, those who associate with all others appropriately and justly; and those who easily and readily bear the unpleasantness and burdens of others, and present themselves as light and moderate as possible to those with whom they associate; furthermore, those who always master their pleasures, and are not excessively overcome by misfortunes, but behave courageously in them, and are worthy of the nature in which we participate; fourth, and this is the greatest, those who are not corrupted by prosperity, nor are they alienated from it, nor become arrogant, but remain steadfast in the order of sensible people; and do not rejoice more in goods that have come by chance than in those that arise from their own nature and prudence from the beginning. And those who have the disposition of their soul well-harmonized not only towards one of these things, but towards all of them, these I call prudent and perfect men, and possessing all virtues.

45. Of Isocrates.

Isocrates said that a good and virtuous man must remember past events, act on present ones, and be cautious about future ones.

46. Of Epictetus.

A life intertwined with fortune resembles a torrential river; for it is turbulent, and full of mud, and difficult to cross, and tyrannical, and noisy, and short-lived.

47. Of the same.

A soul associated with virtue resembles an eternal spring; for it is pure, and undisturbed, and drinkable, and pleasant, and sociable, and rich, and harmless, and indestructible.

48. Of the same.

If you wish to be good, first believe that you are bad.

49. Of the same.

It is better to admit one's faults rarely and act prudently more often, than to say one errs rarely and fail often.

50. Of the same.

Punish your passions, so that you are not punished by them.

51. Do not be so ashamed of reputation as to flee from truth.

52. If you wish to listen well, learn to speak well. And having learned to speak well, strive to act well; and thus you will reap the benefit of listening well.

53. Of the same, Enchiridion.

If anyone does anything bad, or says anything bad, remember that he does it thinking it is proper for him. What then? Will you follow what appears to you, or what is proper itself? But it appears bad to him. Who then is deceived? That person. Who then is harmed? The one who is deceived. For even if one assumes the truth to be complicated, and embraces falsehood, it is not the complicated truth that is harmed, but the one who embraces it.

54. Freedom and slavery, the former the name of virtue, the latter of vice; both are works of moral choice. And moral choice partakes of neither of those things with which it does not share; but the soul is accustomed to govern the body, and all things concerning the body with which moral choice does not share. For no one is a slave who possesses free moral choice.

55. A bad bond is, for the body, fortune, but for the soul, vice. For he who is freed in body but bound in soul is a slave; but he who is bound in body but freed in soul is free.

56. The bond of the body is loosed by nature, through death, and by vice, through money; but the bond of the soul, by virtue through learning, and experience, and practice.

57. If you wish to live undisturbed and content, strive to have all your associates good. And you will have them good if you educate those who are willing, and release those who are unwilling. For depravity will flee along with vice from those who flee them, and kindness and freedom will remain with those who stay with you.

58. From Iamblichus.

Since we live by the soul, we must live well by its virtue; just as, seeing with our eyes, we see well by their virtue.

59. From the same, Exhortations to Philosophy.

One must hasten towards virtue as if into a sacred precinct, so that we may not be exposed to any ignoble insult of fortune.

60. From the same, To Socrates on Virtue.

The virtue of the soul would be perfection, and the moderation of life, and the most supreme and pure activity of speech, and mind, and thought. And the works of virtue are good-like, most excellent, intelligent, earnest, full of moderation, partaking of opportunity, leading, aiming at the best end, graceful, and above all, to be contemplated.

61. Of Agapetus, To Justinian.

Strive always, and just as those who begin to ascend ladders do not stop their upward progress until they reach the highest step, so too should you behave in the ascent to noble things.

62. Of Perictyone the Pythagorean, On Wisdom.

Man came into being and was constituted to contemplate the reason of the nature of the whole and of wisdom; it is his task to acquire and contemplate the prudence concerning existing things.

63. In the same place.

Geometry and arithmetic, and other theoretical subjects, and sciences, are concerned with certain existing things; but wisdom is concerned with all kinds of existing things. For wisdom is concerned with all existing things in the same way that sight is concerned with all visible things, and hearing with all audible things. And of the attributes that belong to existing things, some belong to all universally, some to most of them, and some to each individual. The things then to perceive and contemplate those attributes that belong to all things universally, is characteristic of wisdom; those that belong to most, are characteristic of the sciences concerning nature; and those that are peculiar to each individual, are characteristic of the sciences defined by a particular subject. And for this reason, wisdom discovers the principles of all existing things; natural science discovers the principles of things that come into being by nature; geometry and arithmetic and music discover the principles concerning quantity and harmony. Therefore, whoever is able to resolve all kinds of things back to one and the same principle, and then from that principle to synthesize and enumerate them again, he is considered most wise and most true, and has discovered a good vantage point, from which he will be able to behold God, and all things that are arranged in order and sequence, belonging to Him.

64. Of Metopus the Pythagorean of Metapontum, from On Virtue.

Virtue for man is the perfection of human nature. For each of existing things becomes perfect and supreme according to its own nature of virtue. For the virtue of a horse is that which brings the nature of the horse to its peak; and for each of the parts, the same reasoning applies. For the virtue of eyes is keen sight; and this is the peak of the nature of the eyes. And the virtue of ears is keen hearing; and this is the peak of the nature of the ears. And the virtue of feet is swiftness; and this too is the virtue of the nature of the feet. And it is necessary for all virtue to possess these three: reason, power, and moral choice; reason, by which it judges and contemplates; power, by which it resists and prevails; and moral choice, by which it loves and approves. That which judges and contemplates belongs to the intellectual part of the soul; and that which resists and prevails, belongs to the irrational part of the soul. For moral choice is composed of thought and desire; thought, then, is from the rational part of the soul; and desire from the irrational. And the multitude of all virtues can be perceived from the parts of the soul, and likewise the generation and constitution of virtue. For of the parts of the soul, there are two primary ones: the rational and the irrational. The rational is that by which we judge and contemplate; the irrational is that by which we impel ourselves and desire. These parts either agree with each other or disagree; and strife and disagreement arise from their excess and deficiency. Therefore, it is clear that when the rational part of the soul controls the irrational, patience and self-control arise; but when the irrational part of the soul controls, incontinence and softness arise; and when the former leads, and the latter follows, and both agree with each other, then there is virtue. Patience and self-control, then, arise with pain; but patience is in enduring toil; and self-control is in enduring pleasure. But incontinence and softness are in not enduring, nor prevailing. And for this reason, humans happen to flee good things due to pain, and lose them due to pleasure. And yet praises and blames, and all noble things concerning man, arise in these parts of the soul. And generally, the constitution of virtue arises in this way; let one observe its forms, and its parts, in this manner. For since the soul has two parts, the rational and the irrational; and of the irrational, one is spirited, and the other appetitive; and the rational part is that by which we judge and contemplate; and the irrational, by which we impel ourselves and desire; and of this (irrational part), that which is, for example, defensive and highly combative towards neighbors, is called spirited; and that which is, for example, desirous and appetitive of the body's own constitution, is appetitive; it is evident that according to reason in these parts of the soul, and the multitude of virtues follows, as do their differences and peculiarities. For the virtue of the rational part of the soul is prudence, for it is a critical and theoretical disposition; of the spirited part, courage; for it is a disposition of resistance and endurance in the face of terrible things; of the appetitive part, temperance; for it is moderation and a certain restraint of bodily pleasures; and of the whole soul, justice. For worthless people are produced either by vice, or by incontinence, or by brutishness; and they act unjustly towards others, either for gain, or for pleasure, or for ambition. Vice, then, is more akin to the rational part of the soul; for prudence resembles art, and vice resembles bad art; for how can it devise where injustice comes from? Incontinence, on the other hand, is more akin to the appetitive part; for in mastering pleasure, there is self-control; and in not mastering it, there is incontinence. And brutishness belongs to the spirited part; for when one indulges the desire to do evil, not as a human, but as a beast, it is called brutishness. And the results of these dispositions, for the sake of which they act, also follow. For covetousness, for example, stems from vice; and the vice, from the rational part of the soul. And ambition, from the spirited part; these, when they occur in excess, engender brutishness. Again, pleasure in the appetitive part, when pursued more intensely, engenders incontinence. So, since injustice arises from so many causes, it is clear that righteous action arises from the same number of causes. For by nature, virtue is benevolent and beneficial; and vice is harmful and damaging. And since, of the parts of the soul, one is leading and the other is following; and virtues and vices are concerned with and exist in these parts; it is clear that some virtues are leading, some are following, and some are composite of these. Leading virtues, for example, are prudence; following virtues, for example, are courage and temperance; and composite virtues, for example, are justice. And passions are the material of virtue; for virtue is concerned with these. Of passions, one is voluntary, the other involuntary; and the voluntary is pleasure; and the involuntary is pain. And these same things, both intensifying and relaxing, we, as citizens, harmonize the irrational parts of the soul with the rational part. And the limit of this harmonization is that the mind is prevented neither by deficiency nor by excess from performing its proper function. For the worse is subordinated for the sake of the better, just as in the cosmos every passive element is for the sake of the immutable, and in the pairing of animals, the female is for the sake of the male; for the male sows the soul-generating seed, while the female only provides the material for what is generated; and in the soul itself, the irrational is for the rational. For spirit and appetite are subordinated to the primary part of the soul; the former as a kind of bodyguard and guardian, the latter as a steward and manager of necessities; and reason, established at the very peak of the body, and possessing a radiating and clear vision, seeks the prudence concerning existing things; and this is his natural task, having sought and acquired it, to follow what is better and most venerable than himself. For the knowledge of divine and most venerable things is the principle, cause, and standard of human happiness.

65. Of Cleinias the Pythagorean of Tarentum.

Every virtue, then, is perfected, as was defined at the beginning, from reason, and moral choice, and power. But each of these, considered in itself, is not a part of virtue, but a cause of virtue. Therefore, those who possess the intellectual and cognitive part of it are called clever and intelligent; but those who possess the moral and volitional part are useful and equitable.

66. Of Cleinias the Pythagorean of Tarentum, from On Piety and Reverence.

How many causes must one eliminate, by which man is naturally inclined to injustice? These are three: love of pleasure in bodily enjoyments; covetousness in gaining profit; and ambition in surpassing equals and likes. Therefore, one must recognize that it is possible to oppose these by things which instill fear in people, and things which cause shame, and things which cause desire; fear, for example, from the laws, shame from the Gods, and desire from reason. Therefore, one must teach the young from the beginning to honor the Gods and to respect the laws; for it would be clear from these that every human act, and life, will partake of the greatest holiness and piety, and will proceed rightly.

67. Of Theages the Pythagorean, from On Virtue.

The principles of all virtue are three: knowledge, power, and moral choice. Knowledge is like sight, by which we observe and judge things; power is like a certain strength of the body, by which we withstand and persist in matters; and moral choice is like certain hands of the soul, with which we set ourselves in motion and grasp things. And the arrangement of the soul is likewise. For one part of it is reason, another is spirit, and another is appetite. Reason, then, is that which commands knowledge; spirit is that which commands might; and appetite is that which controls the appetitive part without fear. So, when these three come together into one, having received a single harmony, then virtue and agreement arise in the soul; but when they are in strife and torn from each other, then vice and disharmony arise in the soul. And when reason prevails over the irrational parts of the soul, then patience and self-control arise; patience, indeed, in enduring toil; and self-control, in enduring pleasures. But when the irrational parts of the soul prevail over reason, then softness and incontinence arise; softness, indeed, in fleeing toil; and incontinence, in being overcome by pleasures. And when the superior part rules over the worse part of the soul, and when the former leads, and the latter follows, and both agree and assent to each other, then virtue and perfect goodness arise concerning the whole soul. And when the appetitive part of the soul follows the rational, temperance arises; when the spirited part follows, courage; when all the parts are in agreement, justice arises. For these are what distinguish all vices of the soul, and their excesses from each other. And justice is a certain arrangement of the parts of the soul, and a perfect and most supreme virtue; for everything is contained in it. And the other goods of the soul are not without it; therefore, justice holds great power among the Gods, and among humans; for virtue unites community in the whole and in the universe, and in Gods and in humans. Indeed, Justice is celebrated by the heavenly Gods; and Righteousness, by the chthonic (underworld) deities; and Law, by humans. And these are signs and symbols that justice is the most supreme virtue. And reason is otherwise attested by these things: for when the mind of the soul errs by defect, such a disposition is called folly; when the spirit errs, audacity or cowardice; when appetite errs, incontinence; and when the mind errs by defect, folly; when by excess, cunning; and when the spirit errs by defect, cowardice; when by excess, audacity; and when appetite errs by defect, aversion to pleasure; when by excess, intemperance; and in general, any disharmony not according to right reason, is vice; and if these things occur for no reason, they are called stupidity; and when from fear, cowardice; when from pleasure, intemperance; when from gain, injustice. And the arrangement of these according to right reason, when it arises in contemplating and judging, virtue is called prudence; when it is in enduring pleasant things, temperance; when it is in abstaining from gain and harm to one's neighbor, justice. And its arrangement according to right reason, and transgression against right reason, is aiming at what is proper, and falling short of what is proper. And what is proper is what ought to be; and this needs neither subtraction nor addition; for it is what ought to be. And of what is not proper, there are two forms: excess and deficiency. And excess is more than what is proper; and deficiency is less. And virtue is a certain disposition concerning what is proper; therefore, it is immediately both an extreme and a mean. It is an extreme, because it adheres to what is proper; and it is a mean, because it is between excess and deficiency. For in this way, they are both means and extremes; means, because they fall outside of excess and deficiency; and extremes, because they need neither addition nor subtraction; for they themselves are what ought to be.

68. In the same place.

Since the virtue of the godless [or ungodly] being is concerned with passions, and of passions, pleasure and pain are most supreme, it is clear that virtue does not lie in eliminating the passions of the soul, pleasure and pain, but in harmonizing them. For neither does health, which is a certain good blending of the bodily powers, lie in eliminating the cold and the hot, and the wet and the dry, but in mixing these; for there is a kind of symmetry of these; nor in music does harmony lie in eliminating the high and the low, but in harmonizing these in some way. When the high and the low are harmonized, harmony is attained, and discord is rejected; and when the hot and the cold, and the wet and the dry are harmonized, health arises, and disease perishes; and when spirit and appetite are harmonized, vices and passions are removed, and virtues and moral characters arise. The most distinctive characteristic of moral virtue is moral choice in noble things. For one can use reason and power even without virtue, but not moral choice; for moral choice indicates the dignity of one's character. Therefore, when reason forcibly prevails over spirit and appetite, it produces self-control and patience; but when it is forcibly overcome by the irrational parts, it produces incontinence and softness. And such dispositions of the soul are, on the one hand, incomplete virtues, and on the other hand, incomplete vices. For reason is healthy, but the irrational parts of the soul are diseased. And insofar as spirit and appetite are ruled and led by the rational part of the soul, self-control and patience are virtues; but insofar as they act under compulsion, and not voluntarily, they are vices. For virtue must perform what is proper not with pain, but with pleasure. Again, insofar as spirit and appetite prevail over reason, producing softness and incontinence, they are certain vices; but insofar as they indulge the passions with pain, knowing that they are erring, to the healthy eye of the soul, these are not vices. Again, it is evident from this very fact that virtue must perform what is proper voluntarily. What is involuntary is not without pain and fear; but what is

voluntary, not without pleasure and cheerfulness. "At the same time, also" the discourse of division may intervene, and let these things remain as they are. For knowledge and the vision of things belonging to the rational part of the soul; but power belongs to the irrational part. For inability to endure toils, and mastery over pleasures, is characteristic of the irrational part of the soul. But deliberate choice occurs in both of these, both in the rational part of the soul and in the irrational part; for it consists of thought and desire; of which thought belongs to the rational part, and desire to the irrational part. Therefore, all virtue arises from the harmony of the parts of the soul, and is also voluntary and chosen, by all means in virtue.

In the same place.

Thus, in general, virtue is a kind of harmony of the irrational parts of the soul towards the rational part. It is accustomed to receive its definition according to pleasure and pain, as related to what is proper. For nothing else is true virtue, but a disposition towards what is proper; and what is proper is that which ought to be, and what is not proper is that which ought not to be. Of what is not proper, there are two forms: excess and deficiency. And excess is more than what is proper; deficiency is less than what is proper. And what is proper itself, being what ought to be, would be both extreme and mean; extreme, because it does not require either subtraction or addition; and mean, because it is between excess and deficiency. And what is proper and not proper relate to each other as the equal and the unequal, and the orderly and the disorderly; (these two are both limited and unlimited).

and for this reason the unequal parts are said to be relative to the mean, but not to each other. For an obtuse angle is called that which is greater than a right angle; and an acute angle, that which is less than a right angle; and a greater straight line, that which extends beyond the center; and a longer day, that of the equinox. And diseases occur in the body when the body becomes hotter or colder. For that which is hotter is more than the moderate; and that which is colder, less than it. And the soul too, and the things concerning it, have this disposition and proportion. For boldness is an excess of what is proper in facing dangers; and cowardice, a deficiency of the same. And prodigality is an excess of what is proper in spending money; and illiberality, a deficiency of the same. And anger is an excess of what is proper in a burst of passion; and insensitivity, a deficiency of the same. And the same reasoning applies to the other opposing dispositions. It is necessary for virtue to be a disposition that adheres to what is proper, and a mean of passions, neither impassive nor overly emotional. For impassivity makes the soul unmotivated and uninspired towards what is good; and emotionality, "confused and irrational." Therefore, passion must appear in virtue in such a way, just as shadow and line appear in a painting; for the animated, and the soft, and the imitated truth with the pleasantness of colors, are mostly created through these. And the passions of the soul, according to nature, are animated by the impulse and enthusiasm of virtue. For virtue arises from passions; and when it is generated, it is again increased by them, just as what is well-tuned comes from the acute and the grave, and what is well-tempered from the hot and the cold, and the balanced from the heavy and light.

Therefore, it is not necessary to remove the passions of the soul, "for it is not beneficial"; but rather to harmonize them with the rational part towards what is proper and moderate.

From Archytas the Pythagorean, On Ethical Education.

We say that virtue is sufficient for not being miserable, and vice for not being happy, if we judge by the dispositions themselves. For the wicked person is always necessarily miserable, whether he has material possessions, for he uses them badly, or whether he lacks them, like a blind person, whether he has light and visible brightness or continues in darkness; but the good person is not always happy. "For the possession of virtue is not happiness, but its use." For the one who has sight does not always see; for if he does not have light, he will not see. Two paths intersect in life; one more gloomy, if the wretched Odysseus walked it; the other more pleasant, which Nestor traveled. Therefore, I say that virtue can "reveal" the former, and also the latter. But nature "bestows" happiness, a desirable and stable life, "by fulfilling our purposes"; so that what one does not make clear as one passes through, one is not happy, but also not "entirely miserable."

In the same place.

Therefore, let them not dare to call the good person free from disease and pain, nor let them boldly say that he is free from sorrow; for just as we leave certain pains in the body, so also do we leave painful things in the soul. But the pains of the foolish are irrational; those of the wise, are for the end; but the latter causes us to act towards the end. Furthermore, if it is necessary for anyone possessing any moral virtue to have prudence; since moral virtue is a practical disposition concerning things determined both by prudence and by right reason; and it is also necessary for one who has prudence to have moral virtue; since it is proper to prudence to seek how it is possible to attain the proper aim, which it defines morally; for it is itself the virtue of the desiderative faculty. For in this respect prudence and cleverness differ: prudence is inventive and investigative of things leading to the right aim; but cleverness is inventive of things leading to what is merely expedient.

From Musonius.

It is not possible to live the present day well without proposing to live it as if it were one's last.

From Musonius, On Clothing.

These things he said concerning food. He also urged that the temperate person seek clothing for the body, not for luxury or excess; for immediately he said that clothing and footwear should be used in the same way as armor, for the protection of the body, and not for display. Therefore, just as the most beautiful weapons are the strongest and those most able to protect their user, not those that are conspicuous and splendid; so also the most useful clothing and footwear are the strongest for the body, and not those able to turn the eyes of the foolish. For clothing must reveal the protected person as superior and stronger, and not weaker or "worse." Therefore, those who contrive softness and tenderness of flesh through coverings make their bodies worse; since a flabby and soft body is much worse than a hard and well-trained one; but those who strengthen and harden their bodies with clothing, these alone benefit those who are protected. For this reason it is by no means good "either to cover the body with many clothes, nor to wrap it with bands, nor to soften hands and feet by tying on felt" or certain woven materials, at least for those who are not ill; nor to be altogether unacquainted with beneficial cold and heat, but one must shiver in moderate winter, and be exposed to the sun in summer, and shelter oneself as little as possible. "And to use one tunic is preferable to needing two, and to use one tunic is preferable to using none, but only a cloak." And "to wear shoes is better than to go barefoot for one who is able"; for to wear shoes risks being close to being tied down; but going barefoot provides great "flexibility" and ease for the feet, when they are accustomed. Hence we see the day-runners not using shoes on the roads, and the athletes who would not be able to maintain their speed if they had to run in shoes.

Since we also make houses for the sake of shelter, I say that these too should be made for the necessary needs, so as to ward off cold, and to ward off intense heat, and to be a protection against sun and winds for those who need it. In general, whatever a natural cave provides, having a moderate entrance for man, this our house should provide, if it is to exceed just as much as it is to have suitable storage for human food. What then are the peristyle halls? What are the "painted decorations"? What are the "gilded roofs"? What are the luxuries of stones, some fitted on the ground, others inlaid into walls, some stones brought from very far away, and with the greatest expense? Are not all these things superfluous and unnecessary, without which one can live and be healthy, but which involve the greatest effort and cost a lot of money, from which one could have benefited many people both publicly and privately? And indeed, how much more glorious is it to benefit many people than to live in luxury? How much more noble and good is it to spend on people than on wood and stones? How much more profitable is it to acquire many friends than to be surrounded by a large house? This is what happens to one who generously benefits others. And what good could one derive from such a great and beautiful house, comparable to what one derives from bestowing gifts upon the city and its citizens from one's own means?

From Eusebius.

"May I be an enemy to no one, but a friend to one who is always constant; and may I never be at odds with my closest kin; but if I am at odds, may I be reconciled as quickly as possible. May I never plot against anyone; but if plotted against, may I escape unharmed, without necessity of doing anything irremediable. May I master my anger. May I love and desire and attain only noble things; and as for the opposite of desire, may I never err so as to wish to obtain it. May I wish everyone to be happy, and never envy "anyone who is fortunate." May no one of those who are considered to fare well unreasonably ever surprise or vex me; for why should one envy what is given by fortune? But may my friends, and those who are fortunate according to their worth, rejoice. May I never gloat over one who, having initiated enmity against me of their own accord, suffers misfortune. May I never be lenient with myself for any evil. I caused some harm to myself." May I never, having inadvertently said or done something out of tune, wait for those who will blame and rebuke me; but may I blame myself "until I am healed." May I know how to bear bravely what befalls me; "and may I accept moderate things, just as their nature is"; and may I not add to excessive things from "my own." May I know how to bear good fortune temperately, and never be unreasonably lifted into arrogance by prosperity. May I consider sufficient wealth for a temperate life. May I never have an insatiable and endless desire for money, but may I wish to learn only those lessons that are beneficial for the soul and necessary. May I win a victory that is harmless both to myself and to my interlocutor. May I be careful not to be ambitious at the wrong time with friends and in discussions. May I never, contrary to what I believe, embrace strife in discussions for the sake of victory. May I never be carried away by argument to harm the truth, and to misrepresent what I myself know to my interlocutor. May I always be an ally to those who establish the truth with arguments. May I never even conceive of an unbridled desire for anything. May I always be with the temperate; may it be granted to me always to converse with those from whom I may surely gain something good when I depart. May I never be carried away to commit a wrong for the sake of profit. May I "reform friends who are erring." May I be able to supply friends and those in need with what is necessary. May I never "abandon friends when they are in danger," being able to help them. When friends suffer misfortunes, may I eagerly rectify them, as far as possible. When present with those in sorrow, may I lighten their pains with a gentle and healing word. May I know how to respect myself. May I practice learning what is noble.

I would seek not superfluous things, but rather what is best, and what I would benefit from learning. I would honor the gods and the law of the city, and "with earnest and pious intent." I would always temper "the passion within me." I would wish to be gracious to myself, and not to be difficult regarding affairs. May it not concern me who is wicked, and what evil he has ever done; but may I know the good, and pursue them. I ought to owe nothing to anyone; but if ever by great necessity I should be forced into this, may it be granted to me to be able to become free as quickly as possible. I would praise the good ungrudgingly; and I would abhor a fault-finding tongue from "everyone." I would know how to be silent about what is better.

From Socrates.

One should neither anchor a ship with a single anchor, nor life on a single hope.

From Themistius, On Moderation or On Love of Virtue.

Thus also for man: it is necessary for pleasure and pain, and all other passions, to be intertwined, with pain being more abundant and persistent. And Aesop says this again: for Prometheus, when he fashioned man from clay, did not mix it with water, but with tears. "Is it not therefore necessary to try to cut them out?" For it is impossible. But if it is possible to cut down and soothe, and to calm as much as possible, and to admonish; for the soul receives this care favorably. And thus, as you discipline them, they will appear useful and beneficial to you, instead of useless and harmful. For God did not mix these into man to add harm and disgrace to him, but rather He also wove and built these into the soul for the preservation and salvation of the race: anger, so that we may ward off harmful things; and desire for food and drink, for the innate and necessary efflux; and thus also another "plague" affecting the body, ordered according to another. Each thing must remain within its measure; and this measure becomes virtue for each: for the spirited part, courage; for the desiderative part, temperance; and again for the money-loving and greedy part, liberality and magnanimity; as for what is concerned with honors and powers and "leadership," the measure is magnanimity. But if they are left disordered and untended by reason, like tame and good plants neglected by a farmer, they immediately become wild and arrogant, and produce vices, like harsh and poisonous thorns, harmful to others, and especially to the possessor. And there are things for which, on the contrary, they wither and decay within their prime; and these need reason not to cut off and oppress and crush, but to water and lead back and stimulate towards their proper growth. And for this reason, two vices surround each virtue on either side: one that loves the deficiency of the passion, and the other that embraces the excess. It is necessary not to look at all things, the bad and the distorted, and suspect and drive them out indiscriminately, but to examine the will of nature, and for what purpose it has implanted and impressed each of the passions upon the soul.

From Porphyry, On the Things Leading to Intelligibles.

There are virtues of the political person, and others of one who ascends to contemplation, and for this reason called theoretical, and others of one who has already attained perfect contemplation, and of one who is already a beholder; and others of the intellect, as intellect, and of the pure soul. The virtues of the political person lie in moderation of the irrational part, by following and obeying reason in matters of duty in actions. Therefore, looking towards harmlessness to one's neighbors, stemming from living together and from communal life, they are called political. And prudence is concerned with the calculating part; courage, with the spirited part; and temperance [in the agreement and harmony of the desiderative part with reason; and justice] is the proper functioning of each of these together, concerning rule and being ruled. And the virtues of the theoretical person, who progresses towards contemplation, are at a distance from this world; therefore, these are also called purifications, considered as abstentions from bodily actions and sympathies with the body itself. For these virtues move the soul away towards true being; while political virtues adorn mortal man. And political virtues are forerunners of purifications; for one must, having been adorned by them, abstain from acting with the body primarily. Therefore, in purifications, not concurring with the body, but only acting, establishes prudence, which is perfected by pure intellectual apprehension; and not suffering with it establishes temperance; and not fearing the body as something empty and non-existent, establishes courage. And when reason and intellect lead, and nothing opposes, justice is such a state. Therefore, the disposition according to the political virtues is considered in moderation, having as its end to live as a human being according to nature; but the disposition according to the theoretical virtues, in impassivity; the end of which is likeness to God. Since purification, one kind was purifying, and the other of those purified; purifying virtues are considered in both senses of purification; for they both purify the soul, and when purified, it unites; for the end is to be purified from purifying. But since purifying and being purified was a removal of all that is alien, the good would be distinct from the purifying; so that it is sufficient for the purpose of impurity; but purification will be sufficient, and what remains will be good, and not purification itself. But the nature of the soul was not good, but capable of partaking of good, and good-like; for it would not have come into being in evil. Therefore, its good consists in being with its generator; and vice, in being with what is inferior. And vice is twofold: both being with these things, and with an excess of passions; therefore, political virtues, at least in one way, freeing it from vice, were judged to be virtues, and honorable; and purifying virtues are more honorable, freeing it from so-called psychic vice. It is therefore necessary for it, having been purified, to be with its generator. And thus, its virtue after turning back is this, which consists in the knowledge and understanding of being; not that it does not possess this on its own, but that without that which precedes it, it does not see its own nature. There is another, third kind of virtues after the purifying and political virtues, in which the soul acts intellectually: wisdom and prudence in contemplation of what the intellect possesses; justice in right action, in obedience to the intellect and acting according to the intellect. Temperance is the turning inward towards the intellect; and courage is impassivity, in likeness to that which the intellect beholds, being impassive by nature. And these virtues follow each other, as do others. A fourth kind of virtues are the paradigmatic virtues, which were superior in the intellect to psychic virtues, and are like patterns for them: knowledge is intellection, and wisdom is the knowing intellect; and temperance is towards itself, and proper functioning is proper functioning, and courage, and identity, and remaining pure in itself through abundance of power. Therefore, four kinds of virtues have appeared: [of which] some were paradigmatic virtues of the intellect, and concomitant with its essence; and others, of the soul already looking towards the intellect and being filled by it; and others, of the human soul being purified and cleansed from the body and from irrational passions; and others, of the human soul adorning man, by limiting the irrational with measures, and producing moderation. And he who possesses the greater virtues necessarily possesses the lesser ones; but not vice versa. But he who possesses the greater virtues will not act according to the lesser ones primarily, but only according to the circumstances of generation. For the ends are different, as has been said, and differ according to kind. For the political virtues aim to impose measure on the passions in natural activities; and the cathartic virtues, to completely abstain from passions, taking what was formerly a measure; and those directed towards the intellect, to act without departing from passions to enter into intellection; and those which do not have their activity towards the intellect, but are united with its very essence. Therefore, he who acted according to practical virtues was a good man; and he who acted according to cathartic virtues was a divine man, or a good daemon; and he who acted according to the virtues directed solely towards the intellect was a god; and he who acted according to the paradigmatic virtues was the father of gods. Therefore, we must especially concern ourselves with the cathartic virtues, considering that their attainment in this life, and through them the ascent to more honorable states, is possible. Therefore, one must consider up to what point and to what extent purification can be embraced. For it consists in separation from the body, and from irrational passion.

movement. How it would come about, and to what extent, must be stated. First, as a foundation and base of purification, is to know oneself as a soul, existing in an alien body, and connected to something of a different essence; second, stemming from this conviction, to draw oneself away from the body (and at least in some places) to be entirely impassive towards it. For if someone is continuously active according to sensation, even without passion or the enjoyment of pleasure, he does this; but then he is dispersed throughout the body, becoming connected to it in this way, suffering with the sensory pleasures or pains, with eagerness and inclination to sympathize; from which disposition especially one must purify oneself. This would happen if one received necessary pleasures and sensory experiences only for the sake of healing, or for relief from pains, so as not to be hindered. And one must also remove pains; but if that is not possible, one must bear them gently, making them less by not suffering with them. And anger must be removed as much as possible, and practiced everywhere; but if not, at least to mingle one's choice with it, but the involuntary aspect is something else; and the involuntary is weak and small; and fear must be removed entirely, for one will fear nothing; and the involuntary also in this case. Therefore, one must use anger and fear for admonition; and every bad desire must be banished; and as for foods and drinks, one will not possess them as one normally would; and as for natural sexual desires, the involuntary aspect is not to be indulged; but if so, only as far as the impetuous fantasies of sleep. In general, this very movement.

ABOUT VIRTUE.

Now, the intellectual soul of the one being purified must be pure of these things. And let that which is moved towards the irrational bodily passions be moved dispassionately and carelessly, so that its movements are immediately dissolved by its proximity to the reasoning faculty.

89. From Plato's Phaedo.

"In truth, then," he said, "O Simmias, those who rightly philosophize practice dying, and for them to be dead is least fearful among men."

90. From Plato's Clitophon.

To these words, so beautifully spoken, that virtue is teachable, and that one must especially care for oneself above all else, no one, I believe, has ever contradicted them, nor, I imagine, will they ever. I will contradict them later.

91. From Plato's Menexenus or Epitaph.

But all multitude, and all wealth, yield to virtue...

92. Plato, Republic Book 5.

For it is most beautifully said, and will continue to be said, that what is beneficial is good, and what is harmful is shameful. Entirely so, indeed.

93. Plato, Republic Book 5.

That he is foolish who regards anything else as ridiculous, or attempts to make fun of anything else, looking to some other appearance as ridiculous, than that of the senseless and bad; and who, on the other hand, strives for the good, setting up some other aim than that of the good.

IRANNOT STOBAIOS.

94. Plato, Republic Book 5.

For among the wise and friends, to speak the truth about the most important matters is safe and reassuring; but to speak while doubting and at the same time seeking the arguments, as I do, is fearful and dangerous, and brings no laughter upon oneself.

95. Plato, Laws Book 4.

Nor, indeed, when one eagerly desires to acquire wealth improperly, or acquires it with difficulty, does one then honor their own soul with gifts; for in every way, it falls short; for what is valuable and beautiful in the soul itself is given for a small amount of gold; for all gold on earth and under the earth is not worth virtue.

It is valuable for the body not to be beautiful, nor strong, nor swift, nor great, nor even healthy, although many would think this to be so; and certainly not the opposite of these things; but those things that touch the mean of this disposition are by far the most temperate and safest. For the former make souls boastful and reckless, while the latter make them humble and illiberal; and in the same way, the acquisition and estimation of wealth proceeds according to the same rhythm: for the excessive possession of each of these creates enmities and factions in states and in private life, while the lack of them leads to slavery for the most part. Therefore, let no one be fond of money for the sake of their children, thinking they will leave them the richest; for it is better neither for them nor for the state itself; for the unadulterated substance of the young, and their freedom from want of necessities, is itself most musical and best; for it agrees with us and harmonizes with these things, making life free from pain.

Parents ought to leave much shame to their children, not gold. And we think that in reproving the shameless young, we leave this to them; but it is not from present exhortation that it happens to the young, that which they are exhorted to do.

ABOUT VIRTUE.

by saying that the young must always be ashamed. But the prudent lawgiver would rather exhort the elders to be ashamed before the young, and above all to be careful lest any of the young should see or hear him doing or saying anything shameful; for where elders are shameless, it is necessary that the young also become most shameless there. For the education of the young differs at the same time from themselves, not in admonishing, but in doing themselves throughout their lives what one would say when admonishing another.

Indeed, truth is considered by the gods to be the best of all things, and by men as well; and whoever is going to be blessed and happy, let him from the beginning immediately participate in it, so that he may live as long as possible in truth; for truth is trustworthy. But he who loves falsehood willingly is untrustworthy; and he who loves it unwillingly is foolish; neither of which is enviable. For every untrustworthy and ignorant person is friendless; and when known over time, he has created for himself complete desolation in old age, at the end of his life, so that he becomes as if orphaned of both living companions and children.

Indeed, he who wrongs no one is worthy of honor; but he who neither wrongs nor permits those who do wrong to do so, is worthy of more than double honor than the former. For the former is worth one, but the latter is worth many others, by revealing the wrongdoing of others to the rulers; and he who also helps to punish in proportion to his power with the rulers, let him be proclaimed a great man in the state and perfect, a conqueror in virtue. The same praise must be spoken concerning temperance, and concerning prudence, and concerning whatever other good qualities one possesses, capable not only of having them oneself, but also of imparting them to others. And he who imparts them should be honored as most excellent; but he who cannot, but is willing, let him be left as second; but he who envies, and willingly shares in no good things with anyone through friendship, himself…

IRANNOT STOBAIOS.

…blaming them; and as for property, one should not dishonor it more on account of the possessor, but acquire it according to one's ability. Let us, then, strive zealously for virtue without envy; for he who is such a person increases states, competing himself, but not hindering others through slanders; while the envious person, thinking he must excel by slandering others, himself less intensely strives for true virtue, and disheartens those who compete with him by being unjustly blamed; and on account of these things, making the entire state unpracticed in the emulation of virtue, he makes his own part smaller for glory.

Indeed, every man must be spirited, but also as gentle as possible; for the difficult and troublesome, or even utterly incurable, injustices of others cannot otherwise be escaped than by fighting and defending oneself victoriously, and by punishing without yielding at all; but this no soul is able to do without noble spirit.

But as for our own wrongdoings, if they are curable, we must understand, first, that no one is willingly unjust; for no one ever willingly possessed any of the greatest evils, much less in what is most valuable to oneself; and the soul, as we said, is truly most valuable to all. Therefore, no one willingly takes the greatest evil in what is most valuable, and lives possessing it throughout life; but the unjust person, and he who has evils, is certainly to be pitied; but to pity him who has curable evils is permissible, and to restrain one's anger and to be mild, and not to be constantly bitterly angry like a woman; but to the one who sins greatly and incurably and yields to evil, one must direct one's anger. Wherefore we say that the good man must always be spirited and gentle. And the greatest evil inherent in most men…

ABOUT VIRTUE.

…is in their souls, from which no one who recognizes it can devise any escape. This is what they say, that every man is a friend to himself. By nature, it is so, and it is right that it should be such; but by truth, it is the cause of all errors for everyone, because of excessive self-love. For the lover is blind concerning the beloved, so that he judges what is just, good, and beautiful badly, always thinking that his own must be honored above the truth. For a great man, who is going to be, must not love himself or his own things; but he must love what is just, whether it happens to be done by himself or by another. From this same error also comes the ignorance that is believed to be wisdom in all; whence, not knowing, as one might say, anything, we think we know everything; and not allowing others to do what we do not understand, we are compelled to do it ourselves, erring. Therefore, every man should avoid excessive self-love, and always pursue what is best for himself, not taking on any shame for so doing.

96. Of the same, Laws Book 7.

For much sleep is not fitting by nature, either for our bodies, or for our souls, or for our actions concerning these things. For no one is good for anything while sleeping, no more than when dead; but whoever is most concerned with our living and thinking, let him be awake as long as possible, keeping watch over his health alone, which is not much, but is good when it becomes a habit. And rulers, being awake at night in states, are fearful to wicked enemies and also to citizens; but admirable and honorable to the just and temperate, and beneficial to themselves and to the entire state.

97. Of the same, from On Virtue.

How, then, O Socrates, do you think they come to be, if not...

IRANNOT STOBAIOS.

…by nature, nor by learning? What other way, then, could good men come to be? I believe it would not be easy to make this clear; but I conjecture that it is mostly a divine possession, and that good men come to be, just as the divine seers and soothsayers do. For these do not come to be such by nature, nor by art, but they come to be such by divine inspiration from the Gods; so also good men say to states, each time, what will happen and what is going to be, by divine inspiration, much more clearly than soothsayers. For women also say that such a man is divine, and the Lacedaemonians, when they highly praise someone, say he is a divine man; and in many places Homer also uses this same expression, and other poets. And whenever God wishes a city to fare well, he places good men in it; but whenever a city is about to fare badly, God takes away the good men from that city. It seems to be thus: virtue is neither teachable nor inherent by nature, but comes to be acquired by divine fate.

98. [Concerning virtue, we deliberate and are perplexed, whether it is teachable to be prudent, to act justly, to live well; then we are amazed that while there are myriad works of rhetoricians, pilots, builders, and farmers, good men are merely named and spoken of, like centaurs, giants, and cyclopes; but a flawless work for virtue and a blameless character and untouched by passion is not to be found. But even if nature spontaneously brings forth something beautiful, this is largely obscured by what is foreign, like wild fruit mixed with impure matter. Men learn to play the lyre, and to dance, and to read letters, and to farm, and to ride horses; they learn to wear shoes, to dress, to drink wine...

ABOUT VIRTUE.

...to pour (libations), to cook; these things cannot be done usefully without learning.]

99. From Xenophon's Memorabilia, Book 2.

As many virtues as are spoken of among men, you will find that all are increased by learning and practice.

100. From Xenophon's Memorabilia, Book 1.

Socrates said to this: "O Antiphon, among us, it is considered beautiful and shameful alike to dispose of beauty and wisdom in the same way. For if one sells beauty to anyone who desires it for money, they call him a harlot; but if one makes a friend of a man whom they know to be honorable and good, because he is a lover, we consider him temperate; and in the same way with wisdom, those who sell it for money to anyone who desires it, they call sophists, like harlots; but whoever, knowing someone to be naturally gifted, teaches him whatever good he possesses, and makes him a friend, we consider him to be doing what is fitting for a good and honorable citizen. So I myself, O Antiphon, just as one delights in a good horse, or a dog, or a bird, so I delight even more in good friends; and if I acquire anything good, I teach it, and I introduce others to those from whom I think they will benefit for virtue. And I unroll and go through the treasures of ancient wise men, which they left behind in written books, in common with my friends; and if we see anything good, we select it; and we consider it a great gain if we become friends with one another. When I heard these things, I thought myself blessed, and that he led his hearers to moral excellence. And again once Antiphon asked him, 'How is it, O Socrates, that you think you make others good politicians, but you yourself do not practice politics, if indeed you know how?' He replied, 'Which do you think, O Antiphon, would be more engaged in politics, if I...'

IRANNOT STOBAIOS.

...were to do these things alone, or if I were to take care to make as many as possible capable of doing them?"

101. Of the same, in Memorabilia, Book 2.

Then he who voluntarily toils with hope of good, labors with joy, just as those who hunt wild beasts labor gladly with the hope of catching them. And such prizes of labor are worth little; but those who labor in order to gain good friends, or to overpower enemies, or to become capable in body and soul, and to manage their own household well, and to benefit their friends, and to do good to their country—how can it be thought that such men should not labor gladly in these things, and live joyfully, admiring themselves, and being praised and envied by others? Furthermore, easy living and pleasures of the moment are neither sufficient to give health to the body, as gymnasts say, nor do they instill any worthy knowledge in the soul; but efforts through perseverance in noble and good deeds accomplish their purpose, as good men say. And Hesiod says somewhere,

"For vice is easy to get, even in great abundance;

smooth is the road, and she dwells very near.

But before virtue, the immortal Gods have placed sweat;

long and steep is the path to her,

and rough at first; but when one reaches the summit,

then it becomes easy, however difficult it was."

And Epicharmus testifies to this:

"The Gods sell us all good things for our toil."

And in another place he says,

"O wretched man, do not choose the soft things, lest you have the hard."

ABOUT VIRTUE.

…you seek; and in order that you may sleep sweetly, you prepare not only soft mattresses, but also couches and footrests for the couches; for it is not through toil, but through having nothing to do, that you desire sleep; and as for sexual pleasures, you contrive every means before you need them, and use women with men; for thus you educate your friends;

You disgrace the night, and you make the most useful part of the day sleep; though immortal, you have been cast out by the gods, and are dishonored by good men; of all sounds most pleasant, you are deaf to the praise of yourself, and of all sights most pleasant, you have never seen a good deed of your own. Who would believe you if you spoke? Who would help you if you asked for aid? Or who with good sense would dare to be of your retinue? The young, while they are young, are powerless in body; and when they become old, they are foolish in soul; living carelessly and luxuriating in their youth, they pass their old age in toil and hardship; ashamed of what they have done, and acting wildly in their present affairs, they rush through the pleasures of youth, and leave the hardships for old age.

But I associate with gods, and I associate with good men; and no good work, whether divine or human, comes into being without me; and I am honored by all above all, both by gods and by men to whom it is fitting; for I am a beloved fellow-worker to craftsmen, a faithful guardian of masters' houses, a benevolent assistant to servants, a good helper in the labors of peace, and a steadfast ally in the deeds of war. And for my friends, the enjoyment of food and drink is sweet and effortless, for they endure until they desire them; and sleep is sweeter for them than for those who toil not, and they are not burdened when they leave it, nor do they neglect what is necessary because of it. And the young rejoice in the praises of their elders, and the older rejoice in the honors from the young; and they remember past deeds with pleasure, and present ones well; they act with pleasure, and through me, being friends to the gods, beloved by friends, and honored by their fatherlands; and whenever fate comes…

IRANNOT STOBAIOS.

…at the end, they are not laid dishonored in oblivion, but flourish through all time, being praised in memory. Such things are in your power, O child of good parents, Heracles, to acquire blessed happiness by toiling. This is how Prodicus arranges the education of Heracles in virtue.

102. From Xenophon's Memorabilia, Book 3.

When someone asked him what he thought was the best pursuit for a man, he answered, "Doing well." When asked again whether he considered good fortune also a pursuit, he replied, "By no means, for I consider good fortune and action to be different. For I consider it good fortune when one succeeds in something necessary without seeking it; but I consider it doing well when one has learned something and practiced doing it well; and those who pursue this, I think, act well. And he said that the best and most beloved by the gods were those who did well in farming, those who did well in medicine, and those who did well in politics; but he said that he who did nothing well was neither useful nor beloved by the gods."

103. Of the same, in Memorabilia, Book 4.

Thus Socrates was beneficial in every matter and in every way, so that to anyone who observed this and moderately perceived it, it was clear that nothing was more beneficial than to associate with Socrates and to spend time with him anywhere and in any matter; since even remembering him when he was not present was of no small benefit to those who were accustomed to associating with him and accepting him. For even when playing, he was no less useful to those who associated with him than when serious. For he often said he was in love with someone; but it was clear that he was not seeking those whose bodies...

ABOUT VIRTUE.

...were merely beautiful, but those whose souls were well-suited for virtue. And he inferred good natures from the fact that they learn more quickly what they attend to, and remember what they have learned, and desire all studies by which one can well manage a household and a state, and generally use men and human affairs well. For he considered that those who were educated in this way would not only be happy themselves, but would also be able to make other men and states happy.

And he did not proceed in the same way with all; but those who thought they were good by nature, and scorned learning, he taught that the natures deemed best especially need education; showing that the most gifted horses, being spirited and strong, if they are broken in when young, become most useful and excellent; but if they are left untrained, they become most unmanageable and worthless; and that dogs, being most gifted, both eager to labor and inclined to hunt beasts, if they are well-trained, become best for hunting and most useful, but if left untrained, become worthless and wild and most disobedient; and similarly, among men, those who are most gifted and most robust in soul and most effective in whatever they undertake, if they are educated and learn what they must do, become most excellent and most useful; for they produce the most and greatest good; but if they are left uneducated and ignorant, they become most mischievous and harmful; for not knowing what they must do, they often undertake bad things, and being great and strong, they are unmanageable and difficult to restrain; therefore they produce the most and greatest evils. And those who are proud of their wealth and think they need no education, believing that their wealth will be sufficient for them to accomplish whatever they wish...

IRANNOT STOBAIOS.

...and to be honored by men, he would say, chiding them, that a man would be foolish if he thought he could discern what is beneficial and what is harmful without learning; and foolish if, not discerning these things, he thought he could accomplish what is expedient by acquiring whatever he desired through wealth; and idiotic if he thought he was doing well, unable to do what is expedient, and that things were adequately or well prepared for him for his life; and idiotic also if he thought that through wealth, knowing nothing, he would appear to be good, even if he appeared to be good knowing nothing.

ABOUT VICE. Book 2.

1. Demetrius.

Wickedness is extremely susceptible; for by always looking only to gain, it foolishly and recklessly yields to everything.

2. Axinicus.

When someone lends money to a wicked man, he justly has pain from the interest.

3.

When someone, being prosperous, does shameful things, what do you expect him to do when he is in need?

4. Menander, The Maidservant.

Wickedness devises many schemes.

5. Menander.

I hate a wicked man who speaks good words.

6. Menander.

Wickedness is thoughtless.

7.

Indeed, God causes a reason to arise for mortals, when he wishes to utterly destroy a house.

8.

Renounce the reputation of the just; but do the deeds of one who does everything, where you will gain.

9. Sclerius.

For many mortals, their nature is noble, but the mind within it is ignoble.

10. Philippides.

But the most cruel slanderer, having taken two minas, departs gentler than a lamb.

11. Hesiod, Works and Days.

Nor will there be any favor for the truthful, nor the just, nor the good; but they will honor a man who is a doer of evil and insolence; justice will not be in hands, nor shame; but the wicked will harm the better man, speaking with crooked words, and will swear an oath. Envy, a miserable thing for all mortals, an ugly-faced joy, will accompany him.

IRANNOT STOBAIOS.

12. Zenodotus.

Virtue is indeed proclaimed; but a wicked man has led a silent life, both while living and when dead.

13. Hesiod, Works and Days.

Now indeed, may I myself not be just among men, nor my son; since it is wrong for a just man to exist if the more unjust man gains a greater judgment.

14. In the same work.

A wicked neighbor is a plague, or as great a blessing as can be. Indeed, honor belongs to him who has a good neighbor.

15. Euripides, from Bellerophon.

Nor is good fortune ever secure for a wicked man, nor is haughty wealth lasting; one should compare it to an unjust lineage. For time, which originates from nothing, bringing forth just standards, reveals the wickedness of men to me.

16. Euripides, Medea.

O Zeus, why then did you give men clear signs of gold, which was counterfeit, but for discerning who is the wicked man, no mark is imprinted on the body?

17. Of the same, Tenos.

Alas! Nothing is just in the present generation.

ABOUT VICE. Book 2.

18. Sophocles.

By many foolish acts, the wise man is destroyed.

19. Dio Chrysostom, from the Euboean Discourse.

Wicked things never like to remain the same; but they are always in motion, and proceed to greater licentiousness, finding no necessary limit.

20. Philippus.

Philip, when asked by the Byzantines why he besieged them, said that they were foolish, and like one who, having a beautiful wife, should ask those who come to serenade her why they serenade her.

21. Thales, when asked, "What is more harmful?" he said, "Vice; for even good things, when present, it harms."

22. Demosthenes.

Demosthenes used to say that often when he was about to pray for the wicked to perish, he feared lest he should make the city utterly desolate by his prayer.

23. Pythagoras.

That which is base by divine law is unfit, and therefore transgresses the law.

24. Ausius.

Whoever does not foresee not doing wrong, but rather takes care not to suffer punishment, acts wickedly.

25. Demosthenes, Philippics.

For he who does and arranges these things by which I might be caught, this man is my enemy, even if he does not yet throw a spear or shoot an arrow.

IRANNOT STOBAIOS.

26. Philemon, Agurtos.

Oh, how base is the nature of man as a whole! For it would never have needed law. Do you think man differs from other beasts? Not even a little, but only in form; the others are prone, but this one is upright.

27. Philemon.

Why ever did Prometheus, who they say created us and all other living beings, give to each beast one nature according to its kind? All lions are strong; all hares, on the other hand, are timid; there is no fox that is cunning by nature, and another that is stubborn; but if one were to gather thirty thousand foxes, one would see one single nature, and one single manner.

But as for us, as many as our bodies are in number, so many natures and manners can be seen.

28. Sophocles, Ajax.

I go; for it is shameful if anyone should learn that I punish with words, when I have the power to compel.

ABOUT VICE. Book 2.

29. The same, in Phaedra.

I am going, then; for neither do you dare to praise my words, nor I your ways.

30. Epictetus.

It is shameful to sweeten the swallowing of honeycombs' gifts, and to make the gift of the gods, speech, bitter by wickedness.

31. Lycurgus.

Those who use the good things of nature for worse purposes, for them their good fortunes are hostile. As if someone, being brave, should choose rather to plunder than to go to war; or being strong, rather to rob than to give counsel; or being beautiful, rather to commit adultery than to marry; this man is a betrayer of the good things he has received from nature.

32. Musonius.

Why do we put forward tyrants, when we are far worse than them? For we have the same desires as them, but not in similar circumstances.

33. Theodorus.

Theodorus the Cyrenaic, when Lysimachus the king threatened to put him to death, said, "You have escaped my notice, O King, but you have the power of hemlock."

34. Theocritus.

Theocritus, when asked, "Which of beasts are the most dangerous?" he said, "In the mountains, bears and lions; but in cities, tax collectors and informers."

35. From the Letter On Friendship.

For he who does and arranges these things by which I might be caught, this man is my enemy, even if he does not yet throw a spear or shoot an arrow.

IRANNOT STOBAIOS.

Some people represent their vices with rhetorical elegance: they call sensuality "simplicity," and avarice "foresight."

36. In the same work.

To be resourceful and versatile is useful and necessary where one must use cunning against foreign enemies; but to have a treacherous character and to be most cunning in all things, I attribute to the most wicked part, not to the quick-witted, as some think.

38.

It is easy to praise what one should not, and to blame what one should; but each is the act of a wicked character.

38. Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

For from the same disposition, men both renounce themselves and distrust others.

39. Dio Chrysostom, On Slavery.

Dio says: Good servants are free; but wicked free men are slaves to many desires.

40. Iamblichus, from the Protrepticus to Philosophy.

Similarly, it is as dangerous to give a sword to a madman as it is to give power to a wicked person.

41. Socratic.

Socrates the Cynic, having once heard Plato speaking ill of a wicked man's character, said, "Stop! For neither will you be believed by speaking ill of him, nor will he praise you."

**ON VICE, II.**

42 Simonides.

Simonides the lyric poet, when someone told him that many people spoke ill of him in his presence, said: "Will you never stop slandering me with your ears?"

43 Anacharsis.

Anacharsis the Scythian, when asked by someone, "What is hostile to humans?" he replied, "They themselves are, to themselves."

44 Plato's Republic III.

And of evil and shameful education in a city, will you have any greater proof than the fact that people need a great many doctors and judges, not only the base and manual laborers, but also those who pretend to be free men? Or does it not seem a great proof of shame and lack of education, that one is compelled to use justice from others, as from masters and judges, and because of a lack of one's own? "By all means," he said, "it is most shameful." "Do you think," I asked, "that this is more shameful than this: when someone not only wears out the greater part of his life in lawsuits, as a defendant and a prosecutor, but is also persuaded by vulgarity to adorn himself precisely for this, as if he were skilled in doing wrong, and capable of turning every trick, and having exhausted every loophole, he reckons that he can avoid giving satisfaction in lawsuits, and this for the sake of small and worthless things, ignorant of how much more noble and better it is to prepare one's life so as to need no slumbering judge." "No," he said, "that is even more shameful than the former."

45 From Xenophon's Anabasis.

And Menon the Thessalian was clearly desirous of wealth strongly, and desirous of ruling, so that he might acquire more; desiring to be honored, so that he might gain more; and he wished to be a friend to those who had the greatest power, so that when he did wrong he might not be brought to justice; and he thought the shortest way to accomplish what he desired was through perjury, lying, and deception; and he considered simplicity and truthfulness to be the same as foolishness. He was visibly fond of no one; and to whomever he claimed to be a friend, he was clearly plotting against him. And he never mocked any enemy; but he always spoke derisively of all his companions. And he did not plot against the possessions of his enemies; for he considered it difficult to take what was guarded; but he alone knew that it was easiest to take what belonged to his friends, as it was unguarded. And as many as he perceived to be perjurers and unjust, he feared as well-armed; but those who practiced piety and truthfulness, he attempted to treat as effeminate.

46 Plato's Laws II.

For I clearly say that what are called evils are good for the unjust, and evil for the just; and what are good are truly good for the good, and evil for the wicked.

47 Socrates.

It is the same to moor a ship with a weak anchor as to have hopes from a bad opinion.

48 Aeschines.

For this too a man does uniquely and not in common: for other braggarts, whenever they lie, try to speak vaguely and indistinctly, fearing exposure; but Demosthenes, whenever he brags, first lies under oath.

**ON PRUDENCE. III.**

cursing him to perdition; secondly, he dares to say what he saw would happen as if it will happen in the future, and speaks the names of things whose bodies he has not seen, stealing the attention and imitating those who speak the truth. He is also very worthy of hatred, because being wicked, he misuses the signs of good men.

1 Aeschylus.

"When present, be mindful, lest by your absence you be absent. He is wise who knows what is useful, not he who knows many things."

2 Sophocles.

Nothing better for humans was born than to gain the advantage of foresight, nor of wise counsel.

3. In many forms the Gods lead us astray with their sophistries, being by nature superior.

4. And if you know something very clearly, never expose him who conceals it; for it is a difficult thing by nature to know what someone wishes to keep secret.

5 Sophocles, Ajax.

From these customs, no law would ever be established; if we push out those who win by law, and bring those from behind to the front. But these things must be prevented; for not the broad, nor the broad-shouldered men are the safest, but those who are prudent prevail everywhere. And a large ox, though big in flank, goes straight on its way under a small whip.

6 Menander, Theophoroumenos.

“He who has the most sense is the best prophet and counselor at the same time.”

7 Menander.

Is there among all goods one cause that is most excellent? Understanding, if it is wise regarding the better things.

8 Sophocles, Aleter.

For a benevolent soul, and one that understands justice, is a better discoverer than any sophist.

9 Menander, Imbrians.

Nothing exists, father, in human nature greater than calculation; he who is capable of arranging things, and calculating properly, is everything: ruler, general, leader of the people, and counselor; he who excels in calculation possesses everything.

10 Aeschylus.

Even a man wiser than the wise can err.

11 Menander.

Everything is made subject to prudence.

12 Euripides, Antiope.

You wrongly blamed my weak and female body; for even if I have prudence, that is better than a strong arm.

13. As sight is in the eye, so is the mind in the soul.

14. For it is the part of a good man to help those who toil.

15. But good prudence is a great god.

16 Agathon.

Not by prudence, but by fortune we erred.

17 Chaeremon.

You did not speak ill of prudence as you think.

What is most excellent must be honored everywhere. For he who is prudent has comprehended all things.

18 Euripides, Erechtheus.

“You questioned me rightly, and I wish to advise you, child (for you are already prudent, and you would save your father's counsel if I should die) on noble and useful treasures for the young. And I will say much in a few words. First, it is necessary to have a gentle mind; and to the rich and to those who do not give a share, give yourself equally to piety to all. When two things are present, incline your mind towards one, and hate the opposite. Do not acquire wealth unjustly, if you wish to remain in your home for a long time; for unjustly gained things will not have salvation when they enter houses. But try to have it; for this is what is noble, (and it gives the first marriages). And in poverty there is ignominy, and effeminacy, and dishonor of life. Acquire as friends those who do not yield in arguments; but those who are wicked for your pleasure, let the lock of your house keep them out. Desire the company of older people. Brief pleasure brings pain. And when you are prosperous, child, never pursue shameful loves of common people; which also draw iron, and hangmen, if one shames the children of honest poor people. And never let the wicked grow in the city; for they are evil, whether filled with money, or having entered some office in the city, they prance about unjustly, when their households are prosperous. But, oh child, give me your hand, as a father would touch you, and farewell; and out of shame I do not embrace you too much; for a womanish spirit is not that of a wise man.

19 Theognis.

Eyes and tongue and ears and a man's mind grow perceptive in the middle of his breast.

20 Euripides, Polyeidus.

He who administers his own nature most beautifully, he is wise, and is naturally disposed towards what is expedient.

21 Pythagoras, from the Golden Verses.

Many words, both cowardly and noble, confront humans, by which neither be astonished, nor permit yourself to be hindered. If any falsehood occurs to you, bear it gently; and what I will tell you, let it be fulfilled in all things. Let no one persuade you by word or deed to do or say what is not best for you. Do these things which do not harm you; but consider before acting.

22 Euripides, Peliads.

Do not kick against the goads of those who rule you.

23 Menander.

When another gives you not even a little more, accept the portion; for to receive not even a little, to receive less, will be much for you.

24 Pythagoras.

Strength and a wall and a weapon for the wise is prudence.

25 [MONOSTICHIC GNOMES.

Good prudence is always the greatest good.

A man's character is known by his speech.

It is best to know all good things.

If you are prudent, you will be happy in all things.

The safest is always the strongest.

Some who are imprudent act well.

For experience prevails over inexperience.

I have been taught by observing the misfortunes of others.

It is sweet for a father to have prudence instead of anger.

It is sweetest to have a mind when fortunate.

I hate a sophist who is not wise for himself.

For to perceive is better than to be silent.

Naturally discerning, flee evil-doing.

A mind beyond its age produces hatred.

No one knows what you think, but everyone sees what you do.

The prudent man does not seem to fit everywhere.

Nothing by chance is useful everywhere.

A great bridle of the soul for humans is the mind.

Learning is nothing if mind is not present.]

26 Phocylides.

Indeed, speech is a sharper weapon for a man than iron.

God distributed weapons to each, to winged nature: to birds indeed much swiftness, and strength to lions, to bulls gave self-grown horns, to bees innate defense by stings, and speech is a fortress for humans. The word of divinely inspired wisdom is best. A sophisticated man is better than a strong one. Wisdom governs fields and cities, and a ship.

27 Euripides, Antiope.

Therefore, I would sing and say something wise, disturbing nothing of what afflicts the city. –

And there is pity nowhere in ignorance, but among wise men. For it is not even without penalty for the wise to have an opinion that is overly wise.

28 Theognis.

Never praise a man until you clearly know his temper, and spirit, and what sort of character he has.

For many have a false and deceitful character, concealing an ephemeral disposition within.

But time reveals the character of all these; for I too have greatly departed from common opinion.

29. Understand, and then act.

30 Bias.

Undertake things slowly; but having undertaken, act resolutely.

31 Theobulus.

let this become dear to you, to do nothing out of order, and to always maintain tranquility in life.

pray to the gods to be healthy, as long as you live.

40 From Aristonymus' Tomaria.

It is the work of a good helmsman to adapt to the changes of the winds; but of a wise man, to adapt to the changes of fortune.

41 Socrates.

In sailing, obey the helmsman; but in living, it is better to obey him who is capable of reasoning.

42. Choose the smoothest path; and the most painless life.

43. To reason alone, as to a prudent guardian, entrust your life and youth.

44. And appropriate footwear, and a life that is more painless.

45 Socrates.

Socrates, being asked, "What is prudence?" replied, "Harmony of nature." The same man, being asked, "Who are prudent?" replied, "Those who do not easily err."

46. Antisthenes, being asked, "Why do not the rich go to the wise, but rather the reverse?" replied, "Because the wise know what they need for life; but the others do not know; since they cared more for wisdom than for money."

47 Plutarch.

If foresight of future events is useful.

Therefore, of things, some exist simply, and some exist in relation to us; those existing simply are earth, heaven, sea; and those existing in relation to us are good, evil, desirable, avoidable, pleasant, painful; and since reason is theoretical concerning both, that which concerns only things existing simply is scientific and theoretical; but that which concerns things existing in relation to us is deliberative and practical; and the virtue of the latter is prudence, and of the former, wisdom. Prudence differs from wisdom in that prudence arises in accordance with reason when there is a turning towards and a certain relation of the theoretical to the practical and emotional. Therefore, prudence requires fortune; but wisdom does not require it for its proper end, nor does it require deliberation; for it is concerned with things that are always and invariably the same. And just as the geometer does not deliberate about the triangle, whether it has its interior angles equal to two right angles, but knows it; (for deliberations are about things that are sometimes one way, sometimes another, not about what is stable and unchangeable); so too the theoretical mind, when it acts concerning the first and permanent things, which always have one nature and do not admit of change, is freed from deliberation. But it is necessary for prudence, which is established in matters full of error and confusion, often to be mingled with accidental things, and to use deliberation concerning the more obscure matters; and for the practical faculty, receiving the deliberative, to act already, and of the irrational accompanying and being drawn along in judgments.

48. The same.

For indeed, prudence deals with the good in four ways: either by acquiring good things, or by preserving them, or by increasing them, or by using them skillfully. These are the rules of prudence and the other virtues, which must be used for both.

49 Plutarch. If foresight of future events is useful.

40. But indeed, prudence is the vision not of bodies, but of things, before they come to be for man, so that he may use what happens and encounters him best, providing a view of the future. The body indeed has eyes only for what is in front, and is entirely blind to what is behind; but the mind is by nature able to see past events through memory. For the scribe who is always seated and keeping house within the mind, as Plato says, this is what you were before you came here into the soul, whether a part or an instrument, which receives things as they occur, and preserves them, and sets them in order, and circles back the past, and connects it to the present, not allowing it to flow away into the infinite, and into non-existence, and into the unknown.

50 Theophrastus.

It is necessary, therefore, for one who is to be admired, to be pious concerning the divine, not by sacrificing much, but by frequently honoring the divine; for the former is a sign of wealth, the latter of piety. Then, to care for one's parents well, making one's life obedient to their wishes. For he who is not such, but neglects both the laws of nature and of the city, has transgressed both ways of justice. And indeed, one must take good and humane care of wife and children; for the former return services in old age, and the latter will repay the kindness in sickness and in daily management. And if there is a necessity to engage with someone, try to do so with certainty; for it is the part of a most prudent man to lend wisely, to receive back amicably, or to transact humanely, to recover without enmity.

51 Democritus.

It is the work of prudence to guard against future injustice; but of insensibility, not to defend oneself against what has happened.

52. From prophecy, they said, one must seek foresight; and from medicine, both foresight and correction; for these are the limits of medical science; and from music, an accurate and scientific sensation; and from what are called mathematics, inference and demonstration of the concepts through them.

53 Aristotle.

Aristotle said, "Since things do not happen as we wish, we must wish for them as they happen."

54 Aristotle.

55. Iamblichus, from his Letter to Asphalius on Prudence.

Prudence, being the leader of the virtues, and using them all as a perceptive eye, establishes both orders and measures of them, and showing the most opportune disposition well-ordered, speech makes it manifest in the present. This, therefore, in its prior state receives its genesis from pure and perfect intellect; and having come into being in this way, it looks towards that intellect itself and is perfected by it, since it has it as the most beautiful measure and example for all its activities within itself. And if there is any communion for us with the Gods, it is established most especially through this virtue, and through it we are assimilated to them differently, the discernment of good, expedient, beautiful, and contrary things is present to us from it, and the judgment and rectification of appropriate actions are guided by it. And in sum, it is a kind of governing art for humans, and the originator of the entire arrangement within them, bringing cities and households, and each person's own life, to the divine as an example, drawing it in the best likeness; effacing some things, and leaving others, and justly reproducing both. It is therefore fitting that prudence makes those who possess it godlike.

56 Periander.

Periander, being asked, "What is greatest in the least?" said, "Good understanding in a human body."

57 Democritus.

Great are the pleasures derived from contemplating noble deeds.

58 Plato.

It is necessarily envious, and keeps one away from many other useful associations, from which a man might most become what he is, and is the cause of great harm; and of the greatest harm, from which one might become most prudent; and this happens to be divine philosophy. One who is a lover of it is necessarily kept far away from childish things, being afraid of being despised.

59 The same.

By nature, prudence and great power are accustomed to converge; and these always pursue, seek, and associate with each other.

60 Pythagoras.

Remind yourself that all men say prudence is the greatest good; but few are those who have vigorously acquired this greatest good.

61 Socrates.

Socrates the philosopher, when many of his friends sent him gifts, and when he received nothing in return, was corrected by Xanthippe, and said: "If we readily accept all things given, we will not have givers even when we ask."

62 Diogenes.

Someone said that Diogenes was foolish; but he replied, "I am not foolish, but I do not have the same mind as you."

63 Diogenes.

When he was being sold in Corinth, and the herald asked, "What do you know?" he said, "To rule men." And the herald, laughing, said, "I am selling a great skill, if anyone wishes to buy a master."

64 Gaius on Masters.

I believe it is more prudent to guard against suffering before it happens, than to complain after suffering.

65 Dionysius.

When a certain stranger privately claimed to him that he could tell how to foresee those who would plot against him, he asked him to speak. And the stranger came forward and said, "Give me a talent, so that you may seem to have learned the signs of those who plot against you." So he gave it, marveling at the man's method.

66 Chrysippus.

Chrysippus the Stoic said that the mind is the source of reason.

67 Socrates.

Just as those who sail in fair weather have things ready for a storm; so too those who are prudent in prosperity have prepared aids for adversity.

68 Herodotus, History VII.

That, O King, has been judged by me to be equal: both to be prudent, and to be willing to obey one who speaks good counsel.

69 Herodotus, History III.

But you, having learned how much better it is to be envied than to be pitied, and at the same time how to be angry at your parents and superiors, go to your own.

70 Plato's Laws XII.

For instance, when we stated that there are four kinds of virtue, it is clear that each must be called one, though they are four. What then? And yet again, we call all these things one; for we say that courage is a virtue, and prudence is a virtue, and the other two, as being not many, but this one virtue only. Certainly. In what respect, then, do these two differ, that they received two names, and the others, it is not difficult to say; but that we named it virtue in both, and in the others, is not yet easy. How do you mean? It is not difficult to explain what I mean; for let us divide the question and answer between us. How do you express it? Ask me why, when we call virtue one thing, we again call both of them two things, namely courage and prudence. For I will tell you the reason: because courage concerns fear, of which even animals partake, and the dispositions of very young children; for courage of soul comes into being by nature without reason; but a soul that is prudent and possesses mind has never come into being, nor exists, nor will ever come into being again, as it is a different thing. You speak the truth.

71 Plato.

For how, my friend, could one, starting from false opinion, arrive at truth and acquire even a small part, let alone almost prudence? Not at all.

72 Socrates.

Just as into an empty vessel, one must put the ballast of prudence.

73. The prudent man, as if on a journey, does not gather provisions of great value for life, but those that are most necessary.

From Crito, or Damipus the Pythagorean, from *On Prudence and Good Fortune*.

Prudence and good fortune are related to each other as follows. Prudence is that which is rational and endowed with reason; for it is something ordered and defined. Good fortune, on the other hand, is that which is irrational and without reason; for it is something disordered and undefined. The former is first in origin and power, while the latter is later in origin and power; for the former is naturally inclined to govern and define, while the latter is to be governed and defined. When one accepts their harmony, prudence and good fortune come together. For it is always necessary that the nature which is rational and endowed with reason should possess what will accomplish and order, and that which is irrational and without reason should possess that by which it will be accomplished and ordered. For reason holds true in all things, both for the boundless nature and for the limiting nature. For boundless things by nature are accomplished and ordered by those always possessing reason and prudence; for they have the order of matter and essence. But limiting things are ordered and defined from themselves; for they have the order of active arts and causes.

In the same vein.

The harmony of these natures, occurring in various ways, has created a great and varied difference in the things harmonized. For in the embrace of all things, the harmony of both natures, that of the ever-moving nature and that of the ever-suffering nature, is a cosmos; for otherwise, the whole and the universe could not be preserved, unless the generated shared harmony with the divine, and the ever-suffering with the ever-moving. And in man, the harmony of the irrational part of the soul with the rational part is virtue. For neither in these is it possible,

that a virtue should be perfected, existing on both sides. And in the city, the ruling over the rulers perfects power and concord; for to rule is proper to the stronger, and to be ruled is easier for the weaker, but to hold power and to be in concord is common to both. And the same manner of harmony in the whole and in the household is composed and ordered by studies and education, so as to converge towards reason; and also by sorrows, and pleasures, and good fortune, and misfortune. For life requires both rest and activity, and both gloom and cheerfulness, and both good fortune and misfortune. For the former can hold and gather the mind to resourcefulness and prudence; while the latter, providing relaxation and dispersion, prepares one to face actions with novelty and courage. If, however, one of these should dominate in life, life becomes one-sided and inclined to one extreme, whether leaning towards the gloomy and difficult, or towards the relaxed and light. But the harmony of all these things must occur in relation to prudence; for it is prudence itself that acts as the agent in infinite and finite actions, wherefore it is also the guide and mother of other virtues. For all of them, being harmonized and ordered in relation to reason and law, come to be. Indeed, my speech is now brought to an end directly; for the irrational and the rational exist in all things; and the former defines and limits, while the latter is defined and limited; and that which is composed of both is the harmony of the whole and the universe.

From Archytas the Pythagorean, from *On the good and happy man*.

A prudent man would become so most effectively in this way: first, having a naturally quick and retentive memory and being fond of hard work, he should immediately from youth train his mind in reasoning and mathematics and in precise theories, properly engaging in philosophy; and after these, he should gain experience in divine and human laws and human lives. For there are two things from which the disposition of a prudent person arises: one is to acquire a mathematical and cognitive habit, and the other is to encounter and observe many theories and things himself, and to understand some also through another means. For neither is he who has trained his mind in reasoning and mathematics and in precise theories from youth immediately sufficient for prudence; nor is he who, having been deficient in these, has been involved in many hearings and many affairs. But he who judges in particular instances becomes blind in his mind; and he who always contemplates in universal terms. For just as in calculations, by assembling the parts, it is possible to calculate the whole from them; so also in matters, reason can outline the universal theory, and experience judges in each particular instance.

From Epictetus.

No one is fond of money, or fond of pleasure, or fond of glory; but only the beautiful-lover.

As you would not wish to be shipwrecked while sailing on a large, well-built, and gilded ship; so neither choose to be harbored in a house that is excessively large and luxurious, nor to suffer hardship.

From Demetrius Phalereus, maxims of the Seven Sages.

Cleobulus, son of Evagoras, as Andius said.

Moderation is best. Respect your father. Possess a good body and soul. Be a good listener, but not a verbose talker. Be knowledgeable, or ignorant. Possess a well-speaking tongue. What is proper to virtue, and foreign to wickedness, is to hate injustice. Observe piety. Advise citizens what is best. Control your tongue. Do nothing by force. Educate children. Pray for good fortune. Dissolve enmities. Consider an enemy of the people as a foe. Do not quarrel with a woman, nor be excessively proud, especially in the presence of others; for the former is worse, and the latter can lead to madness. Slaves

do not slander your neighbors; for if you do, you will hear things that will cause you pain. Go slowly to the dinners of friends, but quickly to their misfortunes. Make modest marriages. Consider the deceased blessed. Respect an elder. Hate him who meddles in others' affairs. Choose loss rather than shameful gain. Do not laugh at the unfortunate. Being harsh, make yourself gentle, so that they may be more ashamed of you than afraid. Be master of your own house. Do not let your tongue outrun your mind. Conquer your anger. Do not desire the impossible. Do not lead the way too quickly on the road, nor move your hand; for that is madness. Obey the laws. When wronged, reconcile; but when insulted, retaliate.

From Pittacus of Mytilene.

Surety brings ruin. Remember friends, both present and absent. Do not adorn your face, but be beautiful in your deeds. Do not get rich wickedly. Let no word slander you among those who have shared trust. Do not be slow to flatter your parents. Do not accept what is bad. As you would wish to receive contributions from your children in old age, so also receive them from your parents. It is difficult to know what is good. The sweetest thing is to achieve one's desires. Laziness is painful. Intemperance is bad. Ignorance is heavy. Teach and learn what is better. Do not be idle, even if you are rich. Hide your good fortune. Do not pity envy. Use moderation. Do not trust everyone. As a ruler, adorn yourself.

From Thales of Miletus.

Know your time. Do not say what you are about to do; for if you fail, you will be ridiculed. Use what is useful. Do not do to your neighbor what you resent. Do not reproach the inactive; for on account of these, divine resentment sits. Return deposits. Endure small things from your neighbors. Love your neighbor, being slightly less (than him). Do not speak ill of a friend, nor well of an enemy; for such a thing is illogical. It is difficult to foresee the future. What has happened is secure, the future is uncertain. Earth is trustworthy, the sea is untrustworthy, gain is insatiable. Acquire goodness. Seek healing. Love education, self-control, prudence, truth, faith, experience, skill, companionship, diligence, economy, art, piety.

From Bias of Priene.

Most people are bad. When looking in a mirror, if you appear beautiful, do beautiful things; but if ugly, correct the deficiency of nature with goodness. Undertake slowly; but whatever you begin, confirm it. Hate quick speaking, lest you err; for repentance follows. Be neither foolish nor malicious. Do not accept folly. Love prudence.

From Sosiadus, maxims of the Seven Sages.

Follow God. Obey the law. Revere the gods. Respect your parents. Be subject for justice' sake. Learn by knowing. Understand by hearing. Be yourself. When about to marry, know the right time. Think as a mortal. Be as a stranger.

Know what is being done. Listen much. Speak opportunely. Being poor, do not criticize the rich, unless you greatly benefit them. Do not praise an unworthy man for his wealth. Persuade and receive, do not compel. When you fare well, attribute it to the gods, not to yourself. Acquire prosperity in youth, and wisdom in old age. In deed, you shall have memory; in time, caution; in character, nobility; in effort, self-control; in fear, piety; in wealth, friendship; in speech, persuasion; in silence, order; in judgment, justice; in boldness, courage; in action, power; in reputation, leadership; in nature, nobility.

From Periander of Corinth, son of Cypselus.

Practice everything. Calmness is good. Rashness is dangerous. Shameful gain is a reproach of nature. Democracy is better than tyranny. Pleasures are mortal, but virtues are immortal. When fortunate, be moderate; when unfortunate, be prudent. It is better to die in moderation than to live in want. Prepare yourself to be worthy of your parents. Praise him while living; bless him when dead. Be the same to friends, both fortunate and unfortunate. Avoid him whom you willingly acknowledge as wicked. Do not disclose secret words. Do not rebuke as you will soon be friends. Use old laws, and fresh foods. Do not only punish those who err, but also prevent those who are about to. When unfortunate, hide it, lest you gladden your enemies.

From Sosiadus, maxims of the Seven Sages.

Honor your hearth. Rule yourself. Help friends. Control your anger. Practice prudence. Honor forethought. Do not use oaths. Love friendship. Persevere in education. Pursue glory. Seek wisdom. Speak well what is good. Blame no one. Praise virtue. Act justly. Be well-disposed to friends. Defend against enemies. Practice nobility. Keep away from wickedness. Be communal. Guard your own. Keep away from others' things. Be well-spoken. Listen to all. Favor a friend. Nothing in excess. Save time. See the future. Hate insolence. Respect suppliants. Educate children. Give when you have. Fear deceit. Praise all. Be a philosopher. Judge sacred matters. Act knowingly. Keep away from murder. Pray for what is possible. Use the wise. Test character. Receive and give back. Mistrust no one. Use art. Give what you are about to. Honor benefactions. Envy no one. Be cautious. Praise hope. Hate slander. Acquire justly. Honor the good. Know the judge. Master marriages. Consider fortune. Shun surety. Talk to everyone. Use equals. Begin spending. Enjoy acquiring. Respect shame. Complete grace. Pray for good fortune. Cherish fortune. Observe by listening. Work for what is acquired. Hate strife. Hate reproach. Endure your tongue. Defend against insolence. Judge justly. Use money. Test the incorruptible. Blame the present. Speak knowingly. Do not use violence. Live a painless life. Associate gently. Finish what you undertake, do not be fainthearted. Be friendly to all. Do not be overly confident in your mind. Govern your tongue. Do good to yourself. Be amiable. Answer in time. Toil with justice. Act without repentance. When you err, repent.

understand. Rule your eyes. Advise what is useful. Finish quickly. Guard friendship. Be grateful. Pursue concord. Do not say what is unutterable. Fear the powerful. Seek what is beneficial. Await the right time. Dissolve enmities. Accept old age. Do not boast in strength. Practice good repute. Avoid hatred. Get rich justly. Do not lose your reputation. Hate wickedness. Do not tire of learning. Venture prudently. Do not lose what you have saved. Admire oracles. Love those you raise. Do not fight with the absent. Respect your elder. Educate your younger. Distrust wealth. Respect yourself. Do not begin by being insolent. Crown your ancestors. Die for your homeland. Do not fight with life. Do not laugh at the dead. Sympathize with the unfortunate. Give harmlessly. Do not grieve over everything. Procreate from the noble. Promise nothing. Do not wrong the dead. Fare well as a mortal. Do not trust fortune. If you are a child, be orderly; if a youth, self-controlled; if in middle age, just; if older, reasonable. Die without sorrow.

From Heraclitus.

Of all the speeches I have heard, none reaches this point, that it is wise to be separate from all.

It is better to hide ignorance than to bring it into the open.

From Plato.

Many arts exist among humans that have been found through experience, through experience. For experience makes our life,

but inexperience makes it by chance. And in each of these, some take part in one way and some in another; and the best are the best.

Are you then, by the gods, my child, able to conceive this? Perhaps you young people look at it more sharply, but we older ones more dimly. What is it, and to what do you especially refer? For I do not yet understand what is now being asked. Is it possible for a human being to know everything? Happy indeed would our race be, stranger.

From Socrates.

Neither with a bridle-less horse, nor with wealth without reason, is it possible to use safely.

Life, like a musical instrument, being tuned by relaxation and tension, becomes sweeter.

It is right to praise what is done skillfully.

From Plato.

Most of all, one should endeavor that each of us, neglecting other studies, may become a follower and student of this study, if somehow he can learn and discover what will make him capable and knowledgeable, distinguishing between a good and a bad life, and always choosing the better of what is possible everywhere.

From the same, from Clitophon.

And when you say that if someone does not know how to use something, it is better to leave it unused, if someone does not know how to use his eyes,

to not hear or see with them, or use any other part of the body, it is better to use it badly than not at all. And also concerning art, similarly; for whoever does not know how to use his own lyre, it is clear that he also does not know how to use his neighbor's, or whoever does not know how to use others', or his own, or other instruments, or possessions. And finally, this saying of yours ends well, that whoever does not know how to use his soul, it is better for him to keep his soul at rest, and not to live than to live acting by himself; but if there is a necessity to live, it is better for such a person to live as a slave than as a free man.

From the same, Alcibiades.

Do we not then say again that the many have erred from the best, as in many other things, I suppose, when they have trusted in opinion without reason? We do. Is it then profitable for the many neither to know anything nor to think they know, if they are more eager to do those things which they know or think they know; and by doing so, they are harmed in most cases rather than benefited? You speak most truly. Do you see then that what I said was, that the possession of other knowledge is perilous if one possesses it without the knowledge of the best, since it rarely benefits and harms the possessor in most cases? Did I not seem to speak rightly then? But now it seems so to me, Socrates. Therefore, it is necessary for both a city and a soul that intend to live rightly to cling to this knowledge absolutely, just as a sick person clings to a physician, or one who intends to sail safely to a pilot.

Prudence is a productive power for human happiness; a disposition by which we judge what is to be done and what not to be done; knowledge of good and evil; a productive knowledge of happiness.

Have you ever known anyone harmed by enemies? How not? And what about those harmed by so-called friends and acquaintances, or even by relatives? Some by those closest, brothers, or sons, or fathers? I have known many. What then is the cause, by which not only enemies harm enemies, but also so-called friends harm each other, and by Zeus, many of those who are truly necessary? It is clear that it is the wickedness of men, by which each, I suppose, is harmful to himself. Must we then guard against all friends, and not trust them more than if one seems to be a friend, or an acquaintance, or a close relative? All of them, as this discourse says. Did not then the one who wrote this verse write correctly?

"Be sober, and remember to distrust; these are the sinews of the mind."

Perhaps rightly so.

ON FOLLY.

From Sophocles.

But those who fare ill are not only deaf, but also blind to the evident.

From Euripides.

Not to know anything of your faults is sufficient fuel for boldness and audacity.

From Hesiod.

A fool is he who wishes to contend with the stronger, for he loses the victory and suffers pain besides shame.

From Menander.

Folly is a self-chosen misfortune for mortals.

From Sophocles.

What is difficult to approach, ignorance is an evil.

From Menander.

You who wrong yourself, why do you blame fortune?

From the same, *To the Soldiers*.

No one who errs is conscious how great is the extent of his error, but sees it later.

From the same.

It is difficult to err in such a way, which we are reluctant even to speak of, having done it.

From Euripides' *Ino*.

Many mortals indeed, with their boldness, seek to obscure their misfortunes and hide their evils.

From Euripides' *Temenides*.

Often even a foolish man has spoken opportunely.

From Hesiod, *Works and Days*.

One must not bear one's disposition too swiftly. For having stumbled, no one seems to have planned well.

From Aeschylus.

A heavy burden for a prosperous fool.

From Sophocles.

But folly is indeed the closest kin to wickedness.

From Euripides.

Whoever speaks wisely to an ignorant person will not seem to speak well.

From the same.

This swift and nimble mind brings much misfortune to mortals.

From the same.

The sea washes away all human ills.

From Aeschylus, *In Phrygians*.

Often even a foolish man has spoken opportunely.

From Hesiod, *Works and Days*.

He is indeed best who considers everything himself; [having thought of what will happen and how it will turn out best in the end]. And excellent too is he who obeys one who speaks well. But he who neither thinks for himself nor listens to another, and lays nothing to heart, that man is useless.

From Sophocles' *Ajax*.

For men of evil counsel do not know what is good when they have it in their hands, until someone casts it away.

From the same.

A fool speaks foolish things.

From Euripides.

It is least necessary for a foolish man to flee an enemy; but to yield to the wise and those nobly bred.

From Sophocles.

For nothing is more hostile than evil counsel.

From Theognis.

Whoever thinks his neighbor is nothing, but he alone has various devices, that man is foolish, having a corrupted noble mind. Perhaps we all know various things. But he does not wish to pursue wicked gain; but they are more fond of deceptions.

From Menander.

Simplicity seems to me to be shown, to understand what is necessary, but not to guard what is necessary.

From the same.

When one who is benevolent seeks something better than what he has, he seeks evil.

From Euripides.

I could not fill without holding, pouring wise words on an unwise man.

From the same.

For know this well, what you formerly did not perceive, that to be foolish is to have ignorance first.

From Euripides' *Alexander*.

Whence you ought to conquer, unhappy king, whence you ought not, you are fortunate; for you come to your slaves, but not to your free men.

From Eupolis.

But listen, spectators, and understand many words; for I will first defend myself to you, that when you call foreign poets wise, if someone here, not thinking anything worse of himself, applies himself to poetry, he seems to think very foolishly,

He who does not seem wise, but is so, and knows how to keep silent.

From Rhianus.

Indeed, we mortals are all greatly in error, but we bear gifts from the Gods with a foolish heart. But whoever is deficient in life struggles, and casts evil blame on the blessed ones, grieving; and despises his own virtue and spirit, nor dares to conceive a bold word, nor to do anything, trembling, where men of property are present, and his spirit is consumed by sorrow and misery. But he who thrives, and God bestows prosperity and much rule, forgets the earth under his feet, and his parents are mortals; but with arrogance and a sinful mind, he thunders like Zeus, and holds his head above his neck, and although small, he seeks the well-built Athena, or a path to Olympus, that he may feast with the immortals among them. And Ate, treading with soft feet upon the tips of heads, unnoticed and unseen, sometimes older than old women, sometimes again...

**ABOUT FOLLY. D.**

34. ...an old woman comes upon more subtle faults, bringing offerings of justice to Zeus, ruler of the gods.

35. Menander.

There is nothing, as it seems to me, more audacious than folly.

36. Hesiod.

Wretched, who is often groaned over afterwards, whose affliction is incurable.

37. Sophocles.

Here indeed all men are sick, when they wish to cure evils with evils.

38. Of the same.

These things are most painful, when it is possible to do well; if one brings harm upon oneself.

39. Menander.

For he who does not bear well any of the good things in life, is irrational, for he is not blessed.

40. Menander of Thessaly.

A small pretext indeed is enough to act badly.

41. Philemon.

When the mind is not steady for someone, it is not possible to hear or see anything for oneself.

42. Epicharmus.

Mind sees and mind hears.

43. Cercidas.

How would men, whose heart is shaken and difficult to wash clean from lees, behold wisdom standing near?

44. Proverb.

An ass heard a lyre, and a sow a trumpet.

45. Theognis.

Indeed, satiety has destroyed many foolish men; for it is difficult for a few to recognize when good things are present.

46. From Rhiginus' On Friendship.

Just as it is not possible to behold the light of the sun with weak and impotent sight, so it is even more impossible to see the truth with a weak and impotent mind.

47. Cornelianus against Berenice.

But nevertheless, these great and terrible things were confessed by the bed itself. For this good thing alone is present to their choice, which is the greatest of evils, that they act badly concerning what they do, and are bold about it.

48. Isocrates to Busiris.

I know then that to most of those who are admonished, it is innate not to look towards advantages, but it is so much harder to hear what is said, the more accurately one examines their faults.

49. Plato from Phaedo.

But first let us be careful not to suffer what kind of affliction? I said. Let us not become, she said, misologists, like those who become misanthropes. For, he said, there is nothing worse one can suffer than to hate arguments. And from the same cause arises both misology and misanthropy; for misanthropy comes about from trusting someone too much without skill, and believing him to be entirely true and sound and trustworthy; and then a little later discovering him to be wicked and untrustworthy, and then another. And when someone suffers this often, and especially from those whom they considered most familiar and most trustworthy, eventually, frequently clashing, they hate everyone, and believe that nothing is sound. Have you not noticed this happening in this way? Very much so, I said. Is it not, she said, shameful, and clear that such a person attempted to use men without skill concerning human affairs? For if he had used them with skill, as it is, he would have believed that the good and bad were few, and the majority in between.

50. In the same work.

As I am in danger now, regarding this very matter, of not being philosophical, but like the utterly uneducated, contentious. For when they dispute about something, they do not care about how the argument stands; but they are eager that what they themselves have put forth should seem right to those present.

51. Demosthenes.

Demosthenes the orator, seeing a certain demagogue shouting loudly but foolishly, said: "But it is not the great good, but the good that is great."

52. Crates.

Crates compared foolish men to augers; for without bonds and necessity, they are unwilling to do anything that is proper.

53. Democritus.

Evils are born to men from good things; if one does not know how to guide good things, nor manage them easily.

54. Bion.

Bion said that grammarians, seeking about Odysseus' wanderings, do not examine or perceive their own, that they themselves wander in this very thing, laboring about useless things.

55. Plato from Cleitophon.

And when, as you say, those who train their bodies but neglect their souls do something else of this kind, namely, neglect what rules, but are eager about what is ruled.

56. Heraclitus.

Eyes and ears become bad for foolish men whose souls are barbaric.

57. Socrates.

The coward is a betrayer of his country, and the ambitious man is a betrayer of his ancestral substance.

58. Fugitives, even if not pursued, are afraid; but the foolish, even if they are not doing badly, are disturbed.

59. The foolish behave absurdly in drunkenness, and act madly in misfortunes.

60. Neither the unmusical with instruments, nor the uneducated in misfortunes, are able to adapt themselves.

61. To the life of the uneducated, as to an actor, many changes of proud garb are applied.

62. For the foolish, as for children, a small pretext is enough for crying.

63. Strangers wander on the roads, but the uneducated wander in affairs.

64. It is the same thing to lay a burden on a sick person as to give good fortune to the uneducated.

65. Neither is it safe for sailors to anchor out of place, nor for those who live out of law to live without danger.

66. Proteus changes in form, but the uneducated in soul change at every turn.

67. Many people, just as they are bothered when sick, so too are they bothered by the multitude of things surrounding them when fortunate.

68. Philip compared the Athenians to herms, as having only a mouth, and large genitals.

69. Demades.

Demades compared the Athenians to flutes, for if one were to remove their tongue, nothing else would remain.

70. Theocritus, approaching a grammar teacher who was reading poorly, said: "Why do you not teach geometry?" For when he said, "I do not know," [Theocritus] said, "What is this? For you do not even read."

71. Democritus.

Sensory images and splendid for contemplation in the world, but empty of heart.

72. Forgetfulness of one's own evils generates audacity.

73. The foolish are carried away by the gains of fortune; but the wise of such things, by the gains of wisdom.

74. He who needs knows how much he needs; but he who craves does not know.

75. The foolish, hating life as it is, wish to live in fear of Hades.

76. The foolish live, not enjoying life.

77. The foolish long for youth, but do not enjoy youth.

78. The foolish long for things absent; but they weaken things present, and those that are more profitable than past ones.

79. Men fleeing death, pursue it.

80. The foolish are pleased by nothing in their whole life.

81. The foolish, fearing death, wish to grow old.

82. Glory and wealth without understanding are not safe possessions.

83. Many who are learned do not have understanding.

84. Diogenes.

When he was walking backward in the Stoa, some people laughed at him, and he said, "Are you not ashamed, you who travel your life's path backward, condemning my way of walking?"

85. Socrates, seeing a rich and uneducated youth, said: "Behold, a golden slave."

86. Diogenes used to say that men acquire things for living, but do not acquire things for living well.

87. Aristotle.

Aristotle said that those who attempt to demonstrate obvious things act like those who try to demonstrate the sun with a lamp.

88. Bion.

Bion, when asked what folly is, said: "An obstacle to progress."

89. Stilpo the Socratic.

Stilpo, when asked what is stronger than a statue, said: "Man, when insensitive."

90. Cleanthes.

Cleanthes said that the uneducated differ from beasts only in form.

91. Favorinus said that men are in some respects ridiculous, in some respects pitiable, in some respects hateful. Ridiculous, indeed, because they strive for greater audacity; hateful, because they succeed; pitiable, because they make mistakes; but never enviable.

92. Epictetus.

When invited to a banquet, we make use of what is present; but if someone were to command the host to serve him fish, or cakes, he would seem absurd; yet in the world we ask the Gods for what they do not give, and that too when there are many things they have given us.

93. Of the same.

He said, "Graceful are those who are greatly proud of things not in our power. 'I,' he says, 'am superior to you; for I have many fields, while you are extended by hunger.' Another says, 'I am a consul.' Another, 'I am a procurator.' Another, 'I have curly hair.' But a horse does not say to a horse, 'I am superior to you,' because 'I have much fodder, and many barley, and I have golden bridles, and varied trappings'; but because 'I am swifter than you.' And every living thing is superior or inferior from its own virtue and vice. Is it not, then, that virtue belongs only to man? But must we look at hair, and clothes, and grandfathers?"

94. Of the same.

Patients are annoyed with a physician who advises nothing, and they believe they have been given up on by him; but as for the philosopher, why would one not be so disposed as to think oneself given up on by him and to be temperate, if he were to say nothing useful to him?

95. Of the same.

Those who are well-disposed in body endure both heat and cold; and so too those who are well-disposed in soul endure anger, and grief, and excessive joy, and all other passions.

96. Plato.

I would wish, O Socrates, but I fear lest the opposite should happen; for it seems to me that you are beginning to corrupt the city from its very hearth, attempting to wrong me. And tell me, what does he say you are doing to corrupt the youth? "Why, O admirable man," so to hear it, "he accuses me of being a maker of gods; and as making new gods, and not believing in the ancient ones."

97. In the same work.

For to the Athenians, as it seems to me, they do not greatly care if they consider someone to be formidable, provided he is not a teacher of his own wisdom; but if they consider him to be making others like himself, they become angry, whether from envy, as you say, or for some other reason.

98. Plato from Euthyphro.

A foolish, shameful, and immoderate soul must be considered.

99. Folly must be admitted as a disease of the soul; and there are two kinds of folly, one is madness, the other is ignorance.

100. Eusebius.

Men have a greater desire to have a reputation for learning than for telling the truth. For many, having established opinions contrary to their own, value the knowledge of truth concerning the most necessary things, but took away from themselves the assurance that their belief was not firmly established, and by overturning it to the opposite of their former opinion, they prepared a discourse to hang in the most unstable.

101. Of the same.

Many men in their discussions of affairs, like irrational animals, just as those fight, so they too contend to win; but they no longer make an account of how (what every man ought to foresee, both speaking and acting) may not harm what is expedient for themselves, and what is present, and so that the truth itself may not be harmed.

102. Strife is dear to men; and the desire to prevail against those who contradict everything proposed is immense and irrational; since many do not respect, and by an improper argument wish to prevail even against the most worthy, they win a victory that deserves to be called a Cadmean victory.

103. Men embrace those who are unnatural and speak monstrously, and, having received great sums of money, rejoice as if it were the greatest possession, and are magnanimous; but they are vexed when spending on the most important and trivial things.

104. Most men are sparing in all other things, and if they spend, they are vexed, concerning being applauded by the people, and they cheerfully present all their possessions.

105. The foolish among men honor and admire those who have great wealth and are worthless; but they disdain the worthy, when they find them to be without money.

106. From Aristonymus' Tomaria.

Many, having been wronged by orators, teach their sons to be orators; but no one wronged by a wolf becomes a wolf himself, or bites back.

107. Zeno.

Zeno said it is ridiculous for each person not to pay attention to how they should live their life in affairs, as if not knowing; but to admire the praise of all, as if it were judgment.

108. Socrates.

The intemperate in illnesses, and the foolish in misfortunes, are difficult to treat.

109. Pythagoras.

Sacrifices of the foolish are food for fire; and offerings are a supply for sacrilegious men.

110. From Aristo's Similarities.

Aristo of Chios said that those who labor at the liberal arts, but neglect philosophy, are like the suitors of Penelope, who, failing to obtain her, turned to her maidservants.

111. The same [Aristo] compared the many to Laertes, who, while taking the greatest care of all things in the field, neglected himself; for these people, taking the greatest care of their possessions, overlook their own souls which are full of wild passions.

112. Diogenes.

Diogenes used to say that he saw many people wrestling and running, but none becoming noble and good.

113. Plato.

Do you say that he who desires beautiful things desires good things? Most certainly. Are there, then, some who desire bad things, and others who desire good things? Not everyone, O excellent one, do you think desires good things? Not I. But some desire bad things? Yes. Do you mean that they believe bad things to be good, or do they know that they are bad, yet still desire them? Both, it seems to me. For does it seem to you, O Meno, that one who knows that bad things are bad, still desires them? Most certainly. What do you mean by desiring? To get them for oneself? To get them; for what else? Do you mean that he believes bad things to be beneficial to him if they come to him, or does he know that bad things are harmful to him if they are present? There are those who believe bad things to be beneficial, and there are also those who know that they are harmful. Do you also believe that those who know that bad things are bad, still believe bad things to be beneficial? Not at all, it seems to me. Is it not clear, then, that those who are ignorant of bad things do not desire bad things, but rather those things which they believed to be good; and these very things are bad things; so it is clear that those who are ignorant of them, and believe them to be good, desire good things. Or not? These people are in danger of it. What, pray tell? Those who desire bad things, as you say, but believe them to be bad things harm him to whom they happen, they surely know that they will be harmed by them? Necessarily. But do these people not consider those who are harmed to be miserable, insofar as they are harmed? And this too is necessary. And do they not consider the miserable to be unhappy? I think so. Is there anyone then who wishes to be miserable and unhappy? It does not seem so to me, O Socrates. Therefore, no one desires bad things, O Meno, if he does not wish to be such a person. For what else is it to be miserable, than to desire and acquire bad things? You are likely speaking the truth, O Socrates, and no one desires bad things.

114. Plato from the letter to Dion's friends.

But now some demon, or some avenger, having fallen into lawlessness and impiety, and above all, into the audacious ignorance, from which all evils for all men have taken root and blossomed, and which will bear the bitterest fruit to its begetters in the future, this has overturned and destroyed everything a second time.

115. Socrates.

The coward has weapons against himself; but the fool has money.

116. Neither is harsh wine suitable for drinking, nor is a boorish manner suitable for conversation.

117. Plutarch from On Tranquility of Mind.

But just as cowards and seasick people who think they will fare better in sailing if they transfer from a skiff to a merchant ship, and again if they transfer to a trireme, accomplish nothing, carrying their bile and cowardice along with them; so too changes of life do not remove from the soul what grieves and disturbs it; and these things are inexperience in affairs, irrationality, the inability and ignorance of how to use present circumstances rightly. These things trouble both the rich and the poor, these things also vex the married and the unmarried; because of these things they flee the marketplace, then cannot bear quiet; because of these things they pursue promotions at courts, and when they have gone through them, they are immediately burdened.

118. Plato from Alcibiades II.

Do you then consider these to be wise, those who know what they must do or say? I do. And which are foolish? Is it those who know neither of these things? These. Therefore, will not those who know neither of these things, escape their notice and say and do things they ought not? It appears so.

119. Socrates.

Neither do Achilles' weapons suit Thersites, nor do the goods of the soul suit the fool.

120. A diet for the sick, and good fortune for the foolish, have much that is displeasing.

121. Thunderbolts mostly terrify children, but threats terrify the foolish.

**ABOUT TEMPERANCE. E.**

1. Menander from Georgos.

This is the best man, O Gorgias, who knows how to suffer most injustice among mortals.

2. But I consider nothing older than temperance, since it is always present with good things.

3. But fear of divine things is for temperate mortals.

4. Do not speak of wealth; I do not admire a god whom even the worst of men easily acquired.

5. There are no beautiful words from unbeautiful deeds.

6. Ah me! This is already a divine evil for men, that when someone knows the good, he does not use it.

7. For what need is there for mortals, except for two things, or only one, the stalk of Demeter, and a drink of water?

8. It is fated for mortals to reap evil returns for evil counsels.

9. Menander.

Temperance is the treasury of virtue.

10. [It is necessary for those dining at others' expense to be orderly.]

11. Man is graceful, if he is truly man.

12. [One must obey a good man in authority.]

13. Sophocles.

As day sets and rises again on all human things; the gods love the temperate, and hate the wicked.

14. Sophocles.

Never rejoice in shameful pleasures.

15. Euripides in Bacchae.

It is not Dionysus who forces women to be intemperate in Cyprus, but temperance is in their nature always and in all things.

16. Of the same, to Hippolytus.

O blessed one, what honors you have obtained, Hippolytus, hero, through temperance. Never among mortals is there another greater power than virtue. For the grace of piety came either before or after.

17. Euripides.

For I have never scorned the misfortunes of those who have acted badly, dreading to suffer them myself.

18. When two men are speaking, and one is angry, he who does not contend with words is wiser.

19. May temperance be dear to me, the most beautiful gift of the gods.

20. Alas, alas! How beautiful temperance is everywhere, and it brings good repute among mortals.

21. Euripides from Theseus.

But indeed there is another love among mortals, of a just, temperate, and good soul.

22. Ainus.

Indeed, speak, having prepared diligence through hearing of our words, a path true in all respects, having driven away many-troubled Fates, which rouse the profane multitude, sweeping away with their blindness everywhere, having various deceptive forms. To keep these away from the soul with the guards of reason. For this purification will truly and rightly sanctify you, if you truly hate their destructive race, which first of all bestows shameful things, which desire harnesses with wild reins.

23. Democritus.

It is orderly to obey law, and ruler, and one wiser.

24. It is best for a man to lead his life so as to be most cheerful and least grieved. This would be, if one does not place pleasures in mortal things.

25. One must avoid base deeds and words.

26. Theoboulus.

If wronged, be reconciled; if insulted, defend yourself.

27. Bias.

Try to live in such a way as if you will live both a short and a long time.

28. To live is better when lying on a mat and being cheerful, than when having a golden bed and being disturbed.

29. Things of which fortune is master, to give and to take away, you will need nothing of them.

30. Having been freed from the body, you will need nothing of those things; and of those things of which you will be freed, toward these things, for you to train, call upon the gods to be your helpers.

31. Chilon.

Choose loss rather than shameful gain; for the former will grieve you once, but the latter forever.

32. Sotades.

One must observe of fortune the greatest as the least, and not desire what is absent; for nothing is yours that stands firm. If being rich, you seek daily for more, you are as poor as you have much surplus. As a beggar, you wish to have, and as a rich man, you wish to have more; equally do their souls worry.

33. Socrates.

Socrates said that one should seek pleasures not from others, but from oneself; and one should predispose the body in the proper manner.

34. Socrates.

Socrates said that it is divine to need nothing; but to need as little as possible is nearest to divine.

35. Socrates.

Socrates, when asked from whom one should especially refrain, said: "From shameful and unjust pleasures."

36. Alexander.

When some urged Alexander to see Darius' daughters, and to take the one who surpassed in beauty as his wife, he said: "It is shameful for men who have conquered men to be conquered by women."

37. Socrates.

Self-sufficiency, just like a short and pleasant path, brings great favor, but little toil.

38. Democritus.

Fortune sets a luxurious table, but temperance sets a sufficient one.

39. From Epictetus' Encheiridion.

Let not your laughter be much, nor at many things.

40. You must largely avoid external and private dinners; but if occasion arises, be watchful. For know that if one is polluted, the other must also be filled, when they associate naked.

41. Diogenes.

Diogenes used to say it was terrible if athletes and cithara-singers master their stomach and pleasures; the former for the sake of their voice, the latter for the sake of their body; but no one for the sake of temperance would disdain these.

42. Pythagoras.

Temperance is the strength of the soul; for this is the light of a soul free from passions.

43. Socrates.

Socrates, to one who asked him who was the richest, said: "He who is content with the least." For self-sufficiency is wealth by nature.

44. Democritus.

A father's temperance is the greatest precept for his children.

45. From Aristonymus' Tomaria.

One must guard against toil when exercising; and against envy when prospering.

46. From Serenus.

Dionysius persuaded Aristippus to cast off his philosopher's cloak and put on a purple robe; and when Aristippus was persuaded, he tried to make Plato do the same. But Plato said,

"I could not put on a woman's robe."

And Aristippus, of the same author, said, of the poet,

"For even in revels,

the temperate soul will not be corrupted."

47. From Serenus.

Phocion's wife, to one who was showing her a golden and jeweled ornament, said: "For me, the most splendid ornament is Phocion, being poor, and now in his twentieth year as general of the Athenians."

48. From Epaminondas.

Ambassadors came from the king bringing gold, wishing to bribe Epaminondas. He received them at dinner; for he knew for what purpose they had come. And he ordered them, first to dine, and then to say what they wished. A simple table was set, and they drank vinegar. The ambassadors had nothing to say to this; but Epaminondas, smiling, said: "Go, and tell your master what kind of dinner I eat; and he will understand that I would not betray anything, I who am content with this."

49. Democritus.

Temperance increases pleasures and makes joy greater.

50. From Nicolaus' Collection of Customs.

The Aristoeni kill no living creatures; and they keep the oracles' pottery in golden coverings.

51. From the same author.

The Dardanians, an Illyrian tribe, bathe only three times in their life: when they are born, and at weddings, and when they die.

52. Crates.

Crates, throwing himself into the marketplace, and seeing some selling and others buying, said: "These people, because they are doing opposite things to each other, consider themselves happy; but I consider myself happy because I am rid of both, neither buying nor selling."

53. Antiphon.

Whoever has not desired or touched shameful or evil things is not temperate; for there is nothing over which he has gained mastery, thus presenting himself as disciplined.

54. Isaeus.

I consider it the greatest of services to provide a modest and temperate life daily.

55. Isocrates to Demonicus.

Practice self-control over those things by which it is shameful for the soul to be dominated: gain, anger, pleasure, pain. And you will be such if you consider gain to be that by which you gain reputation, and not that by which you gain wealth. And regarding anger, be disposed towards those who err as you would wish others to be disposed towards you. And regarding pleasures, if you consider it shameful to rule over your slaves while being enslaved to pleasures. And regarding painful things, if you consider the misfortunes of others, and remind yourself that you are human. You would be most spurred on to desire noble deeds if you understood that we gain true pleasures from these. For in idleness and in loving gluttony, pains immediately adhere to pleasures; but to constantly toil for virtue, and to temperately manage one's life, always yields pure and more stable joys. Fear the gods, honor your parents, and respect your friends. Pursue pleasures that come with glory; for joy with what is noble is best, but without it, it is worst.

56. Isocrates' Nicocles or Cyprians.

"What you suffer from others and get angry about, do not do to others."

57. To Agapetus.

I truly define you as a king, as one capable of ruling and controlling pleasures, having crowned yourself with the wreath of temperance, and having clothed yourself in the purple of justice. For other power has death as its succession; but such kingship preserves immortality; and the former is dissolved in this age, but the latter is freed from eternal punishment.

58. The king is lord of all, but exists as a slave of God above all. Then he will truly be called lord, when he masters himself and is not enslaved to unseemly pleasures; but having pious reason as his ally, the unconquerable master of irrational passions, he conquers all-subduing desires with the full armor of temperance.

59. From Hermippus' Collection of well-proclaimed sayings from Homer.

Demetrius of Phalerum used to say these things concerning temperance, "coming to the ancient custom of beloved beds."

60. From Hierax' On Justice.

Therefore, the remaining virtue must be applied to the guarding of pleasures, not allowing reason to escape its own task. For as long as one is reasonable, one will not allow desires that lead to such things to rise up; but when one falls asleep under enchantment, foolishness usually rises up, calling intemperance to dance with it. Therefore, the wise called temperance the virtue that banishes both, being the salvation of reason; indeed, poets' children have more sovereignly called it 'temperance' (saophrosyne); for 'saosai' means to save. Therefore, whoever acquires temperance, being the preservation of reason and salvation, has acquired in himself the perfect possession of justice. But if not, he errs in many ways and acts unjustly in many ways, some for money, some for glory, and some for pleasure.

61. From Iamblichus' Letter on Temperance.

Every virtue truly despises the mortal, but embraces immortality; but temperance excels greatly in this. It has this earnestness because, as Plato says, it spurns pleasures that nail the soul to the body, and stands on holy ground.

62. From the same author.

For how does temperance not make us perfect, expelling from us all that is imperfect and passionate? You would know that this is so if you considered Bellerophon, who, with modesty as his ally, utterly destroyed the Chimera and all the wild and untamed nature. For generally, the unmeasured domination of passions does not allow humans to be truly human, but draws them towards irrational, bestial, and disorderly nature.

63. From the same author.

And temperance, which holds pleasures within defined limits, preserves households and preserves cities, according to Crates' opinion; furthermore, it approaches the divine nature. Therefore, Perseus, striving for the highest good of temperance, guided by Athena, cut off the Gorgon, which I believe dragged humans down into matter and turned them into stone through the foolish indulgence of passions.

64. From the same author.

That temperance is therefore the foundation of virtue, as Socrates said, is self-control of sweet disposition; and temperance is considered the ornament of all good things, as Plato has declared. And the security of the noblest habits is the same virtue, as I say.

65. From the same author.

I confidently assert what is truly acknowledged: that the beauty of temperance extends through all virtues, and it harmonizes all virtues into a single harmony, and puts proportion and mixture into them with one another. Such, then, being the source, it provides for them to come into being, and once they exist, it provides for their secure preservation.

66. From the same author.

And the constitution of the seasons of the year, and the mixture of the elements with each other, preserve the most beautiful and temperate harmony. And all this, on account of the orderliness of the most beautiful measures, is called 'cosmos'.

67. From Teletes' On Self-Sufficiency.

One must, like a good actor, strive to perform well whatever role the poet assigns; so too must a good man strive with whatever role fortune assigns. For, as Bion says, fortune, like a playwright, sometimes assigns the role of protagonist, sometimes that of supporting character, and sometimes that of a king, sometimes that of a wanderer. Therefore, if you are a supporting character, do not desire the role of protagonist, or else you will make something incongruous. You rule well, he says, and I am ruled; and you rule over many, and I am a tutor to this one only; and you, being wealthy, give freely; and I receive from you boldly, neither cringing nor complaining. You use many good things well, and I use few; for they say that expensive things do not nourish, and that it is not possible to use them with benefit, nor is it possible for few and simple things to be used with temperance and without arrogance. Therefore, if things, says Bion, had a voice, in the way that we do, and could plead their case, Poverty would not say first, "Human, why do you fight me?" like a slave sitting before his master in a temple and pleading his case, "Why do you fight me? Have I stolen anything from you? Do I not do everything you command? Do I not pay you tribute orderly?" And Poverty would say to the accuser, "Why do you fight me? If no good thing is deprived for my sake? Is it not temperance? Is it not justice, courage? But may you not be in need of necessities? Are the roads not full of vegetables? Are the springs not full of water? Do I not provide you with as many beds as there is earth? And leaves for bedding? Or is it not for you to rejoice with me? Or do you not see old women eating indiscriminately and making noises? Or do I not prepare for you food without cost and without extravagance? Or does not the hungry man eat most sweetly, and need least seasoning? And does not the thirsty man drink most sweetly, and least await drink that is not at hand? Or does one crave a cake, or a snow drink, when hungry or thirsty? But are these not what people seek out of luxury? Or do I not provide you with dwellings, first, baths in winter, and sacred places in summer? For what kind of dwelling, says Diogenes, do you have in summer that is like this temple of mine, well-ventilated and luxurious? If Poverty says these things, what could you answer? For I think I would become speechless. But we blame everything else rather than our own waywardness and ill fortune, old age, poverty, the one who deceived us, the day, the hour, the place. Therefore Diogenes says that he heard the voice of vice blaming itself:

'No one else is to blame for these things but myself.'

Many fools blame not themselves but circumstances; and Bion says that just as in wild beasts, the bite occurs upon taking hold, and if you seize a snake in the middle, you will be bitten; if by the neck, you will not suffer; so too with circumstances, says he, the pain comes from the apprehension, and if you apprehend them in this way, as Socrates did, you will not be pained; but if otherwise, you will be annoyed, not by circumstances, but by your own habits and false opinion. Therefore, one must not try to change circumstances, but to prepare oneself to deal with them, which sailors do; for they do not try to change the winds and the sea, but they prepare themselves to be able to turn towards them. Fair weather? Calm? They row with oars. Wind astern? They hoist the sails. Headwind? They furl them, they take them down. And you, adapt to present circumstances. Have you grown old? Do not seek the things of youth. Are you weak? Do not seek to carry heavy burdens and strain yourself, but like Diogenes, when someone pushed him and he was weak, he did not strain himself, but showing the pillar to him, said, "My good man, push this." Have you become poor again? Do not seek the diet of the rich; but as you wrap yourself against the air, in fair weather you spread out, in cold you draw in, so too with your existing circumstances, in prosperity you spread out, in poverty you draw in. But we cannot be content with what we have, even when we are given much in luxury, and we judge that to labor and that death is the worst of evils. But if one makes one disdain pleasure, and not be averse to toil, and be indifferent to glory and disgrace, and not fear death, because if you wish, it will be painless, then I say, I do not see how these things themselves—old age, or poverty, or exile—are difficult. For Xenophon says, not unpleasantly, "If I show you two brothers who divided an equal inheritance, one in complete poverty, the other in ease, is it not clear that it is not the money that is to blame, but something else?" So too, if I show you two poor men, two old men, two exiles, one in complete ease and freedom and the other in complete turmoil; is it not clear that it is not poverty and exile that are to blame, but something else?

68. From Epictetus' Enchiridion.

Every matter and person has two handles, one that can be carried, one that cannot. If your brother wrongs you, do not take it from this side, that he wrongs you, but from this, that he is your brother; and so you will take it by the handle that can be carried.

69. From Hermippus' Collection of well-proclaimed sayings from Homer.

Demetrius of Phalerum used to say these things concerning temperance, "coming to the ancient custom of beloved beds."

60. From Hierax' On Justice.

Therefore, the remaining virtue must be applied to the guarding of pleasures, not allowing reason to escape its own task. For as long as one is reasonable, one will not allow desires that lead to such things to rise up; but when one falls asleep under enchantment, foolishness usually rises up, calling intemperance to dance with it. Therefore, the wise called temperance the virtue that banishes both, being the salvation of reason; indeed, poets' children have more sovereignly called it 'temperance' (saophrosyne); for 'saosai' means to save. Therefore, whoever acquires temperance, being the preservation of reason and salvation, has acquired in himself the perfect possession of justice. But if not, he errs in many ways and acts unjustly in many ways, some for money, some for glory, and some for pleasure.

71. From Epictetus' Enchiridion.

Most laughter is to be avoided, and making others laugh; for the place is slippery into vulgarity, and at the same time it is capable of destroying your respect for your neighbors. And another dangerous place for such indulgences is easily leading your neighbor into obscene language. So when something like that happens, if it is appropriate, rebuke the one who speaks obscenely; but if the persons are such that it is not appropriate, by remaining silent and looking sullen and blushing, show that you are displeased with what was said.

72. Pythagorean.

Indeed, nothing is so peculiar to Pythagorean philosophy as its symbolism; such as the kind of teaching mixed with voice and silence in initiation, so that one does not say,

"I sing to the wise, but close the doors to the profane,"

but that it inherently has light and character for those accustomed to expressing it, but is blind and indistinct to the uninitiated. For as the oracle at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals but gives signs, according to Heraclitus; so too the Pythagorean symbols, what seems to be expressed is concealed; and what is concealed is signified.

73. From Nicolaus' Collection of Customs.

The milk-eaters, a Scythian tribe, are nomadic, like most Scythians; they have horse milk as their only food, from which they make cheese, which they eat and drink, and for this reason they are most warlike, carrying their food everywhere with them. These also turned back Darius. And they are most just, having their possessions and their wives in common, so that they call their elders 'fathers,' their younger ones 'children,' and their peers 'brothers.' Among them was Anacharsis, who was considered one of the seven sages; he came to Greece to study the customs of others. Homer also mentions these when he says:

"And of the Mysians, close-combatants, and good horse-milkers,

milk-eaters, and those without possessions, the most just of men."

He calls them 'without possessions' either because they do not cultivate the land, or because they are nomadic, or because they use only bows; for he calls a bow 'life'.

Among these, it was not recorded that anyone envied, or hated, or feared, because of their communal way of life and justice. And their women were no less warlike than their men, and they fought with them whenever necessary, and for this reason they were considered the most valiant Amazons, so much so that they once advanced as far as Athens and Cilicia, because they dwelled near the Maeotic Lake.

74. From Aeschines' Against Timarchus.

For so must the life of a temperate man be pure, that he does not even receive the reputation of evil blame.

75. From Epictetus' Enchiridion.

In a symposium, you must conduct yourself in this way: if something comes to you, reach out your hand moderately; if it passes by, do not hold it back; if it has not yet come, do not cast your desire far off, but wait for it to come to you. So too with wealth, so too with offices, so too with marriage; and you will be worthy to be a fellow-diner of the gods. But if, when things are placed before you, you do not take them, but disdain them, then you will not only be a fellow-diner of the gods, but a co-ruler; for by doing so, both Diogenes and Heraclitus and others like them were and were called divine.

76. Musonius.

If pleasure is to be regulated, nothing is sweeter than temperance; if pain is to be regulated, nothing is more painful than intemperance.

77. Democritus.

Not every pleasure, but that which is noble, must be chosen.

78. From the same author.

Just love, desiring beautiful things without wantonness.

79. From Xenophon's Letter to Lamprocles.

First, you would accept Socrates' extraordinary teaching: to measure wealth. For Socrates said that excessive possession is not wealth; but to use what is appropriate, then not to err in these things. For truly, those who are content with these were called prosperous, and he called all others poor, and said that they suffered incurable poverty; for the ailment is of the soul, not of possession.

80. From the same author.

No evil arises in a man who lays the foundations of wisdom, temperance, and self-control.

81. Socrates.

One who hastens to see virtue as his homeland must pass by pleasures as if they were Sirens.

82. From Serenus.

Euripides gained renown when he said in the theater,

"What is shameful, unless it appears so to those who use it?"

And Plato, meeting him, said, "O Euripides,

Shameful is that which is shameful, whether it appears so or not."

83. From Aristotle's Chreiai.

Gelon, the tyrant of Sicily, had bad breath. When one of his friends told him this, he was angry with his wife because she had not told him; but she said, "I thought your mouth smelled like everyone else's too."

84. Epictetus.

Examine yourself: do you want to be rich or happy? And if you want to be rich, know that it is neither good nor dependent on you; but if to be happy, then it is both good and depends on you. For the former is a timely loan of fortune; but the latter, happiness, is a choice.

85. Just as you would not love and consider happy a viper, or an asp, or a scorpion, when you see it in an ivory or golden casket, because of the preciousness of the material, but because its nature is harmful, you turn away and abhor it; so too when you see vice present in wealth and the pomp of fortune, do not be struck by the splendor of the material, but despise the counterfeit nature of its character.

86. Wealth is not among the good things; extravagance is among the bad; temperance is among the good. Temperance calls to frugality and the acquisition of good things; but wealth calls to extravagance and draws away from temperance. It is difficult, therefore, for a rich man to be temperate, or for a temperate man to be rich.

87. Just as if you were born or happened to be on a ship, you would not hasten to be its pilot, for the ship would not be naturally yours, nor here is wealth naturally yours, but everywhere reason is. Whatever, then, is natural and kindred to you, namely reason, consider that your own, and take care of that.

88. Born in Persia, you did not hasten to live in Greece, but to be happy while staying there; born in poverty, why do you hasten to be rich, but not to be happy while staying here?

89. Just as it is better to be healthy while squeezed on a small cot than to be ill while tossing on a wide bed; so too it is better to be cheerful while constrained in a small fortune than to be despondent while having a large one.

90. Poverty does not cause grief, but desire does; wealth does not remove fear, but reason does. Therefore, having acquired reason, you will neither desire wealth nor complain about poverty.

91. Neither a horse on its manger and harnesses and carpets, nor a bird on its food and cage, is exalted and proud, but both in swiftness, the one of foot, the other of wings. So too, you must not vainly boast about food and shelter and simply about external possessions, but about goodness and beneficence.

92. Living well differs from living extravagantly; for the former comes from temperance, and self-sufficiency, and orderliness, and decorum, and frugality; but the latter comes from intemperance, and luxury, and disorder, and indecorum; and the end of the former is true praise, and that of the latter is blame. If, therefore, you wish to live well, do not seek to be praised for luxury.

93. Let the measure for all food and drink be the first satisfaction of appetite; and for seasoning and pleasure, appetite itself; and you will neither take more than necessary nor need cooks; and you will be content with whatever drink is at hand.

94. Make your prayers, not relaxed and sullen, but splendid and simple; so that your souls are neither disturbed by bodily things, nor deluded by bodily pleasures and neglect them, and then are harmed, indulging in luxury for a moment, but then falling ill in their bodies.

95. Be careful that your stomach does not praise the food, but that your soul praises the cheerfulness. For the former are cast out as refuse, and praise is mingled with it; but the soul, even if separated, remains eternally pure.

96. In banquets, remember that you receive two things, body and soul; and whatever you give to the body, you immediately excrete; but whatever you give to the soul, you preserve forever.

97. Do not mix anger with extravagance and bring it forth; for extravagance, having sprung upon the body, quickly departs; but anger, having entered the soul, remains for the longest time. Therefore, see to it that you do not, driven by anger, insult your fellow-diners extravagantly, but rather cheer them modestly with gentleness.

98. It is shameful to sweeten the swallowing of the gifts of bees, but to embitter the word, a gift of the gods, with wickedness.

99. Let it be your concern at meals that your servants are not more numerous than those served; for it is absurd for many souls to serve a few couches.

100. It is best, if you act manually in preparations, and if, while feasting on food, you manage those present who serve. But if such a thing is difficult at the moment, remember not to serve sluggishly when others are idle, not to eat when others are not eating, not to drink when others are not drinking, not to speak when others are silent.

101. To quarrel and be contentious is everywhere unseemly, but most so in social gatherings during drinking. For no one who is drunk will teach a sober person, nor will a drunk person be persuaded by a sober one. And where the end of persuasion is not present, you exert yourself in vain.

102. Musical cicadas are voiceless snails; and the former rejoice when moist, the latter when warm. Then the dew entices the former, and they shed their skin in it; and the sun, when it is strong, awakens the latter, and they sing in it. Therefore, if you wish to be a musical and harmonious man, when your soul is moistened by wine in drinking, do not let it go forth and be defiled; but when it is inflamed by reason in assemblies, then command your words to prophesy and sing of justice.

103. Consider thoroughly the person you interact with in three ways: as superior, or as inferior, or as equal. And if superior, you must listen and obey him; but if inferior, disobey him; but if equal, agree; and where you are ever caught in contentiousness.

104. It is better to let opinion win by yielding to truth than to be defeated by truth by yielding to opinion.

105. Seeking truth, you will not seek to win by every means; and having found truth, you will possess not being defeated.

106. Truth wins by itself, but opinion wins by external means.

107. It is better to live fearlessly and freely with one free man than to be a slave with many.

108. What you fear to suffer, do not try to inflict on others; and you fear slavery, so guard against being enslaved. For by enduring to be enslaved, you seem to be a slave first yourself; for neither does vice associate with virtue, nor freedom with slavery.

109. Just as a healthy person would not wish to be treated by sick people, nor would wish his cohabitants to be sick; so too a free person would not tolerate being served by slaves, or having his cohabitants enslaved.

110. Whoever wishes to be free from slaves, free yourself from desires; and you will be free. For neither Aristides, nor Epaminondas, nor Lycurgus were called wealthy and enslaved, but the one just, the other divine, the other a savior; but because they were poor, they freed Greece from slavery.

111. If you wish your household to be well-governed, imitate Lycurgus of Sparta; for as he did not fortify the city with walls, but strengthened the inhabitants with virtue, and kept the city free forever; so too you should not surround your house with large courtyards and erect high towers, but strengthen the inhabitants with good will, and trust, and friendship, and nothing harmful will enter it, nor will the whole host of evil be arrayed against it.

112. Do not surround your house with tablets and paintings, but with

ON TEMPERANCE. E.

Temperance is written down: for the one is a timely charm for the eyes, while the other is an innate, ineffaceable, and eternal ornament of a household.

113 Instead of a herd of oxen, try to gather herds of friends into your house.

114 Just as a wolf is similar to a dog, so too a flatterer, an adulterer, and a parasite are similar to a friend. Be careful, therefore, lest instead of guardian dogs, you unknowingly admit destructive wolves.

115 To strive for your house to be admired by whitening it with gypsum is tasteless; but to adorn its character with kindness in society is both beautiful and philanthropic.

116 If you admire small things, you will first be deemed worthy of great things; but if you despise small things, you will be greatly admired.

117 Nothing is smaller than love of pleasure, love of gain, and boastfulness; nothing is greater than magnanimity, gentleness, and philanthropy.

118 Xenocrates. When money was brought to him from Alexander, he entertained those who brought it in his own manner, and said, "Report to Alexander that as long as I live like this, I do not need fifty talents"; for that was how much had been sent.

119 Heraclitus.

It is given to all human beings to know, to have impulses, and to be temperate.

120 Heraclitus. A man, when he is drunk, is led astray by an immature boy, not knowing where he goes, having a wet soul. A dry soul is the wisest and best.

121 From Nikolaos' Collection of Customs. Iberian women annually display whatever they have woven in common; and men, acting as judges, honor the one who has done the most work. They also have a girdle measure, and they consider it shameful if they are unable to encircle their stomach with it.

122 From Thucydides' Oration of the Lacedaemonians. Temperate men, who have safely placed their good fortunes in an uncertain position, would also deal more wisely with adversities.

103 Menedemus. Menedemus, when a young man said, "It is a great thing to obtain what one desires," replied, "It is much greater not even to desire what one ought not."

124 From Plato's Apology of Socrates. For to fear death, O men, is nothing other than to seem wise when one is not; for it is to seem to know what one does not know. For no one knows death, not even if it happens to be the greatest of all goods for man; but they fear it as if knowing well that it is the greatest of evils. And how is this not that disgraceful ignorance, that of thinking one knows what one does not know? But I, O men, perhaps differ from the majority of people in this, that if indeed I claimed to be wiser than someone, it would be in this, that while I do not sufficiently know the things in Hades, I also believe that I do not know them; but to act unjustly, and to disobey what is better, both God and man, that it is evil and shameful, I know. Therefore, as for the evils I know to be evils, I will never fear or flee from the things I do not know, even if they happen to be good.

125 From Plato's Apology of Socrates. For I go about doing nothing else than persuading you, both young and old, not to care for your bodies, nor for your money first, nor for anything else so much, as for your soul, that it may be as good as possible; saying that virtue does not come from wealth, but from virtue come wealth and all other good things for human beings, both privately and publicly.

126 From the same. But by no means do this; for know well, that if you put me to death, being such a man as I describe myself, you will harm yourselves more than me. For neither Meletus nor Anytus could harm me, nor indeed would they be able. For I do not believe it is lawful for a worse man to harm a better one; but perhaps they might put me to death, or exile me, or dishonor me.

127 Plato, Republic III. But certainly one should not be prone to laughter; for almost whenever one gives way to strong laughter, such a person seeks a strong change. "It seems so to me," he said. Therefore, if anyone represents men of worth as overcome by laughter, it is not to be accepted; much less, if gods.

Flourishing in sorrow for the overly arrogant.

128 Plato, Republic III. "What then?" "Shall we not then need temperance for our young men?" "How could we not?" "And is not temperance, for the most part, especially such things as for rulers to be obedient, and for them to rule over pleasures concerning drink and sexual matters and food?" "It seems so to me."

129 From the same. "Some of the necessary pleasures and desires seem to me to be lawless, which risk arising in everyone, but are punished by both laws and better desires, with reason; and in some people they are entirely eradicated, or only a few remain, and they are weak; while in others they are stronger and more numerous." "Which ones do you mean?" he said. "Those," I replied, "that awaken during sleep, when the other part of the soul is asleep, whatever is rational and tame, and rules over that; but the beastly and wild part, filled with food or drink, leaps about and, having cast off sleep, seeks to go forth and satisfy its own inclinations. You know that in that state everything ventures to do such things, as if entirely released and freed from shame and prudence; for it does not hesitate, as it imagines, to mix with its mother, or with anything else, whether human, divine, or bestial; nor to commit any murder, nor to abstain from any food; and in a word, it lacks nothing of folly or shamelessness. 'You speak most truly,' he said. 'But if someone, I suppose, is in a healthy and temperate state regarding himself, and goes to sleep, having awakened the rational part of himself, and having feasted it on good words and thoughts, coming to an understanding with himself; and if the desiring part is neither hungry nor satiated, so that it may sleep, and not disturb the better part by rejoicing or being pained, but allowing it to contemplate purely by itself and to grasp what it does not know, or what has happened, or what exists, or what is to come; and likewise having calmed the spirited part, and not going to sleep having been aroused to anger against anyone, but having quieted these two parts, and having set in motion the third, in which reason arises, in this manner he rests, you know that in such a state he touches truth most, and then least do lawless visions appear in dreams.' 'Absolutely, then,' he said, 'I suppose this is the case.' 'These things, then, we have been led to say in addition; but what we wish to know is this, that a terrible, wild, and lawless kind of desire is present in everyone, and some of us seem very moderate. But this, then, becomes evident in dreams.'"

130 From the same, from Symposium. For every action is thus: performed in itself, it is neither beautiful nor shameful, such as what we now do, or drinking, or singing, or conversing; none of these things is in itself good or bad; but in the action, as it is done, it turns out to be such. For when it is done well and rightly, it becomes beautiful; but when not rightly, it is shameful. Thus, loving, and love, is not entirely beautiful, nor worthy of praise, but only when it leads to what is noble.

181 Plato. For there is a law for us, as there was for lovers, to serve voluntarily, in any kind of service to a boy, provided it is not flattery nor disgraceful; thus, only one other voluntary servitude remains which is not disgraceful; and this is concerning virtue. For it is customary among us that if someone wishes to serve another, believing that through him he will become better, either in some wisdom or in any other part of virtue, this voluntary servitude is not shameful, nor flattery.

132 Plato, from Phaedo. But it is best not to be disturbed by desires, but to hold them lightly and in an orderly manner.

133 Plato. And if you wish divination to exist, then it must be granted as a knowledge of what is to come, and temperance as its mistress, turning away the deceivers, and establishing true seers as prophets of future events for us. For human nature is so constituted, that it would act and live scientifically, I believe; for temperance, by guarding, would not allow ignorance to interfere as a co-worker for us.

134 And indeed, it seems, what you are now saying is that some pleasures are good, and some are bad; is that right? Yes. Are then the good ones those that are beneficial, and the bad ones those that are harmful? Absolutely. And are the beneficial ones those that produce good, and the bad ones those that produce evil? I affirm it.

ON TEMPERANCE. E.

Are you then speaking of such things, for example, those pleasures concerning the body, which we now call eating and drinking, if indeed of these, those that produce health in the body, or strength, or some other bodily excellence, are themselves good, while the opposite of these are bad? Absolutely. And are pains likewise, some good, others bad? How could they not be? So, should we choose and practice the good pleasures and pains? Absolutely. But not the bad ones? That is clear. For surely, we must do everything for the sake of good things—and therefore, for the sake of good things, we must do other things, and pleasant things, but not pleasant things for the sake of good things? Absolutely. Is it then for every man to choose which of the pleasant things are good, and which are bad? Or does one need a skilled person for each? A skilled person. Let us recall what I was saying to Polus and Gorgias; for he himself said, if you recall, that there are preparations, some of which prepare for pleasure itself, being ignorant of what is better and what is worse; while others know both what is good and what is bad; and he placed the experience of cooking among those concerning pleasures, but not as an art; and among those concerning what is good, the art of medicine.

135 Plato. I, for my part, thus maintain these things, and I say that they are true: And if they are true, then whoever wishes, as it seems, to be happy, must practice and pursue temperance; and licentiousness must be shunned, as each of us shuns the plague; and one must prepare oneself, especially by needing no punishment; but if one needs it, either oneself, or some other of one's household, or a private citizen, or a city, one must impose a penalty and punish, if one is to be happy. This, it seems to me, is the aim towards which one must live, directing all one's own affairs towards it, and those of the city, so that justice may be present; and temperance, for one who is to be blessed, to act thus; not allowing desires to be unrestrained and these trying to fulfill them, is an unachievable evil, living a life of banditry; for such a person would not be pleasing to other humans, nor to God; for he is incapable of fellowship. For where there is no fellowship, there can be no friendship. Indeed, O Callicles, wise men say that fellowship holds together heaven, and earth, and gods, and men, and also friendship, orderliness, temperance, and justice; and because of these things they call this whole arrangement 'cosmos,' O friend, not disorder, nor licentiousness. But you, it seems to me, do not pay attention to these things, and though wise in these matters, it escapes you that geometrical equality prevails among gods and men; it is very powerful; but you think you ought to practice greed, for you neglect geometry.

186 Iamblichus, from the letter to Arete concerning Temperance. Therefore, I declare the same concerning all the faculties of the soul: their symmetry with each other, and the good order of spirit, and of desire, and of reason, according to the proper arrangement for each, is good order; and the distribution of these, of ruling and being ruled, when it occurs fittingly, would be temperance in many forms.

ON LICENTIOUSNESS. F.

1 Sophocles. Someone asked Sophocles, when he was an old man, if he still associated with women; and he said, "Speak favorably, for I have escaped it with the greatest pleasure, as if from a raging and wild master."

2 Antisthenes. Antisthenes used to say that pleasures that do not enter through the door must necessarily not exit through the door either; otherwise, one will need to be castrated or treated with hellebore.

ON LICENTIOUSNESS. F.

3 Diogenes. Diogenes used to say that most people, while alive, let themselves rot by soaking in baths and dissolving in sexual pleasures, but when they die, they instruct their bodies to be laid out in incense, and some in honey, so that they may not quickly decay.

4 From the same. Diogenes used to say that in houses where there is most food, there are many mice and weasels; and likewise, bodies that receive much food attract as many diseases.

6 Diogenes, to a young man excessively adorning himself, said, "If for men, you are unfortunate; but if for women, you are unjust."

6 Eryximachus. Eryximachus said that sexual intercourse was a mild epilepsy, and that it differed only in duration.

7 Antiphon. Where pleasure is, pain is also near; for pleasures do not come forth from themselves, but pains and labors follow them.

8 Musonius. The beginning of not hesitating to do shameful things is not hesitating to speak of shameful things.

9 Socrates. Socrates said that adulterers do something similar to those who do not wish to drink from flowing water, but from water at the bottom, which is worse.

10 Solon. Flee pleasure which later brings forth pain.

11 Plato, from Phaedo. Some rule over cities, but are enslaved to women.

12 Eusebius. And yet they call licentiousness being ruled by pleasures.

7913 Consider no one free who gives in to shameful desires. For those who possess slaves to fortune are much more burdened; these men are enslaved to masters who compel them to do these things.

14 From the same. Gluttony fattens the body, raises unreason, but brings to the soul its fairest ornament, reason.

15 From the same. The gods gave a body to the human soul, so that the body might serve the soul. But most people do the opposite, making the body serve everything, and for its unique functions, enslaving the better to the worse, and an immortal soul to a mortal body.

16 From the same. Licentiousness corrupts the soul and destroys the body, which, for the sake of pleasure and to indulge it, compels its possessor to do all the most shameful things.

17 From the same. Licentiousness seizes the soul, just as winds seize a ship, carrying it hither and thither, and making it disobedient to the helmsman; thus also shaking the soul, and compelling it to be disobedient to reason, not allowing it to be at peace, and to anchor in the calmest and safest harbor.

18 Philemon. "For what presumption do you have, tell me? You speak among men as if you were a man, but do you walk about as a whole? Or do you draw the same air as others, tell me, being such a one?"

19 Cleanthes. Whoever endures desiring a shameful thing, that person will do it if they get the opportunity.

20 From the same. From where, then, does the race of adulterers come? From a man swollen with sexual pleasure.

21 Euphron. There is no evil greater than an adulterer; for he wishes to revel in the misfortunes of others.

22 Euripides, Antiope. And indeed, those who train their lives for bodily well-being, if they fail financially, are bad citizens; for a man accustomed to a dissolute character of the belly ought to remain in the same state.

23 Anaxandrides.

Never make yourself a slave to pleasure. This is a characteristic of a wanton woman, not of a man.

24 Alexis. Flee pleasure that later brings harm.

25 Menander, Anger. There is nothing more dishonorable than an adulterer; for he is bought at the price of death.

26 From the same. A shameful life is a reproach, even if it is pleasant.

27 Aristophon, The Physician. For the luxurious houses of courtesans have become inaccessible to those who have nothing.

28 Apollodorus. And let the door be closed with bolts, but no carpenter has made a door so secure through which a weasel or an adulterer cannot enter.

29 Bathon. While there are very many other things in life about which we are all rightly disturbed, those who claim to love moderation in conduct, and who seem to escape detection by feigning virtue, without truly possessing it, most certainly stir my bile. For what difference does it make, by Athena, the manner of the younger and smooth-skinned, compared to which the older and more advanced have rough skin?

30 Phoenecides. "By Aphrodite, I would not endure it any longer, Pythias, to be a courtesan; farewell; do not tell me I failed, it is nothing to me, I want to break off." As soon as she tried, she had a certain military lover; he always spoke of battles, and showed his wounds while speaking, but contributed nothing. He said he was receiving a gift from the king, and he always spoke of this; through this gift, as I say, the wretch kept me for a year as a free gift. I left him, and took another, a doctor. He, bringing in many people, cut and cauterized; he was poor and a public executioner. This man seemed more terrible to me than the other. The one told stories, the other produced corpses. For a third time, fate paired me with a philosopher, who had a beard, and a cloak, and reason; I fell into obvious trouble. For he gave nothing; but if I asked for it, he said, 'Money is not good.' 'Let it be bad, then, for that reason give it to me, throw it away!' He was not persuaded.

31 Socrates. It is impossible to wrap fire in a cloak, or a shameful deed in time.

32 From the same. The wind extinguishes fire, but habit kindles love.

33 From Serenus. Diogenes mocked those who sealed their treasuries with bolts, and keys, and seals; yet opened their own bodies with many windows and doors, through the mouth, and genitals, and ears, and eyes.

34 Zeno. Zeno blamed most people, saying that even though they could derive pleasures from labors, they took them from kitchens.

35 Musonius. Musonius said it was an excess of shamelessness to remember the body's weakness for enduring labors, but to forget about pleasures.

36 From Serenus. Someone said about Euripides that he was a woman-hater; and Sophocles said, "But not in bed, at least."

37 Cleanthes. Cleanthes said that if pleasure is the end, then wisdom is given to humans for their harm.

38 Diogenes. Diogenes said that people pray to the gods for health; but most people do everything contrary to health.

89 Crates. Crates, seeing a golden statue of Phryne the courtesan standing in Delphi, exclaimed that it stood as a monument to the intemperance of the Greeks.

40 Aesop. Aesop said to one who misused beauty, "With what kind of garment, badly clothed, do you strip it off?"

41 On the philosophy of words. And indeed, licentiousness has long been blamed, because in such a state it releases the desiring part to excessive freedom beyond what is proper.

42 Plutarch, from On Pleasure. That pleasure relaxes the bodies, daily softening them with luxuries, the continuity of which takes away their tension, loosening their strength, from which comes not only ease of diseases but also ease of toils, and in youth, a premature old age.

43 From the same. Pleasure is a beast that enslaves, but not a wild one; for if it fought openly, it would quickly be conquered; but now it is all the more hateful for this reason, that it steals away enmity by assuming the guise of benevolence. So it is twofold repulsive, both in what it harms and in what it deceives.

44 From the same. Therefore, as for just pleasures, we would no longer call them pleasures, nor recognize them as such, but rather as treatments. But all excesses beyond these are wanton acts, corrupted, forced, and flattering with varied deceptions; they secretly cause harm. And our law, and that of irrational animals, is that after satisfying desires, there is no further appetite, but satiety of urgent and unrestrained pleasures.

45 From the same. Should anyone praise traitors? Such is pleasure, it betrays the things of virtue. Should anyone praise torturers? Such is pleasure, it tortures temperance. Should anyone praise avarice? Each of these is insatiable. Why do we rejoice in such a great beast that flatters and consumes us?

46 From the same. Why are you not intemperate in front of everyone, but even flee yourself, being ashamed, trusting your wantonness to night and darkness, which have no witnesses? For no one who does good deeds sets darkness before them, being ashamed for the light to witness them, but would rather have the whole world become sun, for the sake of what he rightly does; but every vice keeps itself naked to be seen, projecting a covering over its passions. Therefore, having cut off these pleasures, let us behold them naked: they intoxicate into insensibility, they lust forever, they sleep through deeds, they do not turn back to gates, they do not care for parents, they are not ashamed of laws.

47 Pythagoras. To be enslaved to passions is harder than to tyrants.

48 From the same. It is impossible for one enslaved to passions, and overcome by passions, to be free.

49 From Serenus. Plato said it was difficult to find a good pleasure for the licentious, and health for the sick.

50 From Epictetus. And bringing forth disagreeable philosophers, to whom pleasure does not seem to be according to nature, but to arise from what is according to nature, justice, temperance, freedom. Why then does the soul rejoice and find peace in the lesser goods of the body, as Epicurus says; but not delight in its own greatest goods? And indeed, nature has given me shame, and I blush deeply whenever I conceive of something shameful to say. This impulse does not allow me to posit pleasure as good, and as the end of life.

51 Pythagoras. No one is free who does not master himself.

52 Diogenes. Diogenes determined that nothing was cheaper than an adulterer, who prioritizes his soul over money.

53 From the same. Diogenes used to say that men eat for the sake of pleasure, but are unwilling to stop for the sake of it.

54 Cato the Elder. Cato the Elder, in criticizing luxury, said that it is difficult to speak to a belly that has no ears.

55 Democritus. Daily sleeps signify a burden to the body, or a lack of civic spirit in the soul, or idleness, or lack of education.

56 Cato. Cato said that those who strive in trivial matters become ridiculous in serious ones.

57 Democritus. Sexual intercourse is a minor stroke; for man is driven out of man.

58 From Epictetus' Memorabilia. In Rome, women carry Plato's Republic in their hands, because he advocates for women to be common. For they pay attention to the words, but not to the man's intention; that he does not command marriage and cohabitation with one woman, and then wish women to be common, but rather abolishes such marriage and introduces another kind of marriage. And generally, people rejoice in providing excuses for their own faults. For philosophy says that it is not proper to stretch out even one's finger aimlessly.

59 From the same. Of pleasant things, those that occur most rarely are most delightful.

60 From the same. If one exceeds moderation, the most pleasant things become the most unpleasant.

61 Musonius, from On Sexual Pleasures. And indeed, no small part of luxury in sexual matters is that the luxurious require various kinds of lovers, not only lawful but also unlawful, and not only females but also males, hunting now one, now another beloved; and not content with those readily available, they pursue those that are rare, seeking shameful encounters, which are all great accusations against humanity. But those who are not luxurious, or not bad, should consider only lawful sexual relations in marriage, and those conducted for the procreation of children, to be just, because they are also lawful; but those that pursue mere pleasure are unjust and unlawful, even if they occur in marriage. Other sexual encounters, those by adultery, are most unlawful; and more moderate than these are those between males with males, because the daring act is against nature. And all sexual encounters with females outside of adultery, which are deprived of being done according to law, are also all shameful, at least when they are done out of licentiousness; as indeed, with temperance no one would endure associating with a harlot, nor, by Zeus, with a free woman without marriage, nor, by Zeus, with his own female servant. For the unlawful and indecent nature of these sexual acts is a great disgrace and reproach to those who pursue them; whence no one of this sort tolerates doing such things openly, even if he were able to blush a little; but those who are not entirely shameless dare to do these things secretly and by stealth. And yet, to try to hide what one is doing is to admit that one is in the wrong. "By Zeus," he says, "but it is not as an adulterer wrongs the husband of a corrupted woman, so also one who associates with a courtesan wrongs someone, or, by Zeus, one who associates with a woman who has no husband; for he does not corrupt the hope of any children." But I am able to say that everyone who wrongs, wrongs himself immediately, even if he wrongs none of his neighbors, by certainly making himself worse and more dishonorable; for the wrongdoer, to the extent that he wrongs, is worse and more dishonorable. Therefore, that I may pass over injustice, it is necessarily the case that every act of licentiousness belongs to him who is overcome by shameful pleasure, and who rejoices in being defiled like a beast; for such a one is not least among those who associate with his own slave girl, which some believe to be most excusable, since every master seems to have the right to use his own slave as he wishes. But against this my argument is simple: for if anyone thinks it is not shameful or strange for a master to associate with his own slave girl, and especially if she happens to be a widow, let him consider what it would appear to him to be if a mistress were to associate with a male slave. For it would not seem tolerable, not only if a woman who has a lawful husband were to take a male slave to herself, but also if she, being husbandless, were to do this; and yet, no one would ever deem men to be worse than women, nor less able to govern their own desires, nor the stronger in judgment to be weaker, nor rulers to be ruled. For it is much more fitting for them to be superior men, if they are also deemed worthy to preside over women; but if they appear to be more intemperate and worse. As for the fact that it is an act of intemperance and nothing else for a master to associate with a slave woman, why need one even say it? For it is well-known.

62 From the same, from On Hair-cutting. He said that a man ought to apply hair-cutting to his head in a way similar to how we apply pruning to a vine, solely for the purpose of removing what is useless; that the beard is not a mere tuft of hair, but a covering provided by nature for us; and that the beard has become a symbol of maleness, like a cock's comb, and a lion's mane; therefore, while what is troublesome on the hair should be removed, nothing should be removed from the beard. For it does not bother him at all, as long as the body is healthy, or if he does not suffer from such a disease for which the removal of beard hair would be necessary. "For it has been well said," he said, by Zeno, "that for this reason one should endure and have hair, according to nature, so that one is not burdened by the hair, nor bothered in any activity." For nature appears to guard against deficiency more, and against superfluity less, both in plants and in animals; because it is much easier and more convenient to add what is lacking than to remove what is superfluous. And in both cases, human reason ought to assist nature, so as to fill up deficiencies as much as possible, and to diminish and remove superfluities. Hence, for the sake of endurance alone, for the removal of the superfluous, and not for the sake of adornment, which some believe to be necessary, men smooth their beards, imitating beardless youths, or, by Zeus, those who are just beginning to grow beards; but they do not cut the hair on their heads similarly, but differently, the front from the back. And indeed, it seems,

This world is an order, but it has much disorder, and in no way differs from the adornment of women. For they weave some parts of their hair, others they let down, and others they arrange in another way, so that they may appear more beautiful; and those who are thus handled are clearly desirous of appearing beautiful to those they wish to please, some completely removing their hair, and others styling it so that they may appear shapely among women and children by whom they wish to be praised. Some, moreover, even shave their beards because they are bothered by the hair, and smooth their cheeks; these men are clearly completely broken and enervated by luxury, for they endure being seen as effeminate and womanish, which they ought to have avoided entirely if they were truly men. For why indeed is hair a burden to men? Unless someone were to say that feathers are a burden to birds.

63. From Plato's Protagoras.

This much is enough for the demonstration, which I and Protagoras must demonstrate, concerning the matters about which you questioned us. You asked, if you remember, when we agreed with each other that no knowledge is superior, but that this always prevails, wherever it may be, both pleasure and all other things; but you said that pleasure often prevails even over the knowing person. And since we do not agree with you, you then asked us, "O Protagoras and Socrates, if this suffering is not being overcome by pleasure, but what it is, and what you say it is, tell us." If then we had immediately told you that it was ignorance, you would have laughed at us; but now, if you laugh at us, you will also laugh at yourselves. For you too agreed

that you err due to a lack of knowledge in choosing pleasures and in causing pain (these things are good and bad) and that it is not only knowledge but also measurement that we further agreed upon. And the misguided action without knowledge, you yourselves know, is done out of ignorance; so this is to be overcome by pleasure, the greatest ignorance.

64. From Plato's Philebus.

SOCRATES: Well then, let us judge each of the three things by pleasure and by mind. We must see to which of them we assign each most akin. PROTARCHUS: Do you mean beauty and truth and measure? SOCRATES: Yes. But first, Protarchus, take truth, and having looked at the three—mind and truth and pleasure—answer yourself after a long time, which is more akin, pleasure or mind to truth. PROTARCHUS: Why do we need time? For I think they differ greatly. For pleasure is the most boastful of all things. And as for reason, even in the pleasures associated with love, which are thought to be the greatest, it has received pardon from the gods; as if children, having the least understanding of pleasures. But mind is either the same as truth, or most similar and truest to all things. SOCRATES: So then, after this, consider likewise measure, whether pleasure or wisdom possesses more wisdom. PROTARCHUS: This consideration is easy for you to have set forth. For I think that of all existing things, one would find nothing more immoderate than pleasure and excessive joy; but of mind and knowledge, one would find nothing more moderate. SOCRATES: You have spoken well. Yet tell me the third thing: does mind partake more of beauty than the genus of pleasure, so that mind is more beautiful than pleasure, or the reverse? PROTARCHUS: So then, wisdom and mind, O Socrates,

no one has ever seen or conceived of or experienced anything shameful, awake or asleep, or anything existing. SOCRATES: Rightly so. PROTARCHUS: But as for pleasures, and the greatest ones, when we see anyone experiencing pleasure, or see ridicule or the most shameful things following them, we ourselves are ashamed, and we hide them as much as possible, giving all such things to the night, as if light should not see them. SOCRATES: In every way, Protarchus, you will say, sending messengers and speaking in person, that pleasure is not the first possession, nor the second; but first, concerning measure, and what is moderate and timely, and all such things as these, one must consider their nature to be eternally stated. PROTARCHUS: It seems so, from what is now being said. SOCRATES: Second, concerning what is symmetrical and beautiful and perfect and sufficient, and all such things that belong to this kind. PROTARCHUS: It seems so indeed. SOCRATES: So then, the third thing, as my divination tells me, placing mind and wisdom, you would not stray far from the truth. PROTARCHUS: Perhaps. SOCRATES: So then, are not the fourth things, which we placed as belonging to the soul itself, knowledge and arts, and true opinions, these to be the fourth things in relation to the three? If indeed they are more akin to the good than to pleasure. PROTARCHUS: Perhaps. SOCRATES: And then, the fifth things, which we placed as pleasures, defining them as painless and calling them pure intellectual pleasures, following the senses. PROTARCHUS: Perhaps. SOCRATES:

This world is an order, but it has much disorder, and in no way differs from the adornment of women. For they weave some parts of their hair, others they let down, and others they arrange in another way, so that they may appear more beautiful; and those who are thus handled are clearly desirous of appearing beautiful to those they wish to please, some completely removing their hair, and others styling it so that they may appear shapely among women and children by whom they wish to be praised. Some, moreover, even shave their beards because they are bothered by the hair, and smooth their cheeks; these men are clearly completely broken and enervated by luxury, for they endure being seen as effeminate and womanish, which they ought to have avoided entirely if they were truly men. For why indeed is hair a burden to men? Unless someone were to say that feathers are a burden to birds.

63. From Plato's Protagoras.

This much is enough for the demonstration, which I and Protagoras must demonstrate, concerning the matters about which you questioned us. You asked, if you remember, when we agreed with each other that no knowledge is superior, but that this always prevails, wherever it may be, both pleasure and all other things; but you said that pleasure often prevails even over the knowing person. And since we do not agree with you, you then asked us, "O Protagoras and Socrates, if this suffering is not being overcome by pleasure, but what it is, and what you say it is, tell us." If then we had immediately told you that it was ignorance, you would have laughed at us; but now, if you laugh at us, you will also laugh at yourselves. For you too agreed

that you err due to a lack of knowledge in choosing pleasures and in causing pain (these things are good and bad) and that it is not only knowledge but also measurement that we further agreed upon. And the misguided action without knowledge, you yourselves know, is done out of ignorance; so this is to be overcome by pleasure, the greatest ignorance.

64. From Plato's Philebus.

SOCRATES: Well then, let us judge each of the three things by pleasure and by mind. We must see to which of them we assign each most akin. PROTARCHUS: Do you mean beauty and truth and measure? SOCRATES: Yes. But first, Protarchus, take truth, and having looked at the three—mind and truth and pleasure—answer yourself after a long time, which is more akin, pleasure or mind to truth. PROTARCHUS: Why do we need time? For I think they differ greatly. For pleasure is the most boastful of all things. And as for reason, even in the pleasures associated with love, which are thought to be the greatest, it has received pardon from the gods; as if children, having the least understanding of pleasures. But mind is either the same as truth, or most similar and truest to all things. SOCRATES: So then, after this, consider likewise measure, whether pleasure or wisdom possesses more wisdom. PROTARCHUS: This consideration is easy for you to have set forth. For I think that of all existing things, one would find nothing more immoderate than pleasure and excessive joy; but of mind and knowledge, one would find nothing more moderate. SOCRATES: You have spoken well. Yet tell me the third thing: does mind partake more of beauty than the genus of pleasure, so that mind is more beautiful than pleasure, or the reverse? PROTARCHUS: So then, wisdom and mind, O Socrates,

no one has ever seen or conceived of or experienced anything shameful, awake or asleep, or anything existing. SOCRATES: Rightly so. PROTARCHUS: But as for pleasures, and the greatest ones, when we see anyone experiencing pleasure, or see ridicule or the most shameful things following them, we ourselves are ashamed, and we hide them as much as possible, giving all such things to the night, as if light should not see them. SOCRATES: In every way, Protarchus, you will say, sending messengers and speaking in person, that pleasure is not the first possession, nor the second; but first, concerning measure, and what is moderate and timely, and all such things as these, one must consider their nature to be eternally stated. PROTARCHUS: It seems so, from what is now being said. SOCRATES: Second, concerning what is symmetrical and beautiful and perfect and sufficient, and all such things that belong to this kind. PROTARCHUS: It seems so indeed. SOCRATES: So then, the third thing, as my divination tells me, placing mind and wisdom, you would not stray far from the truth. PROTARCHUS: Perhaps. SOCRATES: So then, are not the fourth things, which we placed as belonging to the soul itself, knowledge and arts, and true opinions, these to be the fourth things in relation to the three? If indeed they are more akin to the good than to pleasure. PROTARCHUS: Perhaps. SOCRATES: And then, the fifth things, which we placed as pleasures, defining them as painless and calling them pure intellectual pleasures, following the senses. PROTARCHUS: Perhaps. SOCRATES:

in the sixth generation.

(Says Orpheus)

Stop the song of the cosmos.

But it is likely that our discourse too will be finished in the sixth judgment.

65. From Euclid.

Sleep is a younger and boyish daemon, easily trusting and easy to escape; but the other is aged and old, deeply rooted especially among older men, untrusting and inescapable. It is difficult to get rid of this daemon once it is present. For it pays no attention to arguments, nor can it hear at all; for it is deaf; nor can one show anything to it by revealing it; for it is blind.

ON COURAGE. 7.

1. Euripides in Bellerophon.

Courage is a great strength against misfortunes.

2. Euripides in Aegeus.

It is possible to prove one's virtue even when defeated by death.

3. Sophocles in Ajax.

For it is shameful for a man to desire a long life,

who gains nothing from his troubles.

For what pleasure does one day after day

add and pile up to the act of dying?

I would not buy a mortal for any price,

who warms himself with vain hopes.

or to live nobly, or to die nobly,

is what a noble man needs. You have heard the whole argument.

4. Menander.

Whenever you do something righteous,

set before yourself a good hope,

knowing this:

that with righteous courage, God also assists.

5. Euripides in Archelaus.

And one thing I proclaim to you: never willingly fall into slavery while alive, when it is possible for you to die free.

6. Euripides in Danaë.

Alas, how fitting it is for noble souls everywhere

that a good character should lead to bravery.

7. Sophocles in Eriphyle.

For the heart of noble men is not softened.

8. Sophocles in Creusa.

Whoever goes forth with courage into danger,

his tongue is straight, and his mind is secure.

9. Euripides in Heracles.

To be slain is terrible, but it brings glory;

to not die is not terrible, but there is pleasure.

10. Euripides in Oedipus.

Which is more useful to be born,

that is, courage and a mind that fears not; for the other is a flaw, though it defends itself; but the latter is a peaceful deed; and in both there is sickness.

11. Aeschylus.

For seven men, fierce leaders of the army,

slaughtering bulls over a black-covered shield,

and touching with their hands the blood of the bull,

swore to Ares and Enyo, and to bloodthirsty Phobos,

that they would either lay waste the city and destroy the Cadmean city by force,

or die and mix their blood with the earth.

And the signs they showed to their parents at home,

they crowned with tears flowing from Adrastus' chariot;

and there was no pity in their mouth.

For their iron-hearted spirit, burning with courage,

breathed like lions looking upon Ares.

And this trust is not delayed by hesitation.

They left by lot, so that each one, having drawn a lot,

might lead his company to the gates.

12. Mimnermus.

I do not hear of such courage and noble spirit in that man from my predecessors, whom they saw,

as he charged thick ranks of Lydian cavalry,

the Hermion (Hermione) of the plain, bringing forth much honey.

For her, Pallas Athena never at all reproached

the keen spirit of her heart, even as she charged among the champions,

and the bloody conflict of battle,

the bitter javelins of the enemy.

For no man was better than him among the enemies

in performing the work of fierce battle,

when he was carried by the rays of the swift sun.

13. Melinno of Lesbos to Rome.

Hail, Rome, daughter of Ares,

golden-filleted, war-minded queen,

sacred land where you dwell, Olympus on earth,

ever unbroken.

To you alone has Fate given

the glorious unbroken royal power,

so that you may rule and hold sway.

And by your mighty bonds,

the breast of the earth and the grey sea

are bound; and you safely govern

the cities of peoples.

But though mighty time overthrows all,

and transforms life in different ways,

only for you, being close to the source of power,

it does not change.

For you alone, out of all, give birth to the bravest

spearmen, mighty ones, like Demeter sending forth

fruit from men.

14. From Homer.

For if you were to be struck or wounded in combat,

you would not fall backward on your neck or back,

but would meet it with your chest or belly,

advancing forward into the skirmish with the champions.

15. From the same.

You will not pierce my back with a spear as I flee,

but strike me through the breast as I charge straight ahead.

16. Socrates.

Socrates, being asked what strength is, said: "Movement of the soul with the body."

17. Epictetus.

For this reason, it is right to praise Agrippinus, because being a man of great worth, he never praised himself; but if anyone else praised him, he would blush. This man, he said, was such that he would always write praise for what happened to him that was difficult; if he had a fever, of the fever; if he was disgraced, of the disgrace; if he fled, of the flight. And once, as he was about to dine, he said, someone came and told him that Nero ordered him to flee; and he said, "Then we will dine in Aricia."

18. Diogenes.

Diogenes said that no toil is noble, unless the aim be courage and strength of soul, not of body.

19. From Thucydides' Speech of Pericles.

For inactivity is not saved, unless it is accompanied by activity.

20. Antigonus.

Antigonus said that the greatest good things do not exist without great evils.

21. Chrysippus.

Chrysippus said that the wise man feels pain, but does not allow himself to be tortured; for he does not yield his soul. And he said that one should desire, but not accept.

22. Democritus.

Courage lessens misfortunes.

23. Musonius.

And if you particularly choose what is advantageous, do not be vexed by circumstances, reflecting on how much in life has not happened as you wished, but as it was advantageous.

24. From the same.

Seize the opportunity to die nobly, when it is possible, lest after a short time, though you may be allowed to die, you may no longer be able to die nobly.

25. From the same.

It is not possible for many to die fittingly while living advantageously, unless they die for the sake of greater advantage.

26. Democritus.

A courageous man is not only one who conquers his enemies, but also one who is superior to pleasures. Some, however, rule cities, but are slaves to women.

Plato said that good men should not wish for a long life, but a glorious one.

28. From Darius.

Darius, father of Xerxes, when praising himself, used to say that in battles and in dangerous situations he became wiser.

29. From the Sayings of Dion.

A Spartan woman, whose son was wounded in battle and distressed by it, said: "Do not grieve, my child, for with every step you will be reminded of your own virtue."

30. From the Sayings of Aristotle.

Anaxarchus the physicist, when Alexander said to him, "I will hang you," replied, "Threaten these many people; it makes no difference to me whether I rot above ground or below."

31. From the same.

Gorgō, the Spartan wife of Leonidas, when her son was going off to war, handed him his shield and said, "With this, or upon this."

32. Democritus.

Glory from justice, boldness of mind, and fearlessness; but fear from injustice, the end of misfortune.

33. From Herodotus' Histories, Book 7.

For great deeds demand and choose great dangers.

34. From Plato's Apology of Socrates.

Perhaps someone might say, "Are you not ashamed, Socrates, for engaging in such a pursuit that now you are in danger of dying?" But I would rightly answer to this that I am not,

my friend, in a great measure.

"So then, do you think it is useful to be ignorant of terrible and dangerous things?" "Not at all," he said. "So then, are those who do not fear such things because they do not know what they are, not courageous?" "No, by Zeus," he said. "For many madmen and cowards would then be courageous." "What about those who fear things that are not terrible?" "Even more so, by Zeus," he said. "So then, do you consider good men courageous when they face terrible and dangerous things, and bad men cowardly?" "Entirely so," he said. "Do you consider any others good in such matters than those who can use them well?" "No, only those," he said. "So then, are bad men those who use them badly?" "Who else?" he said. "So then, does everyone use them as they think they ought?" "How else?" he said. "So then, do those who cannot use them well know how they ought to be used?" "No, not at all," he said. "So then, do those who know how to use them well, and can do so, they alone are courageous?" "Only they," he said. "What about those who have not erred, are they using them badly?" "I don't think so," he said. "So then, have those who use them badly erred?" "Probably," he said. "So then, those who know how to use terrible and dangerous things well are courageous; and those who err in these matters are cowards?" "It seems so to me," he said.

74. From Xenophon's Memorabilia.

Being asked again whether courage is teachable or natural, he said, "I think that just as a body is naturally stronger than another body for toil, so a soul is naturally stronger than another soul for toil."

having come together with a harmony of the soul, Midas consecrated an altar to Idaios Zeus, which he had made of gold by touching it with his hands. This altar, at the time when the chasm occurred, became stone; and after the appointed time had passed, it appeared golden.

70. From Theseus.

When I took possession of Laconia, on account of the slaying of the heralds who had been sent by Xerxes to demand earth and water as tribute, an oracle was given that they would be freed if some Lacedaemonians would agree to be slain by the king. Then Boolis and Spercheas came to the king, asking to be slain; but he, admiring their virtue, ordered them to return.

71. From Plutarch.

They say that courage is a mean between cowardice and rashness, of which the former is a deficiency, and the latter an excess of the spirited part of the soul.

72. From the same.

Agesilaus, being asked about courage and justice, which he would prefer, said, "We would need no courage, if all became just."

73. From Xenophon's Memorabilia.

And courage, Euthydemus, do you consider it among the noble things? "Most noble indeed," he said. "So then, do you not consider courage useful even for the smallest matters?" "No, by Zeus," he said, "for the smallest matters,

scattered, he sent Agesilaus, Themistocles' brother, as a scout. Although his father Neocles had seen in a dream that both his hands had been cut off. And when the man arrived among a multitude of barbarians in Persian attire, he killed one of the bodyguards, Mardonius, thinking him to be Xerxes. But being captured by the spearmen, he was brought bound to the king. And when he was about to be sacrificed to the sun, he placed his right hand on the altar and, without groaning, endured the necessity of tortures, and was set free, saying, "We Athenians are all such; and if you disbelieve, I will put on my left hand as well." And Xerxes, fearing, ordered Agesilaus to be guarded.

64. From Aristides in the third book of the Persians.

When five million Persians were advancing on Greece, the Lacedaemonians sent three hundred men to Thermopylae, giving Leonidas as their commander. He, seeing the multitude of the approaching enemies, feasted with his allies, saying, "Dine thus, O three hundred, as if you are to sup in Hades." When the barbarians appeared, Leonidas, pierced by many spears, charged with an impetuous rush against Xerxes; and taking his diadem from him before his wounds, he held it and breathed his last, bleeding. And when the king cut open his breast, he found his heart full of hair.

65. From Callisthenes in the third book of the Macedonian Wars.

Philip, king of the Macedonians, having subjected thirty-two Chalcidian cities to his scepter, began to ravage Methone and Olynthus. And when he came to a bridge over the Sardon River, and was about to cross,

and having used the blood of his wounds, he inscribed, "The Lacedaemonians over the Argives"; and having done this, he died.

68. From Phalaris' Letter to Peristhenes.

You sent me Euboulos' and Aristophanes' wives, as women who were to be put to death, because they had plotted against me; and you are certainly wondering why I restrained my anger. But if you were to learn the reason, that they suffered nothing from me because of their exceedingly noble reply, you would wonder even more. For when I asked them if they were privy to the plot with their husbands, they said not only yes, but that they had even participated in the tyrannicide. "For what injustice?" I asked. "No personal one," they replied, "but a common one; for it is a common injustice to enslave free cities." "What would you suffer," I asked again, "to atone for your hatred of me, as you deserve?" "To die," they added. And so, I judged that those who die with such virtue were better than those who live.

69. From Callisthenes in the second book of Transformations.

In Celaenae, a city in Phrygia, due to the anger of Idaios Zeus, a chasm with water formed, swallowing up many houses with their inhabitants into the depths. And when the people were in danger, Midas the king received an oracle that the earth would close if he threw into the chasm the most precious thing in human life. And when the Celaenians threw gold and silver and their women's ornaments into the chasm, and still the evil did not cease, Anchouros, Midas' son, considering that nothing was more precious in life than a human soul, jumped into the chasm, embracing his father and bidding farewell to his wife Timothea, and rushed on horseback into the place of the chasm. And the earth,

from the city of the Siconians having come together, Midas consecrated an altar to Idaios Zeus, which he had made of gold by touching it with his hands. This altar, at the time when the chasm occurred, became stone; and after the appointed time had passed, it appeared golden.

70. From Theseus.

When I took possession of Laconia, on account of the slaying of the heralds who had been sent by Xerxes to demand earth and water as tribute, an oracle was given that they would be freed if some Lacedaemonians would agree to be slain by the king. Then Boolis and Spercheas came to the king, asking to be slain; but he, admiring their virtue, ordered them to return.

71. From Plutarch.

They say that courage is a mean between cowardice and rashness, of which the former is a deficiency, and the latter an excess of the spirited part of the soul.

72. From the same.

Agesilaus, being asked about courage and justice, which he would prefer, said, "We would need no courage, if all became just."

73. From Xenophon's Memorabilia.

And courage, Euthydemus, do you consider it among the noble things? "Most noble indeed," he said. "So then, do you not consider courage useful even for the smallest matters?" "No, by Zeus," he said, "for the smallest matters,

for it is for the sake of dangers that men are born courageous; but I see that among those nurtured by the same laws and customs, they differ greatly in daring. However, I believe that every nature is increased towards courage by learning and practice; for it is clear that Scythians and Thracians would not dare to fight the Lacedaemonians taking up shields and spears; and it is clear that Lacedaemonians would not wish to contend with Thracians with light shields and javelins, nor with Scythians with bows. And I see that in all other respects too, people differ from each other by nature, and progress greatly by care. And from this it is clear that all, both the more gifted by nature and the less so, in whatever matters they wish to become distinguished, should learn and practice those things.

75. From Xenophon's Apology of Socrates.

And Apollodorus, who was present, though ardently devoted to him, was otherwise simple-minded, and said, "But I, Socrates, find this most difficult, that I see you dying unjustly." And Socrates is said to have stroked his head and said, "But you, dear Apollodorus, would you rather see me die justly?" And he smiled at the same time. And he is said to have seen Anytus passing by, and said, "But this man, though illustrious, as if he had accomplished something great and noble, if he had killed me, would not then need to train his son in leather-working." "This wretched man," he said, "who does not seem to know which of us has been more fortunate and more beautiful in all time. The victor is worse."

76. From Plato's Apology of Socrates.

And so it is, men of Athens, in truth: wherever one is

stationed, deeming it best to be there, or is stationed by a commander,

there one must, as it seems to me, remain and face danger,

considering nothing, neither death nor anything else,

before disgrace. For I, men of Athens, would have done terrible things,

if, when the commanders whom you chose to lead me stationed me,

both at Potidaea and at Amphipolis, and at Delium,

I then remained where they stationed me, like anyone else,

and risked dying; but if, when God commands, as I both believed

and understood, that I must live philosophizing, and examining myself

and others, I should then, fearing death or any other thing,

abandon my post. It would indeed be terrible, and truly

then would someone justly bring me to trial, because I do not

believe in gods, disobeying the oracle, and fearing death,

and thinking myself wise, when I am not. For indeed, fearing death,

men, is nothing else but thinking oneself wise when one is not;

for it is thinking oneself to know what one does not know.

For no one knows death, or whether it happens to be the greatest

of goods for man; but they fear it as if they certainly know

that it is the greatest of evils; and how is this not ignorance itself,

the most reprehensible kind, that of thinking one knows what one does not know?

77 • From Plato's Apology of Socrates.

For neither in court, nor in war, nor I, nor anyone else

should contrive this, how one may altogether escape death.

For often in battles it becomes clear that it is easier for one to escape death

by abandoning one's weapons and turning to supplication of one's pursuers; and other

many contrivances there are in each of the dangers,

so as to escape death, if one dares to do everything and say anything.

But is this not the difficult thing, men of Athens, to escape death?

Rather, it is much more difficult to escape wickedness; for wickedness runs faster

than death.

78 • From the same, from Phaedo.

Alas, Simmias, how hard I would find it to persuade others

that I do not consider my present fate a misfortune, since I cannot even

persuade you; but you fear that I am now in a more difficult state

than in my former life.

79 • From the same, from Protagoras.

I nowhere, not even here, agree that those who are able are strong;

but those who are strong are able. For power and strength are not

the same; rather, power comes from knowledge, and from madness,

and from spirit; while strength comes from nature, and from the good condition of bodies.

So also there, courage and bravery are not the same; so that

it follows that the brave are courageous, but not

all courageous people are brave. For courage comes to people

from skill, and from spirit, and from madness, just like power;

but bravery comes from nature and from the good condition of souls.

80 • From Democritus.

Wisdom, fearless, is the most valuable of all things.

81 • From Xenophon's Apology of Socrates.

So it seems wonderful to me, how you

appeared to be a work of death, worthy of me. But

neither should I be less courageous because I am dying unjustly;

for it is not shameful for me, but for those who condemned me.

Palamedes also comforts me, who died in a similar manner to me;

for even now he provides much nobler hymns than Odysseus

who unjustly killed him. I know that you too will bear witness

both to the coming and to the past time, that I never wronged anyone,

nor did I make anyone worse; rather, I benefited those who conversed with me,

teaching for free whatever good I could. Having said these things,

very consistently with what had been said, he departed, with

a cheerful countenance, demeanor, and gait. When he perceived

those accompanying him crying, "What is this?" he said, "Are you crying

now? For you have not known for a long time that since I was born,

death was already decreed for me by nature? But if

I am perishing while good things are still flowing to me, then

it is certainly grievous to me and to those who are well-disposed to me;

but if I end my life when difficult things are expected,

I, for my part, believe that you all should be cheerful, as I am doing well."

ON COWARDICE. H.

1 • From Euripides' Bellerophon.

For deceptions and dark contrivances

are found by mortals as a remedy for unmanned needs.

2 • From Sophocles' Acrisius.

A voice cries out: "Oh, hear! Or do I bark in vain?

For everything seems terrible to the one who is afraid."

3 • From Euripides' Meleager.

For cowardly men have no place in battle,

but they depart, even if they are present.

4 • From Homer's Iliad.

Why do you fear war and conflict?

For even if all others are slain

by the ships of the Argives, you have no fear of perishing.

For your heart is not steadfast, nor warlike.

5 • From Sophocles' Phrygians.

For Ares loves to slay the noble and good,

O King! But those who are bold in speech,

fleeing misfortunes, are outside of evils.

For Ares takes no account of evils.

6 • From Euripides' Iphigenia.

I do not consider him wise, who, about to die,

wishes to conquer the terror of destruction with pity.

7 • From the same, from Phrixus.

"You say you are a man; but it is not worthy of a man

to be called cowardly, and to suffer a shameful illness."

ON COWARDICE. H.

8 • From Menander's Brothers.

Why must the timid one guard many things?

9 • From Theognis.

Speech often brings to mortal men

many failures of judgment, Cyrnus, when it is disturbed.

10 • Philemon in his Handbook.

A bad appearance, but cowardly thoughts.

11 • From Sophocles.

Fortune does not assist the disheartened.

12 • From Euripides.

Fear, when one is about to speak concerning the body,

standing in opposition in a contest,

brings one's mouth to astonishment among men,

and prevents the mind from speaking what it wishes;

for danger is present to the former, but the latter remains unharmed.

Nevertheless, I must flee from this contest,

for I see my soul placed as a prize.

13 • From Euripides' Archelaus.

Pleasant life and wicked cowardice

can neither restore a house nor a city.

14 • From Antisthenes.

Whoever fears others, is a slave unaware of himself.

15 • From Diogenes.

Indeed, all terrible things are by nature more apt to strike terror into

those who are expecting them, than to grieve those who have experienced them.

And fear is so difficult that many have already anticipated the deed;

some, when a storm is raging on their ship, did not wait for the ship to be destroyed,

but rather killed themselves beforehand.

16 • From Hyperides.

Hyperides the orator said that anxiety is to be found in the mouth.

17 • From Thucydides, History, Book II, Oration of Phormio.

When men have been defeated, their opinions are not willing to be

the same in the face of the same dangers.

18 • From Antiphon.

Illness is a holiday for cowards; for they do not go out to act.

19 • From Hierocles, from On Justice.

For let us see whether cowards can be just;

for we find those who are the opposite of these, the bold, to be unjust,

because they do many things by force. Cowardice, then,

is the corruption of a rightful opinion concerning terrible things and non-terrible things;

or ignorance of terrible things and non-terrible things, and of neither.

How then could those whose opinions are corrupted and who live unlawfully be

just people? For they would certainly not conjecture well about anything

if the fear concerning the soul does not allow them to engage in any

inquiry whatsoever.

20 • From Demetrius.

ON COWARDICE. H.

For if bravery and cowardice were to stand by

a warrior arrayed for battle, what different speeches

do you think they would utter? Would not bravery command one

to remain and hold one's post? "But they are throwing!" "Endure!"

"But I shall be wounded!" "Persevere!" "But I shall die!" "Die rather

than abandon your post." This speech is stern and harsh;

but that of cowardice, by Zeus, is humane and gentle; for it

commands the fearful one to retreat. "But my shield bothers me!"

"Throw it away!" "And let your breastplate fall off!" Surely, these are softer

than those. And likewise with other things. "Do not take," says

temperance, "from where you ought not; do not eat, do not drink,

endure, persevere; finally, die rather than do what you ought not."

But intemperance says, "Drink, when you wish, eat

whatever you find most pleasant; does your neighbor's wife please you?

Then proceed! Are you short of money? Borrow! If you cannot repay

what you borrowed? Do not pay it back! Do they no longer trust you to lend? Seize it!"

And here too, there is much in between. But who does not know that such

a favor is destructive to those who receive it, but that which is

from the opposite is salvation?

21 • From Plato's Phaedo.

Those who truly philosophize practice dying; and to them,

to be dead is least terrible among men.

22 • From Plato's Phaedo.

"Is this not, then," he said, "a sufficient proof to you of a man

whom you see resenting imminent death, that he was not

a philosopher, but rather a lover of his body? And surely this person

is also a lover of money, and a lover of honor, or both of these, or either.

"Certainly," he said, "it is as you say."

"Then, Simmias," he said, "does not the so-called courage

most appropriately belong to those who are so disposed?" "Certainly, yes,"

he said. "And is not temperance, which most people also call temperance,

that is, not being disturbed by desires, but having little regard for them and being orderly,

does this not belong only to those who have least regard for the body and

are devoted to philosophy?" "Necessarily," he said. "For if you wish,"

he said, "to consider the courage and temperance of others, it will seem

absurd to you." "How so, Socrates?" "Do you know," he said, "that

all others consider death to be one of the greatest evils?"

"Indeed," he said. "Then do not the courageous endure death,

when they do endure it, from fear of greater evils?" "That is so."

"Therefore, all men are brave by reason of fear and dread, except

philosophers; and yet it is illogical to be brave through some fear and cowardice."

"Certainly, yes." "And what about this: have not their orderly people

suffered the same thing, that they are temperate through a kind of intemperance?

And yet we say it is impossible, but nevertheless this similar

suffering happens to them, concerning this foolish temperance,

for, fearing to be deprived of other pleasures, and desiring

those, they abstain from others, being overcome by others. And yet

they call it intemperance, to be ruled by pleasures; but

nevertheless, it happens to them that they are ruled by pleasures or rule

over other pleasures. This is similar to what was just said,

that in a way they have been made temperate through intemperance.

It seems so." "O blessed Simmias, is this not the right way

to virtue, exchanging pleasures for pleasures, and pains for pains, and

exchanging fear for fear, greater for lesser, as if they were coins;

but that alone is the true coin, for which all these things must be exchanged,

is wisdom, and with this, all things, and with this,

courage, and temperance, and in short, true

virtue with wisdom, and with the coming and going of pleasures

and fears, and all other such things; but separated from wisdom,

and exchanged for each other, it is not a mere sketch

of virtue, and in reality, it possesses nothing sound or true;

but the truth is that it is a purification of all such things,

and temperance, and justice, and courage, and even wisdom itself,

is a purification; as they are in danger, those who established these rites

for us are not inferior, but in truth they were long ago hinting

that whoever arrives at Hades uninitiated and unperfected

will lie in mud; but whoever arrives there purified

and perfected, will dwell with the gods.

For indeed, as those who perform the rites say, many

carry the staff, but few are Bacchic initiates; and these, in my

opinion, are none other than those who have rightly philosophized.

ON JUSTICE. Θ.

1. [To the Just, Maxims in a single line.]

The fruit of a just man is not destroyed.

Walk the straight path, by which you may be just.

A just life has a good end.

Be just, so that you may indeed meet with just men.

Be willing to be just rather than merely good.

Having done just deeds, you shall have God as an ally.

Be willing to judge justly, not what is expedient.

I have nothing to say against those who speak well.

A just character is the most valuable possession.

The eye of Justice sees all that happens.

For Justice does not exist in the eyes of mortals.

4 • From Euripides' Alcestis.

For it is not easy to resist the just.

5 • From Euripides.

Possess rightly (if you have it) without blame,

and always preserve yourself, being united with justice.

6 • From Euripides' Hecuba.

For it is noble for a man to serve justice,

and always to do evil to the wicked everywhere.

7 • From Sophocles' Ajax.

Let no violence ever conquer you,

to hate so much as to trample on justice.

8 • From Euripides' Theseus.

Greater than wealth, and much-golden luxury,

is the presence of just and good men.

9 • From Menander.

If you are just, you will use custom as law.

Do not intend any evil against a good man.

A just man does not know how to do wrong.

ON JUSTICE. Θ.

10 • From Menander.

To wrong no one is proper for all mankind.

11 • From Menander's The Superstitious Man.

For one must not wrong suppliants; especially

when they stumble out of goodwill, not wickedness.

This is indeed very shameful.

12 • From Menander.

At every opportune moment, justice must prevail.

13 • From Euripides' Palamedes.

Truly, one just man prevails over myriad unjust ones,

taking divine justice as his ally.

14 • From Philonides.

No one is cowardly who fears the law;

but against enemies, it is a test of bravery.

And it is noble to be defeated by justice.

15 • From Euripides.

Alas, alas, to conquer what is just is a noble prize;

but what is unjust, is evil everywhere.

The beginning is from something small, like fire;

it is wretched at first, but painful in the end;

for deeds of insolence do not long remain among mortals.

But Zeus watches over the end of all things; and suddenly,

as a spring wind quickly scattered the clouds,

stirring the depths of the much-surging, fruitless sea,

and having made the wheat-bearing land shine with noble deeds,

he reaches the lofty seat of the gods, the heaven;

and again he made it clear to see;

and the sun's might shines upon the fertile earth,

beautiful; but no clouds are left to be seen.

Such is the vengeance of Zeus, and he is not swift to anger,

like a mortal man, in every case.

And he who has a wicked spirit is never hidden

through and through; but he is certainly revealed in the end.

But one pays the penalty at once, another later; but if

they themselves escape, and no divine fate overtakes them,

they always come to pay for their unrighteous deeds at once,

either their children or their lineage afterward.

And we mortals think thus, both good and bad,

(as each finds his own opinion pleasing,)

before suffering anything; but then he laments again; and until then

they gape, delighting in empty hopes.

And whoever is afflicted by grievous diseases,

he convinced himself that he would be healthy.

Another, being cowardly, pretends to be a good man,

and, though beautiful, having an ungracious form.

And if someone is poor, and the works of poverty compel him,

he thinks he will acquire much wealth from all sources.

And another rushes off somewhere else; one wanders over the sea

(desiring to bring profit home in ships),

carried by stormy, fish-rich winds,

sparing nothing of his soul.

Another, tilling the multi-treed land,

labors for a year; to him belong the curved plows.

Another, having learned the works of Athena and Hephaestus, the many-skilled,

gathers a livelihood with his hands.

Another, taught gifts from the Olympian Muses,

understanding the measure of desirable wisdom.

Another, Apollo, the far-shooter, made into a seer,

and he knew evil approaching a man from afar,

with whom the gods will surely conspire; but what is fated

no omen nor sacrifice will avert.

Others, having the work of Paean, the many-remedied,

physicians, for whom there is no end.

And often from a small pain comes a great sorrow,

And no one would soothe him by giving gentle remedies.

But having touched with his hands one afflicted by grievous

diseases, he quickly makes him healthy.

Indeed, fate brings evil to mortals, as well as good,

and the gifts of the immortal gods are inescapable.

And for all there is danger in deeds, and no one knows

how it will turn out when wealth begins.

But one who tries to do well, without forethought,

falls into great and grievous misfortune.

But to him who acts well, God gives in all things

good fortune, a release from folly.

And for men, there is no fixed limit to wealth.

For those who now have the most livelihood among us,

strive doubly; who could satisfy all?

Truly, the immortals bestowed gains upon mortals;

but Ruin appears from them, which, whenever Zeus

sends it for punishment, one person has it at one time, another at another.

26 • From Plato.

For do not imagine that if we were searching for gold,

we would ever willingly submit to each other in the search,

and spoil the discovery of it; but when searching for justice,

a thing much more precious than gold, we would then

so foolishly give way to each other, and not strive as much as possible

for it to be revealed.

27 • From Agesilaus.

ON JUSTICE. Θ.

and there is nothing more like him than whoever among us

becomes most just.

54 • From Polo of Pythagorean Lucania, On Justice.

It seems to me fitting to call justice the mother and nurse

of all other virtues; for without it, it is not possible to be

temperate, or brave, or prudent. For harmony and peace

are in the whole soul with good order.

And it is clearer when one considers the rule of these virtues

among us as other dispositions. For partial ones concern those who possess

advantage and for each individual; but for all systems,

and in multitude. In the cosmos, then, these ruling the whole,

providence, and harmony, and justice, being from some

race of gods, having thus decreed; and in a city, peace

and good order are rightly called; and in a household, there is

concord between husband and wife, and goodwill of servants towards

masters, and guardianship of masters towards servants;

and in body and soul, first of all, and most beloved to all living beings,

both health and perfection, and wisdom arising from

knowledge and justice among men.

If the whole and its parts are thus trained and preserved

to be in harmony and to lead one another, how

could it not be called the mother and nurse of all, and by universal vote?

55 • From Plato's Laws V.

Honorable indeed is he who does no wrong; and he who

does not allow others to do wrong is worthy of more than double the honor

of the former. For the former is worth one, but the latter is worth many others,

avenging the injustice of others on the rulers; and he who also joins in punishing

the rulers to the best of his ability, let him be proclaimed a great man in the city

and a complete victor in virtue.

56 • From Hierax, from On Justice.

For let us see what the many think about justice.

Some say it is a disposition of the soul, unbribed,

aiming at what is in each person's power; others say it is a disposition

in the soul, granting neither more nor less to worse fortune or better fortune,

but preserving equality for all.

It seems to me that the former would admire one who does not covet others' property,

and who would observe what is in each person's power, if it were allowed for some to do so;

and the latter, one who does not measure more by misfortune, but considers all worthy of the same things.

What then if someone, having learned this, were most unjust in other respects?

And if he were a robber of money, and coveted others' property,

and were arrogant and intemperate regarding pleasures,

would he be just, being full of such evils?

But when he deems all worthy of the same things,

how is he not foolish, and how is he not unjust, if he similarly

ON JUSTICE. IX.

would he hate the temperate and the intemperate, and the foolish, and the prudent?

57 * From the same.

But not even the not desiring other people's money is the definition of justice, but rather a fortunate circumstance concerning one of the passions. Let us suppose someone to be exceedingly rich, able to provide for many others from his own means, but defeated by ambition and love of honor, and unwilling to tolerate anyone being generous, but rather * insulting some, * striking others, giving orders, delighting in having everyone obey him. What then would one say of such a person, who desires none of others' possessions, but is otherwise violent and tyrannical, and * first treats his servants and maidservants badly, punishing some beyond measure, and consorting with others wantonly; then considers doing these things to be no wrong?

58 * In the same.

Some have defined justice as the mean between excess * and defect, derived from the Peripatetic school; others, from the Stoic school, as a disposition for distributive equality. And as it has been said before, it is not only unjust but most unjust to deem everyone worthy of the same things; and the intermediate between excess and defect is an unnamed outcome of an action, but not a virtue of the soul. But every action is an activity of the soul through the body; and activity is not a virtue, * or else every activity would be a virtue. But all universally acknowledge justice to be a virtue of the soul, but not an action, nor the result of an action. For there are three things concerning each: either a state, or an action, or a result. A state is that by which we are prone to excess or defect; an action is to act excessively or deficiently; and the result is excess and defect. Just as a state is painting; an action is the act of painting; and the result is the picture. And again: a state is sculpture; an action is the act of sculpting; and the result is the statue. If one were to define a state as drawing and a statue, it would be admitted that they are incorrectly naming the result and creating confusion; similarly, one who names excess and defect as a state uses the name of the result for a state of the soul. And so the mean of results would be a result; for if excess and defect are placed among the things that result from actions, then the mean of these would be a result, not a state. But let it be not an outcome, but a state of the soul, neither excessive nor deficient; * for whoever is neither excessive nor deficient, * is just. Now concerning bodily goods, they would not say this is either an extreme or a mean of them; for indeed, these things do not come into being by our intention and effort, but most of them are by nature. For beauty is by nature, and strength of body, and health; but if we should grow old, to increase strength with food and exercises, and to maintain health with a certain diet, and to restore it when it fails; yet, since the acquisition of these things is not originally in our power, it must be attributed to the nature of the body. Yet some are said to be excessive even in these things, in strength, for example, Milo of Croton; in beauty, Lais of Corinth, and others similar to these. What then would be Milo's injustice? Or Lais's excess? Surely, if Milo were to go around striking the weaker, plundering their possessions, and their wives; and Lais similarly, collecting the most money from her lovers, and dissolving some marriages, this would be overreaching. * What then is the matter in which one would make the choice of neither overreaching nor falling short? Or is it that common and communal idea, "it is enough to have what is * one's own, and do not plunder your neighbor's possessions, nor * give away * your own," as if falling short in this respect? One might say, "I should not be forced," for that is up to me; but how can one avoid being overreached? For many are stronger. But if someone wished to help those in need, and * give away orphans in marriage, and ransom captives, these things are perhaps * possible to do, but not for one who values the aforementioned * mean; for to be overreached and to fall short is what one endures when doing these things. How then is it defined by our discourse? As a reasonable disposition of the soul, attentive to uprightness; or as a demand for retribution from those who have previously wronged? Not as that which connects the other propositions.

59 * From Xenophon's Memorabilia

And Socrates said, "Surely, Euthydemus, you do not * desire that virtue by which men become good citizens, and good household managers, and capable rulers, and beneficial to other men, and to themselves?" And Euthydemus said, "Indeed, Socrates, I desire this virtue." "By Zeus," said Socrates, "you desire the most beautiful and greatest art; for this is the art of kings, and it is called kingship." "But," he said, "have you considered whether it is possible for one who is not just to become good in these things?" "Indeed," he said, "it is not possible to become a good citizen without justice." "What then," he said, "have you already achieved this?" "I believe," he said, "Socrates, I would appear no less just than anyone." "Are then," he said, "the works of the just like those of carpenters?" "Yes, indeed," he said. "Then," he said, "just as carpenters can display their own works, so would the just be able to explain their own?" "No, indeed," said Euthydemus, "I cannot explain the works of justice; and by Zeus, I can explain those of injustice; for there are not a few such things to be seen and heard every day." "Do you wish then," said Socrates, "that we write here 'delta' and there 'alpha'; and then, whatever seems to us to be a work of justice, we will place it by the 'delta'; and whatever is a work of injustice, by the 'alpha'?" "If it seems good to you," he said, "to add anything to these, do so." And Socrates, having written as he said, "Then," he said, "is there among men such a thing as lying?" "Yes, indeed," he said. "To which then," he said, "shall we put this?" "Clearly," he said, "to injustice." * "Then," he said, "is there also deceiving?" "Yes, indeed," he said. "To which then shall I put this?" "And this too, clearly," he said, "to injustice." "What about stealing?" "And that too," he said. "What about enslaving?" "And that too." "But concerning justice, will * none of these things be laid down by us, Euthydemus?" "That would be * terrible," he said. * "What then," he said, "if a general * having been chosen, should enslave a city that is both unjust and * shameful, shall we say that he acts unjustly?" "No, indeed," he said. "Shall we say that he acts justly?" "Yes, indeed." "What then, if he deceives them in war?" "Just," he said, "and that too." "If he steals and * plunders their possessions, will he not act justly?" "Yes, indeed," he said. "But I * at first supposed you were asking these things only * concerning friends." "No," he said, "that all that we have placed under injustice, these things “should also be placed under justice?" He said, "It seems so." "Do you wish then," he said, "that having placed these things thus, we define again that it is just to do these things towards enemies, but unjust towards friends; but * it is necessary towards friends to be most simple?" "Yes, indeed," said Euthydemus. "What then," said Socrates, "if a general, seeing his army disheartened, * should lie, * saying that allies are approaching, and by this lie should put an end to the despondency of his soldiers, to which category shall we place this deception?" "It seems to me," he said, "to justice." "And if someone, whose son needed medicine, * and was unwilling to take the medicine, should deceive him and give the medicine as if it were food, and by using this lie, should make him well, to which category shall we place this deception?" "It seems to me," he said, "to the same." "What then, if someone, fearing a friend who is despondent might kill himself, should steal, or * snatch away a sword, or something similar, to which category shall we place this?" "And this too, by Zeus," he said, "to justice." "You say," he said, "that one should not be simple in all things even towards friends?" "By Zeus, no, indeed," he said; "but I retract what has been said, if it is possible." "It is indeed * far more possible," said Socrates, "than not stating things correctly." "But concerning those who deceive their friends to their harm, so that we may not leave * this unexamined either, which is more unjust, the willing or the unwilling?" "But, Socrates," he said, "I no longer trust what I answer; for all that went before seems to me now to be otherwise than I thought then." "Nevertheless, let it be said to me, that the one who lies willingly is more unjust than the one who lies unwillingly." "Does it seem to you that knowledge and understanding of justice is like that of grammar?" "To me," he said. "But whom do you consider more grammatical, one who willingly writes and reads incorrectly, or one who does so unwillingly?" "One who does so willingly, I do," he said. "For he could, when he wished, write them correctly." "Then is not the one who writes incorrectly willingly, a grammarian; and the one who does so unwillingly, illiterate?" "How could he not be?" "And are the just things known by the one who lies and deceives willingly, or by the one who does so unwillingly?" "Clearly, by the one who lies willingly." "Then do you say that the one who understands grammar is more grammatical than the one who does not?" "* Yes, indeed." "And is the one who understands just things more just than the one who does not?" "It appears so." "But it seems to me that these things I am saying are somehow not right." "What then, if someone who wishes to speak the truth never speaks "the same things about the same subjects, but describes the same path sometimes towards the east, and sometimes towards the west; and when giving the same calculation, sometimes states more, and sometimes less; what do you think of such a person?" "It is clear, by Zeus," he said, "that he does not know what he thought he knew." "Do you know some who are called 'slavish'?" "I do," he said. "Is it through ignorance or wisdom?" "Clearly, through ignorance." "Then is it through ignorance of bronze-working that they get this name?" "No, indeed." "But is it through carpentry?" "Nor through this." "But is it through shoemaking?" "Nor through any of these," he said, "but quite the opposite; for most of those who understand such things are slavish." "Then is this name for those who do not know what is beautiful and good and just?" "It seems so to me," he said. "Then must we flee * with all our might so as not to be slavish?"

60 * In the same place.

I once * knew him to discuss with Hippias of Elis about justice as follows. For Hippias, having arrived in Athens after a long time, came upon Socrates saying to some people how wonderful it would be if, while one * were about to be taught how to be a shoemaker, or a carpenter, or a bronzesmith, or a horseman, he would not be at a loss as to where to send someone to find such a teacher; (and some say that both horses and oxen are full of those who wish to make them just;) but if someone wishes to learn what is just himself, or to teach his son or a slave, he does not know where to go to find such a teacher. And Hippias, having heard these things, as if mocking him, said, "Are you still, * Socrates, saying those same things I heard you say long ago?" And Socrates said, "And what is more strange about this, Hippias," he said, "is that I not only always say the same things, but also about the same subjects; but you, perhaps because you are so learned, never say the same things about the same subjects." "Indeed," he said, "I try to say something new always." "Do you, then," he said, "also concerning the things you know, for example, about letters, if someone asks you how many and what kind of letters there are, try to say different things now than you said before? Or concerning numbers, when someone asks if two times five is ten, do you not answer * the same things now as before?" "Concerning these things," he said, "Socrates, like you, I always say the same things; but concerning justice, I believe I can now speak things to which neither you nor anyone else could respond." "By Hera," he said, "you claim to have found a great good indeed, if judges will cease to vote differently; and if citizens will cease to dispute, and go to law, and quarrel about matters of justice; and if cities will cease to differ about matters of justice, and make war; and I, for my part, do not know how I could be left behind by you, before hearing of such a great good that you have found." "But by Zeus," he said, "you will not hear, unless you yourself declare what you believe justice to be; for it is enough that you make fun of others, asking questions but refusing to render an account to * anyone, nor to express any opinion about anything." "But, Hippias," he said, "have you not perceived that I never cease demonstrating what I believe to be just?" "And what kind of discourse is this for you?" he said. "If not by words," he said, "then by deeds do I demonstrate; or does it not seem to you that deed is more reliable evidence than word?" "Much more, by Zeus," he said. "For many who speak justly, do unjust things; but when just things are done, no one would be unjust." "Have you ever perceived me bearing false witness, or slandering, or throwing a city or friends "into sedition, or doing anything else unjust?" "No, I haven't," he said. "Then do you not consider abstaining from unjust deeds to be just?" "It is clear," he said, "Socrates, that even now you are trying to escape from demonstrating what you believe justice to be; for you are not speaking of what the just do, but of what they do not do." "But I thought," said Socrates, "that not wishing to act unjustly was sufficient proof of justice; but if it does not seem so to you, consider if * this pleases you more: for I say that what is lawful is just." "Then do you say the same thing, Socrates, that what is lawful is also just?" "I do," he said. "* Then do I not perceive what kind of lawful or what kind of just you are speaking of?" "Do you know the laws of a city?" he said. "I do," he said. "And what do you consider these to be?" "Those things," he said, "which the citizens, having agreed upon what they must do and what they must abstain from, have written down." "Then," he said, "would not one who governs according to these be lawful; and one who transgresses these, lawless?" "Yes, indeed," he said. "Then would not one who obeys these act justly, and one who disobeys these, unjustly?" "Yes, indeed." "Then is not the one who acts justly, just; and the one who acts unjustly, unjust?" "* How could he not be?" "Then the lawful person is just, and the lawless person is unjust? And the Hippias, * "Laws," he said, "Socrates, how could one consider them a serious matter, or obedience to them, when those who established them themselves often reject and change them?" "For even in war," said Socrates, "cities often make peace again." "And indeed," he said. "Then do you think it makes a difference," he said, "that you disparage those who obey the laws, on the ground that the laws might be overthrown, or that you blame those who behave well in war, on the ground that peace might ensue?" "* By Zeus, not I," he said. "And Lycurgus of Lacedaemon," said Socrates, "have you observed that he made Sparta no different from other cities, except that he * most * ingrained obedience to the laws in her?" "And regarding rulers in cities, do you not know that those who are most responsible for their citizens obeying the laws, these are the best?" "And a city which * most obeys its laws, fares best in peace, and is invincible in war?" "But surely * unanimity seems to be the greatest good for cities, and most often councils and the best men in them urge * citizens to be unanimous, and everywhere in Greece it is a law that citizens swear to be unanimous, and everywhere they swear this oath. But I believe these things happen, not so that citizens may judge the same choruses, nor praise the same flutists, nor choose the same poets, nor that they may delight in the same things, but that they may * obey the laws; for when citizens abide by these, cities are strongest and happiest, they become happiest, and without unanimity, neither would a city be well governed, nor a household well managed. And privately, how would one be less harmed by the city, * and how would one be more honored, than if he obeys the laws? How would one be less defeated in lawsuits, or how would one * win more? To whom would one * entrust deposits, or money, or daughters, or sons, more readily? Whom would the whole city consider more trustworthy than the lawful man? From whom would one obtain justice more, than from parents, or relatives, or slaves, or friends, or citizens, or foreigners? To whom would enemies more readily entrust truces or treaties of peace? To whom would allies more readily consent to become allies? To whom would allies * more readily trust a generalship, or a garrison command, or cities? Whom would one who has benefited others expect to receive gratitude from more, than from the lawful man? Or whom would one more readily benefit, or from whom would one expect to receive gratitude? To whom would one more readily wish to be a friend, or to whom less an enemy? To whom would one less readily make war, or to whom would one wish most to be a friend, and least an enemy? And to whom would most wish to be friends and allies, and fewest enemies? For my part, Hippias, I demonstrate the same thing, that what is lawful is also just; but you, if you think * otherwise, teach me." * "And Hippias," "By Zeus," he said, "Socrates, I do not think I hold contrary opinions to what you have said about justice." "Do you know any unwritten laws, Hippias?" "Those," he said, "which are observed similarly in every country." "Could you tell me," he said, "whether humans established them?" "And how could they?" he said; "for they could not all assemble, nor are they unanimous? Whom then," he said, "do you believe established * these laws?" "I," he said, "believe the gods established these laws for mankind; for among all men it is first considered * pious * to honor the gods." "Then is it not everywhere considered lawful to honor one's parents?" "And that too," he said. "Then is it not also that parents and children should not lie with each other?" "I no longer think so," he said, "Socrates, that this is a law of God." "Why so?" he said. "Because," he said, "I perceive some transgressing it." "For indeed," he said, "many other things they transgress unlawfully." "But the transgressors of the laws established by the gods do pay a penalty, which it is impossible for humans to escape in any way; just as some transgress laws established by humans, and escape paying the penalty, some by being unnoticed, others by being violent." "And what kind of penalty," he said, "Socrates, can they not escape, parents lying with children, and children with parents?" "The greatest, by Zeus," he said. "For what greater evil could human beings suffer by producing offspring badly?" "How then," he said, "do they produce offspring badly, when nothing prevents them from producing good offspring from good parents?" "Because, by Zeus," he said, "those who produce offspring from each other must not only be good, but also in the prime of their bodies." "* Does it seem to you that the seeds of the healthy are like those of the "decaying, or of the decayed?" "But by Zeus," he said, "it is unlikely they are alike." "Then which are * better?" "Clearly, those of the healthy." * "Then are those of the decaying not good?" "It is unlikely, by Zeus," he said. "Then in this way, must one not produce children?" "No, indeed," he said. "Then do those who produce children in this way, produce children as they ought not to?" "It seems so to me," he said.

Who else, then," he said, "would produce offspring badly, if not these?" "I agree with you on this too," he said. "What about," he said, "returning good for good to those who have done good deeds? Is that not everywhere lawful?" "It is lawful," he said. "But * this too is transgressed." "Then do not those who transgress this pay a penalty, "becoming bereft of good friends, and compelled to pursue those who hate them? Or are not those who do good to those who use them, good friends, and are not those who do not return good deeds to such people hated by them because of their ingratitude, and do they not pursue these people most because it is most profitable to use them?" "By Zeus, Socrates," he said, "all these things seem to be divine; for the fact that the laws themselves contain penalties for those who transgress them, seems to me better than any human lawgiver." "Then, Hippias," he said, "do you believe the gods establish what is just, or other things besides justice?" "Not other things, by Zeus," he said; "for it would be hard for anyone else to establish what is just, if not a god." "So it seems, Hippias, that to the gods too, the same things are pleasing: what is just and what is lawful."

61 * From Plato's Republic

"This," I said, "is already more solid, my friend, and it is no longer easy to say anything to it. For if you were to maintain that injustice is profitable, but were to admit it to be bad or shameful, as some others do, we would have something to say in line with accepted beliefs; but now you are clearly going to assert that it is both beautiful and shameful, and you will add all other things to it that we attributed to justice, since you dared to declare it a virtue and wisdom." "You prophesy most truly," he said. "But try to answer me this: does the just man think it right to gain more of what is just?" "Not at all," he said; "for then he would not be witty, as he is now. What then," he said, "of the just action?" "Not of the just action," he said. "But does the unjust man think it right to gain more of the unjust, and believe it to be just, or does he not believe it to be just?" "He would think it right," he said, "and he would claim it, but he would not be able." "But that is not what I am asking," I said; "but whether the just man does not think it right to gain more of the just, and does not wish to, but the unjust man..." "Yes, indeed," he said, "that is how it is." "What then," he said, "does the unjust man then think it right to gain more than the just man, and more of the just action?" "How could he not?" he said; "since he thinks it right to gain more than anyone else." "Then will not the unjust man "exceed and contend with the unjust man, and with the unjust action, so as to take the most of all?" "That is true." "So we say," he said, "that the just man does not exceed his like, but does exceed his unlike; but the unjust man exceeds both his like and his unlike." "You have spoken most excellently," he said. "And indeed," I said, "the unjust man is prudent and good, but the just man is neither?" "And that too," he said, "is well said." "Then," I said, "does not the unjust man seem to be prudent and good, and the just man not seem to be?" "How could he not," he said, "being such a one, and seeming to be such, and the other not seeming to be?" "Well said." "Such then is each of them," he said, "as he seems to be." "But what then?" he said. "Well, Thrasymachus," "Do you say that someone is musical, and another unmusical?" "I do," he said. "Which do you consider prudent, and which foolish?" "The musical man, of course, prudent, and the unmusical man foolish." "Then are not those things which are prudent, good; and those which are foolish, bad?" "Yes." "What then? The art of medicine, is it not so?" "It is so." "Then which, my excellent friend, do you think a musical man, tuning a lyre, "would wish to exceed a musical man in the tension and relaxation of the strings, or would think it right to have more?" "Not I," he said. "What then, an unmusical man?" "Necessarily," he said. "What then, a medical man, would he wish to exceed a medical man in food or drink, or a "man, or a thing?" "No, indeed." "But an unmedical man?" "Yes." "Concerning every art, then, and every lack of art, if you think someone is skilled, * will he then wish to acquire more than another skilled person, or to act, or to speak, and not the same things as his like in the "same action?" "But perhaps," he said, "this must necessarily be so." * "What then," he said, "will the unskilled man not likewise exceed the skilled, but unlike the unskilled?" "Perhaps." "And is the skilled man wise?" "Yes." "And is the wise man good?" "I say so." "Then the good and wise man will not wish to exceed his like, but will exceed his unlike and opposite?" "It appears so," he said. "And the bad and ignorant man, both his like and his opposite?" "It appears so." "Then, Thrasymachus," I said, "does "the unjust man among us exceed both his unlike and his like? Or did you not say so?" "I did," he said. "And the just man does not exceed his like, but does exceed his unlike?" "Yes." "It appears then," I said, "that the just man is like the wise and good, and the unjust man is like the bad and ignorant." "It must be so." "But indeed * we also agreed * that each is such as he is like." "We did indeed." "Then the just man "has been revealed to us as good and wise; and the unjust man, as ignorant and bad."

62 * Since then we agreed that justice is virtue and wisdom, and injustice is vice and ignorance, "Well," I said, "let this stand for us; and we said indeed that injustice is stronger."

63 * "But we must examine it in this way. Would you say that a city is unjust, and attempts to enslave other cities unjustly, and has enslaved many and holds them in subjection?" "How could I not?" he said; "and that too is most excellent. Then will it perform its own work badly?" "Yes, indeed." "Then shall we also place all other things under this same reasoning?" "It seems so to me." "Come now, after this, consider this: Is there a work of the soul which it would not perform for any other existing thing? Such as this: "to take care, and to rule, and "to deliberate, and all such things. Is there anything else "to which we would justly attribute these, and say they are "peculiar to it?" "To nothing else." "What then? And to live?" "Shall we not say it is a work of the soul?" "Most certainly," he said. "Then do we also say there is some virtue of the soul?" "We do." "* Then, Thrasymachus, will the soul ever perform its own works well, if it is deprived of "its proper virtue, "is that impossible?" "Impossible." "Then a bad soul must necessarily rule and take care badly; but a good soul must perform all these things well." "Necessarily." "Then did we not agree that justice is a virtue of the soul, and injustice a vice?" "We did indeed." "Then a just soul, and a just man, will live well; but an unjust man, badly?" "It appears so," he said, "according to your argument; but surely one who lives well is happy and prosperous; but one who does not, the opposite?" "How could it not be?" "Then the just man is happy, but the "unjust man miserable?" "Let it be so," he said. "But surely it is not profitable to be miserable, but to be happy." "How could it not be?" "Then "never, * blessed Thrasymachus, is injustice more profitable than justice."

64 * In the same.

* "These things then," I said, "we have * with difficulty agreed upon, and it has been reasonably admitted by us that these things exist in a city, and these same things exist in each individual soul, and are equal in number. That is true. Then is this already necessary, that as a city was wise, so, and the individual, and it be wise in * this respect? What else? And if an individual is brave, and so, and * this, and a city is brave; and so also all other things have both these properties with respect to virtue? Necessarily. And "just," I think, Glaucon, we shall say a man is in the same way, as a city was just? And this is entirely necessary. But surely we have not yet forgotten this, that the city was just in that each of the three kinds within it performed its own work. This, I think, we have forgotten. Then we must remember, that each of us also, "when "each part of him performs its own work within him, will be more just, and perform his own work. "And indeed," he said, "we must remember." "Then is it not fitting for the * rational part to rule, being wise, and having foresight for the whole soul? And for the spirited part to be subject to it, "and its ally?" "Yes, indeed." "Then will not, "as we said, "a * blend of music and gymnastics bring them into harmony, stretching and nourishing the rational part with noble words and lessons, and relaxing and soothing it with harmony and rhythm?" "Indeed," he said. "And these two, having been thus trained, and having truly learned and been educated, will be in charge of the appetitive part, which * is the largest part of the soul in each, and by nature most insatiable of wealth; which they will guard, lest, "by being filled with the pleasures related to the body, it become great and strong, and do "not perform its own work, but "wish to enslave and rule, "though it * ought not to, and overturn the whole life of everyone." "Yes, indeed," he said. "Then," I said, "and these two would most beautifully * guard against external enemies, on behalf of the whole soul and body, the one part * being commanded, the other fighting * in front, and * following * the ruler, and * bravely performing what has been decided." "That is true." "And brave," I think, we call each individual in respect of this part, when his spirited part preserves "the command issued by reason, whether it be fearful or not, through pains and pleasures." "Quite right," he said. "And wise, we call him in respect of that small part, "how it ruled within him, and commanded these things, possessing within itself the knowledge of what is beneficial at each moment, and for the whole communal system of the three parts." "Yes, indeed." "What then? And temperate, is it not by the friendship and harmony of these "parts themselves, when "the ruling part and "the ruled parts agree that the rational part ought to rule, and do not contend with it?" "Temperance then," he said, "is nothing else than this, both for a city and for an individual; but indeed just, "as we often say, it will be by this and in this way." "Most necessarily." "What then?" I said, "is it not that justice seems to us to be something different, or what appeared in the city?" "It does not seem so to me," he said. "For," I said, "we will "confirm all things perfectly, if anything in our soul still disputes it, by bringing forward the tiresome arguments." "What kind of arguments?" "For example, "if we had to * agree regarding that city, and the man whose nature and upbringing were like that city, "whether such a man, having received a deposit of gold or silver, would defraud it, which do you think would be more likely to do this, he, or those who are not like him?" "No one," he said.

He said, "Then would such a person not be free from sacrilege, theft, and treachery, whether private or public, in cities?" "Free from them." "And he would not be distrustful in any way, whether regarding oaths or other agreements." "How so?" "Adulteries, and neglect of parents, and neglect of the gods, belong to anyone else rather than to such a person." "To anyone else, indeed," he said. "So is it not the cause of all these things, that each thing in him does its own work concerning ruling and being ruled? That, then, and nothing else." "Do you still seek another kind of justice, or is this the very power that provides such men and cities?" "By Zeus, no," he said, "I do not." "So our dream has been fully realized, which we suspected when we first began to found the city, that by some divine will we might have stumbled upon the beginning and type of justice." "Entirely so." "And indeed, Glaucon, this was what was useful, a kind of image of justice, namely, that the shoemaker by nature should properly make shoes, and do nothing else; and the carpenter should build, and so forth for the others." "It appears so." "And the truth of the matter was, it seems, that justice is not concerned with the external action of a person, but truly with the internal, with oneself and one's own, not allowing each part within oneself to meddle in the affairs of others, nor to be meddlesome towards each other within the soul; but in reality, by attending to one's own, and ruling oneself, and setting oneself in order, and becoming a friend to oneself, and harmonizing the three parts, as if they were three notes of a harmony, of course, the lowest, the highest, and the middle, and if any other parts exist in between, bringing all these together and making himself entirely one, and becoming temperate and harmonized out of many, he would then act, if he acted at all, whether in acquiring wealth, or in taking care of his body, or in any political matter, or in private agreements; in all these things, he would consider and call an action just and good if it preserves and works in harmony with this internal state; and wisdom, the knowledge that presides over this action; and an unjust action, if it always breaks this internal state; and ignorance, the opinion that presides over this." "Entirely so," he said, "Socrates, you speak the truth." "Very well," I said, "if we were to say that we have found justice, and the just man and city, and what justice actually is in them, I do not think we would appear to be lying at all." "By Zeus, no, indeed," he said. "Shall we say so, then?" "Let us say so." "Let it be so, then," I said. "For after this, I suppose, we must examine injustice." "Clearly." "So injustice must be a kind of civil strife of these three parts, and meddling, and rebellion of some part against the whole of the soul, so that it rules when it is not fitting, but rather, by nature, should serve the ruling part; such things, I suppose, we will call the disturbance and error of these, both injustice, and intemperance, and cowardice, and ignorance, and in sum, all vice." "These things are so, then," he said. "Then," I said, "are not unjust actions and doing injustice, and conversely, doing just actions, all these things, clearly now, in the same way as injustice and justice?" "How so?" "Because," I said, "they happen to differ in nothing from health-producing and disease-producing things, just as the latter are in the body, so these are in the soul." "How so?" he said. "Health-producing things, I suppose, produce health; and disease-producing things, disease." "Yes." "Then does not doing just actions produce justice; and unjust actions, injustice?" "Necessarily." "And to produce health is to establish things in the body according to nature, and to rule and be ruled by each other; and disease, to rule and be ruled contrary to nature, one by another." "It is." "Then again," I said, "does not to produce justice mean to establish things in the soul according to nature, and to rule and be ruled by each other; and injustice, to rule and be ruled contrary to nature, one by another?" "Completely so," he said. "Then virtue, it seems, would be a kind of health, and beauty, and good condition of the soul; and vice, disease, and ugliness, and weakness." "That is so." "Then does not what is noble lead to the acquisition of virtue, and what is base, to vice?" "Necessarily." "So now, what remains for us to consider, it seems, is whether it is profitable to do just actions, and to practice noble things, and to be just, whether one is hidden or not, being such a person; or to do injustice and be unjust, if one does not pay the penalty and does not become better by being punished." "But," he said, "Socrates, it seems ridiculous to me to even consider this question now, if, when the nature of the body is corrupted, it seems not worth living, even with all food and drink, and all wealth, and all power, then when the nature of this very thing by which we live is disturbed and corrupted, it will be worth living, even if one does whatever one desires, other than this, from which one will be freed from vice and injustice, and acquire justice and virtue, since it has been shown that each of these is what we have described." "For it is ridiculous," I said; "but nevertheless, since we have come this far to see as clearly as possible that these things are so, we must not grow weary." "Least of all, by Zeus," he said, "we must not grow weary in anything."

Plato, Republic.

"Very well then," I said, "since we have come to this point in our discussion, let us recall what was said at the beginning, the reason why we came here: it was said, I believe, that it is profitable for the utterly unjust person, who is reputed to be just, to act unjustly; or was it not said thus?" "It was indeed." "Now then," I said, "let us discuss this, since we have agreed on the nature of acting unjustly and doing just actions, and the power each possesses." "How?" he said. "By forming an image of the soul in speech, so that he who says these things may know what he was saying." "What kind of image?" he said. "Something like those," I said, "which the ancient myths relate of natural forms, like the Chimera, Scylla, and Cerberus, and many others said to have been born compounded of many forms into one." "They are told," he said. "Then form one composite beast with many heads, some of them heads of tame animals, others of wild, and capable of changing and growing all these things from itself." "A formidable task for a sculptor," he said; "but since speech is more malleable than wax and such things, let it be formed." "Then form another shape, that of a lion, and a third, that of a human being, and let the first be by far the largest, and the second the next." "These are easier," he said, "and they have been formed." "Then join them together into one, these three beings, so that they are somehow intertwined with each other." "They are joined," he said. "Then mould an image of a single human being over them on the outside, so that to anyone who cannot see the internal parts, but only the outer shell, it appears to be one creature, a human being."

"It is formed," he said. "Then let us say to the person who claims it is profitable for this human to act unjustly, but not profitable to act justly, that he is saying nothing other than that it is profitable for him to feed the composite beast, making it and the lion strong, and making the human weak, so that he is dragged wherever one of the other two leads him, and not accustoming one part to the other, nor making them friendly, but letting them bite and fight and devour each other." "For he is saying exactly that," he said, "who praises injustice." "Then does not the one who says it is profitable to act justly, say that one must act and speak in such a way that the inner human being becomes most powerful, and will care for the multi-headed creature, like a farmer, feeding and taming the gentle ones, and preventing the wild ones from growing, making the nature of the lion an ally, and caring for all parts in common, making them friendly to each other and to himself, and so he will nourish them?" "For indeed he says exactly that," said the one who praises justice. "So in every way, the one who praises justice would speak truly, and the one who praises injustice, falsely; for considering pleasure, repute, and utility, the praiser of justice speaks truly, while the denouncer speaks nothing sound, nor does he know what he is denouncing, whatever it may be." "I don't think so, indeed," he said, "not at all." "Then let us persuade him gently, for he errs unwillingly, by asking: 'O blessed one, would we not say that noble and base customs have come into being for such reasons? Noble things, those that make the human, or rather, perhaps, the divine part, rule over the bestial part of nature; and base things, those where the wild part enslaves the tame part?' Will he agree, or how?" "If he listens to me," he said. "Is there then," I said, "anyone for whom it is profitable, according to this argument, to receive money unjustly, if, that is, he thereby enslaves the best part of himself to the most depraved? Or if, having received gold, he enslaved a son or daughter, and that to wild and wicked men, it would not be profitable for him at all, nor would he receive much for it? But if he enslaves his own most divine part to the most godless and foul, and has no pity, is he not then wretched, and does he not receive gold for a more terrible destruction than Eriphyle, who took the necklace in exchange for her husband's life?" "Much more so, indeed," said Glaucon, "for I will answer for him." "Then do you not think that intemperance is blamed for such reasons: that in such a person, that terrible, great, and multifaceted creature rises up to freedom beyond what is fitting?" "Clearly," he said. "And is not arrogance and ill-temper blamed when the lion-like and serpentine parts grow and become unduly strained?" "Certainly." "Is not luxury and softness blamed when it weakens and relaxes this very part of oneself, bringing cowardice into it?" "Why, yes!" "And flattery and servility, is it not when one makes this spirited part itself, for the sake of money and the insatiability of that monstrous beast, habitually become a monkey instead of a lion, from an early age?" "Indeed," he said. "And why, do you think, do mechanical and manual trades bring disgrace? Is it for any other reason than this: if someone has a naturally weak part of the best nature, so that he cannot rule the creatures within him, but serves them and can only learn their blandishments?" "It seems so," he said. "Then is it not so, that in order that such a person may be ruled by a similar kind of being, that is, by the best, we say that he must be a servant to that best, and to the divine ruling principle within him, not thinking that he should be ruled to his own detriment, as if he were

a slave? Far from it. But if he has not yet learned, and you have not found it, nor learned it, how do you know, and from where? But perhaps this answer was not correct for you, that you claimed to know it by finding it yourself; but how did it happen? I learned it, I suppose, like everyone else. Again, we have come to the same argument: from whom? Tell me too. From the many. Do you not resort to serious teachers when you refer to the many?

In the same vein.

"Then answer," he said, "and even if you do not hear it yourself, do not believe it from another who says that just things are profitable." "No, indeed," he said, "but I must answer; for I think I shall suffer no harm." "For you are a prophet." "And tell me, when you say that some just things are profitable, and some are not?" "Yes." "And some are noble, and some are not?" "How do you ask this? Did it ever seem to you that anyone acted basely, yet justly?" "Not to me." "But are all just things also noble?" "Yes." "And conversely, all noble things? Are all noble things good, or some good and some not?" "I think, Socrates, that some noble things are bad." "Even base things, good?" "Yes." "Then are you saying things like this: when many people, assisting a friend or relative in war, received wounds and died; while those who did not assist, though it was their duty, returned unharmed?" "Certainly." "Then you call such assistance noble, in its attempt to save those who needed it, and this is courage, is it not?" "Yes." "But bad, in terms of deaths and wounds? Is that so?" "Yes." "Then is not courage one thing, and death another?" "Certainly." "Then are not noble and bad the same thing, to assist friends?"

"It does not appear so." "Look then," he said, "if it is noble and good, as it is in this case; for you agree that assisting is noble in courage; then consider this: is courage good or bad? And consider it this way: which would you prefer to have, good things or bad things?" "Good things." "Then the greatest things?" "Most certainly." "And would you least wish to be deprived of such things?" "Of course." "Then how do you speak of courage, to what extent would you be willing to be deprived of it?" "I would not even wish to live if I were a coward." "So you consider cowardice the ultimate evil?" "I do." "Equal to death, it seems." "I agree." "Then are not life and courage the opposite of death and cowardice?" "Yes." "And would you prefer to have the best things, and least of all the worst?" "Certainly." "(So you consider courage among the best things, and death among the worst? I do.)" "Then you called assisting friends in war noble, as a good action of courage, did you not?" "I appear to have." "But as a bad action, that of death, bad?" "Yes." "Then is it not right to call each action thus: if it produces something bad, you call it bad; and if something good, you call it good?" "I agree." "Then is good also noble, and bad also base?" "Certainly." "Then in war, when helping friends, you say it is noble, but also bad, making no distinction?" "You seem to me to speak truly, Socrates." "Then nothing noble, insofar as it is noble, is bad; nor anything base, insofar as it is base, good." "It does not appear so." "Then consider it further this way: does he who acts nobly not also act well?" "Yes." "And those who act well, are they not happy?" "Of course." "Then is not happiness the acquisition of good things?" "Most certainly." "And do they acquire these things by acting well and nobly?" "Yes." "So acting nobly is good?" "Of course." "Then is not good fortune noble?" "Yes." "Then it appeared to us again, as before, that noble and good are the same." "It appears so." "Whatever we find to be noble and good, we shall find it to be so from this argument." "Necessarily." "And what about good things? Are they profitable or not?" "Profitable." "Do you remember how we agreed about just things?" "I think that those who act justly must act nobly." "Then are not those who act nobly, good?" "Yes." "And are good things profitable?" "Yes." "Then just things, Alcibiades, are profitable." "It seems so."

ON INJUSTICE, AVARICE, AND GREED.

Euripides, Heracleidae.

This has long been my settled conviction:

The just man by nature is a neighbor to others;

But he who lets his desire roam for gain

Is useless to friends and burdensome in dealings.

Serapion.

You do not utter agreeable words for my sake,

But for the sake of your own gain.

Menander.

Greed is the greatest evil among humans.

For those who wish to seize what belongs to others

Often fail, being overcome,

And lose their own possessions to others.

Diphilus.

Is not shameful gain the greatest folly?

For the mind, desiring to get, sees nothing else.

From the same.

If taking were not, no one would be wicked.

This is avarice: when one, forsaking justice,

Is always a slave to gain.

Menander.

You speak what you speak for the sake of gain.

Euripides, Ixion.

Whoever is by nature disposed to have more,

Understands nothing just, nor does he wish it;

He is unsociable to friends and to every city.

Theodectes.

O beautifully shining torch,

Sun, a light desired by all humankind,

Did you ever see anyone else enter such a great contest,

And a decision so hard to escape,

Where I am accused in my words,

And he against whom I speak happens to be my husband,

And those who accuse me prevail?

Aristophanes.

For accepting public money,

Each looks to what gain he will get for himself;

But the common good, like Aisimos, rolls away.

Hesiod, Works and Days.

Wealth is not to be seized, but god-given, far better.

Hesiod, Works and Days.

Fools, they do not even know by how much the half is more than the whole,

Nor how much good there is in mallow and asphodel.

In the same vein.

Do not gain evil things, for evil gains are equal to ruin.

Epicharmus.

One hand washes the other.

Bacchylides, Epinikia.

For to speak once and for all, sharp and keen

Gain enslaves human minds.

Pindar.

Not one who became rich quickly was just.

For one gathers for himself and spares;

But one who ambushes the long-preserved wealth has it all.

Antiphanes.

Wicked gains yield

Small pleasures, but then later

Long sorrows.

Euripides, Ino.

Violently now, O wicked mortals, you seize honors,

And gain wealth from every source,

Mixtures of both unjust and just;

Then you will reap this wretched harvest.

Menander, Adelphoi.

It is hard to find a relative

Who is poor. For no one will admit

That it is proper for him to assist

Someone in need, for he expects to be asked for something.

Sophocles, Tereus.

All barbarian peoples are greedy for money.

Euripides, Hypsipyle.

Gain is more powerful than justice for evil people.

Plato, Crito.

Yet we say that doing injustice is in every way bad and base for the one who does it, is it not? We do. Therefore, must we in no way do injustice? No, surely not. Nor must we return injustice when wronged, as most people think, since we must in no way do injustice? It appears not. Then, Crito, must we do harm, or not? Surely not, Socrates. And what about returning harm for harm when suffering it, as most people say, is that just or unjust? Unjust. For to harm people does not differ at all from doing injustice. You speak truly. Therefore, we must not return injustice, nor do harm to any human being, not even if we suffer anything from them. And consider, Crito, when you agree to this, whether you are agreeing against your own opinion; for I know that only a few people hold and will hold this opinion. For those who hold this opinion and those who do not, there is no common deliberation: but they must necessarily despise each other, when they see each other's deliberations.

Eusebius.

The love of money does not know the boundary sufficient for acquisition.

The love of money, if wealth flows in day by day,

Does not stop, any more than a fire does when fuel is added;

And the desire for more continually ignites, more intensely.

But wisdom alone is a helper, and it knows how to heal this.

From the same.

Greed, if it were to cast away its aimless pursuits, would achieve more than if unlimited wealth were to accrue day by day.

From the same.

Managing one's existing resources. He who plans and he who does not at all wish to use what is necessary.

Never is the acquisition of wealth truly possessed, if one has enslaved oneself to it.

Most people, reasoning poorly,

Thinking themselves wise if they are rich, are deemed foolish and uncouth,

Or skillful, if they spend what is necessary.

Prodicus.

Give something, and receive something.

Herodotus, Histories.

"As a human being, O King, having already seen many great things fall by those who were weaker, I do not bid you to claim everything for your age, knowing that to desire many things is bad."

Eusebius.

One should consider oneself rich if one has what is sufficient;

But he who always desires to acquire more, and never gets enough,

Even if he were richer than Midas, I call him poor,

And Irus, though he has what he needs, to have a soul.

But it is bound by profit and wisdom.

Hesiod, Works and Days.

A gift is good, but a greedy one is evil, a bringer of death,

For whoever willingly gives much,

Rejoices in the gift, and is pleased in his heart;

But whoever takes it boldly,

Even a small thing, chills his heart.

Euripides, Bellerophon.

For evil is innate in all humans.

But whoever takes the most reward in his hands

And becomes evil, for him there is no forgiveness;

But having a greater reward for greater boldness,

He would more easily bear the reproach of those who speak.

Euripides, Danae.

For no man is mightier than money,

Except one; whoever this is, I do not see.

Sophocles, Oedipus.

You let such a magician, a schemer,

A crafty, begging fellow, who sees only profit,

While his art is blind by nature.

Menander, Leucadia.

Whoever extends his hand for gold,

Even if he denies it, he desires evil.

Menander, Flatterer.

No one who was just became rich quickly.

For one gathers for himself and saves;

But he who ambushes the long-preserved wealth has it all.

Antiphanes.

Wicked gains yield

Small pleasures, but then later

Long sorrows.

Euripides, Ino.

Violently now, O wicked mortals, you seize honors,

And gain wealth from every source,

Mixtures of both unjust and just;

Then you will reap this wretched harvest.

Menander, Adelphoi.

It is hard to find a relative

Who is poor. For no one will admit

That it is proper for him to assist

Someone in need, for he expects to be asked for something.

Sophocles, Tereus.

All barbarian peoples are greedy for money.

Euripides, Hypsipyle.

Gain is more powerful than justice for evil people.

Plato, Crito.

Yet we say that doing injustice is in every way bad and base for the one who does it, is it not? We do. Therefore, must we in no way do injustice? No, surely not. Nor must we return injustice when wronged, as most people think, since we must in no way do injustice? It appears not. Then, Crito, must we do harm, or not? Surely not, Socrates. And what about returning harm for harm when suffering it, as most people say, is that just or unjust? Unjust. For to harm people does not differ at all from doing injustice. You speak truly. Therefore, we must not return injustice, nor do harm to any human being, not even if we suffer anything from them. And consider, Crito, when you agree to this, whether you are agreeing against your own opinion; for I know that only a few people hold and will hold this opinion. For those who hold this opinion and those who do not, there is no common deliberation: but they must necessarily despise each other, when they see each other's deliberations.

Eusebius.

The love of money does not know the boundary sufficient for acquisition.

The love of money, if wealth flows in day by day,

Does not stop, any more than a fire does when fuel is added;

And the desire for more continually ignites, more intensely.

But wisdom alone is a helper, and it knows how to heal this.

From the same.

Greed, if it were to cast away its aimless pursuits, would achieve more than if unlimited wealth were to accrue day by day.

From the same.

ABOUT INJUSTICE, etc. I.

37. Of Democritus.

Wealth acquired through evil work incurs greater disgrace.

38. Of Bion.

Bion the sophist used to say that avarice is the metropolis of all evil.

39. Of Simonides.

When someone asked Simonides to compose a eulogy, promising gratitude but giving no money, he said: "I have two chests, one for favors, and one for money. And when I open them, I find the one for favors empty when I need it, and only the one for money useful."

40. Of Antiphon.

Those who work and save, and toil and add, enjoy themselves as one might imagine enjoying; but those who take away and consume feel pain, as if something were being taken from their flesh.

41. Of Herodotus.

That it is evil to teach the soul to desire and have more than what is present.

42. Of Antisthenes.

No miser is good, neither king nor free man.

43. Of Democritus.

JOHN STOBAEUS, Book 10.

10. He who advises a man who thinks he has a golden mind, to what purpose does he toil in vain?

44. Of the Same.

The desire for money, if not limited by satiety, is much more grievous than the direst poverty; for greater desires create greater needs.

45. Of Democritus.

Evil gains bring harm to virtue.

46. Of Diogenes.

Diogenes compared misers to dropsy patients; for the latter, though full of money, desire more; and both suffer more intensely as their desires are fulfilled.

47. Of Socrates.

Socrates, when asked who were lovers of money, said: "Those who pursue shameful gains, and those who neglect their necessary friends."

48. Of Pittacus.

Insatiable is gain always.

49. Of Periander.

Shameful gain is a heavy burden.

50. From the Tomaria of Aristonymus.

ABOUT INJUSTICE, etc. I.

Aristotle says that eight men, robbing together, quarreled among themselves over the spoils, and four of them were left. Again, these quarreled among themselves, and two were left, then one; and what remains if the right sides quarrel with the left?

51. Of the Same.

When Pyrrhus was dreaming of Sicily, and after that Carthage, and much land, Gyges said to him: "And after this, what?" And when Pyrrhus said, "We will live then," Gyges replied: "Then why not live now, before destroying many cities?"

52. Indeed, the life of a miser seems like a feast for the dead; for having everything, he lacks the one who would enjoy it.

53. Of Semiramis.

Semiramis had a tomb built for herself and inscribed it: "Whoever is a king in need of money, let him divide the monument and take as much as he wishes." Darius, upon dividing it, found no money, but instead encountered other writings saying: "If you were not a wicked man, and insatiable for money, you would not have disturbed the tombs of the dead."

54. Of Timon.

Timon the misanthrope said that the elements of evil are insatiability and love of glory.

JOHN STOBAEUS, Book 10.

55. Of Socrates.

The dregs of wine are its sediment, and the meanness of a miser is the sediment of avarice.

56. Of the Same.

One should seek neither conversation from a corpse nor a favor from a miser.

57. Of Xenophon.

"Whom do you consider the common people?" "I mean the poor citizens." "Then you know the poor?" "How could I not?" "Then do you also know the rich?" "No less than the poor." "What kind of poor and what kind of rich do you call them?" "I suppose those who do not have enough for what is necessary are poor; and those who have more than enough are rich." "Have you understood, then, that for some, having very little is not only sufficient, but they also acquire more from it; while for others, having very much is not enough?" "By Zeus!" Euthydemus said, "You remind me correctly. I know of some tyrants who, out of necessity, are compelled to act unjustly, just like the poorest." "Then," Socrates said, "if this is so, shall we place the tyrants among the common people, and those who possess little, if they are economical, among the rich?"

58. Of Democritus.

Hope for evil gain is the beginning of harm.

59. Of Diogenes.

Misers use life like a knife, doing everything according to the handle.

60. Of Plato.

Plato said to someone who was always seeking to acquire wealth: "Wicked man, do not try to increase your possessions, but rather reduce your desires."

ABOUT INJUSTICE, etc. I.

61. Of Diogenes.

Diogenes the Cynic, seeing an old rich woman pretending to be in love, said: "She has not cast her eye, but her tooth, upon him."

62. Of Simonides.

When Simonides was asked why he, though in extreme old age, was still a lover of money, he said: "Because I would rather leave it to my enemies when I die, than beg from my friends while I live." He had recognized the unreliability of the friendship of most people.

63. Of Diogenes.

Diogenes called those who received large and sudden sums "great beggars."

64. Of Apollonius to Euphrates.

The soul, not considering the self-sufficiency of the body, cannot make itself self-sufficient.

65. Of Democritus.

The excessive accumulation of money for children is a pretext that reveals one's own avarice.

66. Of the Same.

What the body desires is easily available to all without toil and hardship; but what it desires with toil and hardship and pain to life, the body does not crave, but rather the malevolence of one's mind.

67. From the Pythagorean Sayings of Aristoxenus.

JOHN STOBAEUS, Book 10.

Regarding desire, he said the following: "This passion is multifaceted and troublesome and most varied; of desires, some are acquired and fabricated, while others are innate; but desire itself is a kind of influx and impulse of the soul, and an appetite for fullness, the presence of sensation, or emptiness and absence, and not feeling. And of erroneous and corrupt desire, there are three known characteristics: indecency, disproportion, unseasonableness; for either the desire itself is indecent and burdensome and illiberal; or, in this respect, it is more intense and longer-lasting than is appropriate; or, in the third respect, it is unseasonable, and directed towards what is inappropriate."

68. Of Plato.

Poverty should be considered not as diminishing one's substance, but as increasing one's insatiability.

69. Of Democritus.

The desire for more destroys what is present, like the Aesopian dog.

70. From the Collection of Customs of Nicolaus.

The Ombrikoi, when they have a dispute among themselves, arm themselves and fight as in war; and those who slay their opponents seem to speak more justly.

71. Of Clitophon from the Italic.

Brennus, king of the Gauls, plundering Asia, came to Ephesus, and having encamped, awaited the term of the war. A certain noble maiden, whose name was Demonaika, falling in love with the barbarian, promised to betray Ephesus to him if she received the bracelets and necklaces. Brennus, having accepted her in a specified place, led his forces and ordered them to throw all the gold they had for ornament into the lap of the greedy man. And when they had done as commanded, Demonaika was buried alive by the abundance of the gold being thrown.

72. Of Plato, Republic, Book II.

For the greatest injustice is to seem just without being so.

73. Of Plato, Republic, Book I.

Do you not know that to be both avaricious and ambitious is said and is indeed a disgrace?

74. Of the Same.

Since then we have agreed that justice is virtue and wisdom, and injustice is vice and ignorance; "Very well," I said, "let this be settled for us thus."

75. Of Plato, Republic, Book IX.

Theft of money is illiberal; robbery is shameless.

76. Of the Same.

If someone steals public property, whether much or little, the same penalty is due. For the one who steals a little does so out of the same desire, but with less power.

77. Of Hieracos, On Justice.

Since the one who begins, he himself, unknowingly wrongs himself, let it be known that since injustice is twofold, he himself is the first to suffer from it, and then the part of him that is wronged; for it would not be a lack of perception for anyone who is tolerable, and if possible, not even for the wicked (for health of soul is the prayer), to think that the wronged are harmed more than the wrongdoers. For there is only one thing that is wronged by all, the soul; and what wrongs and conspires is wickedness, both in the one who wrongs and against the one who is wronged, but the lesser, and the greater; the lesser is the one about to be wronged; the greater is the one intending to wrong; since it also receives the impulse and the swelling from itself. Therefore, when aroused, it first enflames its progenitor, and before giving birth, it burns in the pangs, and pervades and damages, and dyes with its own venomous dye. For just as fire cannot pass through the material that gave birth to it for the destruction of others before completely consuming it; nor can the muraena give birth to aquatic snakes for the destruction of others before devouring the belly that bore them, as Nicander of Colophon and Archelaus the physicist write; so too every unjust person first tastes of wickedness himself, before inflicting it on others. Many, therefore, having stirred up bile within themselves from anger towards others, died themselves before taking revenge on their enemies. Many, therefore, unaware of this, freely indulged in injustices against the weaker, thinking that there was nothing harmful to themselves. And this being admitted, it is necessary to avoid injustice altogether.

ABOUT TRUTH XI.

78. Of Hieracos from "On Justice."

Or what would one say about the contentious character, even if he never desires any property that does not belong to him? How would he act justly, if he deliberates within himself to agree with no one worthy of agreement, but is prepared to quarrel with everyone, setting no measure and no opportune time for contention? For such a person tries to destroy not only what is right in words, but also in actions he often makes his actions violent and perverse; he will make himself not agreeing with the opinions of many; from this he himself will be burdensome to others, and others will flee from him, and he will hate such associations; and he will not endure to look with clear eyes upon those who expose the baseness of his character with freedom; but if he falls among similar people (for there is no great scarcity of such), immediately there are factions, reproaches, and relentless war, from which arise false accusations, and every kind of treachery, and schemes how they might destroy each other. For great evils arise from nothing else than from arbitrary contention.

ABOUT TRUTH. XI.

1. Of Menander, Nannus.

"Let truth be present for you and me, the most just thing of all."

2. Of Olympias.

JOHN STOBAEUS, Book 11.

Truth is a fellow-citizen of the gods, dwelling only with the gods.

3. Of Pindar.

Truth, mistress of great virtues, may you not stumble upon my harsh composition with falsehood.

4. For it is the part of a free man to speak the truth.

The tongue that errs speaks the truth.

5. And maintain faith in all things.

6. Of Homer, Iliad, Book I.

For my word is not to be revoked, nor deceptive, nor unfulfilled, when I nod my head.

7. Of Bacchylides, Hyporchēmata.

For as Lydian stone reveals gold; so truth, all-powerful, tests the virtue and wisdom of men.

8. Of Aeschylus, Judgment of Arms.

For the words of truth are simple.

9. Of Sophocles, Electra.

I will act; for what is just has no need for argument to contend, but rather to hasten action.

10. Of Menander, The Woman Whipped.

ABOUT TRUTH. XI.

Truth sometimes comes to light even when not sought.

11. Of Menander, The Foundling.

It is always best to speak the truth, at all times; this I enjoin for the greatest safety in life.

12. Of Euripides, The Phoenician Women.

The tale of truth is simple, and needs no complex interpretations; for it has its own opportune time; but the unjust speech, being sick within itself, needs wise remedies.

13. Of Sophocles, Oedipus.

Indeed, use what is just; a brief word conquers a long one.

14. Of Iamblichus to Sôpater.

Truth, as its name implies, leads to contemplation of the gods and their pure activity; while this mimetic opinion-making, as Plato says, wanders about the godless and the dark. And it perfects itself with intelligible forms and divine beings, and with things that truly exist, and that always remain the same; while it looks to the formless and non-existent, and to things that are sometimes one way and sometimes another, and it is dim regarding itself. And it perceives what it itself is; but it assumes the appearance of what it seems to be to many. Therefore, it converses with the mind and increases the rational within us; but it hunts after what always seems to be, leading to folly and deceit.

15. From the Memorabilia of Serenus.

Plato used to say that truth was the most pleasant of all sounds to hear. Polemon, however, said that speaking the truth was much more pleasant than hearing it.

JOHN STOBAEUS, Book 11.

16. Of Aeschines in "Against Timarchus."

"But you cast him out, supposing — we know, Pyradres, that one should not laugh — the opposite of these things; but truth is so strong that it prevails over all human reasonings."

17. Of Gaius in "Against Musaeus on Adultery."

"Then, having finally taken the handmaid, he asked how things stood concerning his wife; and she, without delay, immediately told him." Thus truth is spontaneous.

18. Of Plato, Laws, Book V.

"Truth, indeed, God leads as the first of all good things, and among men, of all things; of this, whoever is to be blessed and happy should partake from the very beginning, so that he may live as long as possible being truthful, for he is trustworthy; but the untrustworthy, O friend, is a willing liar; and he who lies unwillingly is foolish; neither of these is to be envied. For every untrustworthy and ignorant person is friendless."

19. Under the leadership of truth, I think, we would never say that a chorus of evils follows it.

20. Of Apollonius to Delios.

To lie is ignoble; truth is noble.

21. Of Eusebius.

The mind embraces truth, and always dwells with it; and being most truthful in its own nature, it sometimes, however, mixes falsehood with good, and presents it for the benefit of those who need it, and to trick for their own good those who are about to be deceived. For then, and never otherwise, the mind knows, and at the opportune moment, it knows all other things.

ABOUT TRUTH. XI.

...hating falsehood, this kind of falsehood is brought forth, from the nature of all other falsehoods, into another form, having been made most useful by the art and wisdom of that mind, which transformed a base thing into this.

22. Of the Same.

Let no law allow anyone to lie in the city, except for the lover of truth, who is also intelligent, and knows when and how falsehood is beneficial; and to do this out of necessary need.

23. Of Hermes from "To Tat."

Concerning truth, O Tat, it is not possible for a human being, an imperfect living creature, composed of imperfect elements, of composite parts, and of a body composed of many elements, to dare to say: "What is possible or just, that I say is truth, existing only in eternal bodies, whose bodies themselves are true, fire is only fire, and nothing else; earth is only earth, and nothing else; air is only air, and nothing else; water is only water, and nothing else." But our bodies are composed of all these. For they have fire, and they have earth, and they have water, and they have air; and they are neither fire, nor earth, nor water, nor air, nor anything true. If, then, the beginning of our composition did not possess truth, how could it ever know or speak truth?

JOHN STOBAEUS, Book 11.

...but only if God wills it. Therefore, O Tat, all things on earth are not truth, but imitations of truth; and not all of them, but few; and the rest are falsehood and illusion, O Tat, and fantasies like images. When imagination receives its influx from above, it becomes an imitation of truth; but without the divine energy from above, falsehood remains; just as an image shows the body of the painting, but is not itself a body in the imagination of the viewer. And it is seen as having eyes; but it sees nothing, and hears nothing at all. And all other things are in the painting; but they are false, deceiving the eyes of those who see them, of those who think they see truth, and of those who truly see falsehood. All those, therefore, who do not see falsehood, see truth. If, then, we think or see each of these things as it truly is, and we think and see truly; but if we are at odds with what is, we will neither conceive nor know anything true. Therefore, O best one, truth is also on earth. And you do not err carelessly, O child. Truth is in no way on earth, O Tat, nor can it come into being; but as for conceiving truth, it is for some men to whom God grants the power of divine vision. Thus, there is nothing true on earth, I say; all are fantasies and opinions; I conceive and speak what is true. Should we not, then, call this truth, to conceive and speak what is true? What then? We must conceive and speak of realities; but there is nothing true on earth. This is true, that it is not...

ABOUT TRUTH. XIV.

...true; here, how could it even come into being, O child? For truth is the most perfect virtue, the highest good, that which is not obscured by matter, nor encompassed by space, naked, clear, immutable, venerable, venerable, good. But the things here, O child, are like this good, perishable, subject to passion, dissolvable, ever-changing, becoming one thing from another. If they are not true to themselves, how can they be true? For everything that changes is false; if it does not remain, but changes its appearances and shows us now one thing, now another. Is not man also true, O father? "Man is not true, O child." For what exists is that which has its being from itself alone, and is what it is by itself; but man is composed of many things, and does not remain by himself; but he changes and transforms from age to age, and from one form to another, and these things are in the body. And many have not recognized their children due to the lapse of little time, and again children their parents. Therefore, how can what changes so much as to be unrecognized be true, O Tat? Is it not, on the contrary, falsehood, occurring in manifold fantasies of changes? You see what is true, that which remains and is eternal; but man is not always; therefore, he is not true. But man is a fantasy; and fantasy, if it were falsehood, would be most extreme. These eternal bodies, then, O father, since they change, are true. But everything that is begotten and changes is not true; but having come into being from the primal father, it...

JOHN STOBAEUS, Book 12.

Wretched is he who speaks beautiful falsehoods,

and does not use these beautiful falsehoods for good.

2. Of Sophocles.

But falsehood does not reach old age.

3. It is evil to conceal, and not fitting for a noble man.

4. Of Sophocles, Creusa.

It is good not to speak falsehoods, but if truth brings terrible destruction, is it pardonable to say what is not good?

5. Of Menander.

It is better to choose a falsehood than a painful truth.

6. Of Peisander.

It is no offense to speak falsehoods for the sake of one's life.

7. Of Homer.

He will not speak falsehoods, for he is very wise.

8. Of Menander.

Plausibility sometimes has greater power than truth, and is more persuasive to the crowd.

9. Of Menander.

It is indeed difficult to speak falsehoods.

ABOUT FALSEHOOD XII.

10. Of Euripides, Hippolytus.

I say that it is even lawful not to revere the law in terrible necessities more.

11. Of Diphilus.

Gain, when timely, brings forth fruit.

12. Of Diphilus, The Treasury.

I believe that falsehood spoken for salvation brings no harm.

13. Of Democritus.

One should speak truth, where it is better.

14. Of Thales.

Thales of Miletus, when asked how far falsehood is from truth, said: "As far as the eyes are from the ears."

15. Of Chaeremon.

It is not fitting for noble men to speak falsehoods.

16. "For he is hateful to me as the gates of Hades, who hides one thing in his heart and speaks another. Do not utter falsehoods; but speak all that is true. Do not hide one thing in your heart, but speak another. Every wise and prudent person hates falsehood. Every wise and useful person hates falsehood. The slander of falsehood damages life. No one who lies remains hidden for a long time. Do not weave deceits. Avoid false testimony, speak what is just."

JOHN STOBAEUS, Book 12.

17. Of Theognis.

At the beginning, falsehood brings little favor; but in the end, it becomes both shameful gain and evil. And nothing good comes to a man when falsehood clings to him, and first comes out of his mouth.

18. When Demetrius was asked what evil follows those who lie, he said: "That they are no longer believed even when they speak the truth."

19. Of Theophrastus.

From calumny and envy, falsehood, having gained strength for a short time, faded away.

20. Of Aelian.

A man from Chios, already old, came to Sparta; he was boastful in other respects, but as for his old age, he tried to conceal his grey hair by dyeing it. So, having come forward, he spoke about the matters for which he had come. Then Archidamus stood up and said: "What sound thing, he said, could this man say, who carries falsehood not only in his soul but also on his head?"

21. Of Lysias.

To lie is most common for those who often err.

22. Of Themistius from "On Temperate Feelings" or "Of the Lover of Children."

For no wickedness is more antisocial than faithlessness.

ABOUT FALSEHOOD. XII.

...but this is the evil from which alone we are at a loss for protection. For indeed, the only protection we have acquired, I mean the oath, is most abused by this very falsehood, when an untrustworthy man needs to deny having acted wickedly. There is also another kind of falsehood, which does not harm others much, but is disgraceful to the one who uses it; for it does not consist in saying or doing something about another, but about oneself and one's own affairs. And this is twofold and bifurcated: either saying less than the truth about one's existing qualities, or saying more and grander things. The former, which falls short of the truth, is called irony; the latter, exaggeration. That which falls short of the truth is elegant and subtle, and sometimes not useless to the philosopher; and for this reason, Socrates himself adopted it in his discussions, when he needed to mock some sophist full of pride and arrogance. For they become more aware of their own insignificance when they, being more ignorant, are exposed by one who pretends to know nothing. But the other type, exaggeration, is burdensome and annoying, and there is no sound so oppressive as self-praise, especially when it comes to education, on account of which those who truly attain it blush when praised by others. So, in relation to truth, shall we not call this a crippled soul, if it hates willing falsehood, and is greatly pained by it, but easily accepts involuntary falsehood, and being caught in ignorance, is not pained, but readily wallows in ignorance like a beast?

JOHN STOBAEUS, Book 12.

23. Of Herodotus.

Where falsehood must be spoken, let it be spoken.

24. Of Plato.

"Do you not see, then, that even now, through this rampart, the multi-headed sophist compelled us to somehow agree that what is not, exists?" "I see it very well." "What, then, shall we say is the definition of his art, with which we are to agree?" "Why do you say this, fearing what?" "That when we say he deceives himself, and that his art is deceptive, what then shall we say? That our soul forms a false opinion by his art, or what shall we say?" "This." "For what else could we say? But then, a false opinion will be one that holds the opposite of what is true?" "How so?" "The opposite." "So you say that false opinion is believing what is not?" "Necessarily." "Is it believing what is not, or what you say is what is absolutely not?" "It must be, if anyone is ever to speak falsehood at all, even a little." "What about believing what is absolutely not? Is that also falsehood?" "Yes, that too." "And speech, I suppose, is false if it is thus considered to be that which says what is not true, and what is true is not." "How else could it be such?"

25. Of the Same.

Indeed, the non-existent appeared to us as a kind of genus among others, scattered throughout all existent things. "Yes." "Then is it not next to consider whether it mixes with opinion and speech?" "Why so?" "If it does not mix with these, it is necessary that all things be true..."

ON FALSEHOOD. XII.

Indeed, with mixing, both false opinion and speech arise. For to believe or say what is not, that is falsehood, existing in thought and in speech. Thus. And falsehood existing, is there deceit? Yes. And surely, if there is deceit, it is necessary for all idols and images * already and phantasms to be full of it. How could it be otherwise?

26 • From Plato's On Justice.

Tell me then, do you consider it just to lie, or to speak the truth? To speak the truth, I say. Is lying then unjust? Yes. And do you consider it just to deceive, or not to deceive? Surely not to deceive. Is deceiving then unjust? Yes. * What then, is it just to harm, or to benefit? To benefit. Is harming then unjust (319)? Yes. Is it then just to speak the truth, and not to deceive, and to benefit? And to lie, and to harm, and to deceive, is it unjust? Yes, by Zeus, very much so. What about enemies? By no means. But is it just to harm enemies, and unjust to benefit them? Yes. So then, is it just to harm enemies by deceiving them? How could it not be? And to lie so that we may deceive and harm them, is that not just? Yes. What then, do you say it is not just to benefit friends? I do. Do you mean not deceiving them, or deceiving them for their benefit? * Even deceiving them, by Zeus. But is it just to benefit by deceiving, yet not by lying, or even by lying? Even by lying, it is just. So it seems, then, that to lie and to speak the truth can be both just and unjust? Yes. And not to deceive, and to deceive, can be both just and unjust? So it seems. * And to harm and to benefit, can be both just and unjust? Yes. These things, it seems, being all such, are both just and unjust? So it seems to me. Listen now. My eye

JOHN STOBAEUS. Book XII.

have a right and a left, just like other people? Yes. And a right and left nostril, and a right and left hand? Yes. So then, since * naming these things, you say that some are right and some are left among my things, if I were to ask you, * whichever * you could say, that the things * next to this one are right, and the things next to you are left? • Yes. Go (320)' then and say this. Since you name these things, you say that some are just and some are unjust, can you say which are just, and which are unjust? To me, at least, it seems that when each of these things happens at the appropriate time, they are just; but when not at the appropriate time, they are unjust. Well said, in your opinion; so then, one who does each of these things at the appropriate time acts justly; and one who does not at the appropriate time acts unjustly? Yes. So then, one who acts justly is just; and one who acts unjustly is unjust? That is true. Who then is able to cut, and burn, and dry at the appropriate time? The physician. Because he knows, or for some other reason? Because he knows. And who is able to dig and plough and plant at the appropriate time? The farmer. Because he knows, or * not? Because he knows. So then, is it not the same with other things, that one who knows is able to do what is necessary, and at the appropriate time; and one who does not know is not? Thus. And so to lie and to deceive and to benefit, one who knows is able to do each of these things at the appropriate time; and one who does not know is not? You speak the truth.

ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH. XIII.

2: "From Sophocles' Oedipus.

Thus shamelessly you have stirred this word; and where do you think this will flee? I have fled; for truth nourishes strength.

3 • From Sophocles' Ajax.

Nor again do I love such a tongue in misfortunes. For harsh words, even if they are perfectly just, bite.

4: "From the same.

• Your tongue nourishes your anger dreadfully. For with justice, it is greatly possible to be proud.

5 • From Sophocles' Tereus.

Be confident; speaking the truth will * never fail.

6 • From Sophocles' Aleadae.

For a just tongue has great power.

7 • From Euripides.

• May it happen to me to be poorer, and if he wishes, worse than a beggar, whoever, being well-disposed to me, speaks from the heart, having passed by fear.

8 • From Euripides' Temenidae.

Beautiful is truthful and unwavering freedom of speech.

9 • From Sophocles.

For shame profits nothing in misfortunes; for silence is an ally to one who speaks. (321)

JOHN STOBAEUS. Book XIII.

(322)10 • From Euripides' Telephus.

Agamemnon, even if someone with an axe in his hands * intends to strike my neck, I will remain silent, * having just cause to speak against you.

11 • From Philemon's The Litigant.

It is ready to speak fittingly.

12 • From Euripides' Hecuba.

Alas, alas. To mortals, good deeds ever furnish good pretexts for words.

13 • From Euripides' Dictys.

Be confident, for justice is mighty.

14 • From Moschion.

Nevertheless, I will never pass over what is right and just in silence. For it will well preserve genuine freedom of speech among the citizens of Athens and the city of Theseus.

15 • From Euripides.

But to be silent about what is just is never proper.

16 • From Philoxenus.

Philoxenus, having once been handed over by Dionysius to the quarries (323) for disparaging his poems, and having been recalled, was then again summoned to hear them; until, having endured something, he stood up. And when Dionysius asked, "Where are you going?" he said, "To the quarries."

ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH. XIII.

...m. But he said, "Against whom?" He replied, "Against Philip, who was awake."

30 • From Democritus.

Democritus, seeing a thief being led away by the Eleven, said, "Wretch, why did you steal small things, and not great ones, so that you too might lead others away?"

31 • From Hippocrates.

Someone was urging Hippocrates to go to Xerxes, claiming that the king was a good man; but Hippocrates said, "I have no need of a good master."

32 • From Demosthenes.

Demosthenes to a thief who said, "I did not know it was yours." He said, "But you knew it was not yours."

33 • From Pythagoras.

Try not to * conceal your faults with words, but to heal them with reproofs.

34 • From the same.

(326) It is not so difficult to err, as not to reprove one who errs.

35 • From the same.

Just as a bodily ailment is not healed by being hidden or praised, so too a soul that is badly guarded and indulged is not healed.

36 • From Plato.

Dionysius the tyrant, despising * him for his friendship with Dion, made him recline in the outermost place; and sneering, he said, "Where, pray, will Plato go from here?"

JOHN STOBAEUS. Book XIII.

...will * deliver a discourse against us in the Academy." And he said, "May there be such an abundance of words, he said, that there is no need to speak about you."

37 • From Diogenes.

Diogenes * asked Plato if he was writing laws; and he replied, "Yes." "What then?" "Did you write a constitution?" "Certainly." "What then? Did the constitution not have laws?" "It did." "Why then must you write laws again?"

38 • From Aelian.

Timotheus, son of Conon, spoke to Aristophon the Azenean, who was the best orator of all; for since Aristophon was a spendthrift, Timotheus attacked him most bitterly, saying, "To whom nothing is enough, to him nothing is shameful."

(327)39 From Ariston's Similes.

When someone said, "You mock me excessively," he replied, "For to those with spleen, bitter and pungent things are beneficial, while sweet ones are harmful."

40 • From Democritus.

Freedom of speech is native to liberty; but discretion regarding the opportune moment is dangerous.

41 * From Demosthenes' Olynthiacs III.

But I consider it the mark of a just citizen to choose the salvation of affairs rather than grace in speaking.

42 • From Serenus.

ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH. XIII.

When the Dacian woman was being sold, to the one who asked if she knew anything, she said, "I am free."

43 * From Themisteus' On the Soul.

If then Diogenes rightly said concerning Plato, "What benefit is there to us from a man who, though he has long philosophized, has harmed no one?" let others * judge. For perhaps * just as honey ought to have a sweet and stinging quality for wounds, so too should the philosopher's discourse.

44 • From Eusebius.

* Freedom of speech proceeds from a free mind and embracing of truth; and you will present it blameless, not by * indiscriminately (828) and randomly rebuking and reviling all, believing this to be freedom of speech; but if you converse with good sense, with those whom it is necessary, and concerning what is necessary, and at the necessary time, for the benefit * of those present.

45 • From the same.

An enemy speaking the truth is preferable to a false friend * speaking anything for the sake of pleasing.

46 • From Socrates.

The grace of freedom of speech, like that of seasons, is sweeter when opportune.

47 • From the same.

Neither a blunt sword nor ineffective freedom of speech should exist.

48 • From the same.

JOHN STOBAEUS. Book XIV.

50 For it is not fitting to remove the sun from the world, nor freedom of speech from education.

49 • From the same.

Just as it is healthy to hold a dirty cloak, so too is it to speak freely while having a poor life.

50 From Hermes to Horus, from Isis.

For reproof, when understood, O mightiest king, leads the one reproved to desire what he did not know before.

(329) ON FLATTERY. XIV.

1481 * From Poseidippus.

Everyone, it seems, called the cloak mine, but no one speaks to me now.

2 • From Critias.

Whoever in dealing with friends does everything to please, sets up immediate pleasure as enmity for later times.

3 * From Euripides' Erechtheus.

• Have friends who do * not slacken in their words; but keep those who are corrupt for your pleasure * and for your sake, shut out by the bolt of your house.

4 * From Zeno.

Reprove yourself, whoever you are, * do not listen for flattery, and remove freedom of speech from flatterers.

5 • From Euripides' Iphigenia.

For good men, when praised, * in a way, hate those who praise them, if they praise too much.

ON FLATTERY. XIV.

6' • From Euripides' Orestes.

This also is a burden, to be praised excessively.

7 • From Nicolaus.

The race of parasites, men, was invented by Tantalus, sprung from Zeus, as they say. Being unable to use his art well, he indulged in an unrestrained tongue; then, falling by chance into an unconscious chariot capable of producing hunger, he was suddenly thrown * from the table. Struck suddenly in the middle of his stomach, he thought he had been turned * upside down. And Sipylo was transformed in this manner, and quite justly; for he would not have been able to endure the freedom of speech of his feeder. And therefore, since such utter vileness has spread throughout all lives, I bitterly * wish to strike, by Zeus, if you grant me freedom of speech, those who pay no contribution, who choose to dine at others' expense without effort. For what, O man, by the gods, do you mean by wishing to be a parasite? Or what among the things in life have you understood? Tell me, for it is worth knowing. Whose disciple have you been? What choice do you emulate? From what doctrines do you proceed? (330)

JOHN STOBAEUS. Book XIV.

(331) do you dare to be a parasite? * We, who have spent our whole lives, are barely able even now to see the open door, because of those who painlessly devour the belongings of others. It is not for every man to have wealth at his table. First * one must have a side (of meat) for these, an impudent face, a constant complexion, an unwearied jaw, immediately capable of delivering blows; these are the fundamental elements of the whole art. Then one must laugh at oneself when mocked; for I think it shameful to be a slave to mockery. Does someone steal from the years, or * even dyes himself, wanting to be beautiful, and falls ill beyond his years? Let this Ganymede be deified. For the sake of pleasing, he speaks to his feeder to his ruin.

149" Is someone disturbed, * and makes all dead * at supper? By being silent, and sneering at him at the table, you too pour out your bile.

ON FLATTERY. XIV.

I think I am well-suited * for the task, children, to be; for all things necessary for one who dines at others' expense are present in me: hunger, recklessness, boldness, stomach, laziness. And now * the rich king of the Lydians has decided that I should be his dinner companion * and friend.

8 • From Democritus.

To praise good deeds is good; for to praise bad ones is counterfeit and the work of a deceiver.

9 • From Aristonymus' Tomaria.

Wood, by increasing fire, is consumed by it; and wealth, by nourishing flatterers, is destroyed by them.

10 • From Sotion's On Anger.

Dolphins swim with swimmers up to the surge, but do not beach themselves on dry land; so too flatterers remain in fair weather, but like those who escort friends on a journey, they follow until the end of the plunder, and then, if they come to rough waters, they depart.

11 • From Favorinus.

Praise is not trustworthy when one praises another for his own advantage.

12 • From the same.

Just as Actaeon died by his own hunting dogs which he had raised, so too flatterers destroy (333) those who nourish them.

13 * From Theodorus' For Elpis Phorianis.

JOHN STOBAEUS. Book XIV.

...There was no small access to it; some welcomed his frankness of character, others perhaps needed it; but many, * accustomed to diseases, and acting according to their nature, who, marveling at the rich as something superior, are accustomed to perish at their doors, even if they are to gain nothing at all from their prosperity.

14 * From Diogenes.

On flattery, as on a tombstone, only the name of friendship is inscribed.

15 * From Isocrates to Demonikos.

Hate flatterers, as you hate deceivers; for both, when trusted, * wrong those who trust them.

16 * From Crates.

Crates says that flatterers are * joint-eaters.

17 * From Antisthenes.

Antisthenes says it is better to fall among ravens than among flatterers; for the former destroy the body when dead, but the latter destroy the soul while living.

(334)18 • From Pythagoras.

Rejoice more in those who reprove you than in those who flatter you; and turn away from flatterers as worse than enemies.

19 • From Antisthenes.

Antisthenes used to say that just as courtesans wish all good things to be present for their lovers, except intelligence and prudence, so too do flatterers for those with whom they associate.

20 * From Crates.

ON FLATTERY. XIV.

Crates said to a rich young man who attracted many flatterers, "Young man, I pity your solitude."

21 • From Socrates.

The favor of flatterers, as it were, flees misfortunes like a turning away.

22 • From the same.

Hunters hunt hares with dogs, but many hunt fools with praises.

23 • From the same.

Wolves are like dogs, but flatterers are like friends, desiring unlike things.

24 * From the same.

Flattery resembles written armor. Therefore, it has pleasure, but provides no utility.

25 • From Plato's Letter to Dionysius.

For I observed both then and now that the great and excessive possessions of both private citizens and monarchs, almost (335) the greater they are, the more and greater are the slanderers they attract, and those who associate with them for pleasure, with shameful harm, than which nothing worse is begotten by wealth and the power of other authority.

26 • From the same, from Menexenus or Epitaphios.

When someone contends in these matters, * as he also praises, it is not considered great to speak well.

ON EXTRAVAGANCE. XV.

1 * From Menander.

Those who spend their own lives irrationally, * by being well-spoken of, quickly cause evil to all.

JOHN STOBAEUS. Book XV.

2 • From Euphron's Didymi.

For he who manages his own life badly, how would he save anyone outside?

3 * From Diphilus.

It is a work of long time to gather a heap, but it is easy to scatter it in a day.

4 * From Menander.

* Some save splendidly, for whom it is harder to acquire something than to preserve life.

(836)5. * From Menander.

If we sail for about four days, we consider the necessities of each day. But if we are to save something for old age, will we not * easily acquire it?

6 * From Theognis.

As for me, walk the middle path with your feet, and give nothing of others' possessions to others, Cyrnus.

7 • From Pythagoras.

Do not spend out of season, * for there is among us a lack of refinement; and do not be illiberal. Measure is best in all things.

8 • From Socrates.

ON EXTRAVAGANCE. XV.

Socrates, seeing someone readily gratifying everyone, and serving without examination, said, "May you perish badly, because you have made the Graces, who are virgins, into * harlots."

9 * From Diogenes.

Diogenes asked for a mina from a spendthrift; and when the spendthrift said, "Why do you ask others for * three obols, but me for a mina?" he replied, "From others I expect to receive it back again, but from you, no longer."

10 * From Crates.

Crates used to liken the wealth of the rich and spendthrifts to the figs * on cliffs, from which a person gains nothing, but ravens and kites do; just like from these, * courtesans and flatterers.

11 • From Demosthenes in Against Leptines.

For most people acquire good things by deliberating well and disdaining nothing; but they are unwilling to guard them with the same means.

12 * From Zeno.

Zeno, to those who apologized for their extravagance, saying they spent from an abundance of wealth, said: "Will you also, pray tell, excuse cooks if they say they have made dishes salty because they had an abundance of salt?"

13 * From Xenophon in the Cyropaedia VII.

For not receiving good things is not so difficult as being deprived of them after receiving them.

ON PARSIMONY. XVI.

1 * From Philemon.

Those who spend their own lives irrationally, * by being well-spoken of, quickly cause evil to all.

JOHN STOBAEUS. Book XVI.

...and deprives his body of food; * such a wretched man I consider to rob even the gods' * offerings, and to be an enemy to his dearest ones.

7 • From Menander.

I have never yet greatly envied a rich man who enjoys nothing of what he has.

8 • From the same.

Do not always * seek gain; be ashamed not to be fortunate justly. There is fear * for the thrice-wretched man who, out of parsimony, incurs hatred double his substance.

9 • From Theocritus.

It is better, O careful miser, * to boil the lentils than to cut your hand by splitting the cumin seed.

10 • From Menander in Pseudo-Heracles.

A harsh life has a certain lack of affection.

11 • From Apollodorus' The Resigner.

But you have spoken almost the sum of evils, for all is contained in avarice.

12 • From Antiphanes.

How wretched are those for whom, for the sake of gain, shameful things appear preferable to noble ones; for receiving blinds the mind.

13 • From Menander in Dyskolos.

You speak of money as an uncertain thing. If you know that these things will remain with you,

JOHN STOBAEUS. Book XVI.

...all the time, guard them, giving them to no one else, but being their master yourself; (340) and as for what is not yours, but belongs wholly to fortune, * why would you, father, envy anyone for these things? For she, perhaps, taking everything from you, will again add to someone else who is unworthy; therefore, I say you must, as long as you are master, use it nobly, father, assisting all, making as many as possible prosperous * through yourself, for this is immortal, and even if you should ever stumble, the same will be there for you again from that source.

• A visible friend is far better than invisible wealth which you have buried.

14 • From Eusebius.

A man who has great wealth stored up, and then * is unable by his own will to use it for any necessary purpose, is like one who trusts in public treasures as his own. For in appearance they are equally rich; but as for what truly belongs to possession, which is to use it, * both are equally deprived.

(341)15 • From Theopompus.

If someone, having acquired the most goods, with sorrow...

ABOUT FRUGALITY. Chapter 16.

...should lead his life, he would be the most miserable of all beings, both existing and future.

16. From Democritus.

The frugal possess the store of the bee, working as if they will live forever.

17.

The children of the frugal become ignorant, just as dancers who rush onto swords, if they miss one single step, stumble where they should place their feet and are destroyed; it is difficult to hit the single mark, for only the trace of the foot remains; and so these children too, if they err from the careful and frugal manner of their father, tend to be ruined.

18.

Frugality and hunger are good, but spending is also good in its time; to know this is good.

19. From Antiphon.

There are some who do not live the present life, but make great efforts to prepare for another life they will live, not the present one; and in this, time slips away.

20. From Metrodorus.

Some prepare for life throughout their lives, intending to live after what is called "living," not realizing that a deadly poison has been poured into all of us from birth.

21. From Democritus.

A life without celebration is a long road without an inn.

22. From Plutarch's Precepts of Health.

Moreover, stinginess and greed compel some to suppress their desires at home, and to starve themselves, so that they may eat profusely from others' abundance and enjoy themselves, as if they were eating without restraint from hostile territory; then, having been ill-disposed, they depart, having an indigestion that provides sustenance for their insatiability on the morrow.

23. Theocritus said that many rich people are trustees, not masters, of their money.

24. From Eusebius.

A man possessing great wealth stored up, and acquiring it solely for the purpose of hoarding, and that he may always add something to what he possesses, he declares that he has wealth but uses none of it for himself, nor for any other useful purpose, never becoming richer, but serving as a guardian and provider of others' money, and often choosing to endure hardships, and acquiring things that do not belong to him at all.

25. From Xenophon in his Cyropaedia.

"And that you may know this too, O Croesus, I consider those to be most fortunate who possess the most, and guard the most; for those who guard the fortifications, these would be the most fortunate.

...they would be the most fortunate, for they guard all things in the cities; but whoever is able to acquire the most justly, and to use the most nobly, him I consider the most fortunate in terms of wealth.

26. From Socrates.

The wealth of the avaricious, like the sun setting into the earth, does not gladden any living being.

27. From the same.

The life of the avaricious is like a dinner for the dead; for though he has everything, he does not have the one who will enjoy it.

28. From Epicurus.

We have been born once; it is not possible to be born twice; and one must not postpone life. You are not master of tomorrow, you defer the opportune moment; and the life of all is lost by procrastination; and for this reason each of us dies while occupied.

29. From Antiphon.

There is a story that a man, seeing another taking money, earnestly begged him to lend it to him at interest; but the other refused, being one who would neither trust nor benefit anyone, and instead laid it aside somewhere; and someone, observing him doing this, stole it; and when he came later, he did not find the money he had deposited. Grieving excessively over the misfortune, both for other reasons and because he had not lent it to the one in need, which would have been safe for him, and had offered something else; meeting the man who had then asked for the loan, he lamented his misfortune, saying that he had erred; and that he regretted not having granted the favor, but having been ungracious; and that the money was certainly lost. But the other told him not to worry, but to consider it to be his own, and not lost, by depositing a stone in the same place; for in any case, even when you had it, you did not use it, so do not now imagine yourself deprived of anything. For if one has not used something, and will not use it, whether it exists or not, it harms him neither more nor less. For when God does not wish to grant good things to a man completely, providing him with abundant wealth but making him poor in wisdom, He takes away the one and deprives him of both.

ABOUT SELF-CONTROL. Chapter 17.

1. From Sophocles' Electra.

To live shamefully is shameful for those nobly born.

2. From Sophocles' Phaedra.

For it is not right for a noble man to delight his soul where it will not also delight in what is right.

3. From Chares.

Strive to control every rein of your stomach; for it alone, of what it suffers, feels no gratitude, and always needs more than is necessary. Whoever does not know how to control his stomach, he has most evils.

4. From Sophocles.

But it is not right to speak of what is not right to do.

5.

All those who labor in philosophy, there in life lies the ability to control one's stomach.

6.

For temperance is the teacher of the wise, and of the noblest counsels.

7. From Euripides.

Never may one blessed with power, my child, pursue shameful loves with the common people.

And the iron draws on the neck, if anyone's children shame the good poor.

8. From Pythagoras.

To every good possession, labor precedes, which is done with self-control.

9. From Iamblichus.

What then? For human beings to acquire a harmonious and well-adjusted disposition, easily shared with those of differing ways, and capable of ruling and being ruled in proper measure; to these follow morals and pursuits, concerning both self-control of pleasures and control over desires. But it is necessary to banish intemperance regarding pleasures as utterly limitless and immoderate.

10. From Phocion.

Phocion's son bought more provisions than usual. Phocion sighed and said, "If you prepare to eat more than you eat."

11. From the letters of Simon to Aristippus.

Remember, however, hunger and thirst; for these can be greatly beneficial to those who pursue temperance.

12. From Pythagoras.

Acquire self-control as the greatest strength and wealth.

13. From the same.

Pythagoras admonished, "Let not a man be often away from man," hinting that one should not continually engage in sexual intercourse.

14. From Apollonius to Eirene.

We have striven for self-sufficiency, not so that we may always use only cheap and simple things, but so that we may have confidence in facing them.

15. From Apollonius to the Knowers.

Do not suppose that I advise others easily; for I myself, being on a barley cake, and on the rest of this accustomed diet, give you such advice.

16. From Diogenes.

Diogenes, taking a clean loaf of bread, threw out the coarse bread from his wallet, saying:

"O stranger, depart from the path of tyrants."

17. From Socrates.

When there was a festival among the Athenians, Alcibiades eagerly sought to send many gifts to Socrates. Xanthippe, being astonished and urging Socrates to accept them, he said: "But we too shall contend with Alcibiades' generosity, by not accepting the gifts sent, and thus showing our counter-generosity."

18. From Aristippus.

He controls pleasure not who abstains from it, but who uses it without being carried away; just as with a ship or a horse, it is not he who does not use it, but he who guides it wherever he wishes.

19. From Pericles.

When Pericles showed a handsome boy to Sophocles, he said, "O Sophocles, the temperate general must have control not only over his hands but also over his eyes."

20. From Epictetus' Encheiridion.

Whenever you conceive a notion of pleasure, as with other notions, be on your guard, do not be carried away too quickly, but wait for the matter, and allow yourself a little delay; then, having examined the notion according to the rules you possess, remember both times: when you have enjoyed the pleasure, being overcome, you will repent and reproach yourself; but when you have abstained, you will rejoice and praise yourself. And if it seems timely to engage in the matter, remember that you must not let its pleasantness and charm overcome you, but try to control the reins.

21. From Demosthenes.

The sensible man must always strive to make reason superior to desires.

22. From Socrates.

When Socrates was asked how he differed from other men, he said: "In that other men live to eat, but I eat to live."

23. From Epicurus.

Thanks to blessed nature, that it has made what is necessary easily available, but what is difficult to obtain, not necessary.

24. From the same.

If you wish to make someone rich, do not add to his money, but subtract from his desires.

25. From Xenocrates.

Xenocrates, if he ever opened a jar of wine, the wine would spoil before it was consumed; and often the provisions would rot and be thrown out. Hence the proverb, "Xenocrates' cheese," used for things that last a long time and are not quickly consumed.

26. From Democritus.

A grateful person is not grieved by what he does not have, but rejoices in what he does have.

27. From Pythagoras.

It is far better to die than to darken the soul through intemperance.

28. From Socrates.

Socrates said that self-control is the mastery of pleasures in the body.

29. From Aelian's Various History.

Chrysippus of Soli lived on very little; Cleanthes even on less.

30. From Epicurus.

...being in need of the most difficult things to find, or he who uses what is most easily available sufficiently? "You claim, Antiphon, that happiness consists in luxury and lavishness; but I believe that to need nothing is divine, and to need as little as possible is nearest to the divine. And the divine is most excellent; and that which is nearest to the divine is nearest to the most excellent."

31. From Socrates.

Socrates, being asked how one could become rich, said: "If he is poor in desires."

32. From Xenophon in his Memorabilia.

And if indeed self-control is a noble and good possession for a man, let us consider if, as he said, it advanced him to this end in such a way: "O men, if, should war occur, we wished to choose a man by whom we ourselves would be most saved, and our enemies most subdued, would we choose anyone whom we perceive to be weaker than his stomach, or wine, or sensual pleasures, or toil, or sleep? And how could we think such a one capable of saving us or conquering our enemies? But if, when nearing the end of life, we wished to entrust to someone the education of our sons, or the protection of our virgin daughters, or the preservation of our wealth, would we consider the intemperate man trustworthy in these matters? And would we entrust to an intemperate slave either cattle, or household management, or supervision of works? And would we be willing to take such a servant or a buyer for free? But if we would not even accept an intemperate slave, why should we not be careful not to become such ourselves? For just as greedy people, by taking away the possessions of others, imagine they are enriching themselves, so the intemperate man is harmful to others, but far more harmful to himself, if it is more harmful not only to ruin one's own household but also one's body and soul. In company, who would delight in such a spectacle, or in one who rejoices more in pungent food and wine than in friends? And one who loves prostitutes more than companions? Ought not every man consider self-control as the foundation of virtue, and establish this first in his soul? For who without this could learn anything good, or seriously pursue anything worthy? Or who, enslaved to pleasures, would not be shamefully disposed both in body and soul? As for me, it seems, by Hera, that for a free man it is desirable not to have such a slave, but for one enslaved to such pleasures, it is necessary to supplicate the gods to have good masters; for only in this way could such a one be saved.

33. From Xenophon in his Memorabilia.

Do you not know that he who eats most pleasurably needs the fewest delicacies? And he who drinks most pleasurably needs the least of available drinks? And as for clothing, do you not know that people change their clothes for the sake of cold and heat? And they put on shoes so that their feet may not be hindered from walking wherever they wish by discomfort? Did you ever know me to remain indoors more on account of cold, or to struggle with heat for shade, or not to walk wherever I wished on account of aching feet? Do you not know that those who are physically weakest, by training their bodies, become stronger than the strongest who neglect themselves, in whatever they train for, and bear it more easily? -- And if it is necessary to benefit friends or a city, which of the two has more leisure to attend to these matters, he who lives as I do now, or he who lives as you, whom you deem fortunate? Which of them would find it easier to campaign, he who cannot live without luxurious living, or he for whom the present suffices? And which of them would be more quickly besieged, he who is in need of the most difficult things to find, or he who uses what is most easily available sufficiently? "You claim, Antiphon, that happiness consists in luxury and lavishness; but I believe that to need nothing is divine, and to need as little as possible is nearest to the divine. And the divine is most excellent; and that which is nearest to the divine is nearest to the most excellent."

34. From Epicurus.

I revel in the bodily pleasure of water and bread. And I spit on luxurious pleasures, not for their own sake, but because of the troubles that follow them.

35. From the same.

We need pleasure only when we are in pain from its absence. But when we are not experiencing this, being in a state of sensation, we have no need of pleasure. For the pleasure provided by nature does not cause injustice externally, but rather the desire arising from empty opinions does.

36. From Plato.

Plato, often thirsty, would draw water from the well, and then pour it out, chastising his desire.

37. From Epicurus.

Epicurus, when asked how one could become rich, said: "Not by adding to what one possesses, but by cutting down on one's needs."

38. From Democritus.

The rarest pleasures are the most delightful.

39. From the same.

If one exceeds moderation, the most pleasant things will become the most unpleasant.

40. From the same.

Brave is not only he who conquers his enemies, but also he who conquers pleasures.

41. From Eusebius.

This is the opinion of an excellent man: that one should not believe oneself to have been born for the purpose of eating, nor to consider life to consist in this, nor to believe that food was discovered for human beings solely for the sake of living.

42. From the same.

Self-control is also good for the body. For it is an ally to health, and it engenders temperance in the soul. Temperance prepares the soul for a tranquil, calm, and peaceful life.

43. From Musonius On Food.

Regarding food, he often spoke with great earnestness, as if it were no small matter, nor of little importance; for he believed that the beginning and foundation of temperance lay in self-control over food and drink. Once, leaving aside other discourses, which he delivered on each occasion, he said something like this: that one ought to prefer cheap food over expensive food, and easily obtainable food over difficult to obtain food, and thus food natural to humans; and that which is natural to us is what grows from the earth, both what is edible and what is not but can nourish humans well; and not taking from animals, but using them in other ways. Of these foods, the most suitable are those that are readily available without fire, since they are also the most immediate; such as seasonal fruits, some vegetables, milk, cheese, and honeycombs; and whatever needs fire, whether grain-based or vegetable-based, these too are not unsuitable, but are all natural to humans. He declared meat to be a more beastly food, and more suitable for wild animals. He also said that it was heavier, and an impediment to thought and wisdom; for the vapor arising from it, being more cloudy, obscures the soul; which is why those who consume much of it appear slower in intellect. He said that humans, since they are most akin to the gods among earthly beings, should also nourish themselves most similarly to the gods. For the gods are satisfied with vapors rising from the earth and water; and it would be most similar for us to partake of such food if we consumed the lightest and purest; and in this way, our soul would also be pure and dry, which would be best and wisest, as Heraclitus believes, saying: "A dry soul is wisest and best"; but now, he said, we live much worse than irrational animals. For though they may be driven by desire like a whip towards food, they are at least free from cunning in matters of food and from artificial preparation, being content with what comes their way, and seeking only satiety, and nothing beyond. But we devise various arts and contrivances to sweeten the pleasure of food and to flatter the act of eating excessively. To this extent we have progressed in gluttony and gourmandizing, so that just as with music and medicine, some treatises have been written on cooking, which greatly increase the pleasure in the throat, but destroy health. Indeed, one often sees the homes of those who live luxuriously with food in a worse state; some of them are similar to women suffering from pica; for they too, like those women, dislike common foods, and have their stomachs ruined. Hence, just as useless iron constantly needs sharpening, so too their stomachs want constant sharpening when eating, either with pure wine, or with vinegar, or with some bitter food. But the Laconian was not like this, who, seeing someone with a bird of fat and luxurious quality set before him, refusing to eat it out of indulgence and claiming he could not, said, "But I, too, can eat a vulture and a goat." Zeno of Citium, even when ill, did not think he should partake of more luxurious food, but when the attending physician ordered him to eat a pigeon, he refused, saying, "He treats me like a Manichaean." For he believed, I think, that in his treatment he should be no softer than any slave who was ill; and if they could be treated without partaking of more luxurious food, then so could we. It is necessary that a good man should in no way be softer than any slave. Therefore, Zeno rightly believed that one should be cautious of luxury in food, and not yield to it even a little; for once one yields, one will advance very far, since pleasure has great power to increase in both drinks and foods. These were what seemed to us new things to say about food, which he usually spoke about.

44. From Xenophon in his Memorabilia.

45. From the same in Book 4 of Memorabilia.

"Tell me, Euthydemus," he said, "do you consider freedom a noble and great possession for a man and a city?" "Most certainly," he replied. "Therefore, whoever is ruled by bodily pleasures, and through them cannot do what is best, do you consider him free?" "Not at all," he replied. "Perhaps you think that he who does what is best is free; but then do you consider it slavish to have those who prevent one from doing these things?" "Absolutely," he replied. "Do you then consider the intemperate to be completely slavish?" "By Zeus, certainly," he replied. "And do you think that the intemperate are only prevented from doing the noblest things, or are they also compelled to do the most shameful things?" "It seems to me," he replied, "that they are just as much compelled to do the latter as they are prevented from doing the former." "Whom do you consider masters who prevent the best things and compel the worst?" "As bad as possible, by Zeus," he replied. "And what kind of slavery do you consider the worst?" "I," he replied, "consider it to be slavery to the worst masters." "Therefore the intemperate are enslaved to the worst slavery?" "It seems so to me," he replied. "And does not intemperance prevent wisdom, the greatest good, from men, and rather force them into the opposite? Or does it not prevent them from attending to what is beneficial and from understanding it, by drawing them towards pleasures? And does it not often, when they perceive good and evil, startle them and make them choose the worse instead of the better?" "That happens," he replied. "And as for temperance, Euthydemus," he said, "to whom would we say it belongs more than to the intemperate?" "For surely the deeds of temperance and intemperance are opposite." "I agree to that too," he replied. "And as for attending to what is proper, do you think anything prevents it more than intemperance?" "No, I do not," he replied. "And as for choosing harmful things instead of beneficial ones, and attending to the former while neglecting the latter, and compelling the temperate to do the opposite, do you think anything is worse for a man?" "Nothing," he replied. "Therefore, is it not likely that temperance is the cause of the opposite, or intemperance is the cause of these evils, for humans?" "Certainly," he replied. "Therefore, is it not likely that the cause of the opposite is best?" "Certainly," he replied. "It seems then, Euthydemus," he said, "that temperance is best for a man?" "Certainly," he replied, "for to choose the best, and to abstain from evil, and thus, he said, they become the best and most fortunate of men, and most capable of discussion. And he said that discussion was named from coming together to deliberate in common about things according to their kinds.

ABOUT INTEMPERANCE. Chapter 18.

1. From Sophocles.

Why do you praise this? For every man who is drunk is weaker in temper and devoid of sense. He likes to pour forth much idle talk, unwilling to hear what he said badly of his own accord.

2. From Sclirius.

How unbearable is he who is either drunken or mad, for he is always safe for himself, but dangerous to his neighbors.

3. From Eratosthenes.

Wine indeed has a power equal to fire, when it enters a man, it churns like the Libyan sea under the north or south wind, and reveals things hidden from the depths, and shakes men's minds completely.

4. From Menander.

Much unmixed wine compels one to think little.

5.

For it is not the quantity of drink, if one examines it, that causes intoxication, but the nature of the drinker.

6. From Philemon.

...who was sober before, then becomes foolish. But you, knowing this, do not drink wine to excess; but rather rise before you become drunk, lest your stomach compel you to be its daily servant.

7. From the same.

A man's foolishness and sober wine, when he drinks beyond measure, it lightens his mind.

8. From the same.

All excessive wine is always bad.

9. From the same.

I was drunk; a sufficient excuse for erring.

10. From Theognis.

Hunger's satiety has already destroyed far more men than those who wish to have more than their due.

11. From the same.

It is shameful for a drunkard to be among sober men, and shameful for a sober man to remain among drunkards.

12. From the same.

Much wine drunk is bad; but if one drinks it with moderation, it is not bad, but good.

13. From Aeschylus.

Bronze is the mirror of form, wine is the mirror of the mind.

14. From Theognis.

Whoever exceeds the measure of drinking is no longer master of his own tongue or mind.

He speaks inappropriate things that are shameful to sober men, and is ashamed of nothing he does when drunk.

15. From the same.

When a foolish man drinks too much, and a sober man drinks beyond measure, it lightens his mind.

16.

Wise men recognize gold and silver in fire; but wine reveals a man's mind, even a very prudent one; and it exposes all wickedness, so as to shame even the wise man.

17.

My head is heavy with wine, Onomacritus, and wine compels me; no longer am I master of my own judgment, and it runs through the house; but come, I will try, lest wine also affects my feet, and my mind, for I fear I may do something rash when emboldened, and bring great disgrace upon myself.

18. From Homer.

Wine makes even a very prudent man sing, and laugh softly, and dance, and speak some word that might better have remained unspoken.

19. From Menander.

It is difficult when one, having drunk too much, speaks more, knowing nothing but pretending to.

20. From Euripides' Auge.

Now wine has made me beside myself; I admit that I wrong you, but the wrong was not willing.

21. From Philippides.

ABOUT INCONTINENCE. IH.

it is, saying 'I was drunk, father, so that I may receive forgiveness from you.'

To insult the weak by force, Pamphilus, does not seem to be a sin.

Panyassis.

Come now and drink; virtue, even this very thing, is for men to drink much wine at a feast, knowing how, while at the same time ordering other lights, *who at a feast and in war, a swift man, endures suffering, *where few endure, and await swift Ares. I would have equal glory, whoever, being present at a feast, at the same time commands another people. It seems to me that a mortal lives, and does not truly live a life of endurance, who, having restrained himself from wine, drinks another drink, being new in spirit, *equal to fire, a help against earthly ills, companion to every song, for it is a sacred part of feasts, and of splendor, of banqueting, and of delightful love, and of hunting, and of painful distress.)

Therefore, you should drink at a feast with a cheerful heart, not sitting like a vulture made evil by food, having forgotten joys.

23. Pythagoras.

It is impossible for one who is enslaved by passions and dominated by them to be free.

24. Chrysippus.

They say drunkenness is a small madness.

1025. Pythagoras said drunkenness is a practice for madness.

26. Anacharsis.

Anacharsis said that when the bowl is mixed and placed by the hearth, the first (cup) should be drunk for health; the second for pleasure; the third for insolence; and the last for madness.

27. Antisthenes.

Antisthenes says that those pleasures that do not come in through the door, upon entering, will have to either burst forth, or be purged with hellebore, or certainly be starved out, exacting bad returns for the previous short-lived gluttony.

28. Plutarch, from "That Women Should Also Be Educated."

To Dionysus, they consecrate the fennel-stalk and forgetfulness, as it is not right to remember what was done amiss in wine, but rather to admonish those who need childish guidance. To this agrees also the saying, "I hate a mindful drinking companion."

And Euripides called forgetfulness of foolish things wise.

29. Plato.

A drunken helmsman and every ruler of anything overturns everything, be it a ship, or a chariot, or an army, or whatever else is governed by him.

30. The same.

Not only, it seems, would an old man become a child twice, but also a drunken mortal.

31. Democritus.

Men ask for health from the gods with prayers, but they do not know that they have the power for it within themselves; doing the opposite through intemperance, they themselves become betrayers of health by their desires.

32. Plutarch, from "That Women Should Also Be Educated."

*Ignorance, as Heraclitus says, is a task to conceal otherwise, but in wine it is more difficult; and Plato says that in wine characters become manifest. As Homer also says, 'they knew each other not even at the *table.'

33. The same.

Sophocles blamed Aeschylus for writing while drunk; 'for even if he does what is fitting,' he said, 'he does so without knowing it.'

34. Pythagoras.

Pythagoras, when asked how a drunkard could stop being drunk: 'If,' he said, 'he continuously observes what he does.'

35. Anacharsis, when asked how one might avoid getting drunk, said: '*If,' he replied, 'he would observe what those who are drunk do.'

36. Democritus.

Those who pursue pleasures of the belly, exceeding the proper measure, in eating or drinking or sexual intercourse, for all of them, the pleasures are brief and short-lived, lasting only as long as they eat or drink, but the pains are many. For this is characteristic: to always desire the same things; and whenever they get what they desire, the pleasure quickly passes, and there is nothing good in *it, but the enjoyment is brief, and then they need the same things again.

37. Plato.

Whoever cares for the body does not care for himself; but whoever cares for money cares neither for himself nor for what belongs to him, but even *further away from himself.

38. Musonius, from "On Food."

Gluttony and gourmandizing are most shameful, he said; no one will contradict that. But I have found very few who seek to escape these things; I see many who crave such foods when *absent, and when present are unable to abstain, and use them lavishly when they use them, even to the harm of their body. And yet, what else would gluttony be than incontinence regarding food, by which people prefer what is pleasant in food to what is beneficial?

and gourmandizing is nothing other than intemperance in the use of relishes. And intemperance, being evil everywhere, displays its nature most of all here, making gourmands resemble pigs or dogs in their greediness instead of men, and unable to behave properly, not with their hands, nor with their eyes, nor with their swallowing; so much does the desire for pleasure in food throw them off. That it is most shameful to be thus with regard to food is well known, in that we resemble irrational animals rather than rational human beings. But since this is most shameful, the opposite would be most beautiful: to eat in an orderly and decorous manner, and to display temperance here first, which is not easy, but requires much care and practice.

*Why is this so? Because among many pleasures that persuade man to err and force him to yield to them against his own interest, the pleasure regarding food is in danger of being the most difficult to fight. For we engage in other pleasures more rarely, and can abstain from some for months and even whole years; but it is necessary to partake of this one every day, and mostly twice a day; for man cannot live otherwise. So the more often we partake of the pleasure in eating, the greater the dangers there. And indeed, with every serving of food, there is not one danger of error, but many. For he who eats *more than he should, errs; and he who rushes in eating, no less; and he who is stained by relish more than he should, and he who prefers more pleasant foods to healthier ones, and he who does not share equally with his fellow diners. And there is another error regarding food, when we partake of it at the wrong time, and when we should be doing something else, we abandon that and eat.

Since there are so many and yet other errors regarding food, one must be clear of all of them, and the one who is to be temperate must not be subject to any. One could be pure and without error by training and habituating oneself to choose food not for pleasure, but for nourishment, nor to soften the swallowing, but to strengthen the body. For swallowing came to be a passage for food, not an instrument of pleasure; and the stomach, for the same reason, came to be a root for every plant. For just as there the root nourishes the plant by drawing food from outside; so the stomach nourishes the living creature by drawing *food and drink that are introduced. And just as it happens for these to be nourished for the sake of survival, and not for pleasure; similarly for us, *food is a remedy for life for man. Therefore, it is proper for us to eat so that we may live, not so that we may enjoy ourselves, if we are to be in agreement with the excellent saying of Socrates, who said that many people live in order to eat, but *he himself ate in order to live. For indeed, no man who wishes to be fair-minded will deem it right to be similar to the many, and to live for eating; just as those who hunt for pleasure from food by all means.

That God, who created man, prepared food and drink for them for the sake of preservation, and not for pleasure, one might learn best from this. *For indeed, food, when it performs its function best, then it does not at all please man in digestion and assimilation, but we are nourished and strengthened by it; yet we feel no pleasure then, although this time is longer than when we are eating. And indeed, if God had designed food for our pleasure, we ought to feel pleasure from it during this longer period, and not during that very brief moment in which we swallow. Yet, *for the sake of that very brief time in which we take pleasure, countless relishes are prepared, and the sea is sailed to its limits; and cooks are more highly esteemed than farmers; and some serve meals, spending the value of fields, and these things do not at all benefit the bodies from the extravagance of the foods. For quite the contrary, those who use the simplest foods are the strongest. You would see, for example, the slaves of masters, and the country folk of the city dwellers, and the poor of the rich, being for the *most part stronger, and more able to toil, less tiring in their labors, more rarely falling ill, and more easily enduring cold, heat, sleeplessness, and everything *of that kind. And even if both luxurious and simple food strengthens the body, one ought to choose the simple, because it is *more temperate, and more befitting a good man, *by which also what is easily obtained is preferable to what is difficult to obtain, and what is effortless to what is troublesome, and what is ready to what is unprepared *for food, more suitable for the fair-minded. And to sum up all about food, I say that one ought to make its purpose *health and strength, as it should be eaten only for these reasons, which indeed require no luxury; and when eating, one should attend to decorum and the proper measure, and to avoid being stained by both food and leisure.

ABOUT FORBEARANCE. IX.

1. Euripides, Andromache.

A small quarrel from the beginning brings forth great strife among men. This the wise among mortals carefully avoid, lest they create strife among friends.

2. Philemon, The Arbitrator.

There is nothing sweeter or more musical than to be able to endure being reviled. For he who reviles, if the one being reviled does not pretend to hear, reviles *himself.

3. Euripides, from Protesilaus.

When two are speaking and one is angered, the one who does not contend with words is wiser.

4. Demosthenes.

Demosthenes, when someone reviled him, said, 'I do not descend into a contest in which the vanquished is superior to the victor.'

5. Plato.

Plato, when reviled by someone, said: 'Speak ill, since you have not learned to speak well.'

6. Aristippus.

Aristippus, when someone reviled him, said: 'Of speaking ill, you are master, but of hearing justly, I am.'

7. Plutarch, from "How One Can Profit from One's Enemies."

For words, a very light matter, according to divine Plato, a very heavy penalty follows, both from gods and from men. But silence, everywhere indeed free from blame (not merely thirstless, as Hippocrates says), but in revilings, it is noble and Socratic, and even more Heraclitean; *if indeed he also, *did not heed even as much as the hateful tales of flies.

8. Pythagoras.

Consider it a great education by which you will be able to bear ignorance.

9. Eusebius.

It is best to accustom oneself to control anger, especially not to be easily moved by it; but if not, at least in any case not to immediately fill oneself with that which is compelled by it and is irrational.

10. Sophocles, Ajax.

For virtue conquers greatly with enmity.

11. Theognis.

I cannot, my soul, *provide all things in tune, endure; for you do not alone love beautiful things.

12. Theophrastus.

Indeed, nothing should be done by the wise out of anger. *For rage is irrational, and would never do anything with foresight; but being drunk with contentiousness, it uses its impulses at random. So one must not inflict punishments from sudden errors, nor on slaves, nor on others, in order that you may *always do what is best according to reason, and not what is pleasing to anger; and that you may exact vengeance from your enemies without intending to harm *yourself in doing so. For to take revenge on someone by harming oneself is no less to pay a penalty than to receive one. Therefore, one should seek revenge rather slowly, than quickly and unprofitably *punish the enemy at one's own expense.

13. Epictetus, "On Friendship."

And who among you does not admire Lycurgus the Lacedaemonian? For when one of the citizens put out one of his eyes, and he took the young man from the assembly, intending to punish him as he wished; he refrained from that, but having educated him, and having shown him to be a good man, he led him to the theater, and when the Lacedaemonians marveled, he said: 'This man, whom I received from you as an insolent and violent one, I return to you as a gentle and public-spirited man.'

14. Pittacus.

Pittacus, having been wronged by someone, and having the power to punish him, forgave him, saying: '*Forgiveness is better than punishment; for the one is of a mild nature, but the other is beastly.'

15. From Epictetus' Enchiridion.

Begin then from *small things. Is the oil spilled? Is the small wine stolen? Say that *freedom from passion is sold for so much, *serenity for so much, but for free, nothing happens. And when you call your servant, anticipate that he may not obey, and may do nothing of what you wish. But it is not *for him in such a way that it is in his power to disturb me.

16. Musonius, from "If a Philosopher Should Write an Indictment for Insolence."

He said that he himself would never write an indictment for insolence, nor would he advise anyone who deserves to philosophize to do so. *For those things which some suffer and seem to be insulted by, none of them are insults or shame to those who suffer them, such as being reviled, or struck, or spit upon, of which being struck is the most grievous. And that they have nothing shameful or insulting is shown by the Lacedaemonian *boys being publicly whipped, and exulting in that very thing. And if the philosopher is unable to despise blows or revilings, what advantage would there be for him, who ought to appear to despise even death? By Zeus, but the mind of the doer is terrible, for it considers mocking and insulting, striking, or reviling, or doing *something of that kind. Demosthenes, for example, said that certain looks are insulting to people, and such things are unbearable, and they drive people out of their minds.

These things, some who are ignorant of what is truly beautiful and shameful, and who gape at reputation, believe they are being insulted, *if someone looks at them more bitterly, or laughs at them, or strikes them, or reviles them. But a man of good sense and understanding, such as a philosopher ought to be, is not troubled by any of these things, nor does he consider suffering them shameful, but rather doing them; since he who errs is immediately in shame, but he who suffers, insofar as he suffers, does not err, and thus nothing shameful happens to him. Hence, a man of understanding would not even go to lawsuits or accusations, *since he would not even think he had been insulted; for it is petty to be indignant, or to become agitated about such things; but he will bear what happens gently and quietly, since this is also proper for one who wishes to be magnanimous. Socrates, for example, was clearly of such a disposition, that when he was publicly reviled by Aristophanes, he not only did not get angry, *but even met with him and requested him if he would also wish to use *such. *He would quickly have been angered if reviled a little, he who did not even get angry when reviled in public.

Phocion the good, when his wife was publicly disgraced by someone, so severely rebuked the disgracer, that *when the latter, being afraid, came to him and asked for forgiveness from Phocion, he was unaware that it was his wife that he had abused. 'But my wife,' he said, 'has suffered nothing from you, *so perhaps there is no need for me to defend myself.' And I could mention other ancient men who were "tried with insolence, some of whom were *abused by someone with words, others with their hands so as to suffer bodily harm; and they appear neither to have been revenged on those who abused them, nor to have pursued anyone else, but rather to have borne their own affairs very gently. *For indeed, to consider how to retaliate against someone who bites, and to harm in return *a beast, is not characteristic of a man who cannot even do this, namely, that most of the errors committed by men are due to ignorance, from which the injured person immediately stops; but to receive wrongs *fiercely, nor to consider *anything incurable by those who commit abuses—there is some hope of good for them, and it is gentle and philanthropic.

*How much better for the philosopher to appear in such a way, as to deem worthy of forgiveness if someone wrongs him, rather than to appear to be avenging himself by suing and accusing, and in truth to be acting shamefully, inconsistently with his own principles; if he says, 'a good man would never be wronged by a bad man,' yet he complains as if being wronged by wicked men, *claiming to be good himself.

17. Dio.

As Dio the Academician was returning from a symposium, someone followed him, speaking ill of him, and leaving nothing out of his slanders; but he remained calm. And when they came to his house, as he was about to enter, the reviler said, 'What now?' Dio replied to him, 'Not a word.'

18. Xenophon, from "Symposium."

And Socrates again said: 'Indeed, gentlemen, it seems very good to me to drink; for truly wine, by watering the souls, lulls men's sorrows, as mandragora does, and kindles their good cheer, like oil a flame. It seems to me that men's symposia suffer the same things as plants growing in the earth. For those plants, when God waters them *too copiously, cannot stand upright, nor be aired by the breezes; but when he waters them as much as they delight, they grow very straight, and arrive at fruitfulness blooming; so also we, if we pour the drink in too copiously, *our bodies and minds immediately *fail, and we cannot even breathe, much less shall we be able to say anything; but if our boys frequently sprinkle us with full cups, so that I too may say in *Gorgias's words, that we shall arrive at a more playful state not by being forced to drink by wine, but by being persuaded.'

19. Herodotus.

Stranger, O Spartan, reproaches falling upon a man love to rouse his anger. But you, having accepted insults in discourse, did not persuade me to become rude in return.

ABOUT ANGER. K.

1. Theognis.

Nothing, Cyrnus, is more unjust than anger, which harms him who possesses it, yielding basely to passion.

2. Euenus.

Often has anger revealed men's hidden minds, *much worse than madness.

3. Menander.

In anger, a miscalculation never *springs forth from a single source. This now prevails, but if it declines a little, it will observe what is more to its advantage.

4. Philemon.

We are all mad whenever we are angry. For to restrain anger is a pain.

5. The same.

All things that a man does when angry, you would later find to be errors.

6. Restrain yourself when angry. 'But I wish to.' 'No one, father, has ever received a favor for anger.'

7. Euripides, Aeolus.

For whoever immediately yields to anger, ends badly; for it causes men to err most frequently.

8. Epicharmus.

Do not show yourself to be short-tempered over small things.

9. The same.

Where anger ought to prevail, let reason prevail instead.

10. The same.

No one considers anything properly when angry.

11. Euripides, Archelaus.

*Great anger has destroyed many mortals, and ignorance, *two evils for those who use them.

12. Euripides, Archelaus.

Much shameful conduct is inherent in base anger. For outside of anger, every man is wiser. Many evils come from anger born of lack of training.

13. Aeschylus.

Words are causes of vain anger.

*standing safely near hidden enemies; and neither boast openly when victorious, nor lament when defeated at home, but rejoice in joys, and in evils *do not be greatly vexed; and know what *rhythm man possesses.

14. Sophocles.

Indeed, stubbornness incurs foolishness.

15. Chaeremon.

But believe that all things happen badly in anger.

16. The same.

And anger forces many to do evil.

17. Euripides, Philoctetes.

Just as our body is by nature mortal, so it is fitting that one who knows how to be temperate should not have immortal anger.

18. Sosiphanes.

Now let your spirit, old man, rage before your eyes, but *now it is necessary to feel just anger.

19. Menander.

How great a pain it is to restrain anger!

20. Menander.

There is no remedy for anger, it seems, *other than the noble word of a friend.

21. The same.

Even if you *are greatly pained, remain undisturbed, act *rashly; *for it is especially necessary for the wise man to control irrational anger in disturbances.

22. The same.

And this quick temper, and very bitter, is immediately a sign of pettiness to all.

23. Theocritus.

It is not lawful, O shepherd, at midday, it is not lawful for us to pipe; for we fear Pan; for whenever he rests weary from hunting, he is bitter, and a sharp bile always sits at *his nostril.

24. Homer.

Grieving, his mind was greatly filled with rage, and his eyes were like blazing fire.

25. Euripides.

For gentleness, when it comes to the violent and savage man, greatly deprives him.

26. Euripides.

For angers are terrible among men under misfortune, and delusion approaches the heart.

27. Sophocles, Oedipus.

O foolish one, anger in troubles is not helpful.

28. Archilochus.

Soul, my soul, tossed by helpless sorrows, *endure, and ward off enemies by striking back.

34. Neophron, in Medea.

'Well then. What will you do, soul? Plan well, before you err, and make what is dearest most hateful. *Whither did you ever rush, wretched one? Check your spirit and your strength hateful to the gods. And why do I lament these things, seeing my soul deserted and neglected by those who ought least to neglect it? Do we become so soft by suffering such evils? You will not betray yourself in troubles, O soul. Alas, it is determined! Children, go *out of sight; for a great bloody rage has already entered my soul. O hands, hands, for what a deed *we are being armed! Alas, wretched daring, which is about to destroy my long life in a short pain.'

35. Euripides, Medea.

Not now have I seen for the first time, but often, fierce anger as an uncontrollable evil.

36. In the same.

*A terrible and hard-to-treat anger arises, when friends come into conflict with friends.

37. Euripides, Telephus.

It is time for you to have a mind superior to anger.

38. But anger is stronger than my counsels,

ABOUT ANGER. K.

which is the cause of the greatest evils for mortals.

39. Anger, when suffering, has no security.

40. Among the wicked, when a rough and quick-tempered person is present, he has ignorance.

41. From Homer.

But Achilles, subdue your great anger, nor is it right for you to have a pitiless heart. For even the gods themselves are flexible.

42. From the same.

Thus indeed, earth-shaker, dark-haired one, do I bear this harsh and powerful message to Zeus; or will you change it? For the minds of noble men are flexible.

43. From Plato.

Plato, having once been angry with one of his slaves, bade himself to be grateful to the gods that he was angry; for he would certainly have been punished if he had not been angry.

44. From Antiphon.

There is nothing that an angry person would discern well; for what he intends, he corrupts the judgment of the person.

45. From Herodotus.

Reproaches, when they come upon a person, tend to stir up anger.

46. From the same.

Just as anger dwells in the ears of men, good things, having heard them, fills the body with delight; but having heard things contrary to these, it swells up.

47. From Aristotle.

Or do you not see that in all things done in anger, reason is absent, fleeing from passion as from a bitter tyrant?

48. From Arrian.

There are some great-souled individuals who act gently, calmly, and as it were, without anger, even in matters where those who are vehemently carried away by anger act. Therefore, one must guard against their oversight, as it is much worse than becoming furiously angry. For these quickly find satiety in vengeance; but the others prolong it greatly, like those suffering from a slow fever.

49. From Apollonius of Macedon.

The flower of quick temper is madness.

50. From the same, to Aristocles.

The passion of anger, if not addressed or treated, becomes a natural disease.

51. From Apollonius, to Demokrates.

He who gets excessively angry over small transgressions does not allow himself to discern whether the offender has done a lesser or a greater wrong.

52. From Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

That the foresight and guardianship against falling into great and seemingly real and actual anger is greater.

53. From Sotion, from On Anger II.

ABOUT ANGER. K.

To the wise, instead of anger, tears came to Heraclitus, and laughter to Democritus.

54. Just as noble ships are not only those that sail in fair weather, but those that withstand and are saved from a storm; so too are men who withstand anger and passion, great and brave. To hypocrites, then, even if they are not truly angry, feigning anger has proved advantageous; but noble men, even if they are truly angry, use this pretense.

55. From Aristotle.

Just as smoke, irritating the eyes, prevents one from seeing what lies at one's feet; so too does anger, when aroused, obscure reason, and does not allow the mind to grasp the painful consequences that will arise from it.

56. From Democritus.

To fight against anger is difficult; but for a man to master it is a sign of good judgment.

57. From Plato.

Plato, once being angry with his slave, when Xenocrates stood by, said, "Take this man and whip him; for I am angry."

58. From Plutarch.

Aristotle says that Satyrus of Samos bade his friends to stop their ears with wax, while he was on trial, so that he might not be confused by anger when reviled by his enemies.

59. From Plutarch, from On Slander.

Newly bought slaves do not ask if their master is superstitious or envious, but if he is prone to anger.

IOANNIS STOBAEI, Book 20.

60. From Rufus, from Epictetus' On Friendship.

But above all, it is the work of nature to bind and harmonize the impulse with the proper and useful perception.

61. From the same.

And to think that one will be despised by others unless one harms one's enemies in every way is characteristic of extremely ignoble and foolish people. For we say that a despicable person is conceived as being unable to harm; but much more is he conceived as being unable to help.

62. From Democritus.

All strife is foolish; for considering what is harmful to an enemy, one does not see one's own advantage.

63. From Aristippus.

Aristippus the Cyrenaic philosopher, seeing someone angry and raging with words, said: "Let us not use words in anger, but let us put an end to anger through words."

64. From Naucrates.

Naucrates the wise said that quick-tempered people suffer similarly to lamps; for these too are consumed by more oil.

65. From Aristotle.

Anger is a bestial passion, continuous in its state, harsh in its grip, and violent in its power, causing murders, cause, ally of misfortune, accomplice of harm and dishonor, loss of possessions, and moreover, the origin of destruction.

66. From Antiphon.

Whoever, intending to do ill to his neighbor, fears lest, having failed to do what he wished, he should experience what he did not wish, is more sensible. For while he fears, he delays; and while he delays, often the intervening time turns his mind away from his desires; and in what has happened, there is no possibility of change; but in what is about to happen, there is. Whoever thinks he will harm his neighbors, but will not suffer in return, is not sensible. Hopes are not always good; for many have been brought to incurable misfortunes by such hopes, and those who thought they would harm their neighbors were themselves revealed to have suffered these things. And no one would judge a man's temperance more correctly than he who restrains himself from the immediate pleasures of anger, and has been able to control and conquer himself. But he who wishes to indulge his anger, wishes immediately for worse things instead of better.

67. From Epictetus.

When you undertake something with arrogance and threats, remember to declare beforehand that you are mild; and by doing nothing savage, you will pass through without regret and blameless.

68. From Cato the Elder.

Consider an angry person to differ from a madman only in time.

69. From Ariston.

Slander seems to be begotten by anger, so that the mother is not agreeable.

IOANNIS STOBAEI, Book 20.

70. From Plutarch, from On Anger.

Whatever men do using anger, these things are necessarily blind and foolish, and entirely mistaken. For it is not possible for one to use reason while employing anger; and what is done without reason is altogether unskilled and distorted. One must therefore make reason one's guide, and thus undertake the actions of life, correcting and turning aside the anger that arises on each occasion, just as helmsmen do with the waves that come their way. For there is no less fear of anger, like a rolling wave from the bow, that it will utterly destroy both oneself and the entire house, and overturn it if one does not sail skillfully. Moreover, there is need of diligence and practice in these matters, whereby those who have accepted anger as an ally of virtue are utterly vanquished, enjoying as much of it as is useful, both in war and, by Zeus, in public affairs; but the greater part of it, and the superficial part, must be sifted out and expelled from the soul, which is called anger and bitterness from quick temper, things least fitting for brave souls. What then is the practice concerning these in life? To me, it seems most likely to come about in this way: by us practicing and sailing far away from it beforehand. For example, in relation to servants and wives. For he who is gentle at home will be much more gentle in public, being inwardly such and made such by those at home, for the good of his own soul.

ABOUT KNOW THYSELF. K.

The "know thyself" is useful for the admonition of braggarts, who babble beyond their own power.

From Alexander.

Alexander, having suffered a long illness, when he recovered, said, "Nothing worse could have happened; for the illness reminded us not to think too highly of ourselves, as we are mortals."

From Plutarch, from On Tranquility of Mind.

And indeed, wines and gluttony make the body moist and strong, but the soul weak; and continuous care and preservation of wealth increases riches; but disdain and temperance are a great aid to philosophy. Therefore, not all things are for all people, but one must learn to know oneself by obeying the Delphic inscription, and then use oneself as one is by nature, and not envy another's way of life at different times, and force nature.

From Epictetus' Handbook.

10. Do not be puffed up by another's advantage. If a horse were proud, saying, "I am beautiful," it would be tolerable; but if you say, "I have a beautiful horse," know that you are proud of the horse's beauty. What then is yours? The use of your perceptions; when you have them according to nature, then be proud; for then you will be proud of your own advantage.

From Demosthenes, in Against Leptines.

And to expect good things, and to pray to the gods that they come; but to consider all things human.

From the same.

But I think the future is unclear to all humans, and circumstances become the cause of great events; therefore, one must IOANNIS STOBAEI, Book 21. be moderate in prosperity, and appear to foresee the future.

20. From Plato, from the Lovers.

"What then, if someone, being a human, is ignorant of good and bad people, does he not then ignore whether he himself is good or bad, since he too is a human being?" He agreed. "And for someone to be ignorant of himself, is that temperance or not temperance?" "Not temperance." "Then to know oneself is temperance?" "I affirm it," he said. "This then, it seems, is what the Delphic inscription also commands: to practice temperance and justice." "It seems so." "And by this same thing, do we also understand how to punish correctly?" "I affirm it." "Is not then, understanding how to punish correctly, this is justice, and discerning both oneself and others, is temperance?" "It seems so," he said. "Then justice is the same as temperance?" "It appears so." "And indeed, cities are well-governed when wrongdoers receive punishment. You speak truly."

21. From Xenophon, in Memorabilia IV.

"And Socrates said, 'Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever been to Delphi?' 'Yes, twice, by Zeus,' he replied. 'Did you then observe what was written on the temple, "Know thyself"?' 'Yes, I did.' 'Did you then pay no attention to the inscription, or did you apply yourself to examining yourself, to know who you are?' 'By Zeus, no,' he said; 'for I very much believed I knew this, and I would hardly know anything else if I did not even know myself.' 'Which do you think knows himself, he who only knows his own name, or he who, like those buying horses, do not think they know the one they wish to know until they examine whether it is docile ABOUT KNOW THYSELF. K. or disobedient, and whether it is strong or weak, and whether it is swift or slow, and how it stands with respect to all other things suitable and unsuitable for the horse's use? Whoever examines himself in this way, to see what kind of person he is for human needs, has come to know his own power. "It seems so to me," he said, "that one who does not know his own power, is ignorant of himself." And he said, "Is it not clear that by knowing themselves, people gain the most advantages, and by deceiving themselves, the most disadvantages? For those who know themselves, know what is suitable for themselves, and they discern what they are capable of and what they are not. And what they know how to do, they accomplish what they need, and they succeed; and by refraining from what they do not know how to do, they become faultless, and avoid doing badly. And for the same reason, being able to judge other people, they acquire good things from the needs of others, and they avoid bad things. But those who do not know themselves, but are deceived about their own power, are similarly disposed towards other people and other human affairs, and they know neither what they need, nor what they are doing, nor whom they are using, but erring in all these things, they fail to obtain good things and fall into bad things. And those who know what they are doing succeed in what they undertake, and they become famous and honored; and those who are like them are happy to associate with them; and those who fail in their endeavors desire these people to advise them and to be their leaders, and they place their hopes for good things in them, and for these reasons they love them most of all. But those who do not know what they are doing, choosing badly, and failing in whatever they undertake, not only suffer loss and punishment in these matters themselves, but also become inglorious for these reasons, and objects of ridicule, and live despised and dishonored; and do you also see among IOANNIS STOBAEI, Book 21. cities, that as many as, being ignorant of their own power, fight against those stronger, some are overthrown, and others become slaves from being free? And Euthydemus said, "It seems to me very much, Socrates, that it is of great importance to know oneself; know this: and as to where one should begin to examine oneself, I look to you, if you would be willing to explain it to me." "Then, Socrates said, "do you certainly know what good and bad things are?" "Yes, by Zeus," he said; "for if I did not know even these things, I would be baser than slaves." "Come then," he said, "and explain these things to me." "It is not difficult," he said; "for first, I consider health to be good; and illness to be bad. Then, the causes of each of these, both drinks and foods, and practices, those that lead to health are good; and those that lead to illness are bad." "Then," he said, "are not both health and illness, when they become causes of something good, good; and when they become causes of something bad, bad?" "When then," he said, "would health become a cause of evil, and illness of good?" "When, by Zeus," he said, "some, having participated in a shameful military campaign, or a harmful seafaring, or many other such things, are destroyed through strength, while others are saved by being left behind due to weakness." "You speak truly." "But do you see," he said, "that even among the simple, some participate through strength, while others are left behind through weakness?" "Then," he said, "are not things that sometimes benefit and sometimes harm, what are they more, good or bad?" "They do not appear to be either, by Zeus, according to this argument." "But wisdom, Socrates, is undoubtedly good; for what could a person not do better if he were wise than if he were ignorant? Why then," he said, "have you not heard of Daedalus, that, having been seized by Minos because of his wisdom, he was forced to serve him, and was deprived of both his homeland and his freedom, and attempted to escape with ABOUT KNOW THYSELF. K. his son, he lost his child, and he himself was unable to be saved, but being carried off to the barbarians, he again became a slave there?" "Yes, by Zeus, it is said," he replied, "these things." "And have you not heard of the sufferings of Palamedes? For he, envied by Odysseus for his wisdom, is praised by all as being destroyed. These things are also said," he replied. "And how many others do you think have been carried off to kings because of their wisdom, and become slaves there?" "It is likely," he said, "Socrates, that happiness is an undeniably good thing. Unless, he said, Euthydemus, one were to compose it from ambiguous goods." "What then," he said, "of the things that contribute to happiness would be ambiguous?" "Nothing," he said, "unless we add to it beauty, or strength, or wealth, or reputation, or anything else of that sort." "But by Zeus, we will add them," he said. "For how could anyone be happy without these?" "By Zeus," he said, "we will add them, for from these many difficult things happen to men; for many are corrupted through beauty by those who are inflamed by beautiful people; and many, attempting greater deeds through strength, fall into no small evils; and many, being softened by wealth and plotted against, perish; and many, through reputation and political power, have suffered great evils. But indeed," he said, "if I do not speak correctly in praising happiness, I also admit that one ought not to pray to the gods for knowledge. But these things," Socrates said, "perhaps because you strongly believed you knew, you have not even examined."

22. From Plato, from Philebus.

And on the other hand, it is a passion having the opposite of all wickedness, or what is said by the Delphic inscriptions. "Do you mean 'Know thyself,' Socrates?" "Yes, I do. But on the contrary, then IOANNIS STOBAEI, Book 21. that, clearly, to not know oneself at all, would be what the inscription means. "What then, Protarchus," he said, "do you try to divide this into three parts?" "How do you mean?" he asked, "for it is not possible." "You mean that I should now divide this," he said. "I say so and I beg you to do so, in addition to speaking." "Then does not each of those who are ignorant of themselves necessarily suffer this passion in three ways?" "How so?" "First, by believing themselves to be richer in terms of money than in their actual substance; for many certainly have such a passion; and still more are those who believe themselves to be greater and more beautiful, and in all bodily respects to be superior to their true reality. Most certainly. And by far the most, I think, are mistaken concerning the third kind of these things in their souls with respect to virtue, believing themselves to be better, though they are not. Most certainly. And as for virtues, is not all wisdom concerning the multitude, which is full of strife and false presumption of wisdom?" "How could it not be? Indeed, anyone who said such a thing would rightly say it is an evil, a passion. Most certainly."

23. From Plato, Alcibiades I.

"Come then, what does it mean to take care of oneself? Lest we often unknowingly take care not of ourselves, though we think we are; and when then does a person do this? Is it when he takes care of his own possessions that he also takes care of himself?" "It seems so to me." "What then? When does a person take care of his feet? Is it when he takes care of what belongs to his feet?" "I do not understand." "Do you call something 'of the hand,' for example, a ring, is it something else that you would say belongs to a human being, or a ring?" "No, indeed." "Then similarly, a shoe for the foot?" "Yes. And clothes and bedding IOANNIS STOBAEI, Book 21. or other parts of the body similarly?" "Yes." "Then when we take care of shoes, do we then take care of feet?" "I do not quite understand, Socrates." "What then, Alcibiades, do you call taking proper care of anything?" "I do." "Then when someone makes something better, do you call that proper care?" "Yes." "What art then makes shoes better?" "Shoemaking." "Then we take care of shoes by shoemaking?" "Yes." "Or does shoemaking for the foot, or that art, make feet better?" "That art." "And does it not make feet better, not just the other parts of the body as well?" "It seems so to me." "And is that not gymnastics?" "Most certainly." "Then we take care of the foot by gymnastics, and of what belongs to the foot by shoemaking?" "Quite so." "And of the hands by gymnastics, and of what belongs to the hand by ring-engraving?" "Yes." "And of the body by gymnastics, but of what belongs to the body by weaving and other arts?" "Absolutely." "Then we take care of each person himself by one art, and of his possessions by another?" "It seems so." "Then when you take care of your possessions, you do not take care of yourself?" "Not at all." "For it seems that it is not the same art by which one takes care of oneself and of one's possessions." "It does not seem so." "Come then, by what art might we take care of ourselves?" "I cannot say." "But so much at least has been agreed, that it is not by that art by which we make our possessions, or anything else, better, but by which we make ourselves better." "You speak truly." "Then did we ever know what art makes a shoe better, without knowing what a shoe is?" "Impossible." "Nor what art makes rings better, without knowing what a ring is?" "True." "What then? Would we ever know what art makes these things better, without knowing what we ourselves are?" "Impossible." "Then is it easy to know oneself, and was it some simple person who dedicated this inscription in the Pythian temple, or is it something difficult, and not for everyone? To me, Socrates, it has often seemed to be for everyone; often IOANNIS STOBAEI, Book 21. but very difficult." "But, Alcibiades, whether it is easy or not, this is how it stands for us: if we know it, we might quickly come to know the care of ourselves; but if we are ignorant of it, never." "That is true." "Come then, in what way might this be most clearly discovered? For in this way we might quickly find out what we ourselves are; but as long as we are still ignorant of this, it is impossible." "You speak correctly." "Then tell me, by Zeus, to whom are you now speaking, to someone else, or to me?" "To you." "Then am I not also speaking to you?" "Yes." "Then is Socrates the one speaking?" "Most certainly." "And Alcibiades the listener?" "Yes." "Then does Socrates speak with words?" "Certainly." "And you call speaking and using words the same thing, do you not?" "Most certainly." "And is the one using and that which he uses not something different?" "How do you mean?" "Just as a shoemaker cuts with a cutting-tool and a chisel and other tools?" "Yes." "Then is not the one cutting and using different from that which he uses to cut?" "How could it not be?" "Then similarly, is not the one playing the cithara different from the cithara he plays, and the cithara player himself would be something else?" "Yes." "Then this is what I was asking just now, whether the one using and that which he uses always appear to be different?" "They do." "What then? Shall we say that the shoemaker cuts with tools only, or also with his hands?" "With his hands too." "Then he also uses these?" "Yes." "Does he also cut leather using his eyes?" "Yes." "And the one using and that which he uses, we agree, are different." "Yes." "Then a shoemaker and a cithara player are different from the hands and eyes they use to work with." "It appears so." "Then does a person also use his whole body?" "Most certainly." "And was not the one using and that which he uses different?" "Yes." "Then a person is something different from his own body." "It seems so." "What then, is a human being?" "I cannot say." "But do you mean that the user of the body is something?" "Yes." "Then is it not something else that uses it, but the soul?" "Nothing else." "Then it rules?" "Yes." "And indeed, I think no one would believe otherwise. What then? Is it not that a human being is one of three things: IOANNIS STOBAEI, Book 21. soul, or body, or both, the whole of this? What then? But did we not agree that the ruler of the body is a human being? We did. [What then is a human being?] Then does the body rule itself? By no means. For we said that it is ruled? Yes. Then this would not be what is sought. It does not seem so. But then does the composite of the body and soul rule the body, and is this then the human being? Perhaps so. Least of all, for where one part does not cooperate, there is no way for the whole to rule. Correctly. But since neither the body nor the composite is a human being, it remains, I suppose, that either it is nothing itself, or if it is anything, it is nothing else but the soul. - Most certainly. Then it must be shown to you even more clearly that the soul is a human being? By Zeus, no, but it seems to me to be sufficient. But if not precisely, then at least moderately, it suffices for us; for we shall know precisely then, when we discover that which we just now passed over due to its requiring much consideration. What is this? What was just now said in this way, that the very self must first be examined; but now, instead of the self, we have examined each one as to what it is. And perhaps that will suffice; for we would not say that anything is more sovereign than ourselves, or rather, the soul. No, indeed. Is it not then right to believe that I and you commune with each other using words with the soul, to the soul? Most certainly. This then was what we said a little earlier, that Socrates communes with Alcibiades using words, not to your face, as it seems, but to Alcibiades; and this is the soul. It seems so to me. Then the one who commands us to know ourselves bids us to know the soul. It seems so. Therefore, whoever knows anything of the body, knows what belongs to it, but has not known himself. Thus then. Therefore, no one of IOANNIS STOBAEI, Book 21. physicians knows himself as a physician; nor trainers, as trainers. It does not seem so. Then it is very far from the truth that farmers and other craftsmen know themselves; for they do not know what belongs to themselves, it seems, but something even further removed from themselves, according to the arts they possess; for they know what belongs to the body, for which it is treated. "You speak truly." "If then temperance is to know oneself, then no one of these is temperate in his art." "It does not seem so to me." "For these reasons, these arts are thought to be vulgar, and not lessons for a good man." "Most certainly." "Then again, whoever takes care of the body, takes care not of himself, but of what belongs to him?" "It is likely." "And whoever takes care of money, takes care neither of himself nor of what belongs to him, but something even further removed from him?" "It seems so to me." "Then the money-maker does not even engage in his own affairs?" "Correctly." "But if someone has become a lover of Alcibiades' body, did he not then love Alcibiades himself, but something of Alcibiades?" "You speak truly." "Whoever then loves your soul?" "It necessarily appears so from the argument." "Then he who loves your body, when it ceases to blossom, departs and is gone?" "It appears so." "But he who loves your soul does not depart, as long as it is on the way to being better?" "That is reasonable." "Then am I not the one who does not depart, but remains, when the body fades, and others have left?"

24. From the same.

"You seem to me to speak well, Socrates, but try to explain in what way we might take care of ourselves. Has it not then been established for us so far, that what we are, has been reasonably agreed upon? And we feared lest, failing in this, we should unknowingly take care of something else, and not of ourselves."

ABOUT KNOW THYSELF. K.

"That is true. And after this, then, that one must take care of the soul, and look to this. Clearly. But the care of bodies and possessions must be entrusted to others. What then? In what way then might we know these things most clearly? Since having known this, it seems, we shall know ourselves. Are we then not understanding what the Delphic inscription, which we just now mentioned, means, when it speaks well, by the gods? What do you mean? What are you thinking of, Socrates? I will tell you what I suspect this inscription means and advises us: for it is likely that it does not serve as an example in many ways, but only with respect to sight. How do you mean this? Consider also, if, advising our eye as a human being, it said, 'See yourself,' how would we suppose it was advising something? Would it not be to look to this: that into which an eye, by looking, would see itself? Clearly. Then let us consider into what we, by looking at things, would see that and ourselves at the same time. Clearly, Socrates, into mirrors and such things. You speak correctly. Then are not such things present in the eye too, that we see? Most certainly. Do you then realize that the face of the one looking into an eye appears in the opposite eye, as in a mirror? This we also call the pupil, being an image of the one looking in. You speak truly. Then an eye, by looking at another eye, and looking into this, which is its best part, and sees, in this way would see itself. It appears so. But if it were to look at something else belonging to a human, or anything else that exists, except that to which it happens to be similar, it would not see itself. You speak truly. Then an eye, if it is to see itself, must look into IOANNIS STOBAEI, Book 21. itself, and for the eye to look into that place in which the excellence of the eye is found; and this is sight. Thus. Then, Alcibiades, if the soul is to know itself, must it not look into itself, and especially into that part of it in which the excellence of the soul is found, namely wisdom, and into something else to which this is similar? "It seems so to me, Socrates." "Then can we say what is more divine than the soul, or that concerning which knowledge and understanding exist?" "We cannot." "Then this part of the soul is like the divine; and whoever looks into this and understands all that is divine, namely God and wisdom, would in that way most especially know himself." "It appears so." "And do we agree that to know oneself is temperance?" "Most certainly." "Then, just as mirrors are clearer than the reflection in the eye, and purer and brighter, so also God is purer and brighter than the best part of our soul?" "It seems so, Socrates." "Then by looking at God, we would use that most beautiful mirror, and among human things, into the virtue of the soul; and in this way we would most especially see ourselves, and come to know ourselves." "Yes." "And do we agree that to know oneself is temperance?" "Most certainly." "Then, if we do not know ourselves, and are not temperate, would we be able to know our own good and bad things? And how could that happen, Socrates?" "It is impossible for you, perhaps..."

**ON KNOW THYSELF**

...it seems Alcibiades does not know what belongs to Alcibiades, namely, that it is Alcibiades'. That, by Zeus, is impossible. Then, are not our own things truly ours, unless through ourselves? How so? And if not even our own things, then not those of our possessions? It does not seem so. Therefore, we do not quite rightly agree, agreeing just now that there are some who do not know themselves, but do know their possessions; and others who know their own possessions. For all these things seem to be perceived by one and the same art: oneself, one's own things, one's possessions. It is perilous. Whoever is ignorant of his own affairs is also ignorant of others' affairs in the same way. What then? Will he not also be ignorant of others' affairs, and those of cities? Necessarily. Such a man, then, could not be a statesman. No, certainly not. Nor an economist. No, certainly not. Nor will he know what he is doing. No, certainly not. And will he who does not know what he is doing not err? Yes, certainly. And will he who errs not fare badly, both privately and publicly? How could he not? And he who fares badly, is he not wretched? Yes, very much so. And what about those for whom he acts? They too. Therefore, it is not possible for anyone to be happy, unless he is temperate and good. It is not possible. Therefore, the wicked among men are wretched. Yes, very much so. Therefore, he who becomes rich is not freed from wretchedness, but he who becomes temperate. So it seems.

* From Plato's Charmides.

And I would not be ashamed to say that he who does not correctly claim at some point, or agree to this, that a person who is ignorant of himself is temperate. For I myself almost say that temperance is precisely this, to know oneself, and I agree with him who dedicated this inscription in Delphi. For it seems to me that this inscription is set up in such a way as if it were a salutation

...being of the god for those entering, instead of "hail"; as if this salutation were not correct, and one should not exhort each other to "hail," but to be temperate. Thus, the god addresses those entering the temple in a way that differs somewhat from men, as he who dedicated it, as it seems to me, intended, and says to whoever enters, nothing other than "be temperate." But he speaks more enigmatically, like a prophet. For "Know thyself" and "Be temperate" are the same, as the inscriptions say, and I too, perhaps one might think it is something else; this is what I think happened to those who dedicated the later inscriptions, "Nothing in excess" and "A pledge, then mischief." For they too thought that "Know thyself" was an unusual advice, but not a salutation by the god for those entering; and then, that they themselves might dedicate nothing less useful as advice, they wrote and dedicated these.

* From Porphyry.

What then was it, and whose was the sacred command at Pytho, that "to know oneself" addresses those who are about to supplicate the god? For it seems to enjoin neither honoring the god as is proper, nor even obtaining what is asked from the god, while one is enveloped in ignorance of oneself. But whether it was Phemonoë who decreed this, which is beneficial for all human beings, through whom Pythios is said to first distribute graces to mankind; or whether it was an offering of Phanothea of Delphi, or of Bias, or of Thales, or of Chilon, moved by some divine inspiration; or whether it was Cle-

...magistrate, one should pay more attention to it being a precept of Pythios, and that Chilon should be used, namely, that it is best for men to learn when asking; or whether it was inscribed in the newly founded temple, after the rocky and bronze ones, as Aristotle said in his writings on philosophy. Whatever its origin, Iamblichus, let it be disputed; but that it was uttered by a god or not without a god, seems evident from the fact that it is set up in Pytho, indisputably. What it means, then, and that it enjoins to be prepared for the god before the lustrations, it would be necessary to know.

* From Porphyry's On "Know Thyself".

But perhaps "be temperate" implies hearing someone say instead "preserve your prudence"; for temperance was indeed preservation of prudence. And thus one would speak towards thinking and the cause of thinking, commanding oneself to preserve oneself; and this would be the mind. But if this is so, then we must again know our essence, what it is. And others indeed, saying that man has been well-arranged as a small universe, say that the inscription commands to know man; and since man is a small universe, it commands nothing else but to philosophize. If, then, we strive to philosophize unerringly, let us be eager to know ourselves, and we shall achieve correct philosophy, ascending from our own understanding to the contemplation of the whole. But that we reason from what is in us and about the whole, and by examining and finding ourselves we transition more easily to the contemplation of the whole, is rightly said; but perhaps the god does not command the contemplation of oneself for the sake of philosophy, but for some other purpose.

...for the sake of something greater, for which philosophy was also adopted. For philosophy was cultivated out of affection, our love for wisdom and for theoretical wisdom; and the zeal for the command "know thyself" aims at the acquisition of true happiness, which consisted in a disposition according to wisdom, and in the acquisition of the contemplation of the good, which belongs to wisdom, and the knowledge of what truly exists. To contemplate and learn what truly exists, then, it commands us, not that we may philosophize, but that we may become wise and happy. For the acquisition of our true being, and the true knowledge of it, was the acquisition of wisdom; if, that is, wisdom is properly the true knowledge of the being of things, and through wisdom is acquired perfect happiness.

28. * From the same author, from the fourth book.

Since there was a descent for us to these earthly things and to the outer man, and since we were deceived into thinking that what is seen is what we are, an appropriate exhortation is given for the knowledge of one's own power. For Plato, in the Philebus, mentioning "know thyself," divides ignorance into three parts. Therefore, ignorance of oneself is everywhere evil, whether one, having ignored the greatness of one's worth inwardly, abases the divine, or having ignored what is naturally humble outwardly, exalts himself. Or is it not true that every mortal, on the contrary,

...as when a child by the sea makes playthings out of sand,

and when he has made them, then with hands and feet he throws them down again.

(414) Therefore, whoever exalts himself through ignorance of himself is caught by nature, which created him, more than she

...wills, beholding her own works as childish playthings; but she seems to preserve what is fitting in all things, being not deceived along with those who exalt themselves. Therefore, "know thyself" extends to every conception of one's existing power, commanding one to know the measure in all things. To know oneself, then, seems to refer to the necessity of knowing the soul and the mind, as we subsist in these; and to know oneself completely seems to include ourselves and our own possessions and those of our relations. Such, then, is the precision of Plato's thought in these matters, as he has chosen to speak, apart from other things, of knowing oneself without also knowing all that pertains to us; and again, to know oneself completely, so that the immortal within may be known as human, and the outward, image-like man may not be ignored, and the things that differ from these may become known. For the perfect mind within differs, in which man himself exists, of whom each of us is an image; and it differs in relation to the outer image, namely, the body and its possessions. Of these things, one must also know their powers, and care for them up to a certain point, so that we do not attribute the worth of the immortal to what is perishable and earthly, making it ridiculous; and again, in the comedy-tragedy of foolish lives, so that we are not involved, nor do we attribute the humility of the mortal to the immortal, thus becoming pitiable and altogether unjust in our ignorance of what is fitting.

**ON ARROGANCE**

1. * From Euripides, Glaucus.

Heavy is the burden of an evil man's arrogance.

2. Whoever is by nature prone to have more than his fellow citizens, is unsociable towards friends, and towards every city.

3. * From Sosiphanes.

Oh, wretched mortals in many ways, but blessed in few, why do you pride yourselves on your powers, which one moment gave light, and the next took it away? And if you prosper, being nothing, straightaway you think yourselves equal to heaven, and you do not see the master, Hades, standing near.

4. * From Philemon.

"Know thyself"—be well assured that this saying has renown in Delphi, not in vain.

5. * From Euripides.

Whenever you see someone exalted to a height, and proud of wealth and lineage, having lifted his brow higher than fortune, expect swift retribution for him.

6. * From the same author.

They who swell with pride about themselves—they themselves do not know human nature.

7. * From an unknown author (from the same passage as the preceding).

Does anyone ever consider as great a man whom any chance occasion may utterly wipe out?

8. * From an unknown author (possibly from the same).

For greater diseases bring forth greater suffering to mortals. And it is not fitting for mortals to adorn the gods.

9. * From Menander, The Tithe-Woman.

Those who raise their eyebrows like idiots, and say, "I'll consider it"—for when will a man consider, concerning some matter, whether he is unfortunate when he falls? For things automatically flow toward what is expedient, even if you are asleep, or else the opposite happens.

10. * From Chaeremon.

In general, the better part does not allow one to be greatly proud.

11. * From Menander, The Steersmen.

O thrice wretched,

all who swell with pride about themselves!

For they themselves do not know human nature.

12. * From the same author.

Whoever is without understanding

is caught by boastfulness and faults.

13. * From Euripides, Alcmaeon.

See the tyrant, how as a childless old man he flees. Mortals should not think great thoughts.

14. * From Euripides, Aeolus.

It is better for a wise man to be silent than to engage in conversation. I would not be friends with such a man, nor associate with him, who believes he is self-sufficiently wise, considering his friends as slaves.

15. * From Euripides, Andromache.

For those who are inflated with pride bear with bitterness the better arguments from those inferior to them.

16. * From Demonax.

Being mortal, do not think thoughts above the gods.

17. * From Euripides.

Wisdom, but not true wisdom,

is to not think mortal thoughts.

Life is short; and on this short life,

if anyone pursues great things,

he cannot bear what is present.

These are the ways of the mad,

and of the ill-counseled, in my opinion.

18. * From Euripides, Heraclidae.

Zeus is the punisher of the excessively arrogant.

19. * From Menander.

Money, my lad, seems to you capable of providing not just the necessities of life daily—bread, flour, vinegar, oil—but something greater. But there is no immortality, even if you accumulate those famed talents of Tantalus; but when you die, you will leave these to others. So what am I saying? Do not trust this, even if you are very wealthy, and do not look down on us, the poor; but make yourself worthy of eternal prosperity in the eyes of observers.

20. * From Sophocles, Ajax.

For I see that we, all who live, are nothing but phantoms, or a light shadow. Therefore, seeing such things, let no one speak a word of excessive pride to the gods, nor take on any arrogance, if you are stronger in hand, or have great depth of wealth.

21. * From the same author.

For excessive and useless bodies

fall with heavy misfortune from the gods.

22. The prophet said that whoever, being born of human nature, then thinks thoughts not befitting a human, acts thus.

23. * From Sophocles, Tereus.

Mortals should think mortal thoughts, knowing this: that there is no one, except Zeus, who is a dispenser of what is to happen in the future.

24. * From Sophocles, Colchians.

It is good for mortals to think thoughts befitting humans.

25. * From Euripides, Alcmaeon.

For it is fitting for those who have fared badly to speak humbly, but not to gaze upwards at fortune with arrogance.

26. * From Hippothoon.

Being a human, remember your common fate.

27. * From Sotades.

Even if you are born a king, listen as a mortal.

If you spit far, it is excessive phlegm that dominates.

If you adorn yourself finely, these things were before you as a sheep.

If you wear gold, this is a boast of fortune.

If you are rich, this is an unseen strength of time.

If you are boastful, this is an outburst of folly.

But if you are temperate, this is a gift from the gods.

Temperance is present, if you measure yourself.

28. * From Isidoros.

Being mortal, try to look at what lies behind.

29. * From Menander, The Man Set on Fire.

That in which you are most proud, this will destroy you, that you think you are someone, and indeed countless others.

30. * From Menander, The Promiser.

Your humility, if you are dignified, will appear beautiful to outsiders, dear friend; but if you make yourself humble, and you also count it as nothing, this seems ridiculous.

31. * From the same author, The Basket-Bearer.

For he who acts enthusiastically does not succeed.

32. * From Euripides.

Happiness is accustomed to creating arrogance.

33. * From Euripides, Telephus.

But yield to necessity, and do not fight with the gods.

Dare to look at me, and calm your pride.

For often the god has humbled the greatest things, and restrained them again.

**FROM AELIAN'S HISTORIES.**

40. * From Diogenes.

Of ostentation, as with gilded weapons, what is inside is not like what is outside.

41. * From the same author.

Arrogance, like a shepherd, leads the many wherever it wants.

42. * From Democritus.

For he who prolongs himself in superiority ends in evil disrepute.

43. * From Democrates.

Democrates, ascending the acropolis in his old age, and panting, said he was doing what the entire city of Athens does; for it breathes greatly, but has little strength.

44. * From Xenophon.

For the boastful man seems to me to be one who pretends to be richer than he is, and more courageous, and who promises to do things he is incapable of, and these things become evident, that they do them for the sake of obtaining some gain and profiting; but those who contrive laughter for their companions, neither for their own gain, nor for the loss of their hearers, nor for any harm, how would these not more justly be called witty and pleasant, than boastful?

45. * From Xenophon, in his Education of Cyrus.

It seems to me, Cyrus, to be more difficult to find a man who can handle good things well, than one who can handle bad things. For the former brings insolence to many, while the latter instills temperance in all.

46. * From Herodotus.

You see how the god strikes down with lightning the tallest animals, and does not allow them to be boastful; but the small ones, he does not vex at all; and you see how into

...the greatest buildings and such trees he always casts his bolts; for god loves to humble all that is exalted. And thus a numerous army is destroyed by a small one in such a way, when the god, being envious, casts fear into them, or thunder, by which they are destroyed, as they deserved. For god does not allow anyone to think great thoughts, except himself.

**ON SELF-LOVE**

1. * From Critias.

It is dreadful when one, being unwise, thinks he is wise.

2. * From Sosicrates.

We are good at seeing evil in others; but when we ourselves do it, we do not recognize it.

3. * From Menander.

No one sees his own evils, Pamphilus, clearly; but he will see another's unseemly behavior.

4. * From the same author, Aspis.

For he who wishes to see and expect only what he desires,

is an illogical judge of truth.

5. * From Euripides.

We are all wise at advising;

but when we ourselves err, we do not know it.

6. * From Aesop.

Aesop said that each of us carries two bags, one in front and one behind; and into the one in front, we put the faults of others; and into the one behind, our own, which is why we do not see them.

7. * From Aristonymus' Tomaria.

Thus, some people think they are philosophizing, just as drunkards think they are sober.

8. * From Socrates.

Socrates used to say that if someone in the theater were to announce for shoemakers to stand up, only they would stand up; likewise for coppersmiths, weavers, or others by craft; but if for the wise or the just, all would stand up. And it is most harmful in life for the many, being foolish, to think they are wise.

9. * From Demosthenes.

Therefore, the easiest thing of all is to deceive oneself; for each one wishes what he desires, and believes it; but things are often not so by nature.

10. * From Diogenes.

Diogenes said that some men, speaking what is necessary, do not listen to themselves, just as they do not hear lyres producing beautiful sounds.

11. * From Herodotus.

For if someone were to command all men to choose the most beautiful laws from all laws, and to consider them

...to do away with each of their own; thus, each nation believes its own laws to be by far the most beautiful.

12. * From an unknown author (perhaps Herodotus).

Self-love is a clumsy possession. Do not cure evil with evil. Many prefer what is more equitable than what is just. Many, seeking their mothers' property, have already lost their fathers'.

13. * From Plato.

Plato advised that whenever we are inclined to mock others, we should turn back to ourselves and consider whether we ourselves are not subject to the same faults. For self-love conceals much and surrounds the one who is more ridiculed.

14. * From Apollonius Satyrus.

Many men are advocates for their own faults, but accusers of others'.

15. * From Eusebius.

Many who think they love themselves, do not truly love themselves; for in all things they yield to themselves for this very reason, and by gratifying themselves contrary to truth, they fall into the most contrary situations.

16. * From Eusebius.

Many wishing to seem most prudent, being deterred by their closest friends who are indeed prudent, do not deign to retract from opinions once formed; but in order that they may not be exposed as abandoning a mistaken view, they persist in their opinion, by which they fall into the evils resulting from it.

17. * From Plato, Cratylus.

* For it is most difficult of all for one to be deceived by oneself. For when one's deceiver does not stand even a little apart, but is always present, how is that not terrible?

18. * From the same author, Laws.

Of all evils, the greatest inherent in most men's souls is this: that each one, having complete forgiveness for himself, can contrive no escape. This is what they mean when they say that every man is by nature his own friend, and it is right that he should be so. But in truth, self-love is the cause of all sins for each person, always. For the lover of what is loved is blind; therefore, he judges badly what is just, and good, and beautiful, considering it always right to honor his own things before the truth. For he should not love himself, nor his own things, if he is to be a great man; but he should love what is just, whether it is done by himself or by another. From this same fault, and from believing that his own ignorance is wisdom, which happens to all, they, not knowing, so to speak, anything, think they know everything, and not allowing others to do what they do not understand, we are forced to do things ourselves that we err in. Therefore, everyone should flee excessive self-love, and should pursue what is better for himself, feeling no shame at such a pursuit.

**ON CONSCIENCE**

1. * From Diphilus.

For whoever is not ashamed of himself,

...when he has committed base deeds with himself as witness, how will he not be ashamed when he knows nothing?

2. * From Pythagoras.

But most of all, be ashamed of yourself.

3. * From Menander.

He who is conscious of something, even if he is most bold, his conscience makes him most timid.

4. * From Sophocles.

But when a thief is clearly caught,

he must be silent, even if he has fine words to speak.

5. * From Euripides, Orestes.

O wretched Orestes, what malady destroys you?

Conscience, because you know you have done terrible things.

6. * From Sophocles.

It was terrible then, when someone, being noble,

was conscious of it within himself.

7. * From Antiphanes.

For not being conscious of any wrongdoing in one's life

brings much pleasure.

8. * From Pythagoras.

He who commits injustice suffers greater evils through his conscience, being tormented, than he who is scourged with bodily pains and blows.

9. * From Isocrates to Demonicus.

Never hope to hide anything shameful you do; for even if you escape the notice of others, you will be conscious of it yourself.

10. * From Isocrates, Nicocles or Cyprians.

Conceal nothing, neither what you possess, nor what you do, nor what you intend to do, knowing that many fears necessarily arise concerning hidden matters.

11. * From Bias.

Bias, when asked what would make life fearless, replied, "A clear conscience."

12. * From Periander.

Periander, when asked what freedom is, replied, "A good conscience."

13. * From Socrates.

Socrates, when asked who lives without disturbance, replied, "Those who are conscious of nothing amiss in themselves."

14. * From Diogenes.

For who would fear anything less, or be more confident, than he who is conscious of no evil in himself?

15. * From Plutarch, from "On Tranquillity of Mind."

For conscience, like a festering wound in the flesh, is always bleeding and stinging the soul's remorse. For reason dispels other sorrows; but remorse itself, gnawing with shame and punishing itself. For just as those who are cold and afflicted with fevers are more tormented by external heat or cold than those who suffer the same, and fare worse,

...so too, accidental misfortunes bring lighter sorrows, as if they were inflicted from outside. But when,

if someone else is to blame for me, but I myself am,

and it is mourned, coming from within due to our failings, it makes what is shameful more painful.

16. * From Isocrates, Nicocles or Cyprians.

Do not envy those who possess the most, but those who are conscious of no evil in themselves. For with such a fortune, one could most pleasantly live one's life.

**ON MEMORY**

1. * From Porphyry, On the Powers of the Soul.

For just as we understood the other powers from their activities, so by contemplating memory as a process occurring through association, and what is apprehended by sensation or by reason, we established this as a power of the soul, or it is called memory by association, which Aristotle defines as the retention of a phantasm, as an image, of which phantasms are an image; for example, when a sensation occurs, and having ascended to the imaginative faculty, the affection that occurs in the imaginative faculty, whatever it may be, is called a phantasm. Furthermore, when the sensory faculty has been removed from sensation, what is perceived in the image of the sensible object, from which the phantasm is composed, having a logos in relation to the phantasm; for example, an image was formed in the imaginative faculty of what was perceived by sensation. When

On Memory. Chapter 25.

1. If, therefore, there is a retention concerning the phantasm's image, it is called memory. This, then, is common to irrational animals; but articulated memory, through which we also recollect, belongs only to rational beings; for articulated memory is peculiar to reasoning. Therefore, those around Aristotle say that irrational animals remember, but do not recollect; only man both remembers and recollects.

2. From Plato's Cratylus.

Memory, everywhere, indicates that it is a permanence in the soul, not a movement.

3. From Aristotle's On Memory.

The retention of phantasms is called memory; and the recollection of these, remembrance. Not that the same individuals are both mnemonic and recollective, but for the most part, the slow are more mnemonic, while the quick and eager to learn are more recollective. Memory differs from phantasy in that the latter's movement is that of sensation in action, or of thought; for we say both are phantasms alike; but the former is like a painting of the soul; for the movement that occurs from sensation is impressed in some way upon it, similar to things impressed by rings. Therefore, to those who are in much movement due to passion or age, memory does not occur, just as when movement and impression fall into flowing water; but to those who are chilled, like ancient buildings; and due to the hardness of what receives the impression, the forms are not produced. Therefore, both the young and the old are forgetful; for in the former, it flows away due to growth, and in the latter, due to decay. Similarly, neither those who are very quick nor those who are slow appear to remember; for the former are too fluid, and the latter too hard, so that in the former the image does not remain in the soul at all, and in the latter it makes no impression at all.

4. From Plato's letter to Dionysius.

The greatest safeguard is not to write, but to learn by heart; for what is written cannot but escape. For these reasons I have never written anything about these matters, nor is there any writing of Plato, nor will there be; but what is now said belongs to Socrates, a beautiful and young man.

5. From Plato's Philebus.

If one were to call this joint movement of the soul and body, occurring in a single affection, sensation, one would not speak amiss. Most truly, indeed! Do we not now understand what we wish to call sensation? What else? Therefore, if someone were to call the preservation of sensation memory, he would speak rightly, according to my judgment. Rightly, indeed! But have we not recognized that recollection differs from memory? Perhaps. Is it not this? What? That when the soul herself recovers, without the body, as much as possible the affections she experienced with the body, then we say she recollects. Indeed? Very much so. And again, when having lost memory, whether of sensation or of learning, she again recalls all these things to herself, we call it recollection and remembrance. You speak rightly.

6. From Iamblichus' On the Soul.

These being the most common faculties, there are also others of the soul, which are not merely supplementary to it, as memory is the retention of a phantasm.

On Oblivion. Chapter 26.

1. From Sophocles' Synedeipna.

Oblivion, hated by the Muses, and unwarlike, you have caused pains worse than death, most fortunate, holding a short strait of life from songs.

2. From Euripides' Orestes.

O Lady Oblivion of evils, how wise you are, and a longed-for deity for the unfortunate.

3. From Sophocles' Tyrannical Satyr.

And oblivion, deprived of all things, deaf, voiceless.

4. From the same author's Mysians.

How sweet it is for those who fare ill, and for a short time, to forget the evils that are present.

5. From Plato's Philebus.

For oblivion is the departure of memory.

6. From Plato's Symposium.

For what is called practice, is when knowledge departs; for oblivion is the departure of knowledge.

On Oath. Chapter 27.

1. From Choerilus' Perseids.

An oath ought to be neither unjust nor just.

2. From Aeschylus.

Not oaths in a man are trust, but a man of oaths.

3. From Alexis' Those Who Are Initiated.

An oath is reliable, if I but nod.

4. From Amphidos.

For whoever trusts nothing to one who swears, that person easily knows how to perjure themselves.

5. From Antiphanes.

Lady, when someone despises one who swears, though they have not known them to have perjured themselves before, that person, I think, despises the gods and has themselves perjured before.

6. From Sophocles' Hippodamia.

But the soul becomes more attentive when an oath is added. For it guards against two things: the blame of friends and sinning against the gods.

7. From Apollodorus.

When there is a whip, do you give an oath to a slave?

8. From Antiphanes.

He who gives an oath to the wicked, is mad.

On the contrary, the gods now do this: if someone perjures themselves, then immediately, the one who gives the oath becomes thunderstruck, as I think is just, because they trusted someone.

9. From Alexis' Olynthians.

For one should not trust those who swear, but rather the deeds themselves, always.

10. From Lycurgus.

One must help friends and relatives, provided one does not perjure oneself.

11. From Isocrates' To Demonicus.

Accept an imposed oath for two reasons: either to clear yourself of shameful charges, or to save friends from great dangers. But for the sake of money, do not swear by any god, even if you intend to keep your oath; for you will be seen by some as perjuring yourself, and by others as avaricious.

12. From Epictetus' Encheiridion.

Refuse an oath, if possible, altogether; if not, as far as you can.

13. From Eusebius.

Most people counsel others to be truthful; but I declare it to be sacred not to swear easily in the first place.

14. From Herodotus.

For if someone should perjure themselves, the gods now do the opposite.

18. From Herodotus' Histories, Book 1.

He said to them, Leutychides, these things: "O Athenians, do as you yourselves wish; for by both returning and not returning, you do what is righteous or the opposite. But what kind of event occurred in Sparta concerning a deposit, I wish to tell you. We, the Spartans, say that in Lacedaemon, in the third generation from me, a man named Glaucus was born, son of Epikydes. We say that this man excelled in all other things, and indeed, he was the best at hearing about justice among all who lived in Lacedaemon at that time. It happened, we say, at an opportune time, that a Milesian man arrived in Sparta, wishing to meet with Glaucus, making such a proposal: 'I am a Milesian; I have come, Glaucus, desiring to partake of your justice. I decided, therefore, to convert half of my property into silver and entrust it to you.' After some time had passed, the children of the man who had entrusted the money came to Sparta; and having met with Glaucus, they demanded the money; but he denied it. Then the Milesians, making a lament, departed. Glaucus, meanwhile, went to Delphi, to consult the oracle; and when he asked if he might gain the money by an oath, the Pythian priestess addressed him with these verses: 'Glaucus, son of Epikydes, for the moment it is more profitable to gain by oath, and to seize the money. Swear, since death awaits even a truthful man. But an oath has a nameless child, and no hands, no feet, but pursues swiftly, until it utterly destroys the whole family and household. The family of a truthful man is better in the long run.'

Having heard these things, Glaucus entreated the god to allow him to keep what was said; and the Pythian priestess said that what was attempted by the god, and to act, have equal power. Then Glaucus, having sent for the Milesian foreigners, returned their money to them. And the reason for this account, O Athenians, which I set out to tell you, will be stated. There is no longer any descendant of Glaucus; nothing, no hearth, is considered to belong to Glaucus; and he has been utterly eradicated from Sparta. Thus, it is good not even to think of a deposit except to return it when demanded.

On Perjury. Chapter 28.

1. From Sophocles.

For with oaths, a woman escapes the bitter pangs of childbirth, but when her trouble ceases, she is caught in the same nets, overcome by present desire.

2. Aphrodisius (for) an oath is not redeemable.

3. From Callimachus.

He swore, but they say truly, that oaths in love do not reach the ears of the immortals.

4. From Diphilus.

An oath is the same for a companion and an orator. Each of them swears to the one with whom they speak.

5. From Sophocles.

For no oath is burdensome to a man who is a deceiver.

6. From Euripides.

My tongue has sworn, but my mind is unsworn.

7. From Menander.

Our present life has confused faith.

8. From Hesiod's Theogony.

And Oath, who causes the most trouble to mortals on earth, whenever someone willingly swears a false oath.

9. From Democritus.

Oaths which bad men take under compulsion, they do not keep once they have escaped.

10. From Euripides.

For the divine is not unintelligent, but it understands oaths wrongly taken and those sworn under compulsion.

11. From Euphron's Assembly of the Gods.

You bring new gods before me, for the sake of the gods, so that you do not often perjure yourself with the old ones.

12. From Euripides.

Do you think the gods are forgiving if one wishes to escape death by oaths, or imprisonment, or violent evils from enemies?

13. From Eusebius.

I say that anyone who has decided to perjure himself, and has proceeded to the oath, even if by some chance the act of perjury is not completed, or even if he did not intend to demand it back, nevertheless he is considered by me to have the intention of a perjurer, and to be liable for the punishment due for the sin of perjury, the same as those who have actually perjured themselves.

14. From Cleanthes.

Cleanthes said that one who swears either swears truly or perjures himself, depending on the time of swearing. For if one swears intending to fulfill, that is to swear truly; but if one has the intention not to fulfill, that is to perjure oneself.

15. From Chrysippus.

Chrysippus said that to speak truthfully differs from to swear truly; and to perjure oneself from to lie under oath. For the one who swears at whatever moment he swears, either speaks truly or lies; for what is sworn by him is either true or false, since it is a proposition; but the one who swears at whatever moment he swears, either swears truly or perjures himself, when the time for which the oaths were referred is not present. For in the same way, someone is said to arrange well or not to arrange well, not when he arranges, but when the times for the agreements arise; thus one will be said to swear truly or to perjure themselves, when the times when they made their agreements arise, according to the oaths.

16. From Xenophon's Anabasis, Book 2.

First and greatest, the oaths of the gods prevent us from being enemies to each other; and whoever is conscious of having neglected these, I would never wish them to prosper. For I do not know how anyone could escape the war of the gods, or into what darkness they could flee, or how they could escape to a safe place. For in all respects, all things are subject to the gods, and in all respects, the gods rule equally over all.

17. From Herodotus' Histories, Book 1.

For without strong necessity, strong trusts are not willing to remain.

18. From the same author.

Men, by applying artful craft to gold, have learned what is pure; but it is not possible to observe a man by rightly weighing his judgment. Such a fate from the gods brought us together long ago. It is necessary to place trust in friendship with hearts not double-faced, and not considering an oath-breaking as more beloved than an oath. For such a man postpones the retribution from the gods, and delights in a wretched delusion concerning the present. For who does not know that justice awaits the wicked? And if retribution does not immediately follow, it happened, but in time, let it be considered an advantage to the separated suns, which the god kept unmined among the Persians, in living beings. And how the divine does not have a sluggish oversight of men is clear from deeds of truth. For it is said that Archetimus from Erythrae, a city of the Ionians, when staying in Tenedos, offered hospitality to Kydias, who had with him a considerable quantity of gold. And Kydias entrusted this to him in such a way, believing that he would suffer no violence from a man, as he was convinced that they were now firmly united in friendship. There, avarice cast an evil counsel into Kydias' heart. For when the deposited gold was demanded back, he made a harsh denial, and as the matters fell into doubt, it was finally decided to confirm it by oath. And Kydias, wishing to confirm the trust on the third day, by committing it to the gods, went home and devised such a scheme: he hollowed out a staff, and placed all the gold inside; and for a hand-grip, he bound a bandage all around it, so that he might conceal his prepared pretense; and when the appointed day arrived, making a slow approach, he bore the staff as if it were a sick person; and standing before the shrine which he intended to make a witness, he handed the staff to Archetimus, containing all the injustice inside, until he should finish the appointed oath; and stretching out his hands, he said that he had received a deposit from Archetimus, but that he would return it. This was a lie cleverly contrived. Archetimus, oppressed by what had been said, smashed the staff with a heavy blow; and from it, when it was broken, came out the mass of the deposit. Archetimus, then, by such foresight from the gods, fared well, but Kydias is said to have suffered a wretched reversal of fortune. Secondly, one must not make light of trust when giving oaths to men, for a varying fortune is carried by the wind and runs a great risk.